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Palestinian `identities' in Athens: negotiating hybridity, politicisation and 
citizenship in diasporic spaces 
Elizabeth Mavroudi 
Abstract 
Cross-border connections may be making the identities of those in diaspora more 
fluid, hybrid and `in-between' as they actively strive to maintain symbolic and 
material links to their territorial homeland. However, the political project of 
those with a cause to advocate and who represent themselves as a `united' entity 
with a defined `identity' may mask underlying tensions and ambivalence about 
notions of home and belonging, which may in turn, influence political actions 
such as advocacy. Using in-depth qualitative research on the Palestinian diaspora 
in Athens carried out over a period of nine months in 2003-4, this thesis explores 
how Palestinians dynamically negotiate identities that are politicised but 
inseparable from cultural and social facets of their lives. It reveals that the Greek 
support they receive, their cross-border connections, statelessness and 
perceptions of suffering and injustice because of exile and displacement have 
triggered the need to advocate self-determination and political as well as cultural 
`unity'. At the same time, because they are a diverse group of people who often 
have complex citizenship status and difficulties travelling, their propensity to be 
politically active is shaped by the fact that their lives are grounded in Athens 
subject to both uneven power relations and a lack of access to formal political 
spaces. The thesis demonstrates that although Palestinian involvement in 
informal (but contested) diasporic spaces encourages processes of `helping' and 
advocacy, contradictory feelings of hope and despair, resistance and apathy are 
commonplace, as they feel attached to and isolated from the homeland, 
politically and culturally. It also illustrates that there is a decoupling but also 
coupling of citizenship and `national identity', depicting the changing 
relationships between territory and `identity' that need to be examined so that 
citizenship can be made more relevant to those with ambiguous or difficult 
relations to the state. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
In this introductory chapter, the main aims of the research are 
described. This is followed by the provision of contextual information, 
which begins with a brief historical overview of migration to Greece 
and an account of research on this, followed by a summary of 
citizenship and immigration policies in Greece. Research on 
Palestinians in Europe as well as the role and significance of the PLO 
is analysed, after which background information on Palestinians in 
Greece is focused on. The chapter ends with an outline of the thesis. 
The Palestinian diaspora was created in 1948, with the advent of the state of 
Israel, a date Palestinians remember as the 'Nakba'. As a diverse group of 
people, Palestinians in diaspora often appear to be in a complex position, 
psychologically, politically and legally. Such a position is exemplified by 
Barghouti (2004: 10-11), as he crosses the bridge from Jordan into the West 
Bank for the first time in thirty years: 
Here on these prohibited wooden planks, I walk and chatter my 
whole life to myself... Moving images appear and disappear without 
coherence, scenes from an untidy life, a memory that bangs 
backward and forward like a shuttle. Images shape themselves and 
resist the editing that would give them final form. Their form is their 
chaos. 
A distant childhood. The faces of friends and enemies. I am 
the person coming from the continents of others, from their 
languages and their borders. The person with spectacles on his eyes 
and a small bag on his shoulder. And these are the planks of the 
bridge. These are my steps on them. Here I am walking towards the 




Is this a political moment? Or an emotional one? Or social? 
A practical moment? A surreal one? A moment of the body? Or of the 
mind? The wood creaks. What has passed of life is shrouded in a mist 
that both hides and reveals. Why do I wish I could get rid of this bag? 
This poignant piece of writing succinctly captures many of the ideas this thesis is 
exploring. The conftision and ambivalence between different times and spaces 
Barghouti experiences because of his displacement and exile are themes that are 
present throughout. This extract also highlights the disjointed merging of the 
cultural, social and political within diasporic Palestinian feelings, experiences 
and actions and that, as a result, being and feeling Palestinian is difficult. 
Barghouti appears to be experiencing his 'Palestinian-ness" as something 
intensely longed for and tangible but also intangible, chaotic, distant, imagined 
and problematic as he tries to make sense of this particular moment. The lack of 
clarity about citizenship appears to play a role in this; he does not know what 
'category' he comes into. This ambiguity with regard to citizenship is another 
key theme. It illustrates the relevance of studying a group such as the Palestinian 
diaspora, which appears to be striving to create 'shared consciousness', or 
collective 'Palestinian-ness' through constructions of unity and cross-border ties 
to Palestine and the rest of the Middle East. In Greece, their existence both 
within and outside state borders and official 'categories' may be both enabling 
and hindering for them, as they dynamically position, represent and negotiate 
their identities, as well as similarities and differences, temporally and spatially as 
individuals and in groups. They may slip inside boundaries, re-creating and 
solidifying networks and relations with each other and the homeland, they are in- 
between 'here' and 'there' and they also get 'stuck' outside, or excluded as non- 
citizens or foreigners and as a result of disunities and tensions in the diaspora 
1 This thesis is using the notion of 'PalestiMan-ness' in inverted commas In order to problematise 
Palestinian 'identity' and to help depict the complexities, ambivalences and hybridity of feeling 
and being a diasporic Palestinian in Athens. These issues are discussed and analysed ftirther in 
Chapter Two. It should be noted here that although the title of this thesis uses 'inverted commas 
around the word identities, because of discussions in the viva, this will not occur throughout the 
thesis as it is acknowledged that it is not necessary to do so. However, this thesis stresses that it is 
only possible to explore Palestinian multiple and dynamic identities and will hopeftilly illustrate 
that the notion of a singular Palestinian 'identity' or 'national identity' is problematic despite 
participant attempts to create one for political and cultural reasons, hence the use of inverted 
commas around 'Identity' and 'national identity'. 
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itself This thesis focuses on notions of 'Palestinian-ness' as fluid and diasporas 
as evolving processes in-the-making. This helps highlight the importance of 
movement, suggesting that 'Palestinian-ness 1) is flexible and continuously 
evolving yet, at the same time, grounded within particular times/spaces. Such 
terms problematise the singularity and authority of the word 'Identity' and the 
assumptions of authenticity and distinctiveness that often accompany it. In 
addition, they also aim to interrogate understandings of diasporas as 
homogenised cultural, social and political entities with neatly defined and 
distinct 'national' and/or 'ethnic' identities. 
A case study of the Palestinian diaspora in Athens may be able to shed 
light on the difficult relationships between home, belonging, the homeland, 
citizenship, 'Identity' and nationalism, as well as politicisation and potential 
political activism. These are all issues that are extremely important to 
Palestinians in diaspora and how they deal with such complexities may provide a 
useful tool to help understand how the geographies of such interrelated issues are 
changing. In particular, this thesis is influenced by calls to "develop (or 
rediscover? ) analytical tools and concepts not coloured by the self-evidence of a 
world ordered into nation-states" (Wimmer and Glick Schiller 2002: 325). 
In order to try and understand these issues further, this thesis seeks to 
explore some of the interconnected facets and constructions of 'Palestinian-ness' 
in Athens, such as politicisation, home, hybridity, belonging, 'in-between-ness' 
and strategic 'shared consciousness'. This thesis aims to understand the ways in 
which Palestinians feel politicised and are potentially politically active as part of 
their everyday lives as well as how this is related to other cultural and social 
aspects of 'Palestinian-ness'. The advocacy and lobbying of what they call the 
Palestinian cause appears to be one of the major ways in which Palestinians are 
being politicised. This research suggests that for the majority of Palestinians in 
Athens, the Palestinian cause appears to entail an end to Israeli occupation in the 
West Bank and Gaza 2 (which they see as illegal), self-detennination leading to 
the creation of a Palestinian state, the Right of Return for Palestinian refugees 
and a solution to the issue of Jerusalem. This research explores how, in the 
process, they may be involved in postcolonial, hybrid and diasporic spaces, 
' This research was conducted before the Israeli withdrawal of settlements from Gaza. 
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where they are strategically negotiating what it means to be politicised, to 
advocate and be resistant but in which they may also feel despairing and 
experience political apathy. Politicisation within the context of this thesis can be 
seen as a general terrn that describes the ways in which Palestinians act, feel and 
think politically on an everyday basis that cannot be separated from cultural and 
social facets of their diasporic lives and identities. 
This research aims to discover the significance of formal citizenship 
status in Palestinian lives and actions in Athens and how they may be both 
symbolically and materially affected by it as well as how they may utillse it. As a 
result, citizenship as a set of theories and spatial practices is interrogated in order 
to analyse how it is perceived and experienced by those with and without forinal 
citizenship. Perceptions of the relationships between citizenship and 'national 
identity' are explored in the process. Notions of citizenship and diasporic 
Talestinian-ness' are seen as needing to move beyond the arbitrary boundaries 
of nation-states, yet at the same time, the continued hindrances borders pose and 
the appeal of territorialisation, 'shared consciousness' and attachment to a 
territorial homeland have to be acknowledged. 
Above all, this thesis stresses the salience of in-depth, grounded research 
that takes into account the situated positive and negative aspects of people's 
lives, experiences, feelings and actions. The strength of this research lies in its 
potential ability to assess and understand the daily tensions, power inequalities 
and intricacies of the lives and identities of people 'on the move' within a 
dynamic time-space framework that recognises the bounded and unbounded 
nature of diasporic existence. The thesis also uses the case study of the 
Palestinian diaspora in Athens in order to illustrate the material relevance of the 
abstract notion of hybridity to everyday life. It is hoped that the realities of the 
complex relationships between constructions of home, homeland, belonging, 
political action and processes of resistance will challenge the concepts of spatial 
(and potentially homogenising notion of) 'Identity politics'. A much more 
nuanced appreciation of the ways in which migrants and those in diaspora are 
constructing 'shared consciousness', unities and disunities, in which 
transnational or cross-border connections and hybndity are crucial components, 
may then be possible. 
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Contextual information 
Although this thesis focuses on the Palestinian diaspora, it is important to place 
Greece contextually within Europe and particularly Southern Europe, so that the 
relatively recent changes in terms of migration to such countries (within which 
the Palestinian diaspora can be loosely placed) can be understood. King (2000) 
has developed a model of migration in Southern Europe, which is based on 
labour migration. He views migrants primarily as economic workers who are 
responding to specific (and often contradictory) social and economic aspects of 
Southern Europe, such as the need for foreign labour and, at the same time, the 
increasing barriers to immigration. This combination and constant battle of 
'fortress' restrictions and 'eldorado' opportunities appears to be an ongoing 
process and forms an important framework for understanding migration in 
Southern Europe and in Greece. The strategic position of Greece within the EU 
and between Europe and the Middle East as well as the geographical proximity 
of Greece (materially and psychologically) to the Middle East is important to 
bear in mind, as they may influence the nature and extent of diasporic cross- 
border connections. In addition, the issues surrounding the Palestinian diaspora 
in Athens may be placed within wider perceptions of Arabs in Europe and 
around the world on Palestine and the Middle East. 
Research on migrants in Greece 
Although not a great deal of research has been carried out on migrants, let alone 
diasporic groups, in Greece, there is an emerging interest in migration, as it is 
being recognised that this is a relatively under-researched area (Mestheneos 
2002; Amitsis and Lazaridis 2001; Marvakis et aL 2001 and Tnandafyllidou and 
Petronoti 2001). Most migration research carried out in Greece appears to 
concentrate on economic aspects of migration (for example, see Fakiolas 2000 
and losifidis 1997). Reports on Greek immigration law and policy-making 
(Skordas 2003; Psimmenos and Georgoulas 1999), for example, seem to favour 
the division of migrants into strict categories for analytical and practical 
purposes. There has also been some research on the state of refugees and their 
lives (see Black 1992; Petronoti 1998,2001; Mestheneos 2002 and Lazaridis and 
Theotoky 1999). Despite the ethnographic nature of some of this research, most 
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is quantitatively based and according to Lazarid's (2000: 51), there have been 
very few attempts to carry out detailed qualitative research on either female 
migrants or on how migrants themselves "perceive and interpret their 
experiences". However, work such as that of King et al. (1998) on Albanian 
migrants, Lazaridis and Psimmenos (2000) and the work by Lazandis herself 
(2000) on foreign domestic workers in Greece are amongst the notable 
exceptions. 
Historical overview of migration in Greece 
It is only relatively recently that Greece has been acknowledged as a country of 
immigration as opposed to emigration. The existence of the Greek diaspora has 
been well documented (see, for example, Roudometof and Karpathakis 2002). 
Greece, however, has always been a country that has operated as a "connecting 
agency" (Psimmenos and Georgoulas 1999: 42) between Europe, Asia and 
Africa. This is partly due to its long tradition of shipping, commerce and tourism 
and the global links these have resulted in. Greece's strategic geographical 
position in the Eastern Mediterranean must not be forgotten, as it has led to a 
multitude of dense economic and social networks centred in and around Greece. 
It was only after the 1970s that Greece started to become a country of 
immigration, experiencing what Cavounidis (2002) has called a sudden 
transforination in terms of migration. This immigration consisted not only of 
Greek return migrants from the US, Europe and Australia, but also of economic 
migrants from Eastern Europe, South-east Asia and Maghreb countries (Fakiolas 
2000, Nikolinakos 1973). According to Petrakou (1999), for example, some 20, 
000 foreign workers arrived from Morocco, Egypt, Philippines, Pakistan and 
Ethiopia between 1974-1975. This period of immigration was linked to the need 
to provide a cheap supply of labour and in the process, labour agreements as a 
result of guest worker policies,, were made between Greece and several 
surrounding countries. These were instrumental in allowing the implementation 
of Greece's economic and political goals at the time. 
To this day, the main objective of Greek immigration-related government 
policy and decision-making has been economically based. In other words, it is 
concerned primarily with labour migration and the resulting benefits to the Greek 
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economy. This issue has been of particular importance to academics and migrant 
activists who claim that in the process, Greece is neglecting the human rights and 
legal protection of migrants, particularly in the wake of complicated and 
bureaucratic legalisation processes which, according to Jarvis (2004) are difficult 
for migrants to make sense of She has called for increased migrant involvement 
and representation in political decision-making that affects them and also 
highlights the disillusionment many migrants in Greece feel as a result of their 
position. 
From the 1980s, an upsurge in the number of migrants from East and 
Central Europe has occurred (Cavounidis 2002). Since the 1990s, however, they 
have been outnumbered by Albanian migrants, who, according to The National 
Centre for Social Research (EKKE), comprised nearly two thirds of the total 
immigrant population, which in 1999, was estimated to be around 800,000. 
Many Greek immigration figures appear to hide undocumented migrants, who do 
not enter the country through legal channels. Also obscured in such demographic 
approaches to migration is the plight and experiences of refugees and asylum 
seekers, who are increasingly being viewed as illegal immigrants. Although 
Greece signed the 1951 Geneva Convention, it was traditionally seen as a 
country of transit for refugees, on their way to more affluent Western European 
countries. This was a position that was encouraged by the Greek government. 
With the ever-increasing pressure of the perceived need to tighten and control 
immigration into so-called 'Fortress Europe', Greece is seen as having an 
important role to play because of its geographical location. During its six-month 
European Presidency in 2003, an important priority (third in the list of five 
priorities) was the control of migration, particularly illegal immigration. Thus, 
Greece has taken on the difficult task of stepping up the policing and controlling 
of its borders, which have often been seen as vulnerable and conducive to illegal 
immigration. There have also been attempts to stem the flow of potential asylum 
seekers from outer lying European countries into Western Europe through 
proposals which make EU countries asylum seekers first enter (such as Greece) 
responsible for the asylum process. However, the United Nations High 
Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) stresses that there has to be a balance 
between regulation and protection of refugees (cited in Tzilivakis 2002). 
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Amnesty International and other human rights organisations have criticised the 
Greek government for its harsh attitude towards undocumented migrants and 
asylum seekers, claiming that the result has been the turning away of hundreds of 
people fleeing from persecution and according to Tzilivakis (2005a), the vast 
majonty of asylum seeker applications are turned down. Greece has had to enter 
a phase where it acknowledges and makes positive steps to deal with both 
migrants' lives and Greek attitudes towards them. This is becoming increasingly 
important as, by 2015, the UN estimates that there will be 3.5 million immigrants 
in a total population of 14.2 million (cited in Galati 2002). 
Citizenship and immigration policies in Greece 
As Western European countries tighten their borders it appears that Greece,, like 
other Southern European countries, will be forced to become more than just a 
temporary place of residence. King (2000: 14) stresses that: "Southern Europe 
has been transfon-ned from a 'waiting room) pending a further northward 
move ... 
into a 'terminus' or desirable destination in its own right". Thus, the 
legal and citizenship aspects of migrants' lives become important. Only when 
immigrants are given a chance to become citizens and asylum seekers are able to 
become political refugees can they start to feel included in their host society and 
begin to claim rights. In addition to this, potential political participation or 
advocacy is more likely to occur when migrants are given some sort of legal 
status or host country citizenship. Unfortunately, a large proportion of 
immigrants currently residing in Greece are undocumented, which makes them 
illegal, vulnerable and with little access to social insurance and economic 
security. 
In terms of immigration policies, Greece has always tended to promote 
assimilation in order to protect its 'national identity', which has resulted in a 
Greek society with greatly supported and reinforced shared religion, language 
and culture (Rozakis 1996). This, however, also makes it more difficult for 
immigrants to feel as though they belong, because they tend to be seen as 
'Other', as visibly different (Triandafyllidou 1998; 2000) and, therefore, 
excluded from Greek society. As the Greek government has only fairly recently 
acknowledged the fact that Greece is indeed a country of permanent 
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immigration, immigration laws and policies have been slow to matenalise and 
those that have are being implemented with difficulty. In addition to this, the 
Greek government does not easily grant citizenship to foreigners even if they are 
legal and have been resident in Greece for a substantial period of time (Fakiolas 
1999). Instead, ethnic Greeks, such as Pontian Greeks, or Greeks who lived in 
Asia Minor prior to 192 1, have always been favoured. The first immigration law, 
passed in 1921, relates to this specifically as it was aimed at assimilating Greek 
refugees from Asia Minor and at this time anyone who was not deemed Greek by 
origin was classified as 'alien'. Although this is not officially the case now, such 
an attitude appears to still be present. To reiterate, it is very difficult for someone 
who is not Greek or at least ethnically Greek to become a Greek citizen. 
Foreigners appear to be tolerated as long as they are of some use to Greece and 
its economy. At the same time, though, in order to live their lives in Greece more 
easily, migrants do have to 'integrate' to a certain extent. This is not necessarily 
easy, however, and the lack of opportunities and incentives for migrants to feel 
as though they fully 'belong' to Greek society may have implications in terms of 
cross-border networks and political participation. 
Although one cannot generalise about the diverse group of people that 
make up the migrant population in Greece, it is becoming clear, as mentioned 
above, people are increasingly migrating to Greece on a long-term basis. While 
Greek migration policy has begun to deal with this, Greek society as a whole, 
will arguably take much longer. However, there are signs that Greece is 
becoming more tolerant of its 'multicultural' status (Tzilivakis 2003a), despite 
the recent tendency in some Western countries to abandon state-sponsored 
multiculturalism and advocate assimilation (Mitchell 2004). This move towards 
multiculturalism in Greece seems to be the result of constant negotiations 
between migrant community groups and the state, and it appears that it has 
mainly been up to committed community groups to make the first moves to 
combat xenophobia, but also to reach out and provide material and emotional 
support to migrants. There is substantial evidence to suggest that popular 
perceptions of many migrant groups have been extremely negative (EKA 1997; 
Close 2002: 197). Albanians, in particular, have been subject to stereotypical 
and negative representations in the media, are often perceived as criminals 
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(Simipoulos 2004) and are discriminated against, creating marked social 
exclusion (Lazaridis and Psimmenos 2000). Even government officials working 
with migrants have been known to differentiate amongst different immigrant 
gToups based on their perceptions of such groups as Psimmenos (2001) has 
shown. However, there are increasing government initiatives to promote better 
relations between Greeks and migrants. One example is the government's new 
think-tank, called the Migration Policy Institute (Tzilivakis 2003a). In addition, 
260 million euros is being made available from 2003-2006 to 'train' Greeks and 
the civil services to co-exist with immigrants, as well as to help migrants 
integrate (Galati 2002) although Tzilivakis (2005a) reports that this initiative has 
not materialised due to a lack of government money. The effects of such moves 
remain to be seen and there are those who remain sceptical about such efforts, 
particularly when recent changes to immigration policy have proven very hard to 
implement. It appears that the EU has had a significant influence on such efforts, 
particularly during the period of Greek EU presidency, which may mean that 
such efforts are more cosmetic than sincere. Law 1975/1991 was aimed at 
harmonising Greece's immigration policies with those of Europe. According to 
Psimmenos and Georgoulas (1999: 58), however, its principal aim was to 
eliminate illegal migration and it stated that Greece was not a country of 
immigration, thus making it even more difficult for long term legal immigrants 
to obtain Greek citizenship and to participate in political life (Fakiolas 1999: 
207). 
Psimmenos (2001) argues that implementation of policies are made 
difficult because of the specific bureaucratic, centralised and authoritarian style 
of administrative management, which appears to be unduly influenced by party 
politics, ideology and personal favours. In such an atmosphere of often racist, 
systematic and engrained political clientelism, it is perhaps unsurprising that 
certain groups and individual people get favoured, whilst others are 
discriminated against. What becomes apparent in Psimmenos's work (ibid. ) is 
the tendency of immigration officials to classify according to pre-conceived 
stereotypes. This is particularly worrying as it is such officials who are 
responsible for the granting of much-needed work pen-nits and who make vital 
decisions concerning migrant lives and citizenship statuses. In addition to this, 
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implementation is made all the harder as a result of a lack of communication 
between policy-makers and the officials and police who are actually doing the 
implementing on the ground. Implementation appears to be the result of a 
precarious balance between official government discourses on modernisation and 
restructuring of welfare services and the administrative organisational culture 
and practices of officials and organisations who have to translate such policies 
into reality. In what is a time of economic and political transformations for the 
Greek government, officials appear to be carrying out implementation as a result 
of constant negotiations between furthering their careers, institutional interests 
and restraints and the aims of a labour market. In short, they are left to judge the 
use of particular groups of economic migrants to the Greek economy, whilst at 
the same time, these decisions are made on the basis of perceptions of migrants 
as a 'threat' that has to be controlled. The end result is that implementation is 
subject to a problematic organisational culture that is replete with complex 
networks that are arranged on the basis of cultural and structural negotiations 
between official, institutions and immigrants themselves (Kassimati and 
Psimmenos 2002). This appears to have been a major reason why the legal drive 
in 1998 to regularise migration by providing temporary residence and work 
pen-nits to 350,000 undocumented migrants was a failure (Fakiolas 1999). 
A second attempt at regularisation was occurring whilst the research was 
in process, although it too has been plagued with problems of implementation 
and what appears to be insurmountable bureaucracy, even though it was 
designed to correct the mistakes of the previous attempt. It forms part of Law 
2910/2001, which is concerned with all matters relating to the regulation of the 
legal status of foreigners in Greece, including entry, work, residence, expulsion 
as well as the granting of citizenship, although it does not apply to refugees and 
asylum seekers. It appears that the inherent failure of immigration policies, 
particularly in terms of dealing with illegal immigration, is the result of the 
incongruous treatment of migrants by such laws. On the one hand, migrants are 
viewed purely in ternis of how they can benefit the Greek economy, which has 
led to their exploitation and, on the other hand, the basic and human rights that 
all immigrants should have must also be taken into account. Regularisation is 
desirable, but only if immigrant laws can ensure the adequate treatment of 
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migrants and provision of rights in the actual process of regularisation and once 
they do become legal. 3 Tzilivakis (2003b; 2005a) also reiterates the numerous 
problems that have been associated with the current wave of regulansation, 
whereby not only is the actual process full of bureaucracy, but it is also 
increasingly difficult for migrants to meet the criteria needed for legalisation. In 
addition, once they attain legal status, they are not so attractive because as 
employees their employers have to pay their social insurance (known as IKA in 
Greece). This has meant that they are less able to find Jobs once they have legal 
status and this has been an incentive for many migrants to remain illegal and part 
of the vibrant informal economy of Greece. It is worth noting that Psimmenos 
and Georgoulas (1999) also feel that present migration policies are lacking in 
basic measures that ensure human rights because most immigrants do not have 
any social security or benefits. Whilst illegal migrants are in a vulnerable 
position, those who are legal do not necessarily appear much better off, as they 
are still prone to exploitation by prospective employers who control the terms of 
their employment (Kourtovik 1999, cited in Psimmenos and Georgoulas 1999). 
The illegality of so many migrants and the difficulties they experience 
also appears to have prompted the vigorous use of informal networks outside the 
formal political sphere in Greece, but also transnationally, in order to provide 
economic,, social and political support (Fakiolas 1999). Other research has also 
pointed to the use Eritrean refugees make of such networks, allowing them to 
improvise and be flexible as a strategy for improving their lives and overcoming 
institutional barriers (Petronoti 2001). Refugees and asylum seekers appear to 
have faired a little better than labour migrants in terms of the protection, 
provision and support available to them from such organisations as the Greek 
Council for Refugees (GCR), but they too are at the mercy of bureaucratic and 
arduous asylum procedures and the government's attempts to minimise illegal 
immigration .4 
The limited participation of the vast majority of foreigners (both 
refugees and labour migrants alike) in Greek political life is an issue that needs 
addressing. However, it is also this that potentially motivates migrant groups to 
3 For a full review of this law, as well as its shortcomings, see Skordas (2002). 
4 For more in-depth discussions of recent legislation on reftigees see Toxopeus (1997) and a 
report by the European Union's Directorate General for Justice and Home Affairs (200 1). 
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organise and be politically active through infon-nal spaces at the local community 
and collective levels, as well as the transnational in order to exert pressure on the 
Greek government. This would also explain the tendency for groups such as 
Palestinians to work together and cooperate via complex networks with other 
migrant groups, as well as NGOs, as a strategy to maximise their influence (and 
advocacy of causes or issues) and security and minimise their vulnerability and 
exclusion. 
In order that the long process of settling the intricacies of migrant social, 
economic and political integration and participation in an increasingly plural and 
diverse Greek society can begin at policy level, it would seem that current efforts 
to legalise migrants have to be continued and enhanced, however difficult this 
might be. It does appear that the Greek government's uncommitted and 
unconvincing attempts to provide migrants with secure and basic legal rights is 
strongly linked to its fear that, in the words of Fakiolas (1999: 213), they would 
change from being "political objects to political actors". This would ultimately 
pose a major challenge to Greece's zealous attempts to preserve its much- 
guarded perceptions of national identity and cultural unity. At the same time, the 
symbolic and material cross-border connections migrants, refugees and those in 
diaspora create and nourish may encourage them to continue feeling attached to 
and identify with their homeland or host country. This should not prevent them 
from being able to gain Greek citizenship and they, in the process, should not 
have to conform to stereotypical and homogenous notions of Greek national 
identity. 
Research on Palestinians in EuKppe 
Palestinians in diaspora call the area depicted in Figure I their historical 
homeland that now encompasses Israel and which, as the map itself states, they 
see as occupied. Figure 2 illustrates the areas within historical Palestine to which 
many diasporic Palestinians can trace the villages of their families and are crucial 
to feelings of displacement, home and belonging. Figure 3 is a more recent map 
of Palestinian areas in all their complexity. All the maps are of symbolic 
importance in constructions of diasporic and exilic 'Palestinian-ness', suffering 
and politicisation. 
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Figure 3- Map of Palestinian areas and Israeli settlements in the West Bank 
and Gaza (2000) 
The West Bank and Gaza Strin. March 2000 
Palestinian Academic Society for the Study of International Affairs 
(PASSIA) 
(Source: www. passia. org/palestine_facts/MAPS/wbgs1. htm) 
There does not appear to have been much research on Palestinians in 
Europe. Of the research that has been carried out, a great deal appears to focus 
on Palestinians as refugees (see, for example, Karmi and Cotran 1999), issues of 
assimilation and integration in the host country and cultural 'identity' (see, for 
example, Karmi 1999). Most diasporic Palestinians live in and around the 
Middle East and are incredibly diverse, socially, economically and politically 
(Weighill 1999, Said 1986). Figure 4 depicts the dispersal of Palestinians around 
the Middle East and the rest of the world. 
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Although it is difficult to ascertain the exact number, it is estimated that there are 
roughly 150,000 Palestinians living in Europe, of which around 80% are 
Lebanese Palestinians (Shiblak 2000). It seems that Palestinians only started 
migrating to Europe in large numbers from the late 1960s onwards. It was only 
as a consequence (both directly and indirectly) of the 1967 Israeli occupation, the 
ensuing political turbulence and resistance, as well as the escalating 
discrimination towards Palestinians in some Arab countries that more large-scale 
migration to Europe began. Indeed, Palestinians were increasingly perceived as a 
security risk in countries such as Jordan and Lebanon and this led to increasing 
political persecution, which acted as an incentive for Palestinians to move 
beyond the Middle East. Although the majority of the first migrations during the 
1970s were individual decisions, after the civil war in Lebanon in the 1980s, 
whole communities of refugees fled to Europe, primarily to Germany, 
Scandinavia and Western and Eastern Europe. It is thought that the largest group 
of Palestinians in Europe are in Germany where it is claimed that they number 
about 80,000 (Shiblak 2000). There have also been more recent movements of 
Palestinians to Europe as a result of the ongoing tensions in Palestine and Israel 
and the second Intifada. In Britain alone, two to three thousand Palestinians 
arrived in last couple of years (ibid. ). It is interesting to note Hanafi's (2005) 
observation that Palestinians have 'infiltrated' Europe; by this he appears to 
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mean that their movement has gone largely unnoticed. He also stresses the 
differences in the types and origins of Palestinians moving to specific European 
countries. For example, he notes the high numbers of professional Palestinians 
amongst communities in the UK, France, Germany, Spain and Italy many of 
whom originally moved as students and later decided to stay. In the Netherlands, 
Dem-nark, Norway and Sweden, there are many Palestinians who fled after the 
civil war in Lebanon in the 1980s, but this group contained few academics and 
professionals (ibid. ). 
It is unsurprising, perhaps, given this diversity, that there are wide 
variations between Palestinian communities in Europe, although it appears that 
the majority are stateless holders of refugee travel documents with vulnerable 
and insecure citizenship status. This is because despite the fact that over three 
million of the Palestinian diaspora are registered as refugees with United Nations 
Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees (UNRWA), Palestinians are 
excluded from the 1951 Geneva Convention on refugees. This has meant that 
once: 
UNWRA registered refugees ... 
leave its field of operation in the 
Middle East they are often not treated by the international community 
as 'genul . ne Y refugees and therefore cannot claim asylum outside the 
Middle East. (Weighill 1999: 11) 
The issues of citizenship, home and belonging are particularly acute for 
Palestinians, as many, particularly in the Middle East, feel they have been the 
victims of continuous discrimination, exclusion and marginalisation for over 50 
years. Within Europe, there appears to be a distinction, however, between the 
first, older groups of Palestinians and the later ones who have arrived in the last 
two decades. The former appear to have integrated more than the latter and, 
according to Shiblak (2000), there is minimal contact between the two. However, 
all Palestinians in Europe have had to experience and still are experiencing exile 
and statelessness. 
Perhaps what is more important is the variation in the feelings and 
and politicisation felt by Palestinians " constructions of nati 1 11 1111 in different 
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European countries as well as how this is related to their host country and their 
position and integration within it. For many, disillusionment and apathy has 
apparently resulted in the loss of a coherent and collective cultural 'identity' or 
shared feelings of being Palestinian, making them feel confused about where 
they perceive they belong and where their home is (Shiblak 2000). The 
homeland, always a part of their identities and memory is for some, a very 
distant and uneasy notion to come to terms with. In Sweden, for instance, Ghani 
(2000) describes how Palestinians live on the periphery of Swedish society in a 
state of alienation, finding little comfort in knowing that they are Palestinian and 
that they have a homeland. Indeed, according to Ghani (ibid. ), in Sweden the 
homeland is perceived as symbolic of the suffering they have had to endure 
rather than a stimulus for 'solidarity' or a collective and united 'Identity'. One 
reason given for their apparent , in-between-ness' is that the majority are the 
offspring of poor Palestinian refugees who left Palestine in 1948 and have never 
known their homeland. Another reason for this marginality is the very different 
culture and society in Sweden and indeed in all of Western Europe that they have 
had to adapt to. Hanafi (2005) also discusses the feelings of despair of 
Palestinians with low incomes living on social welfare in Scandinavian 
countries. Hanafi (ibid. ) points to the large scale 'assimilation' of Palestinians in 
France, which is felt may be the consequence of the 'French absorption model' 
of immigrants that is seen as unique within Europe, as well as weak community 
networks. 
It is interesting to note the difference between better off Palestinian elites 
and the 'average' Palestinian in terms of feelings of 'Identity' in the diaspora as a 
whole. It seems that elites who are in a more privileged position are able to 
engage in cross-border activities, such as sending money and travelling to the 
homeland. This appears to be related to the fact that they enjoy more secure 
citizenship status and are able to move around the world more freely as a result, 
living life to a high standard. They may have dual nationality, which greatly 
enhances their ability to create and maintain cross-border political, social and 
economic networks. These have had a positive influence in terms of initiating 
further global movements of Palestinians and commercial activities. According 
to Hanafi (2005), however, connections between European Palestinians and the 
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'homeland' are loose compared to North American Palestinians. Virtual 
networks, such as PALESTA 5 are being created in order to connect Palestinians 
but many are aimed at professionals with access to the internet. The differences 
between elite and lower income Palestinians highlight the diversity of Palestinian 
existence in Europe as well as the potential for tensions within and between 
different communities. 
According to Dorai (2002), non-elite Palestinians in exile maintain their 
sense of cultural and 'national identity' more strongly. This is a result of the 
tradition of oral history and 'collective memory' in which images, for instance, 
of a family's village are passed down from generation to generation (Said 1986). 
For them, an idealised homeland is still clung to, whereas elites may be more 
aware of and influenced by the transformation that Palestine is continuously 
undergoing and appear to have a less idealistic perception of their homeland as a 
result. What is significant, however, as Dorai (2002) stresses , is that this does not 
appear to have severed or undermined perceptions of 'unity' or 'solidarity' of 
Palestinians in diaspora. The conflicting opinions of authors in terms of whether 
Palestinians do feel 'united' and possess strong feelings of 'national identity', 
appears to indicate that more research is needed on the Palestinian diaspora both 
within Europe and North America and on these complex issues in particular. 
The role and importance of the PLO to Palestinians in diaspor 
The role and importance of the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) in the 
identities and political activism of the Palestinian diaspora must be noted. 
Bowman (2003: 335) stresses the role in which organisations such as the PLO 
play in evoking "banner of the nation", which "enabled Palestinians in various 
sites and states to imagine their differences subsumed within the programme of 
liberating 'Palestine"'. As Lindholm Schulz (2003: 46) also points out: "the 
PLO and its activities and networks throughout the world indicate the 
pervasiveness and salience of diaspora politics in international relations". 
5 PALESTA: Palestinian Scientists and Technologists Abroad, a virtual community established at 
the end of 1997, which has the "objective of harnessing the sclent1fic and technological 
knowledge of Palestinian expatriate professionals for the benefit of development efforts in 
Palestine" (Hanafi 2005: 586). 
19 
According to the late Yasser Arafat6 
, the PLO "is not one of many Palestinian 
institutions. It is the all-embracing Palestinian institution that Comprises all the 
institutions of the Palestinian people". It has transforined the Palestinian people 
"from a refugee people waiting in queues for chanty and alms into a people 
fighting for freedom" (quoted in Rubin 1993: 145). 
The PLO was founded in 1964 and was initially concerned with Arab 
nationalism. This was because it was created by the Arab League as a separate 
entity for the Palestinian people, but "it was under Egyptian control and the 
armed forces connected with it formed part of the annies of Egypt, Syria, Jordan 
and Iraq" (Hourani 1991: 412). It was only after 1967 that the PLO's ideologies 
started specifically promoting Palestinian nationalism and the liberation of 
Palestine, after it became influenced by al-Fateh, a sub-group founded in the late 
1950s by Yasser Arafat and several other young refugee Palestinians flom Gaza. 
Al-Fateh's rhetoric of activism, armed struggle and resistance had a great deal of 
popular appeal and support, particularly as it engaged in military activities and, 
after 1969, it became the most influential group within the PLO (Cobban 1984). 
It was in Cairo, at the Fifth Session of the Palestinian National Council (PNQ 
that Al-Fateh (together with other Palestinian guerrilla organisations) joined the 
PLO and where Yasser Arafat was elected as the Chairman of the executive 
committee (Davis 1997). In 1974, the PLO was recognised as the sole 
"legitimate representative of the Palestinian people in any Palestinian territory 
that is liberated ... the PLO 
[was also] recognised by the League of Arab States as 
the representative of the (non existent) state of Palestine" (ibid.: 84). 
The PLO's role in constructions of what it means to be Palestinian cannot 
be underestimated. For instance, the PLO used the Kuffiya, the traditional 
headscarf worn by peasant farmers and Bedouins and turned it into a symbol of 
Palestinian resistance. This was because it was also worn by the fedayeen, the 
guerrilla-soldiers who fought and sacrificed their lives for Palestine. It was they 
who became the symbol for anned struggle and resistance; to be Palestinian, 
therefore, came to mean resistance and struggle for liberation against all odds. 
Such constructions have remained important through time as can be seen by the 
This research was carried out before the death of Yasser Arafat. 
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existence of the two Intifadas and Palestinians who are willing to sacrifice their 
lives for their cause. Here, we can also see the importance of the notion of 
having a cause, which is seen as potentially uniting all Palestinians whatever 
their class or status, and the wearing of the peasant Kuffiya by PLO members 
signified this construction of a unified Palestine. The PLO appears to have 
managed to spread its pervasive notions of what it means to be Palestinian to 
Palestinians as well as non-Palestinians around the world. For instance,, the 
Palestinian Representation in Greece, like those in many other European 
countries, started its life as a PLO office (and is still PLO affiliated) and is an 
important political actor. Incidentally, as Palestinian participants in this research 
call the Representation an embassy, so too will this thesis. 
Of further symbolic importance is that resistance, self-representation and 
activism have formed the backbone of PLO ideology and the will to unite, persist 
and try to change the status quo appears to be lodged in the minds and hearts of 
the Palestinian diaspora. This is despite its turn towards a more pragmatic, 
institutional approach since the 1970s that focused less on revolution and more 
on self-determination and statehood. This has also meant that 'Right of Return' 
of Palestinian refugees, which was originally one of the core issues has 
increasingly become compromised. Hourani (1991) points to 1988 as the 
beginning of a new phase for the 'Palestinian problem'. The existence of the first 
Intifada appeared to illustrate the 'unity' of the Palestinians in the West Bank 
and Gaza. The PLO found itself in a position of power but 
i. ts own nature was changed. It had to take into account the opinion of those in 
the Occupied Territories and their desire to end the Occupation. The Palestinian 
National Council, the representative body of Palestinians met in Algiers and 
produced a charter proclaiming its willingness to accept the existence of Israel 
and to negotiate a settlement with it. (Hourani 1991: 433) 
This focus on the creation of a state of Palestine on the 1967 borders (in other 
words, within the West Bank and Gaza) is an issue of much contention amongst 
diasporic Palestinians, many of whom feel that the peace process is ignoring the 
issue of return. The divisions between those Palestinians 'Inside' or from the 
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West Bank and Gaza and those 'outside' in diaspora have been exacerbated by 
the fact that despite the Palestinian diaspora being instrumental in early 
constructions of Palestinian nationalism and representation, since 1999 and the 
establishment of the Palestinian National Authority (PNA), they have 
increasingly felt 'left out'. The PNA was created to represent the interests of 
Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza; the PLO, most of whom physically 
moved to the West Bank and Gaza, was to continue representing the Palestinian 
diaspora. 7 However, their roles soon blurred and creating a Palestinian state, 
using a step-by-step and self-rule approach became the primary objective. This 
was a long way from the original revolutionary ideals. 
Popular and particularly diasporic opposition to and loss of faith in the 
PLO and PNA (especially with Arafat as a leader) increasingly started to occur 
during the peace process, which was initiated at the Madrid conference in 1991. 
This may have been linked to the increasing tendencies towards patronage 
politics, the pursuance of elite interests, corruption and the weakening of 
processes to ensure transparency in decision-making and governance within the 
PNA and its legislative council, the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) 
(Lindholm Schulz 2003). Rubin (1993: 148) claims that the PLO is not 
democratic and that Palestinians have had limited control over the organisation 
and have not necessarily approved of its tactics. According to Johnson and 
Kuttab (2001), the Palestinian Authority (PA) has engaged in 'authoritarian 
populism', in which 'the people' are used to legitimise the government but are 
also, at the same time, not given the opportunity to participate politically, have a 
political voice and thus get involved in the decision-making that affects their 
lives. They also claim that the peace process has created "a profound political 
crisis of Palestinian nationalism", which has resulted in the marginalisation of 
the social movements, NGOs and political activism that were very active during 
the first Intifada (ibid.: 25). This has also been the result of the movement from 
informal to formal politics and associated closed political structures on the road 
to statehood. The PLO also appears to have been subject to numerous internal 
conflicts and disunities, whilst claiming to be united (Rubin 1993). 
7 For more on the legal aspects of Palestinian citizenship and provisional statehood, see Davis 
(1997). 
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The peace process has also highlighted tensions between the PLO and 
opposing factions as well as within the PLO (Rubin 1993) although according to 
Johnson and Kuttab (2001), the hegemony of the PA is increasing at the expense 
of the fragility of Left-opposition parties. The potential for formally based 
political activism in the diaspora could, therefore, be seen as decreasing even 
more as they may be becoming even more marginalized and separated from 
decision-making that affects their present and future legal and socio-political 
relationships with Palestine. At the same time, this should not cloud the 
continued attempts at infort-nal political activism that may take place in the 
diaspora in order to counterbalance what could be called a 'double exclusion' in 
many instances. As stateless individuals (especially if they are not citizens of the 
country in which they reside), Palestinians are often excluded from the formal 
political sphere both where they live and where they are from and feel they 
belong (Palestine). The results of this in terms of political activism and 
mobilisation appear to be very varied throughout Europe but Lindholm Schulz 
(2003) rightly points to the increase of spaces and events such as demonstrations 
in different European countries that allow Palestinians to voice their 
dissatisfactions and hopes. At the same time, the advent of what Hanafi (2005) 
calls 'cyberdemocracy' and virtual networks and communities may be 
stimulating activism in the struggle for diasporic Palestinian involvement in the 
decision-making processes leading to a Palestinian state, in which their human 
and civil rights may be represented. 
The experiences and perceptions of the Palestinian diaspora in Athens 
must be placed within this very brief introduction to what appears to be chaotic, 
unstable and very complicated Palestinian politics. The politicised 'Palestinian- 
ness'), potential activism, constructions of 'shared consciousness') and feelings of 
home and belonging of the Palestinian diaspora in Athens and beyond are greatly 
influenced by the socio-political climate in Palestine, their perceptions of it and 
their relationships and cross-border connections to it. 
Palestinians in Greece 
Palestinians appear to have been relatively invisible in research on refugees and 
migrants in Europe and especially in Greece. The paucity and unrellability of 
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data on migrants in Greece is always a factor to bear in mind (Cavounidis 2002; 
Mestheneos 2002: 182). Strict typologies common in much migration research 
may have some use but they, as well as official statistics, also allow a great 
number of people to 'disappear' within categories (Psimmenos and Georgoulas 
1999: 48) and are of limited value in terms of exploring the realities of the lives, 
identities and experiences of those in diaspora. Classifications are also 
misleading and not particularly helpftil in this respect as they often depend on 
generalisations, rather than on in-depth explorations. This is particularly the case 
for Palestinians, as their country of origin, for example, may often be classed as 
Egypt or other Middle East countries, such as Jordan, and their legal citizenship 
as Egyptian or Jordanian accordingly. Palestinian immigrants seem to be classed 
as having come from and thus are subsumed into the arbitrary category of the 
'Middle East' generally, which includes a huge variety of migrants. 
Alternatively, they are simply classed as 'other'. In short, it appears to be 
virtually impossible to officially trace their movements into and subsequently 
within Greece, particularly as they do not constitute a large minority. It is 
estimated that there are around 4000 Palestinians currently in Athens, according 
to the Palestinian embassy there, although interestingly and, perhaps, 
unsurprisingly there is no general consensus on this amongst Palestinians. The 
majority are Muslims, fonning part of the 120,000 Muslim minority in Greece 
(Rozakis 1996). On the whole, Arabs in Greece appear to be 'hidden', an 
observation made by Nagel (2002) with respect to Arabs in Britain. 
In contrast, perhaps, to diasporic groups in other Western countries, 
Palestinians in Greece do not appeal for rights based on the fact that they are 
'Arab' or 'Muslim', but Palestinian. Several officially recognised Unions have 
been created, aimed at helping and protecting the rights of their members and to 
gain some understanding of the number and status of those involved. A key 
aspect of their existence appears to be to promote the Palestinian cause and to 
disseminate information about the historical and contemporary plight of the 
Palestinian people. The role of such formal Palestinian advocacy movements in 
both public and private spheres must not be underestimated. To date, there is a 
General Union of Palestinian students (GUPS), a General Union of Palestinian 
24 
Workers (GUPW)8, as well as a Palestinian Doctors' Union and there are also 
plans to create a Civil Engineers' Union. One should not forget the alms of the 
first Palestinian groups that were created in the Middle East primarily for 
purposes of creating resistance and solidarity and "uniting all the resistance 
movements of the Palestinian people regardless of their political differences" 
such as the Students' Federation and al-Fatah (Frangi 1983: 95). The political 
organisation of Palestinians has always been complex, but the fact that the 
embassy supports the PLO has implications for ordinary Palestinians in Greece. 
According to the embassy, any political activity that does get their seal of 
approval must not undermine or contradict its official position. 
Palestinians appear to have had an easier time than other migrants in 
Greece in terms of the popular and governmental support they have received 
(Mavroudi 2002, Shawa, personal communication, 2004). Their favoured, if 
hidden presence makes their residence in Athens more interesting and unique, 
but at the same time, this should not obscure the socio-economic differences and 
power inequalities amongst Palestinians in Athens. The significance of their 
position and support outweighs their numerical insignificance, making them a 
very viable group of people to research. The diversity of the Palestinian diaspora 
in Greece needs to be pointed out. There are: 
refugees (both legal and illegal; their exact number is uncertain). 
legal labour migrants (who number roughly 100 according to the GUPW; 
this does not, however, include those who are not registered with the 
Union, as well as those who are in Greece illegally). A few in this group 
are Greek citizens and many have lived in Greece for over 10 years. 
9 students (of whom there are estimated to be around 120 in Greece and 80 
in Athens, according to the GUPS in Greece). Most are in Athens legally, 
although many appear to work part-time for financial reasons, which is 
not strictly allowed under the student permit they have. 
8 There appear to be two opposing Workers' Unions; this will be discussed ftirther in Chapter 
Five. For now, it suffices to say that there appears to be an 'old' and a 'new' one, which was 
being created at the time of research. 
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* transient foreign company employees (FCE), of which there are 
estimated to be around 400 according to anecdotal evidence from 
employees. The vast majority appear to be legal residents whose 
residency is linked to their jobs. Participants also refer to these foreign 
companies as 'Law '89 Companies 
e doctors (this group numbers about 2000, according to the Palestinian 
embassy in Greece), all of whom appear to be legal. It is individuals in 
this group who are most likely to possess Greek citizenship and who have 
been resident in Greece the longest. 
This list is not exhaustive, but it provides an idea of the general composition of 
Palestinians living in Athens. The numbers are estimates and clearly the total 
does not add up to the 4000 given by the Palestinian embassy; it is, therefore, 
very difficult to know the exact numbers in each 'group'. For the purposes of this 
research, however, this does not matter a great deal. There are those who are 
legal, have valid work permits or who have married Greek women or men (the 
former is more common) and have obtained Greek citizenship and there are 
others who are illegal (although according to official sources their numbers are 
negligible). Most Palestinians in Athens do not have Greek citizenship and could 
effectively be seen as stateless. Their often ambiguous and confusing citizenship 
status is linked to their statelessness and displacement round the Middle East and 
the ensuing granting of different legal statuses. As a result, it very difficult to 
classify them as an arbitrary and easily defined group. It is possible that the 
reason that so little is known about Palestinians in Greece is precisely because 
they are 'hidden' in the sense that they keep to themselves as much as they can, 
not creating problems and cooperating with the Greek authorities as much as 
possible. 
Although it is clear that the vast majority of Palestinians residing in 
Greece could be considered to be refugees and, in fact, some of them and their 
families are UNRWA registered, it is very difficult to ascertain exact figures of 
citizenship and refugee statuses of Palestinians in Greece. Figures from the 
UN-HCR in Greece are shown in Figure 5. 
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Figure 5- Applications and recognition of Palestinian asylum seekers (1990- 
2003) 
Applications Recognition (granting of asylum) 
1990: 6 0 
1991: 4 0 
1992: 0 0 
1993: 0 0 
1994-. 2 3 
1995: 5 11 
1996: 0 2 
1997: 5 3 
1998: 4 6 
1999: 2 0 
2000: 36 4 
2001: 38 0 
2002: 60 5 
2003 (until Sept): I 10 0 
According to the embassy, there are very few officially registered refugees in 
Greece. This may be because asylum procedures in Greece are complex and 
deter most potential asylum seekers, such as Kurds from applying 
(Papadopoulou 2003). However, many Palestinians in Athens may recognise 
themselves as refugees in the general sense that they as a people have been 
displaced and are in exile. 
It appears that most Palestinians in Greece are first generation migrants in 
the sense that they have been the ones to make the move to Greece, not their 
parents. This does not necessarily mean, however, that Palestine was their last 
place of residence. Many have been part of the Palestinian diaspora in the Middle 
East since 1948 or 1967, two dates that have prompted mass movements of 
Palestinians. This means, therefore, that many Palestinians living in Greece have 
never lived in Palestine, or indeed visited it. One could say, therefore, that 
Palestinians in Greece are relatively recent migrants to the country, as it appears 
that the first wave of immigration was during the early 1980s when a number of 
Palestinians came as students and business people as a result of the war in 
Lebanon. In fact, this was when a large Palestinian-owned engineering and 
construction company relocated to Athens from Beirut where it was originally 
based. This has resulted in the employment of several hundred Palestinians, most 
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of whom are men. Students have continued to come to Athens, because they 
receive scholarships from the Greek government. 
It appears that the attitude and position in the 1970s and 1980s of the 
main eft-wing Greek poll II under the itical party, PASOK, in power at the time, 
leadership of Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou, influenced the migration of 
Palestinians to Greece. lordanidis (2000: 21) reports in the conservative Greek 
daily 'I Kathimenni' that: 
the Greekparadox is that ever since 1974, Arafat has had a steadfast 
ally and supporter in Greece, that is the late Prime Minister Andreas 
Papandreou and his PASOK socialists. The reformist Prime Minister 
Costas Simitis 9 also appeared with Arafat before the enthusiastic 
socialist congress last October. Now that the US questions Arafat's 
leadership, Simitis and his government remain silent and 'Brother' 
Arafat has been dumped. 
Incidentally, 198 1, the year that PASOK came into power was also the year that 
scholarships were established to help Palestinian students in Greece. Although 
the numbers available to Palestinian students appears to be decreasing, the 
scholarships have continued to be given over the years regardless of the political 
climate in Greece. It is interesting to note that it was under a right-wing 
government that Palestinian students first received free tuition in 1976, thanks to 
the efforts of the newly created GUPS; it was members of this Union who talked 
to Ministers about the need for Palestinian tuition fees to be waived. Helena 
Smith (2002) of the Guardian newspaper also stresses the support and 'pro- 
Palestinian' sentiment that is evident in Greece. She points out how a wide range 
of Greeks, from celebrities to students "have joined forces to express outrage 
over the plight of the Palestinians and Israel's incursions in the West Bank". It is 
apparent, therefore, that there is a great deal of popular support for Palestinians 
and their issues. Palestinians may feel this support is linked to Greek historical 
9 Costas Simitis belonged to the same political party, PASOK, as Papandreou, which was in 
power in Greece at the time of the research. As of 7 March 2004, Nea DImokratIa, a right wing 
political party has been in power, under Kostas Karamanlis. 
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experiences of occupation. Others such as Smith (2002) claim, however, that 
this pro-Palestinian sentiment may also be the result of Greek anti-semitism (see 
also GHM 2002). Such anti-semitic attitudes are hard to understand but may be 
related to the negative position of the Greek Orthodox Church on the Jewish 
religion, which may have influenced Greek perceptions of Jews in Greece, but 
also in Israel. Greece, for example, was the last of the EU states to create 
diplomatic ties with the state of Israel in 1990. 
It should be pointed out that a great deal of active political and social 
support is provided by a number of Greek socialist, communist, as well as human 
rights groups, organisations, and Workers' Unions. A Palestinian cultural 
festival, for example, (held 7-13 June 2002) was organised under the general 
auspices of a group promoting relations between Athens and Palestine with the 
co-operation and financial support of numerous Greek labour and cultural 
organisations, such as the General Coalition of Greek Workers (GSEE), the 
Centre for Research on Equality Issues and the Greek Film Centre. It illustrates 
the coming together of diverse groups with different interests around the 
Palestinian cause. There are also demonstrations and charity events, which 
although occur at regular intervals, also appear to be linked to specific events in 
the Middle East, such as the war in Iraq and the two Intifadas in Palestine. 
Groups such as the Socialist Workers, their publications and newspapers, local 
representatives of pan-European forums and groups such as the European Social 
Forum that were bom out of the anti-capitalist protests and issues of Seattle and 
Genoa are leading the support for Palestinians in Greece. The Palestinian cause 
is also often perceived as uniting the Left (Sifakakis 2002). There are Greek 
advocacy networks in place that work together in varying degrees with the 
Palestinian diaspora, but also on their own, to promote and encourage support for 
Palestinians in the mass media and to influence Greece's (and possibly Europe's) 
leaders. There are strong drives by these groups for financial assistance to 
Palestinians in Palestine through fundraising activities, such as a Greek- 
Palestinian campaign to save Palestinian trees and the 'I euro for the children of 
Palestine' appeal partially organised by the GSEE. Summer camps for 
Palestinian children, brought over from Palestine have also been organised and 
there is a campaign to support and raise money for Palestinians held in Israeli 
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jails. This support for Palestinians within Greece also potentially spills into the 
European socialist scene via Greek groups with European affiliation. 
It seems that Greek support of Palestinians is continuing and perhaps 
increasing. One only has to look at the reception in Greece in June 2002 of the 
two exiled Palestinians who were besieged by Israeli troops in the Church of the 
Nativity, in Bethlehem. As one of them stresses, in an interview with 
Athanasiadis (2002): "We left Palestine and we arrived in Palestine. The Greeks 
received us with warm hospitality". Athanasiadis (2002) reiterates that Greece is 
one of Europe's most pro-Palestinian countries, pointing out that: 
Athens ... 
has been displaying enthusiastic support in recent months 
particularly after Israel's re-occupation of se4f-rule areas in the West 
Bank and Gaza on the 29'h March. A recent gallop poll revealed that 
94% of Greeks were against Israel's recent invasion of the occupied 
West Bank, 85% held a negative opinion of Ariel Sharon and 89% 
supported Palestinian Authority Chairman Yasser Arafat. 
With the advent of a conservative government in 2004, however, it remains to be 
seen whether overt official and public support for Palestinians will continue in 
the same way. 
One always has to keep in mind this crucial contextual information and 
support and the effects it has had on Palestinian lives and identities in Athens. 
The favountism towards Palestinians is also made all the more interesting given 
the somewhat negative attitude of the Greek government and public towards 
migrants generally. What it does illuminate potentially, however, is how political 
institutions, NGOs and officials can have mutually beneficial relationships with 
migrants and those in diaspora. It is important to consider how both individuals 
and groups get involved in such relationships and what the outcomes are 
for all 
parties involved. Certainly support for Palestinians is linked to many 
factors, but 
one must not forget the (uneven) power structures and relations in place and 
how 
different groups and people 'play the game' to get what they want, in terms of 
support for their particular goals, which is often very 
hard to uncover. Crucially, 
this support does not mean that all Palestinians in Athens are treated 
fairly and 
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feel politically included. Even if as a group Palestinians are not overly 
discriminated against , it is one thing for them to be supported and quite another 
for them to feel able to participate politically in Greece and to have a say in the 
political, social and economic decisions that affect their lives and those of 
Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza. However, this case study may be able to 
illustrate how such positive relationships between Greeks and Palestinians have 
influenced Palestinian notions of home and belonging as well as their tendencies 
towards political advocacy and feelings of empowerment. 
This research on the Palestinian diaspora in Athens attempts to add to 
research on Palestinians living in diaspora outside the context of the Middle East, 
which tend to be neglected in existing studies. There do not appear to be clear- 
cut trends in the nature of Palestinian identities, feelings of politicisation and 
experiences of political action and advocacy throughout Europe. Although this 
rightly suggests the diversity of the Palestinian diaspora, it also points to the fact 
that more research is necessary to understand these differences. These may be 
dependant on a number of factors. These include the level of host country 
support for the Palestinian cause, the make-up of particular communities (in 
terms of age, gender, class and generation), the nature and intensity of cross- 
border connections to the homeland, as well as networks between those in 
diaspora, the host society and other migrants and refugees. In addition, the 
ability (and desire) of those in diaspora to obtain citizenship, permanent 
residency or asylum may also be important. 
The use of Athens and Greece as a destination of part of the Palestinian 
diaspora may shed some light on some of these issues, as there are particular 
factors to consider here. To reiterate points raised above, Greece is the closest 
European Union country to the Middle East and there have been close relations 
between Greek and Palestinian leaders such as Yasser Arafat in the past. Popular 
(and to a lesser extent, political) support for the Palestinian cause remains high. 
Greek national identity appears to be closely guarded. As a result, non-Greeks 
find it hard to obtain Greek citizenship and asylum seekers find it even harder to 
claim asylum. There also appear to be intense symbolic and material cross- 
border connections between Greece and Palestine as well as the Middle East. 
Such factors may influence Palestinian identities and understandings of 
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difference as well as perceptions and realities of inclusion and exclusion, 
political participation and activism within Greece. 
It is important to understand how these specific factors merge and 
influence diasporic Palestinian identities and politicised actions in Athens. At the 
same time, one of the alms of this research is for it to be applicable and of use in 
understanding other diasporic and migrant groups who may have to deal with 
similar issues. In particular, it can add to vital knowledge on the interlinkages 
between 'Identity' and politicisation as well as the ways in which such peoples 
negotiate everyday identities in relation to and as a consequence of 
(im)mobilities, territorial attachments (and detachments), political affiliations 
and (dis)unities. 
Outline of thesis 
This thesis is divided into eight chapters. Having introduced the aims of this 
research and provided contextual information concerning the Palestinian 
diaspora, Chapter Two outlines the key ideas, theories and debates that inform 
and underlie the thesis. A synopsis of the main methodologies employed follows 
in Chapter Three, where the importance of positionality and reflexivity are also 
discussed. Chapters Four to Seven form the analysis of this thesis, in which 
politicised, hybrid and strategic notions of 'Palestinian-ness' are critically 
explored using the empirical findings of this research. Perceptions of home, 
belonging and the realities of living 'in-between' are dealt with in Chapter Four, 
whilst Chapter Five focuses on strategic and collective constructions of 'unity', 
"shared consciousness' and 'community' tensions. The last two analytical 
chapters attempt to explicitly link Palestinian identities to the realities and 
processes of citizenship, representation, resistance and advocacy. Chapter Six 
discusses the coupling and decoupling of citizenship and 'national identity'. 
Chapter Seven focuses on perceptions and realities of opportunities and 
hindrances within contested diasporic spaces in terms of political activism (in the 
form of advocacy) as well as feelings of resistance and empowerment. Chapter 
Eight brings together the major themes and findings of this research in order to 
highlight its intellectual significance within human geography and beyond. 
32 
Chapter 2 
Theoretical perspectives: debating notions of diaspora, hybridity, 
postcolonialism, 'identity' and nationalism 
In its endeavour to understand and explore the constructions and 
negotiations of identities and political actions of the Palestinian 
diaspora in Athens, this research uses a number of differentl but linked 
theories. To begin with, a brief outline of globalisation and cross- 
border connections and their underlying relevance to the research are 
given. The sections that follow discuss how this thesis is approaching 
and using concepts of postcolonialism, hybridity, diaspora, nationalism 
and citizenship in order to interrogate notions of 'Identity'. 
Cross-border connections: grounding the global 
This research is based on the idea that the global and the local co-exist in 
people's everyday lives in surprising, confusing and ambivalent ways, but that at 
the same time, there are many different opportunities and hindrances that 
culminate in lives, feelings, actions and spaces that are not only hybrid and 'in- 
between% but also grounded and situated. As Al Ali (2002: 100) stresses: "it 
seems imperative to ground transnational practices firmly in material 
circumstances and avoid getting lost in post-modem landscapes of elusive hybrid 
nomads and cosmopolitans". It is important, therefore, to carry out in-depth 
geographical research that is able to analyse the complexities of the endless 
conjunctions and enmeshing of times and spaces for real people. 
If the contemporary world is characterised by movement, globalisation 
and migration, the spaces created and identities negotiated in the process also 
need to be re-theonsed in terms of the connections people, migrants and those in 
diaspora have with each other. Transnational and cross-border networks can be 
seen as integral parts of transnational and diasporic communities as they are a 
major way that perceptions of collective and shared identities are articulated and 
grounded (Vertovec 2001). Migrants and those in diaspora are being increasingly 
connected with one another through mass communication and transport. As a 
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result, there are ever increasing opportunities for the 'here' and the 'there' to 
actually come together via networks and linkages between people and places, 
within people's minds, symbolically as well as virtually and materially through 
physical connections. The symbolic relevance of the transgressive qualities of 
networks I in motion', therefore, must not be forgotten in terms of people's actual 
lives. As Yeoh and Huang (2000: 414) point out: "These networks are not only 
imagined ties of a shared past or future, or connecting flows of cultural ideas and 
icons, but also embodied networks between groups of people. " It seems that 
networks imply movement, unlimited flows between spaces, an endless joining 
and crisscrossing web of times and spaces that have to be untangled and traced. 
According to Portes et al. (1999: 219), what are truly new aspects of 
transnationalism (and of diaspora) "are the high intensity of exchanges, the new 
modes of transacting and the multiplication of activities that require cross-border 
travel and contacts on a sustained basis". 
The ability of people and groups to become involved in transnational or 
diasporic political practices are seen as potentially enabling an increase in rights 
and benefits for both groups and individuals and the ability to resist and effect 
changes to their lives. As Guarnizo and Smith (1998: 19) also stress, "politically 
organised transnational networks and movements also weld together 
transnational connections by constituting structures of meaning". An example of 
such 'structures of meaning' include 'principled issue networks' attempting to 
advance such causes as political and human rights and environmental protection, 
which are not limited to physical mobility, but are dependent on the symbolic 
exchange of cultural objects and commodities, as well as social and monetary 
interchanges in the form, for example, of remittances. Keck and Sikkink (1999: 
90) point out that advocacy networks are able "to 'frame' issues to make them 
more comprehensible to target audiences, to attract attention and encourage 
action and to 'fit' with favourable institutional venues". They point out that such 
networks can be understood as political spaces in which "differently situated 
actors negotiate formally and informally the social cultural and political meaning 
of their joint enterprises" (ibid. ). At the same time, it 
is interesting to note 
Melucci's (1989: 71) observations of the existence of "submerged networks or 
latent social movements of people who are not consciously part of a movement, 
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but who are innovating or talking to each other". For Melucci, social movements, 
change, resistance and empowerment are woven into the fabric of everyday life, 
and are based on "the capacity and will [of people] to re-appropriate space and 
time" (ibid. ). In this way, the processes of being political and being politically 
active may not be overtly realised but are dependent on daily cross-border 
networks of migrants and those in diaspora. 
Cross-border networks and their consequences in terms of advocacy and 
empowerment need to be carefully analysed in such a way that their 
connectedness and consistency, as well as autonomy and disconnectedness 
(Castells 1996), are brought to the surface. Networks connect, but they can do so 
unevenly. The power relations involved are extremely hard to pin down because 
of the grounded and unbounded nature of power (Radcliffe 1999) yet 
understanding how people and places are involved in such power flows and 
inequalities is crucial. Networks operate at and across numerous and integrating 
scales that are "radically relational" (Howitt 2002), as well as situated, allowing 
alternative more flexible and dynamic theorisations of the local and the global in 
which the actions of both those in power and those disempowered or resisting 
can be explored (Perreault 2003). 
Connections and networks allow people to maintain constant imagined and 
concrete links with others, 
offering us different possibilities for how to re-locate ourselves. On 
the one hand, connections (in the imagining of self, sameness or 
difference) can make us more certain of our own identities and thus 
foster an insular sense of 'us' versus 'them'. On the other hand, 
connections offer us new possibilities ofsharing in difference through 
interaction. (Valentine 1999: 58) 
This is why conceptualisations of boundary crossings and movement are so 
important. Cross-border connections allow new and varied ways of thinking 
about spatial interactions because of the implicit relevance to people's lives. This 
is not only how the local and the global are connected, but also how both can be 
visuallsed together in ways that allow people to be constructed as subjects and 
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agents of change. At the same time, researchers such as Hanafi (2005) dealing 
with diasporic communities, are concerned about the factors that inhibit the 
creation and continuation of real and virtual networks and connections both 
within the host country and to the homeland. The importance of boundedness 
and unboundedness to migrants and those in diaspora must also be taken into 
account as they may feel connected and disconnected, attached and detached to 
the homeland and host country as a result of the nature and intensity of their 
cross-border networks. 
This research is embedded in current theorisations and lived experiences of 
globalisation. The world is perceived as becoming increasingly connected, with 
people living out lives that are physically separate but joined via technology and 
mass communications. As a result, distances between places appear to be 
shrinking and spaces are increasingly interlapping (see, for example, Appadurai 
1990; Giddens 1990 and Harvey's 1990 concept of time-space compression). 
This view of the world as coming together must also, however, be 
counterbalanced. For example, Hannerz (1996: 19) stresses: "globalisation has to 
be brought down to earth" so that such abstract theories are made relevant to the 
concrete everyday realities of people's lives. This is why careful analysis of the 
ways in which globalisation and cross-border connections are affecting 
perceptions of home, belonging and the relationships between 'identity' 
negotiations and citizenship are particularly important (Croucher 2004). The 
nature of poststructuralist and post-modem celebrations of hybridity, 
heterogeneity, fluidity and diversity, which allow a re-conceptualisation and 
deconstruction of arbitrary categories, may be attractive. However, the danger is 
that a dependence on the theoretical may not be matched by practical research 
that is aimed at understanding how people are trying to create what they see as 
change for the better, or are trapped within uneven power relations. It is much 
easier to theorise on the radical potential that living 'in-between' can have in 
terms of postcolonial resistance, as Bhabha (1994) has done, but it is another 
matter to carry out grounded, messy and complicated research on real people. 
Such in-depth qualitative research on the everyday is necessary to show 
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our cultural insights and our attention to everyday practice and the 
relations ofpower and illuminate how the operations ofglobalisation 
are translated into cultural logics that inform behaviour, identities 
and relationships. (Ong 1999: 22) 
The concepts of globalisation and cross-border networks may help to 
explore notions and realities of diasporic existence as both focus on the nature 
and effects of boundaries and movement of people. The idea of diaspora, in 
particular, denotes and stresses networks of sharing, familiarity, 'co- 
responsibility' (Werbner 2000) and belonging that extend well beyond the 
realms of defined countries. The term 'cross-border' connections and networks 
may portray the realities of those in diaspora better than the term 'transnational' 
if one is aiming to think 'beyond the nation-state' and conceptualise a 
globalising world. The presence of intense cross-border networks (both symbolic 
and material) between Greece and Palestine (as well as other Middle Eastern 
countries) form the basis for the analysis of Palestinian lives and 'Palestinian- 
ness , in Athens as diasporic and hybrid. Rather than scrutinise in detail the 
networks that exist, this research aims to uncover the results of such networks in 
terms of their influences and effects on cultural, social and political constructions 
of 'Palestinian-ness', home, belonging, 'shared consciousness' and political 
advocacy in diasporic spaces. 
Postcolonial perspectives 
This research uses postcolonialism as an important underlying framework in 
tandem with diaspora, in an attempt to carry out research that brings together 
theoretical and practical aspects of Palestinian lives and identities in Athens. 
Postcolonial perspectives are crucial to this research as they potentially allow the 
theorisation of people's lives and experiences as marginalised and silent, as well 
as empowered and resistant. Postcolonial theories stress the recognition of the 
former and the imminent possibility of the latter for people affected by 
colonialism and other forms of oppression. Postcolonial perspectives also force 
us to re-think notions of 'authenticity', pure/native 'Identity' and their 
relationships with politicisation and political action. Although there are 
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numerous strands of postcolonial theory, there are certain themes that appear to 
be prevalent. Many of the debates on postcolonialism are literary based and 
apart from brief introductions to the main ones, I am more concerned with the 
relevance of such debates to my research. These are discussed first, followed by 
an examination of how human geographers have used such theories in their 
research. 
Postcolonial perspectives insist on the reworking and deconstructing of 
homogenous western knowledges, assumptions and ways of looking at the 
world. Implicit in this is the importance of allowing voices that have been 'lost' 
or suppressed by colonisers to be heard, and in the process, a reassertion and re- 
creating of a 'hidden' past has the potential to materialise. This does not mean, 
however, a return to an essentialised 'native' or traditional 'pure' culture 
unadulterated and uncontaminated by colonialism and the West. Rather, it has to 
be remembered that all cultures are hybrid (Hall 1990) and are constantly 
changing (Brydon 1995) as the local and the global, the past and the present 
interact. Said (1978; 1994) reminds us of this and the dangers of essentialising 
people and cultures who are deemed to be somehow different as 'Other'. This is 
what he claims the West has been and is still guilty of According to Said, the 
'Orient',. which symbolises those cultures alien to the West, has been 
constructed, represented and portrayed systematically in stereotypical and 
simplistic ways in literature and in the mass media, for example, a tendency that 
continues to this day. The outcome of this has been the formation of pervasive 
discourses of imperialist domination over such people and places, creating unjust 
and unequal relations of power. Such artificial 'imaginary geographies' can have 
ighlight the importance potentially very real and devastating consequences and hi 
of the issue of representation. 
A major consideration within postcolonialism is the voices of colonised 
people. This means that postcolonial theories must be historical, politicised and 
self-aware in their projects. These three facets help facilitate the processes of 
representation and agency of such peoples. This has to occur because of the 
continuing effects of past colonialism and present occupations, such as those in 
Palestine (Young 2001). It is only through recognition that the past and the 
present are inextricably tied that the manifestations of the past can be actively 
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dealt with and resisted. Postcolonial perspectives force past histories to occupy 
awkward positions in the present, so that the two occupy an uneasy co-existence, 
which can lead to potential resistance and recovery of alternative visions, 
memories and experiences. Such perspectives are particularly relevant in terms 
of research with groups such as Palestinians who are arguably still under colonial 
occupation and who are constantly materially and immaterially dealing with past 
and present domination, displacement and exile (Young 2001; Sidaway 2000). 
As Jacobs (1996: 22) stresses: "diasporic groups ... still 
face the force of neo- 
colonial formations and live lives shaped by the ideologies of domination and the 
practices of prejudice established by imperialism". 
Above all, perhaps, the relevance of postcolonial theories is their 
optimism and hope for social change through resistance and agency. Colonial 
and postcolonial worlds and realities are constantly clashing and merging. The 
4post' in postcolonial does not mean we live in a world free from the clutches of 
colonialism and oppression. Both continue to exist on a considerable scale. 
Rather, by seeing the world as postcolonial, people are enabled and empowered 
to visualise and recreate their lives and pasts without the often-destructive and 
overwhelming influences of colonial and Western stereotypical representations 
and knowledges. In the process, there is the possibility for unravelling prevailing 
power inequalities between people and places as the subversive and the 
ambivalent are forced to appear, albeit in partial and confusing ways. The ways 
in which people do come together and potentially feel united in order to resist 
have to be explored. Such strategic affiliations and negotiations demonstrate how 
people can feel 'the same' or share similar ideas and at the same time, are 
different, with their own dynamic hybrid, and ambiguous constructions,, feelings 
and actions. To this end, Ashcroft et al. (1995: 56) point out that "the value of 
postcolonial discourse is that it provides a methodology for considering the 
dialogue of similarity and difference". Minh-ha (1991) also stresses the 
importance of understanding and locating the concept of being the same yet 
different in terms of identities, and of being both insider and outsider, ideas 
which are crucial for understanding the dynamic and also momentarily 
fixated 
relations between people and places. 
39 
As a set of frameworks, postcolonial theories might allow the local and 
the global to come together, so that the interconnected local and global spaces 
and networks of diasporic lives can be traced and untangled in ways that are not 
merely relativist. The world is a heterogeneous place in which to live, but people 
are placed in it in very different, uneven ways. An emphasis purely on 
postmodem diversity and difference is seen to ignore this and the ways in which 
certain people and groups pursue and maintain power, but also resist and are 
agents of change (Sardar 1998). People are not necessarily passive recipients of 
colonial authority. Thus, it is seen as imperative that a 'subject' be formed to act 
as a starting point from which to posit change. This subject is an agent of change, 
similar to the notion of the 'subaltern' born out of the Subaltern Studies group in 
India in an attempt to understand and empower India's 'peasant consciousness'. 
Such voices which have not been heard before are, however, neither necessarily 
coherent nor unified, and will have been affected in some manner by 
imperialism, something that must always be recognised (Spivak 1988). 
It is not enough to simply document or recover lost or marginallsed 
voices, although this is important. Without sustained research into how people 
become and continue to feel marginalised and disempowered as well as how they 
are able to improve their situation through processes of resistance, the elite 
groups and networks of power that exist would continue unchallenged. 
Encouraging such people who have not been heard before to speak out and have 
an audience can potentially allow past and present injustices and everyday 
realities and difficulties to be recognised, allowing them to become empowered 
(subjects'. This is particularly important for groups such as the Palestinians who 
feel that their histories (especially in the years before and after the founding of 
the state of Israel) have been silenced in official Israeli discourses (Farah 2003: 
9). This has led to several attempts to 'rewrite' Israeli and Palestinian histories so 
that not only can the voices of those whose lives were severely affected be heard, 
but also to make the Israeli state accountable for the problems it has created for 
Palestinians. ' It is only through such efforts that present Palestinian claims for 
self-deten-nination, the Right of Return and compensation can be understood and 
1 For more on the work of the so-called 'New Israeli Historians' see, for example, Ragan and 
Shlaim (2001), Pappe (1999) and Morris (1987). 
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acted upon. The question remains of how to represent this 'subject I in ways that 
are not dominating, homogenising or stereotypical. There have been those who 
have argued that any contact with such 'subjects' by researchers based in 
Western institutions taints the representation process as such research is 
inextricably tied to Western knowledges and ways of seeing and understanding 
the world (Parry 1995). After all, it is these uneven power relations that 
postcolonialisin is trying to dismantle. Representation is always a difficult issue 
that confronts not only the researcher or intellectual but also individuals and 
groups who are situated, grounded and engaged in constant subjective 
positionings between times/spaces and past/present/future. For the researcher, 
issues of representation are always pertinent and problematic and one way to 
partially overcome them is by being vigilant and transparent about one's own 
positionality during and after the research process. 
The importance given to a stable, identifiable and distinct 'identity' seen 
as necessary for processes of political resistance and empowerment forms part of 
the implicit and difficult relationship between coloniser/colonised. Central to this 
is the problem of constructions of 'home' and belonging. Nation-states are often 
seen as the rightful and accepted 'homes' of identities (or 'national identity'). 
This is problematic and especially so when one considers the vast array of 
past/present colonialisms, occupations, imperialisms, oppressions that one could 
perceive as affecting almost all peoples materially or symbolically at some point 
in time/space. These oppressions very possibly do not appear to be immediately 
located within the current configuration of nation-states but could be seen as 
being intricately related to them, as current territorial states may 'hide' past 
imperialisms, silencing, marginalisation and so forth. Yet the emphasis by 
postcolonial theories on the nation-state may potentially ignore such important 
relationships. As LeBlanc (2002: 25 1) suggests, we need to consider "the 
limitations of postcolonial theory and the necessity to rethink "space" outside the 
cultural and territorial confines of nationalist discourse. " In addition, one must 
also problematise (and not romanticise) liberation and resistance struggles that 
are based on simplistic, stereotypical relationships between 'identity', statehood 
and territory and consider the intense cross-border connections and power 
relations involved in the process within and beyond nation-states. 
41 
Bhabha (1994) provides us with extensive theorisations on the 
relationships between the colonial and postcolonial and in particular, the ones 
colonised people have with colonial as well as postcolonial realities. His work 
stresses how hybrid 'Third Space', situated 'in-between' the binary categories of 
colonial and postcolonial, of self and other, of 'here' and 'there', is able to mimic 
colonial authority and imperialism subversively because of its continuous 
(enigmatic questioning'. This ambivalence and mimicry, which is both part of 
and separate from colonialism, is what transforms people from 'abject objects' 
into 'subjects of history' (Young 2001: 355) who are potential agents of change. 
These are lives, times and spaces that are real, surreal, elusive and evade simple 
analysis, in a constant state of negotiation. As Young (1995: 27) stresses, 
hybridity "suggests the impossibility of essentialism". Rose (1995) argues that 
the potential in Bhabha's writing is radical because of its liminal and opaque 
nature, which refuses to be pinned down. His 'Third Spaces' are hybrid in the 
sense that they are both the same and other, the 'here' and the 'there' are brought 
together in an uneasy tension. There is no easy way to theonse difference: "space 
becomes something which itself must be made different" (Rose 1995: 369). 
What Bhabha does not do, however, is provide a way to relate this to real 
people's lives: "his spatialities remain analytic, not lived" (ibid.: 372) and are 
arguably, therefore, limited, for all their radical potential. The theoretical 
possibilities of Bhabha's writing, as well as other cultural and postcolonial 
writings have to be theorised in tandem with the practical, if their full potential is 
to be realised. Within this thesis, hybridity is used to denote the 'in-between- 
ness" of Palestinian lives and actions. It stresses their position as juxtaposed 
uneasily but also potentially powerfully between 'here' and 'there', between 
colonial and postcolonial worlds, where spaces/times merge and affect their 
everyday lives and identities in surprising, ambivalent and confusing ways. 
Postcolonial theories have also been criticised for being overly focused 
on the literary and theoretical. As Brydon (1995: 141) points out: "literature 
cannot be confused with social action". Although understanding and 
deconstructing past resistance movements and histories are very important, 
istance and anti-colonial struggles must not be contemporary strategies of resi I 
forgotten, as they are still an integral part to many people's lives. As Palestinians 
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in Athens negotiate their 'Palestinian-ness' and advocate the Palestinian cause, 
they may also be seen as engaging in what could be called contemporary 
strategies of postcolonial resistance. Although they may physically live away 
from the site of colonialism, they are still connected to it symbolically (and often 
materially too). It is only through carrying out material research on precisely 
how people whose histories have been silenced and who have been marginalised 
go about the processes of resistance that the realities of postcolonial existences 
may emerge. This reiterates the fact that there are indeed many neo-colonial 
relations between countries and peoples and that subsequent uneven power 
relations and oppression are not issues that can be relegated to the past. 
This is where the importance of human geography lies. Human 
geographers are equipped, theoretically and practically to understand and explore 
the complexities and nuances of disjointed, hybrid and confusing colonial and 
postcolonial times and spaces that crisscross the past and the present, the old and 
the new, the here and the there. Mitchell (1997b) is critical of Bhabha's high 
levels of abstraction and removal from reality and is wary of premature 
celebrations of hybridity and in doing so she demonstrates the potential strength 
of a human geographical approach. Like Blunt (2005: 11), in her work on Anglo- 
Indian women, this thesis is concerned with the "material histories and 
geographies" of the Palestinian diaspora that whilst accepting the ability of 
hybridity to theoretically transgress borders, can ground it within real people's 
lives, feelings and experiences. In addition to this, despite having to recognise 
and deconstruct their own embeddedness in western, masculinist knowledges 
(McEwan 1998; Sidaway 2000), postcolonial geographies must not only "be 
alert to the continued fact of imperialism" (Sidaway 2000: 606), but also 
recognise that such geographies are the very spaces where such accepted and 
dominant geographical narratives can be potentially (dis)located. Geographers 
have stressed the importance of carrying out detailed, nuanced "historical and 
ethnographic studies of the diverse, material-cultural, multi-locale entanglements 
of [these] 'cognitive mappings' in situated theory/practice" (Cook and Harrison 
2003: 312, citing Katz 2001, Miller 2002 and Thrift 2000). Cook and Harrison 
(ibid.: 3 10) also discuss how research that is underpinned by postcolonial 
theories should be aimed at revealing, de- legitimi sing, de-centring and re- 
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materialising the alternative and hybrid "messy, mixed-up, interconnected nature 
of histories, geographies and identities" that have been "neatly 
compartmentalised and opposed in European [and other] colonial discourses". 
According to Blunt and Rose (1994) rethinking space as fragmented and 
fluid is crucial to postcolonial representations by feminist geographers. In the 
process, a more subjective and situated politics of location, which problematises 
essentialist and transparent conceptions of space, is made possible. Robinson 
(1995) extends this argument to consider the concept of 'speaking with' people 
from other places and cultures as a way to engage with the 'Other' and to find 
44postcolonial ways of producing understandings and knowledge" (ibid.: 218). 
Dwyer (2002) illustrates the pertinence of using postcolonial geographical 
research to explore issues of 'Identity' through a politics of positioning and 
negotiation. Her approach is useful because it demonstrates the particular 
applicability of postcolonialism within a geographical framework to 
contemporary concerns such as nationalism, home, homeland and belonging, 
which are of primary significance to this research. It is only through actual 
research on people's lives that this reflexivity and the historical and 
contemporary symbolic and material relations between researcher and researched 
and consequently between the colonised and coloniser can be revealed. Besio 
(2003: 31), for example, stresses the importance of being aware of power 
relations, subjectivities and dialogue between "the post and colonial as processes 
that intersect and form both places and subjects". She found that by engaging in 
research with people who have been subject to colonialism she "came to a 
gTeater understanding of colonialism's lingering effects on postcolonial 
interactions. " Through her ethnographic research, she came 'face-to-face' with 
the realities of postcolonial interconnections (ibid. ). 
Geographical research informed by postcolonial theories may also be 
particularly sensitive to the often competing, ambivalent, hybrid but also 
nationalist and potentially essentialist forms that postcolomal and diasporic 
spaces and identities may take on. Such research is able to search for and 
understand diversity and difference as well as collectivities and similarities as 
ways in which people construct and negotiate themselves as positioned, 
subjective and strategic, in-between colonial oppression and postcolonial 
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resistance. In this way, the homogenisation of 'identity' and 'solidarity' may be 
undermined, deconstructed or fractured. This can allow for individual and 
gendered expression, representation and flexibility whilst at the same time, 
enabling people to come together as groups and share knowledges, experiences 
and actions that may potentially change their lives for the better. Above all, 
perhaps it is important to locate "postcolonial geographies on the material, rather 
than on the solely textual or abstract terrains" and of moving beyond analyses of 
European imperialisms (Blunt and McEwan 2002: 6). If postcolonial theories are 
to remain contested and provisional (Nash 2002) by virtue of their deconstructive 
qualities, it is useftil for postcolonial geographies to interact with transnational 
and diasporic perspectives, so that the binaries of 'them' and 'us' constructed 
and implied in local and global interactions can be unsettled. 
Interrogating diaspora and trans nationalism 
Diaspora is often theorised together with transnationalism. As TOMO'lyan (1991: 4) 
notes, "diasporas are the exemplary communities of the transnational moment". 
Wahlbeck (1998: 14) has also described diaspora as "one real and lived 
transnational experience". Such approaches may also explain why the journal 
Diaspora has 'Journal of transnational studies' as its subheading. William Safran 
(1991: 83-84) provided the following definition of diasporas in the first issue of 
this j ournal: 
expatriate minority communities whose members share several of the 
following characteristics: 1) they, or their ancestors, have been 
dispersed from an original specific "centre " to two or more 
peripheral", orforeign, regions; 2) they retain a collective memory, 
vision, or myth about their original homeland - its physical location, 
history, and achievements; 3) they believe they are not - are perhaps 
cannot be - fully accepted by their host society and therefore feel 
partly alienated and insulatedfrom it; 4) they regard their ancestral 
homeland as their true, ideal home and as the place to which they or 
their descendants would (or should) eventually return - when 
conditions are appropriate; 5) they believe that they should 
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collectively, be committed to the maintenance or restoration of their 
original homeland and to its safety and prosperity; and 6) they 
continue to relate, personally or vicariously, to that homeland in one 
way or another, and their ethnocommunal consciousness and 
solidarity are importantly defined by the existence of such a 
relationship. 
Contemporary definitions of diaspora invariably revolve around these key 
aspects. Diaspora is thus often used to describe groups of people who feel they 
possess a shared 'ethnicity', 'culture' and traditions, have been displaced and are 
dispersed round the world. For example, Sheffer (1999) claims that new 'ethno- 
national diasporas' are emerging and Stack (1999) focuses on 'ethnic groups as 
emerging transnational actors". On the one hand, diaspora has become 
synonymous with celebrations of hybridity, 'travelling' or nomadic, fluid 
identities and living 'in-between' spaces and cultures. On the other hand, it has 
also been seen as the portraying 'closed' homogenous and stereotypical 'ethnic' 
and religious entities round the world (Werbner 1998), creating constructions of 
nationalism that may be exclusive or 'extreme' (Carter 2005) and that are based 
on more purist notions of a defined 'culture' and 'identity'. As Soysal (2000: 2) 
notes: "the dominant conceptualisations of diaspora presumptively accept the 
formation of tightly bounded communities and solidarities (on the basis of 
common cultural and ethnic references) between places of origin and arrival". 
Wimmer and Glick Schiller (2002: 324) also stress that: 
diaspora studies often trace dispersed populations no matter where 
they have settled, focusing on dynamics of interconnection, nostalgia 
and memory and identity within a particular population, relating 
them to a particular homeland. No longer confined to a territorially 
limited entity, the nation is extending across different terrains and 
places but nevertheless imagined as an organic, integrated whole. In 
this modus operandi, the nation-state building processes that impinge 
upon diasporic populations in various locations are usually 
overlooked. 
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Although Cohen (1999) has advocated the importance of a 'primordial 
identity', he has also described diasporas (1997: 2) as: 
positioned somewhere between nation-states and 'travelling 
cultures' in that they involve dwelling in a nation-state in a physical 
sense, but travelling in an astral or spiritual sense thatfalls outside 
the nation-state's spaceltime zone. 
Cohen's description here may be useful in part but it, like many other positive 
accounts of diasporas, ignores the ways in which diasporas construct collective 
identities and potentially self-essentialising or homogenising nationalisms 
through the processes of re-territonalisation, which need to be analysed in 
tandem with hybridity and fluidity. Although Carter's (2005) call for a 
geopolitics of diaspora to take such issues into account is useful, the notion of 
'ethnic identity' appears to be seen as given and unproblematic and is, therefore, 
reminiscent of Werbner's problem with how diasporas have been conceptualised. 
For Werbner (2000: 7) it is the daily materiality of diasporas that is important in 
order to bring together theoretical accounts (or diaspora aesthetics) and empirical 
accounts (or 'real' political mobilization) of diaspora so that they are "mutually 
constitutive". Werbner also goes on to stress that we must move beyond easy 
assumptions about such relationships and of using words such as 'solidarity' and 
'loyalty' to describe diasporic cultures and political activism. 
The strength of the notion of diaspora, as used in this thesis, lies 
somewhere in-between positive and negative depictions of diasporas, 
recognising that elements of both are important to diasporic existence. In 
particular, while this thesis views diasporic Talestinian-ness' as hybrid, fluid, 
multiple and dynamic, it is also very aware of the potentially homogenising 
constructions of collective 'national identity' that occur as strategic essentialisms 
in order to advocate causes and obtain rights and gain eventual statehood. As a 
result, it takes into account that processes of de-territonalisation and re- 
territorialisation, boundedness and unboundedness may be occurring. 
Diasporic identities are often seen as being constructed and negotiated as 
here and there, on multiple levels and as 'in-between'. Cultural interpretations 
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that emphasize and advocate the importance of hybridity and border crossings as 
ways to understand an increasingly globalised and interconnected world 
(Clifford 1997) are useful. As a result, identities are seen as hybrid (Bhabha 
1994), malleable, ever-changing representations and always in-the-making (Hall 
1990). Such views stress the incomplete, unstable and fluid nature of identities 
and cultures generally, insisting on the fallacy of hegemonic, artificial, all- 
encompassing boundaries put around people and places. As Lavie and 
Swedenburg (1996: 10) amongst many others (e. g. Said 1994, Welsch 1999) 
reiterate: "all cultures turn out to be, in various ways, hybrid". Therefore, it is 
important to conceptualise migrants and those in diaspora as being perpetually in 
movement and travelling (Yeoh and Huang 2000: 415). Anzaldua's (1987: 217) 
work on the hybrid border identities between Mexico and the US depicts the 
transgressive and empowering qualities of living and feeling 'in-between', 
whereby it is possible to define oneself inwardly by looking outwards without 
rigid 'identity' boundaries, in a dynamic, endlessly shifting world. This is 
perhaps best illustrated in the closing lines of her poem 'To live in the 
Borderlands means you': 
To survive the Borderlands 
you must live sinfronteras 
be a crossroads. 
Though Anzaldua's words and work are inspiring, life 'in the margins' is 
not necessarily easy. In emotional terms, as Said (1986: 63) points out, "every 
direct route to the interior, and consequently the interior itself, is either blocked 
or pre-empted. The most we can hope for is to find margins. " Hybrid lives and 
identities are, therefore, not necessarily unbounded: "diaspora journeys 
are ... neither purely emancipatory nor reactionary: 
instead they are provisional, 
dependant on the confluence of circumstances and continually elude foreclosure" 
and are "ridden with disruptions, detours and multidestinations" (Yeoh and 
Huang 2000: 415). In addition, the continuing and uneven forces of power and 
domination that affect people's lives need to be analysed (Guarnizo and Smith 
1998). The work of Glick Schiller et al. (1999) is a good example of an approach 
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that is sensitive to such considerations. They argue that migrants and those in 
diaspora are connected to more than one society simultaneously and that it is 
important to extend the bounded analytical categories of social science. Yet their 
approach also stresses the importance of recognising that dynamic experiences 
operate within a framework of a global capitalist system and of structural 
conditions that are given and beyond people's control, such as the nation-state. 
Thus. ) migrants and those in diaspora are perceived as both bounded and 
unbounded. It is important to re-iterate that while conceptually the notions of 
diaspora and transnationalism may enable us to transgress boundaries and 
counteract 'container concepts' of assimilation as migrants and those in diaspora 
are increasingly 'deterritonallsed' (Basch et al. 1994), at the same time "place 
continues to count" (Kivisto 2001). Migrants and those in diaspora are often 
grounded by material institutional, economic, political factors that can mean a 
denial of rights in their country of residence. As Ong (1999: 16) stresses: 
in our desire to find definite breaks between the territorially bounded 
and the deterritorialised, the oppressive and the progressive, and the 
stable and the unstable, we sometimes overlook complicated 
accommodations, alliances, and creative tensions between the nation- 
state and mobile capital, between diaspora and nationalism, or 
between the influx of immigrants and the multicultural state. Attention 
to specific histories and geopolitical situations will reveal that such 
simple oppositions between transnational forces and the nation-state 
cannot be universally sustained. 
Hybridity may theoretically involve a creative mix of old and new, of here 
and there, but as it is actively negotiated through time and space, it can be both 
easy and difficult for people to deal with. As a result, for those in diaspora, the 
notions of home and hybridity are often intertwined. The ambivalence and 
both 
complexity of such words should not detract from the very real II 
can have, practically, on people's lives, feelings and actions. 
It is important to 
understand diasporic perceptions and feelings of 
hybridity, home and belonging 
49 
as they can all play a large role in creating collective and politicised 
constructions of the homeland, 'solidarity' and 'shared consciousnessi. 
By studying those in diaspora we may also be better able or equipped to 
understand the changing relationships, power relations, ambivalences and 
tensions between people and places as they negotiate their contemporary and 
contextualised, historicized identities and collectivities across and within 
boundaries. According to Lindholm Schulz (2003: 9) diasporas need to have 
"strong collective images of the homeland" and she stresses that "diaspora 
requires a transnational existence -a dispersal and a diffusion throughout the 
world". By this, we can assume that what is needed in order to maintain the 
diaspora are cross-border connections as well as constructions of a unified 
(national identity" that link the diaspora to its homeland. In the process, 
assumptions are often made on the relationships between territory, 'identity', 
nationalism and often citizenship, where self-determination is seen as a goal. It 
is such assumptions that this thesis is seeking to better understand and explore. 
For those in diaspora, 'here' and 'there', past and present may come 
together uneasily and ambiguously as both exist within their lives 
simultaneously. As Soysal (2000: 2) notes: "diaspora is a past invented for the 
present, and perpetually laboured into shapes and meanings consistent with the 
present". The spaces those in diaspora create are a reflection of this 'in-between- 
ness", which at the same time may be seen as potentially useful for constructions 
of unifying and defining political and 'cultural unities'; however, they are also 
hybrid as they make sense of living 'here' in the present and a histoncized 
feeling of belonging 'there'. Diasporic activism and advocacy within the country 
of residence needs to be placed within this tension between constructing unities 
and dealing with disunities as well as within a need to advocate a cause 'here' 
that is inevitably linked to the homeland 'there'. Diasporic activism can, 
therefore, be seen as the merging of collective imaginings of belonging 'there' to 
the daily realities of living and being politicised and politically active 'here'. 
Despite the fact that diasporas are often seen as operating in the same 
way as transnationalism, if the homeland is not a distinct and defined nation- 
state, as in the case of Palestinians, feelings, networks and connections cannot be 
transnational in the sense that there is no Palestinian state at the other end. It is 
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for this reason that the notion of diaspora can be thought of as potentially more 
useful than transnationalism for the purposes of this research. If the notion of 
transnationalism is deconstructed, we come to realise that is based firmly within 
the realm of nation-states, hence, the idea of crossing or transgressing state 
boundaries or borders. It still very much sees the world as divided up into nation- 
states with their associated cultural and national identities, or as Wimmer and 
Glick Schiller (2002: 324) put it: "transnationalism studies ... reproduces the 
standard image of a world divided into nations and thus naturalizes this vision of 
the world in new forms". This in itself is unsurprising. The problem with 
transnational approaches and their bias towards the nation-state is perhaps their 
inability to examine how contemporary movements (metaphorically and 
physically) may be changing the nature of the state, or making the state in its 
present form problematic. For those displaced within diasporas, the need for 
national identity that can lead to nationalism and state formation or at least the 
ability to have a defined 'territory' they can call home and identify with has to be 
explored. Diasporic groups try to create specific political versions of their 
'identity' that they feel comfortable with and that can serve as 'fictive unity' 
(Robins and Aksoy 2001), which they may perceive as necessary in order to 
achieve the 'nationalism' they feel they must have in readiness for a future state. 
Far from being a static notion, 'Palestinian-ness' is understood here as 
being continuously negotiated in representations and articulations of differences 
and similarities within 'communities' in Greece and that such constructions are 
intimately tied up in evocations of and connections to the homeland. By linking 
an exploration of diasporic subjectivities with spaces where politicisation and 
advocacy may potentially occur, this research is able to examine the close 
connections between diasporic political, social and cultural constructions of 
'Palestinian-ness', diasporic activism in Greece and cross-border networks to 
(and imaginings of) the homeland. In the process, we may be able to gain a 
heightened understanding of how people in diaspora who are both in flux 
metaphorically or unbounded but often stationary physically (or 
bounded) are 
able to construct notions of belonging and identities that may enable the 
flexible 
and strategic use of time and space. 
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Problematising nationalism 
It is necessary to examine the notions of nationalism and 'national identity' in 
order to explain why this thesis does not use these terms to describe the complex 
processes of collectivity and 'shared consciousness' that Palestinians appear to 
be expenencing. Standardised definitions of nationalism and 'national identity' 
are provided first as a basis for subsequent interrogation. The nation-state 
appears to be a major institution goveming and organising people's lives today. 
Put simply, it is assumed that the people within it constitute a nation, who feel 
they belong to the nation-state. As Shapiro (2000: 80) notes: 
the primary understanding of the modern 'nation' segment of the 
i nation-state' is that a nation embodies a coherent culture, united on 
the basis of shared descent or, at least, incorporating a' eople' with p 
a historically stable coherence. 
This form of belonging to a nation-state is usually called nationalism. According 
to Smith (1999: 37), nationalism is: 
an ideological movement for the attainment and maintenance of 
autonomy, unity and identity of a human population, some of whose 
members conceive it to constitute an actual or potential 'nation'. By 
a 'nation', I mean a named human population sharing a historical 
territory, common myths and memories, a mass public culture, a 
single economy and common rights and dutiesfor all members. 
'National identity', assumed to be a prerequisite to nationalism, is seen as 
requiring collective imaginings in the form of imagined communities (Anderson 
1983), where a strong symbolic attachment to one another and the state must be 
imagined in order to create a shared sense of belonging and sustain a nation- 
state, which can no longer be maintained by traditional face-to-face contact. In 
order to create a 'national identity', however, a nation is assumed to exist: "the 
(nation"' is "a human group that is conscious of forming a community, sharing a 
common culture, is attached to a clearly demarcated territory, having a common 
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past and a common project for the future and claiming the right to rule itself' 
(Guibemau 2001: 242). 
The problem at the heart of such arguments is that it is assumed that there 
is a necessary and naturalised 'non-nal' relationship between territory, 'national 
identity' and citizenship, whereby 'national identity' is neatly located in a clearly 
demarcated and bounded nation-state. Wimmer and Glick Schiller (2002: 302) 
have noted that what they call 'methodological nationalism' is "the assumption 
that the nation/state/society is the natural social and political fonn of the modem 
world". It is such assumptions, they argue, that have deeply influenced academic 
theories within the social sciences and that may explain why "the lack of a 
temporal and spatial fit between state and nation is one of the main causes of 
many of today's national conflicts" (Smith 1999: 38). Despite the relevance of 
the homeland for diasporic and migrant populations, the fact that there are 
thousands of perceived homelands located in less than 200 nation-states needs to 
be taken into account. Allowing all indigenous groups with perceived homelands 
and rights to self-determination and statehood clearly would lead to chaos given 
the current configuration of nation-states. Yet, the mainstream and widely 
accepted notions of nationalism, 'national identity' and the nation-state would 
seem to suggest that such claims to self-detennination are not only justified but 
to be encouraged. This paradox is not only evident, but extremely problematic 
for both nation-states and those seeking nation-states as there is no way to 
resolve it given the current state of affairs. 
The ongoing situation in Israel/Palestine amongst many other locations, 
testifies to this endemic problem that will continue as long as the assumption that 
a 'national identity' needs a defined territory to realise a nation-state and that 
within a nation-state, there is one nation of people that belong exclusively to that 
nation-state. Khalidi (1997: 209) illustrates the salience of such issues when 
he 
asks the open-ended question of whether the limited success 
in creating a 
Palestinian 'identity' will "finally allow the achievement of self-determination, 
statehood, and national independence the modem world 
has taught us is the 
"natural state" of peoples with an independent national identity 
like the 
Palestinians". Statements such as this are justified by current understandings and 
uses of the relationships between 
'national identity', nationalism, and territorial 
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nation-states. Such relationships need to be theonsed together and are very 
important for those in diaspora, such as Palestinians who feel the need for self- 
detennination and statehood in which they may perceive their 'Identity' and 
rights can be protected. 
Constructions of nationalism amongst those seeking statehood have also 
been theonsed as responses to threats of violence or perceived 'antagonisms'. 
This is violence 
members of that not-yet-existent nation perceive as inflicted upon them 
by others who make it impossible for them to exist in anything other 
than an autonomous state. An antagonism, rather than threatening a 
pre-existing and seýflconscious entity, brings the community it 
threatens into being through that threat, and gives it shape and 
identity to what it threatens through placing it at risk. Perceptions of a 
violence afflicting a diverse range ofpersons give rise to a concept of 
a 'national enemy'and, through that concept, to the idea of solidarity 
with those whom that enemy opposes. 
(Bowman 2003: 319-20) 
This idea may add to our understanding of why some diasporic groups in exile 
come to feel the need for 'unity' and 'solidarity' (or what Bowman calls the 
'logic of mobilisation') and at the same time, how and why differences in 
'Identity' may be played out and accentuated as a result of feelings of insecurity 
and risk. Bowman goes on to comment on the repercussions of such nationalist 
imaginaries in terms of us/them relationships, where the world is perceived as 
"divided between the good, but threatened, community of an 'us' and the evil 
community of a 'them', existing solely to destroy that 'us"' (ibid.: 32 1). 
Deconstructing or interrogating nationalism can be seen as an attempt to 
understand why people within and without nation-states come to feel 'united' 
within a defined 'identity' as well as to appreciate the intricate and dynamic 
negotiations of tensions, conflicts, disunities, exclusions, inclusions, power 
relations that they undergo and have to deal with in the process. As Fine (1999: 
154) points out: "Nationalism is a fickle beast. In its best moods, it liberates 
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human beings from colonial oppression and unites people previously fragmented 
but it also excludes those deemed not to belong and demands the active assent of 
its 'own' nationals". Armstrong (1998) is also wary of nationalism, which he 
argues does not always constitute an 'imagined community' because "the idea of 
nationalism is complex and negotiable" and that "there are limits to 
generalisations about nationalism: it is a relative and situational phenomenon, 
each case being associated with particular places and times" (ibid.: 2-3). 
Nationalism can also potentially (and unsurprisingly) lead, therefore, to what 
Gilroy (1999) has called 'ethnic absolutism' or extreme forms of nationalism and 
purist constructions of 'identity' that can be seen behind tragic processes such as 
ethnic cleansing. Such violence and oppression can clearly not simply be 
relegated to non-Westem 'others'. As Wimmer and Glick-Schiller (2002: 307) 
remind us: 
what we nowadays call ethnic cleansing or ethnocide, and observe 
with disgust in the 'ever troublesome Balkans' or in 'tribalistic 
Africa' have been constants of the Euro ean history of nation 
building and stateformation, from the expulsion of the gypsies under 
Henry VIII or of Muslims and Jews under Ferdinand and Isabella to 
Ptolemy'S night in France or the ' eople exchange' (as it was called P 
euphemistically) after the Treaty of Lausanne between Turkey and 
Greece. 
For the study of those in diaspora, constructions and notions of 'national 
identity' and nationalism are crucial issues because they often highlight what is 
simplistic about general theories surrounding nationalism outlined at the 
beginning of this section. As the supposed advent of globalisation and mass 
migration appear to be changing the accepted state of affairs, some have argued 
that a better understanding of the 'new geography of globalisation' 
is needed. 
This is so that the complex relations between local and global, as well as 
'Identity' and place can be critically interrogated (Marden 1997). 
At the same 
time though, we need to understand concepts and processes such as nationalism, 
4national identity' and territorialisation (or attachment to a defined territory or 
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homeland) because diasporic populations in exile, such as Palestinians are often 
seen as trying to 'achieve' them. 
For diasporic peoples who are displaced, a homeland is usually perceived 
as crucial, because it supposedly acts as stronghold in a world of flux and is a 
starting point for definitions of 'Identity' and origin. In the absence of a concrete 
nation-state, it is often seen as the symbolic glue that holds people together. At 
the same time, this can also be a political project, because it is assumed that it is 
also the starting point for the creation and maintenance of Cnational identity', 
which will lead to nationalism and the 'nation', both of which are necessary 
prerequisites to constructions of 'unity', 'solidarity' and eventual statehood. As a 
construction, the homeland is open to interpretation and at the same time , it is 
open to manipulation by those in power who are creating official ideologies and 
discourses that are then disseminated. This may be similar to the way in which 
those in power use state nationalism to suit their own agendas (Annstrong 1998, 
citing Hobsbawm. 1983/1992; 1990). 
A 'shared consciousness' and shared history is perceived as being needed 
in order to bind and unite people. In the process, 'invented traditions' 
(Hobsbawm and Ranger 1983), as well as 'collective memories' (Said 2000) 
may be used. This is because the past is seen as crucial to the present: "appeals 
to the past are among the commonest of strategies in interpretations of the 
present" (Said 1994: 1). These appeals often become embedded as history as the 
linear and irrefutable truth and disguise the fact that history is relative, subjective 
and open to different interpretations. As Shapiro (2000: 80) notes: "the symbolic 
maintenance of the nation-state requires a management of historical narratives as 
well as territorial space". Groups or leaders can appropriate and propagate such a 
view of history in order to gain power and/or unite people. As a result, certain 
historical events and representations are favoured over others, which may be 
ignored (see, for example, Allan and Thompson 1999, on the time-space of 
'national' memory and Nuttall and Coetzee 1998, on the making of memory in 
South Africa). Although a detailed analysis of such issues is beyond the scope of 
this thesis, they are important to keep in mind. 
Nationalistic and unifying aspirations and sentiments may be 
understandable for those without access to state-based political rights or who 
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have been subject to occupation, discrimination or marginalisation. As outlined 
above, constructing nationalism or national identities may be perceived as a 
legitimate act, precisely because it is seen in practice in host states as a legitimate 
basis for nation-states and the citizenship that comes with it. Many argue that the 
nation-state remains important (Triandafyllidou 1998, Marden 1997) as it is 
perceived as the main way in which people can obtain rights. As Ong (1999: 15) 
points out: "the nation-state ... continues to 
define, discipline, control and regulate 
all kinds of populations whether in movement or in residence. " This is also why 
the state, nationalism and national identity have many opponents. Verdery (1994, 
quoted in Robins and Aksoy 2001: 708), succinctly summarises such concerns: 
the kind of seýflconsistent person who "has " an "identity" is a 
product of a specific historical Process: the process of modern 
nation-state formation... 'identities' are crucial tags by which state- 
makers keep track of their subjects: one cannot keep track ofpeople 
who are one thing at one point and another thing at another. 
Such sentiments and the changing relationships between individuals, groups and 
the state as a result of migration and globalisation have led to theorisations of the 
decoupling of citizenship and 'identity' (Isin and Wood 1999), the decline of the 
nation-state (Kearney 1999) and 'post-national membership' (Soysal 1994; 
2000). 'National identity' is problematic and contested and it is used throughout 
this thesis to denote that Palestinians in diaspora construct notions of collective 
belonging and attachment that may be exclusive or arbitrary. However, the term 
(shared consciousness' may be seen as a more apt description because it takes 
into account that feelings of belonging and attachment can be 
fluid, multiple, 
ambivalent as well as collective. It is important to interrogate 
how Palestinians 
are constructing 'shared consciousness'. In order to 
do this, we need to 
understand how Palestinians and those in diaspora operate as groups, as self- 
named communities whilst they negotiate similarities and 
differences amongst 
themselves. This allows us to explore the important issues of social, cultural and 
political representations, which can subsequently 
help explain activism and the 
advocacy of the Palestinian cause. 
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Debating 'unities': tensions and representations 
Robins and Aksoy (2001) dismiss the use of the notion of 'imagined 
community' to describe the experiences of Turkish Cypriots in London. Instead, 
they focus on a form of individualism that they have borrowed from Anthony 
Cohen, which seeks to "elicit and describe the thoughts and sentiments of 
individuals which we otherwise gloss over in the generalisations we derive from 
collective social categories" (Robins and Aksoy 2001: 688, citing Cohen 1994). 
Such a pin-pointing and elevation of the individual could be seen as necessary in 
order to capture the diversity and complexity of human existence but ignores 
how people may perceive themselves as sharing feelings of belonging and 
attachment/detachment. It may be true that categories such as 'community' are 
generalising but research still needs to be carried out on the processes of 
communal (as well as individual) relations. Only then can we begin to 
understand how people begin and continue to see themselves as part of groups, 
collectives, societies and countries, however homogenising such spaces and 
unities may be. It is individuals who are thinking and acting within groups and 
by looking at individuals in relation to each other as well as time and space, we 
may be able to trace power inequalities and define issues that may marginalise 
and exclude people. Here, one is reminded of the debates within postmodernism, 
between increasing fragmentation and individualisation and the ability of people 
to put differences aside and construct unities for political purposes. Both appear 
to be salient and occurring at the same time. 
The naming of groups as 'Palestinian' or 'Turkish Cypriot' and so forth 
recognises the implicit tendency for researchers and those in diaspora to define 
and essentialise. Such labels, which unfortunately become associated with 
distinct cultures and traditions, have to be accepted but also eventually 
interrogated. Particularly for those in diaspora, the construction of themselves as 
similar (and being able to potentially overcome differences) can often be seen as 
empowering and desirable (for example, see Valins 2003 on the 'stubborn 
identities' of ultra orthodox Jews in Manchester) but can also be marginalising. 
Group 'identity' politics and activism (and associated overlooking of 
differences) are often perceived as necessary within diasporas who have 
messages or causes they would like to see addressed by various actors and 
58 
institutions. At the same time, such group 'solidarities' risk homogenising 
differences and can be potentially exclusionary for those who fall outside certain 
'Idealised' ways of being and acting. The same is equally true for constructions 
of 'national identity'; indeed the complex issues of similarities and differences 
and constructions of 'them' and 'us' are endemic to all populations living 
together and are often very hard to resolve. Such themes are crucial for those in 
diaspora as they are engaged in a continuous struggle in terms of how to 
represent themselves and how they are being represented to others, as well as 
how to deal with differences that come up, in a way that does not jeopardise their 
cause. 
It has been established that it is often seen as necessary for groups of 
people to come together and agree on certain issues, as this is the way that they 
can get their messages across. This is where the notion of 'community' is seen as 
useful. It is viewed as a form of collective belonging, within which the group and 
individuals' identities are negotiated, constructed and represented. It is important 
to remember that "it is through the active construction of representations of 'the 
community' that members have a sense of commonality, shared purpose, 
'interest' and so on" (Kahani-Hopkins and Hopkins 2002: 289). This means 
"representations of collective identity are anything but neutral for they are bound 
up with recruiting support for particular political strategies" (ibid. ). Communities 
can create imagined homogenous spaces, in which there are conflicting identities 
and tensions, both within and between them (Valentine 2001: 136) and the 
utopian ideal of local communities has been criticised for this emphasis on unity 
over difference (Young 1990). They are not necessarily anti-assimilationist, free 
of "ideologies of purity" (Clifford 1997: 251) or nationalist projects. However, 
the notion of 'community' itself is contested and open to varying interpretations 
(Delanty 2003). Senses of community can also be ambivalent and uncertain 
(Radcliffe 1999: 37). Goldring (1999: 167-68) for instance, argues that the idea 
of community is about shared history and identity and "mutually intelligible 
meanings" and that for "meaning to be contested (within a community), there 
must be some degree of intelligibility within which to struggle over meaning". 
To create 'shared consciousness' and 'unity', diasporic identities are seen 
as being constructed and negotiated collectively on the basis of selected, 
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potentially ideallsed 'non-ns' of behaviour or unifying causes. At the same time, 
it is important to remember that: 
transnational migrants forge their sense of identity and their 
community, not out of a loss or mere replication, but as something 
that is at once new andfamiliar -a bricolage constituted of cultural 
elementsfrom both the homeland and the receiving nation. 
(Kivisto 2001: 568) 
Their identities may, therefore, be perceived as 'in-between' as well as strategic. 
For Kennedy and Roudometof (2001: 9,17), "communities are units of 
belonging whose members perceive that they share moral, aesthetic/expressive or 
cognitive meanings, thereby gaining a sense of personal as well as group 
identity" and although this can put up boundaries between who is seen as a 
member and who is not, "communities ... are consciously constructed and 
continuously reinvented". Thus, the notion of 'community' can "become a 
collectivity which is actively struggled over rather than passively received" 
(Dwyer 1999: 54) and where "communities are imagined contingently and 
constructed through debate, dialogue and are fluid and changing" (ibid. ). As Hall 
(1999: 303,302) points out: "Identities are not an essence but a positioning". 
Hence, there is always a "politics of position" which "far from being externally 
fixed in some essentialised past ... are subject to the continuous 
'play' of history, 
culture and power". However, in the process, people may essentialise their 
'imagined communities I in order to create change. Werbrier (1997: 248) argues 
for "sel f-essentiali sing as a mode of reflexive imagining" that is "constitutive of 
self and subjectivity", which can create solidarities that are empowering and 
resistant without being racist or xenophobic and that are negotiated and 
performed in private and public diasporic spaces, often hidden from view. 
Alleyne (2002: 609) also stresses that: "identities based in ethnic communities 
have often proved to be politically useful, to provide a sense of solidarity in the 
face of political and social exclusion". 
On the one hand, fragmented identities of difference and diversity in the 
postmodern sense are important. On the other 
hand, the ab1lIty of people wIthin 
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groups to hold multiple and segmented identities and engage in a 'politics of 
sameness" and 'difference' (Nagel 2002), or to position themselves differentially 
over time and space, is also significant. This does not mean necessarily that 
people are homogenising into some essential 'Identity' or 'pure' nationalism, but 
that personal differences in opinion and perception may be put aside at certain 
moments and spaces in order to come together for specific socio-political 
reasons. In the process, different times and spaces are brought together, forcing 
us to re-think how people who may be very different can come together because 
of similarities that are constructed and maintained globally, transgressing 
borders. It may mean, however, that certain aspects of a culture are stressed or 
highlighted as being ideal or unique to that group of people, thereby representing 
or displaying such attributes as 'authentic', as a way to preserve a feeling of 
cultural uniqueness, or feelings of belonging. This stresses the importance of the 
"situational nature of identity construction" which leads to "negotiation 
strategies" that cannot be ignored (Matthews 2002: 77-8). As Lindholm Schulz 
(2003: 204) points out, people 'pick and choose' their identities. Understanding 
and examining such positionings and strategies can lead to the (always partial) 
uncovering of power inequalities, as well as the positive and negative aspects 
is within diasporic groups that can have a large impact on people's lives. Thi 
could help explain how people actually deal with being themselves as dynamic, 
positioned and situated individuals as well as being part of a wider group and 
having to ascribe to a certain acceptable and definable 'Identity'. The themes at 
the heart of this discussion seem to be the representation and negotiation of 
similarities and differences on an individual as well as collective basis, which are 
key components of any dialogue on gToup and society dynamics. The core issue 
of such debates appears to be a disjuncture between those who believe or assume 
there are distinct (primordial' cultures to which people can relate (Cohen 
1999) 
and, therefore, belong (hence the use of notions such as multiculturalism) and 
more postmodern ideas on hybridity and identities as constantly in-the-making 
and situated over time and space. 
2 
2 Such postmodern and poststructuralist ideas 
do not seem to have had an impact on 
. 
policy- 
making, because if taken to their natural conclusion can potentially 
lead to fragmentation and 
disunity, to which there are no easy solutions. In addition, as 
Wimmer and Glick Schiller (2002: 
326) note: "the task is to determine what reductions of complexity will 
make best sense of the 
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For those in diaspora, the search for belonging and shared 'community' 
attachments may be difficult but also even more salient, as they may be more 
prone to feelings of insecurity and vulnerability. Constructing a 'national 
identity' or strategic 'ways to be/act' may be perceived as a solution or as 
desirable, in order to unite a disparate and fTagmenting group. For diasponc, 
migrant and refugee populations, such issues can be particularly acute as they 
may not have the luxury of their own country to cushion them and they may, 
therefore, not take for granted the easy assumptions afforded to those who were 
born and raised in one place. Not only do they have to deal with the complexities 
of local-global interconnections, they often have to actively define and defend 
who they are and where they belong. This is why they are at the cutting edge of 
contesting the relationships between 'community', territory, citizenship and 
'identity'. However, such terms are problematic and contested and we should be 
wary of their homogenising potential. It is important to stress again that 
analysing diasporic and transnational migrant "social fields and networks as 
communities tends to reify and essentialise these communities" (Wimmer and 
Glick Schiller 2002: 324). At the same time, group, collective and shared 
dynamics, attachments and consciousness can be seen as constantly being bound 
and unbound, or engaged in "an unending process of tying and loosening" 
(Shapiro 2000: 96, citing Nancy 1991). 
A person can be visualised as transgressing arbitrary 'identity' 
boundaries for empowerinent and resistance purposes, but at the same time, the 
connections, compromises, political affiliations and strategic essentialisms that 
may have to occur (and that are not necessarily in the interest of everyone who is 
supposed to be represented) have to be appreciated. The difficult question is, 
however, how to ensure people are being represented politically in ways that 
they not only agree with, but that allow them both the potential to participate and 
secure what they feel are their basic needs. This is relevant to people with or 
without formal citizenship. This is especially important for people within 
diasporic groups because the connections and cohesions with each other and the 
host country's institutions and cultures may be particularly tenuous and 
contemporary world and which ones are leaving out too many tones and voices, transfom-ung 
them into what model builders call 'noise"'. 
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complicated. They may also want entitlements in more than one country and see 
citizenship as a survival strategy to secure whatever rights they can. 
Citizenship and political participation 
Citizenship is a contested and complicated notion (Faulks 2000), one that 
constitutes a dynamic performance of identities (Joseph 1999). It involves a set 
of practices and processes that allow individuals to construct, negotiate and 
position themselves spatially and temporally for strategic and legitimising 
purposes. It constitutes both a theoretical concept and a very real part (both 
positive and negative) of people's lives, especially for migrants and those in 
diaspora. It encourages 'national identity' definitions and validations based on 
the possession of documents such as a passport that allow official belonging to a 
country. Therefore, it is inclusive as well as exclusive. Citizenship is 
increasingly being seen as in need of critical reappraisal in order to make it 
relevant to the needs of people today, such as women (Lister 1997, McEwan 
2005, Yuval-Davis 1997) and migrants (Croucher 2004; Benhabib 2004) who are 
being potentially excluded or marginalised. The changing relationships between 
citizenship, identities, perceptions and realities of hybridity, belonging, 
politicisation and potential political activism are crucial issues for those in 
diaspora. 
It is important to note the links between citizenship, nationalism and 
(national identity' in that "who gets defined as a 'true' citizen within the city- 
state or nation-state depends in part on who carries with them what is deemed to 
be the correct baggage of history, ethnicity, language and religion" (Painter and 
Philo 1995: 112). Therefore, citizenship is often seen as prescriptive, forcing 
citizens to subscribe to certain stereotypical and 'ideal' ways. As Gupta argues 
(1997: 193) "Citizenship ought to be theonsed as one of the multiple subject 
positions occupied by members of diversely spatialized, partially overlapping or 
nonoverlapping collectivities. " It is important to consider and re-conceptualise 
citizenship as a set of practices, experiences and meanings created by individuals 
who are members of multiple communities as well as by groups (Staehell 2002). 
Citizenship needs to be thought of as a means for inclusion and participation in 
society, but at the same time, it has to be a notion that critical, contested and 
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dynamic. The interrogation of the relationships between citizenship, belonging 
and 'Identity' may also illustrate how, for migrants and those in diaspora, a 
decoupling of citizenship and 'identity' may be occurring (Isin and Wood 1999). 
It could be argued that the central importance of politicisation, particularly 
for those without forinal citizenship, is its capacity to allow people to have a 
voice with which to potentially claim rights in order to better their lives and to 
participate politically. For migrants and those in diaspora who are not citizens, 
citizenship is still a reality that affects them in myriad ways. Itzigsohn (2000: 
1146) claims that "transnational politics have opened spaces for participation of 
previously marginalized groups" and that "we are witnessing the emergence of 
new forms of political action and citizenship that transcend the territorial and 
political boundaries of states" (ibid.: 1127). This may be true for those with 
formal citizenship status but political participation through informal political 
spaces outside the realm of the nation-state also needs to be explored. The ways 
in which formal citizenship status (or the lack of) can influence the everyday 
lives, realities and experiences of those in diaspora with complex residency and 
legal status and difficult relations to the state in ways that are often not 
straightforward or necessarily emancipatory need to be taken into account. 
People are involved and placed in these unofficial spaces differently. For 
example, as power struggles within groups are played out, those who need the 
most help, such as vulnerable illegal immigrants or domestic workers may not 
benefit (Kofinan 1995) and are excluded or marginallsed further. 
Political participation analysed in relation only to citizens may be seen as 
exclusive because a large number of people within a state may be left out 
because of undocumented or non-citizenship status. As political participation is 
normally associated with formal citizenship status, such people may not seen as 
politically active or politicised. However, this is not always the case and the 
informal political spaces they may be involved in need to be explored. Migrants 
and those in diaspora may dip into and use different strategies at 
different times 
and different spaces in order to better or deal with their 
lives, drawing on as 
many resources as possible and using the cross-border connections 
they have 
available to them. 
64 
Diasporic Spaces 
Diasporic spaces need to be theonsed and researched in depth because it is 
through these formal and informal spaces that grounded and relational 
subjectivities are negotiated, individually and privately, but also publicly and 
collectively. These are spaces that are materially concrete as well as symbolic 
and metaphorical in the sense that the meanings that are constructed transgress 
the physicality of actual space. As Massey (1994: 168,170-17 1) notes, space 
is the simultaneous co-existence of social interrelations at all 
geographical scales, from the intimacy of the household to the wide 
space of transglobal connections ... a large component of identity of 
that place called home derived precisely from the fact that it had 
always in one way or another been open; constructed out of 
movement, communication, social relations which always stretched 
beyond it. 
Here, the importance of the home as a diasporic space in motion and as 
inextricably "multidimensional, resonant and open to other spaces" is suggested 
(Wise 2000: 298). In addition, the relations between the physical and emotional 
elements of such diasporic spaces are crucial; the two cannot exist independently 
of each other. These spaces are always in the process of being positioned, 
situated and (dis)located by those involved within them. Therefore, if we are to 
see such spaces as fluid and interconnected , it may be useful to imagine space as 
having "neither an originary point to which we may return, nor an end point 
(telos) at which we will eventually arrive". As result, "we are always in- 
between" (ibid.: 305). This is why diasporic spaces may also be seen as hybrid 
and 'in-between'. 
Brah (1996: 18 0) usefully di scusses the concept of 'diaspora space " which: 
marks the intersectionality of contemporary conditions of 
transmigrancy of people, capital, commodities and culture. It 
addresses the realm where economic, cultural and political effects of 
crossing1transgressing different 'borders' are experienced; where 
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contemporary forms of transcultural identities are constituted; and 
where belonging and otherness is appropriated and contested. 
Like diasporic identities, diasporic spaces are often seen as being able to 
transgress borders. They may be able to bring different countries or locations 
together in ways that are significant and empowering for those in diaspora, 
allowing them to potentially be involved in political activities. It is in diasporic 
spaces where feelings of belonging and politicisation are potentially defined and 
debated and where perceptions of resistance, hope and agency can arise. The 
symbolic importance of diasporic spaces cannot be ignored, as it is within and a 
result of such material spaces that powerful senses of shared experience, 
persecution, injustice and suffering may be articulated. The material and the 
immaterial are, therefore , inextricably tied. However, diasporic spaces are also 
contested as they are not necessarily open to everyone and people are placed 
within them in very different, uneven ways and in the process, some may feel 
excluded. 
The idea of diasporic spaces, as used within this research, can allow us to 
think about people's spatial and temporal negotiations, constructions, feelings 
and realities of political advocacy, activism, inclusion, exclusion and agency. 
The creation of diasporic spaces or spaces as a result of cross-border 
connections and 'space-shrinking' technologies, in which people can informally 
negotiate themselves as hybrid and strategic political, cultural and social beings 
are important because they enable such people to contest the exclusionary 
relationships between citizenship and political action, as well as 'Identity'. Such 
spaces also pave the way for the continued undermining of the hegemony and 
control of nation-states and may allow people to come together, feel politicised 
and discuss their needs and rights. At the same time, there need to be 
regulations and legal systems in place and it is the nation-state that currently 
provides this. Although notions such as a 'world government' based on 
'universal rights', and 'post-national membership' (Soysal 1994; 2000) have 
been put forward, they seem a long way off at present. Itzigsohn (2000: 1147) 
asserts that "political transnationalism ... 
does not constitute a challenge to the 
structures of power and the social hierarchies that existed before". Despite this, 
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understanding the processes of political participation that may take place within 
host countries but depend on cross-border, transnational and diasporic relations 
is a step towards the re-thinking of the role of the nation-state in its current form 
and the exclusions it promotes and allows. 
Geography, politics and diaspora 
Human geography is often perceived as having a key role to play in research on 
migrants, those in diaspora and on transnationalism. As Mitchell (I 997a: I 10) 
stresses: 
Through geographically informed research and theoretically 
nuanced understandings of difference and alterity, the difficult 
questions related to borders and identities will be forced to the 
surface even if they remain partially unanswered and unanswerable. 
Geographers are concerned with understanding and grounding time-space 
interactions. In particular, human geographers have an important role to play in 
exploring the relations between such interactions at varying scales and levels. 
They have thus made significant contributions to the analysis of space, power 
and politics. As Thrift (2000: 274) notes: "space ... is the stuff of power". Massey 
(1993; 1994; 1999) has extensively deliberated on the importance and intricacies 
of spatial processes, politics and power. In a similar vein, Amin (2004) proposes 
a new relational politics of place and space in which political actions are not 
interpreted merely in local, territorial or regional ternis. The influences that 
affect spatial politics are seen as more open-ended than bounded and are 
perceived to be juxtaposed between varying scales of proximity and distance. 
Hence, political actions can also be understood as negotiations between the 
situated and the transnational/global. Therefore, space is an important 
component of political activism, a crucial consideration within this research. As 
McEwan (2000: 646) stresses, in her work on women and citizenship in South 
Africa, democratisation: 
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requires the creation of spaces (metaphorical and material) for 
participation, where emphasiS is placed on the ability of people to 
participate and mould the politics that shape their everyday lives. 
Human geographers are well equipped, theoretically and practically, to 
carry out research that not only transgresses borders, but that is also able to pull 
together the political, social, cultural and economic aspects of diasporic life. In 
this way, not only can the concepts of hybridity and bricolage be related to 
people's lives, but also the connections between people and places can be traced 
and placed "in the context of growing global uncertainty, xenophobia and 
racism" (McEwan 2004). In this way, it will be possible to appreciate the 
similarities and differences that occur between those in diaspora in terms of their 
constructions and negotiations of 'identity', citizenship and economic statuses as 
well as their political activities and how these are played out through local- 
global interactions. This allows a better understanding of how certain groups are 
placed in both disadvantaged (such as refugees or those in exile) and advantaged 
positions (such as elites) as well as the "unromanticized and noncelebratory 
experience of space-time in a transnational population" (Bailey et al. 2002: 141). 
Combining geographical, postcolonial and diasporic perspectives 
Diasporic and postcolonial perspectives remind us that hybridity does not 
necessarily equate to resistance and empowerment (Guarnizo and Smith 1998; 
Jacobs 1996: 15), is not to be celebrated just yet (Mitchell 1997b; Pratt 1999; 
Anthias 2001) and that detailed contextual and historicized research is vital so 
that "political implications of complex, untidy, differentiated and ambiguous 
local stones" (Nash 2002: 228) are explored. One could argue, however, that the 
reason hybridity has been criticised in such ways is because of our continued 
dependence on nation-states, whose present form may limit hybrid connections 
and spaces because of the presence of distinct and (over) protective borders, 
increasingly defining who rightfully belongs (Croucher 2004). 
The use of the word 'Palestinian-ness' throughout this thesis captures the 
sense of identities in-the-making, as fractured and fluid but also as strategic and 
associated with shared visions of what it means to be Palestinian. At the same 
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time , it stresses an idea central to this research, that of diasporas as processes and 
in-the-making. Terms or categories of classification such as 'Identity', 
'nationalism' and even 'transnationalism' appear to be used far too easily 
(Robins and Aksoy 2001) and are all connected to the emergence and power or 
influence of nation-states. Yet when conducting research on diasporas these 
terms are very hard to avoid. The use of the notions of diaspora and 'Palestinian- 
ness , is then perhaps to interrogate and problematise such terms. Even though 
diasporas may have been imagined as homogenised entities with neatly defined 
(cultures' attached, this research hopes to move beyond such simplistic analyses. 
In order to do thisl the political, social and cultural need to be thought of, 
explored and understood together, which may be hard to do, particularly with the 
current configuration of distinct disciplines that study diasporas. 
Human geographical research should be not only critical, but also 
practical and relevant to the people involved. The value of combining human 
geographical, diasporic and postcolonial perspectives is based on the premise 
that the latter two are engaged in and committed to transgressing symbolic and 
physical boundaries and human geography enables the necessary concrete 
research on people's lives to be carried out. The importance of postcolonial and 
diasporic perspectives is this imminent and latent possibility of transgressing 
material and immaterial borders. As stressed earlier, "we need to think beyond 
previous paradigms of transnationalism, of diaspora as dispersed ethnic, religious 
or national communities" (Werbner 1998: 12). Notions of hybridity, diaspora 
and postcolonial theories all have the potential to be used together to act as a 
useful framework to think beyond simplistic notions of 'Identity' and belonging. 
Each set of theories and debates adds layers of richness and depth of 
understanding to diasporic lives, actions, experiences and emotions. At the same 
time, such combined and flexible use of different approaches allows exploration 
into the processes that affect perceptions of unities and disunities as well as 
realities of inclusions and exclusions for those in diaspora. The location of this 
research in Athens also enables the vital 'opening up' of sites of diasporic 
existence and engagement beyond the so-called recognised 'global cities' such as 
London, illustrating that there are hybrid and diasporic populations 'in the 
margins' with alternative viewpoints and realities. 
69 
The strength of a human geographical approach is the ability to critically 
link different aspects of people's lives and at the same time, recognise the 
complexity of the times and spaces that influence people's identities and political 
actions. As Blunt (2005: 10) notes: " while geography is clearly central to 
understanding diaspora both in theory and practice, ideas about diaspora also 
raise questions about space and place". If we are to truly move beyond the 
nation-state conceptually or make it more relevant to the contemporary world in 
which we live, perhaps we should try not to use terins that are so intimately 
connected to the nation-state. Even the word 'diaspora' could be criticised for its 
categorizing tendencies and links to naturalising and encouraging territory- 
'Identity' associations and linkages. At the moment, however, and for the 
purposes of this research, I will retain 'diaspora' as a way to think about 
Palestinians as a group as well as individually. Their feelings, experiences and 
actions are 'on the move' (Lindholm Schulz 2003) but are also constantly being 
'fixed' and 'unfixed' as they make sense of, negotiate and position themselves 
and their lives in Athens, between 'here' and 'there'. It is important to remember 
when analysing 'here' (Greece) and 'there' (Palestine) that Greece is a country 
and Palestine is not and that associations Palestinians have with both are 
relational. 3 Lives of movement also require stasis, spaces that are constructed as 
stable or fixed, as home, the homeland, a house and so forth with which to 
position oneself and feel security. The nation-state has come to take on this role 
of provider of imagined stability and security. Even though those in diaspora 
may crave such defined spaces to 'hold' them, the homeland as a 'natural' space 
to belong to, live in and form a state in are political constructions that exploit 
feelings of insecurity in a world of movement and defined nation-states in which 
those in diaspora may be made to feel unwelcome or different. 
It is very important to consider how hybrid and diasporic lives, identities 
and political actions are shaped by and fit into power relations. It is clearly not 
enough to expound generally about the hybrid and transgressive qualities of 
these issues in a purely theoretical manner. Theory needs to be extended and 
3 By this, I mean that Palestinians have to continuously place themselves within the dynamic 
contexts of 'Greek-ness', Greek surroundings, Palestine as well as the Middle East and beyond. 
Palestine, as will be seen in Chapter Five, is a problematic notion in itself. I use the term 
Palestine as opposed to the Occupied Territories, because most Palestinian participants did. 
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linked to material geographical research. If identities are to be seen as fluid,, 
shifting and open-ended, 'identity' as a potentially homogenising categories of 
belonging, citizenship and political action needs to be critically interrogated. The 
potential for political and socio-economic change within human lives arises as a 
result of the creation of spaces that are able to sit within and transgress 
boundaries, where there are ever new and different ways to be included in the 
political practices and activities that have the potential to advocate change. In the 
process, therefore, it is vital to think of identities as non-essentialist and 
relational constructions and negotiations that are, at the same time, grounded and 
historicized. We need to ask how constructing differences and similarities can 
be done in a positive manner, so that tolerance, compromise and negotiation 
become ways of obtaining rights, where 'them' and 'us' and 'here' and 'there' 
are recognised as situational, sliding and interconnected spatially and temporally. 
It is important to carry out grounded qualitative geographical research in order to 
deconstruct and analyse the complex and merging times and spaces, in which the 
social, cultural and political come together within lives,, experiences, emotions 
and actions. In this way, perceptions of home, belonging, citizenship, political 
actions and cross-border connections can be explored in ways that are 





This chapter provides a detailed outline of the qualitative 
methodologies employed in this research, which was carried out over a 
period of nine months in 2003-4. It highlights the research questions 
and focuses on the realities and practicalities of the research design 
and process, as well as ethics, power relations, positionality and 
representation. In addition, it includes a discussion of the importance 
of such issues within qualitative research in general. It goes on to 
analyse the use of interviews and ethnography as research methods and 
the difficulties posed by language during research of this nature. 
Research Questions 
Before discussing the methodologies employed, it is important to provide clear 
statements on the research questions this thesis is attempting to examine. They 
are, as follows: 
1. To explore how Palestinians in Athens negotiate and construct diasporic 
identities, as well as notions of home, the 'homeland' (both real and imagined), 
belonging and citizenship and the relationships between them. In order to do this, 
the research interrogates the salience of the notions of 'hybridity' and 
'transnationalism' as well as postcolonial theories in the understanding of the 
material lives and symbolic identities of the Palestinian diaspora. It examines the 
political and cultural effects of being displaced and living in exile; it also 
explores the importance of attachments and cross-border connections to 
Palestine/Middle East to Palestinian lives and identities in Athens in order to 
gain an appreciation of the role of territorially based belonging. 
2. To appreciate the dynamic spatial and temporal elements of this constant 
positioning, ambivalence and living 'in-between', both 'here' and 'there', as well 
as the strategic and politicised maintenance of 'unity' and 'shared consciousness' 
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as ways of advocating the Palestinian cause. In examining these issues, the 
research explores what appear to be interrelated political, social and cultural 
elements of Palestinian identities and actions. 
3. To critique notions of diaspora as an overly unified ethnic totality through 
understanding the inherent power relations, constraints and tensions (both 
institutional and socio- economic), and the consequent realities of dealing with 
differences, inclusions, exclusions and representation within the Palestinian 
diaspora in Athens. The research demonstrates that diasporic lives, emotions5 
identities and actions can perhaps be both strategic and ambivalent, united and 
disunited and in the process add to debates on the complex nature of diasporic 
identities, politicisation and advocacy and the relationships between them. 
4. To investigate the potential hybridity and lived experiences of symbolic and 
material diasporic spaces. The research explores how and why Palestinians 
establish and are involved in overlapping public and private, formal and informal 
spaces. It also investigates the implications of this for re-thinking citizenship, 
examining potential political agency and action, both individually and 
collectively, as well as exploring how Palestinians in Athens may feel included, 
excluded, marginalised, empowered or resistant as a result. 
5. To demonstrate how researching diasporic identities, spaces and politics can 
act as a framework for understanding the lives of other diasporic peoples within 
Athens, the wider contexts of Europe and the rest of the world, as well as to 
contribute to ongoing research on migrants and the themes of citizenship, 
identity and politicisation. 
Research design: practicalities of implementation 
Qualitative research methods were deemed the best way to explore the research 
questions. In-depth discussions with respondents formed the main 
bulk of the 
research, although more semi-structured interviews with officials were also 
carried out. Local documents and material were also examined to provide 
the 
necessary contextual information needed. The research was originally 
designed 
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to be carried out in two phases. The first phase of research was supposed to be 
carried out between May 2003 and September 2003 and the second from 
September 2003 to March 2004 but in reality the two periods merged. It was 
important, therefore, that the research process was a flexible and iterative one5 
so that it was able to deal with such changes that occurred. The first phase 
endeavoured to extend the initial contacts made with Palestinians during MSc 
research, through the process of snowballing. It was important to understand the 
background of the immigration policies that may have influenced or affected the 
Palestinian diaspora in Athens even though this research is not primarily 
concerned with analysing such policies. Although it was thought that an attempt 
would be made to bring together the top-down policy aspects of migration in 
Greece and bottom-up experiences and perceptions of Palestinian migrants, in 
reality, the Palestinians interviewed did not seem overly affected by the policies. 
Despite this, Greek immigration policy and laws were examined via more semi- 
structured interviews with officials and academics. 
Major sources of information were local newspaper articles, which 
contained invaluable facts, debates and viewpoints on immigration policies and 
migrants' problems with them. A conference on migrant rights,, entitled 
'Migrants as workers or human beings? ' was also attended in February 2004. 
This provided a useful overview of the key issues affecting migrants in Athens 
and was interesting as it was attended by academics, policy-makers and 
migrants, who were all able to discuses the issues. Key non-governmental 
organisations in Greece, such as the Greek Council for Refugees (GCR) and the 
network for the Support of Immigrants and Refugees (DYMP) were contacted in 
order to try and elicit more infon-nation on the Palestinian diaspora but such 
attempts proved futile on the whole. The UNHCR provided some statistics, 
which have been included in Chapter One. 
Two types of interview comprised the main research method. To 
understand the more technical policy and legal debates, a series of semi- 
structured interviews were carried out with Greek academics working on 
issues 
of immigration such as Dr Marina Petronoti at EKKE (The 
National Centre for 
Social Research) and Dr Rossetos Fakiolas at Panteio University, Athens. An 
official from the Aliens department (that deals with 
immigrant and asylum 
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applications) was also interviewed and email communication occurred with F_ 
UNHCR representatives in Athens. These were one-off interviews with set 
questions arranged into themes, although they were flexible, so that respondents 
were able to discuss certain issues if they wished to. This seemed to be the best 
way of finding out necessary background information. However, it must be 
stressed that the majority of more formal information on the Palestinian diaspora 
in Athens had to come from the embassy and leaders of Unions as there did not 
appear to be a great deal of data on the Palestinian diaspora in Athens. 
The main bulk of the research involved the use of inforinal, unstructured 
interviews, where I met participants on as many occasions as possible. Such 
interviews were more 4 conversational' in manner (Kitchin and Tate 2000: 214) 
and allowed the development of 'conversational partnerships' (Rubin and Rubin 
1995). These enabled the participant to meander more freely through topics of 
interest and to initiate discussions. Fifty-four respondents of diverse 
backgrounds were interviewed using such methods, of which twenty-two were 
women and thirty-two were men. Appendix One lists all the respondents 
involved in this research and provides information on their gender, occupation, 
age, place of origin and residence time in Athens, as well as the time, date and 
place of interview and the language used. 
Prior research suggests that the majority of Palestinians in Athens appear 
to be first generation, between twenty and forty years of age and male (Mavroudi 
2002). Therefore, this was reflected in the number of people interviewed who lie 
in this age range. The children of Palestinians who marry Palestinians together 
with Greek-Palestinian children, whose parents are both Greek and Palestinian, 
give rise to an important second generation. As this generation is in its infancy in 
Athens, generally speaking, this research does not specifically focus on it. 
However, some interviews with second-generation Palestinians were carried out 
in order to acknowledge its presence and to raise questions and issues for future 
research on the Palestinian diaspora as well as to begin to understand inter- 
generational differences. Although gender was not a factor that was targeted in 
particular, an attempt was made initially to interview an equal amount of men 
and women but this was not possible and more men than women were located. 
This may have been due to both the demographics of the Palestinian diaspora in 
75 
Athens and gatekeepers involved. The number of men and women finally spoken 
to reflected suggestions by contacts and not necessarily my wishes; I was happy 
and grateful to listen to whoever had the time to participate. The unequal number 
of men and women was not seen as problematic for the purposes of this research, 
which was not aimed at being a representative survey of the Palestinian diaspora 
in Athens. The general aim was to speak to as wide a cross-section and as many 
members of the Palestinian diaspora in Athens as possible, in order to appreciate 
their diversity, differences and similarities. 
The key gatekeepers for locating participants were Palestinians who 
attended the Parikia (the Palestinian 'community' house) as well as the 
Palestinian embassy. To this end, I spoke to illegal immigrants, officially 
recognised refugees, wealthier more educated employees of foreign-owned 
companies and teachers, Palestinians who were unemployed or working in 
manual and unskilled labour, as well as businesspeople who were self-employed. 
I tried to meet Palestinians who were and were not involved in the Parikia, 
embassy and Unions and who had differing political affiliations. However, 
political attachments or support of particular political groups was often hard to 
ascertain and did not appear to be something many Palestinians were particularly 
keen to share with me in any depth. In this way, I have hopefully been able to 
gain a deep understanding of the diversity of the Palestinian diaspora in Athens. 
Although I would have liked to be able to meet all participants on numerous 
occasions, it was not always possible to meet up again because of participant 
time and family constraints. I interviewed a senior official in the Palestinian 
embassy on several occasions, the representative of the PLO in Greece, as well 
as two Greek-Palestinians who are involved in Greek politics, one in his capacity 
as the Deputy Mayor of an Athenian municipality and another during his 
campaign to become an MP for the PASOK political party at the general 
elections held in 2004. These interviews were more semi-structured in nature. 
Having located key contacts and assessed the practicality and suitability of 
the proposed interviews as research methods, the second phase involved carrying 
out in-depth, loosely structured interviews. This was the most difficult part of the 
research and necessitated spending longer periods of time with respondents. All 
interviews took place wherever respondents felt was suitable. The majority of the 
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took place in participants' homes, as this was felt by participants and the 
researcher to be the ideal location to discuss the issues central to this research. 
Thirty-eight of the interviews were carried out in English; the rest were carried 
out in Greek. ' Over thirty interviews were taped and then transcribed and a 
detailed field diary was also kept, which enabled specific contextual notes to be 
written. Interviews and meetings that were not taped necessitated the writing of 
notes during and after the interview. 
Interview questions were fortnulated to try to explore the research 
questions and themes. The first couple of questions were more general, aimed at 
'placing' the respondent and finding out necessary background information. For 
example, they were asked under what circumstances they arrived in Athens, 
where they had lived before and how long they had resided in Greece. These 
questions often amounted to a brief oral history of their own as well as their 
family's lives, often from 1948 or the time of their dispersal and/or displacement 
to the present day. This part of the interview also aimed to uncover the main 
citizenship and residency statuses. The questions then proceeded to work through 
the main themes and areas of interest as outlined in the research questions above, 
starting with issues of home, 'identity' and belonging and then continuing with 
feelings of politicisation, political unity, advocacy and participation, and the 
spaces in which such activities may take place. 
After transcription, the analysis of interviews began with a thorough 
reading of all the transcripts in tandem with the relevant pages of the research 
diary and field notes in order to gain an in-depth appreciation of the interviews as 
a whole and in relation to each other. A second reading of the transcripts was 
accompanied by the highlighting of general themes, of which there were three. 
The first was home, belonging and feelings of being Palestinian. The second was 
perceptions of politicisation and political unity, apathy and empowem-ient. The 
third encompassed citizenship, spaces of advocacy and material political actions. 
These broad themes were designed to fit into the proposed analytical chapters, of 
which three were originally envisaged. Therefore, during this second reading, a 
coding system was used with a number outlining the relevant chapter and theme 
as well as notes on the specific use of particular sections. For example, code 
The issues surrounding language are discussed in more detail at the end of this chapter. 
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number one might be used with a note to highlight that the section referred to 
important material on feelings of being Palestinian. This coding of themes relating 
to chapters proved very useful in the writing up of the research as the themes 
already correlated with empirical chapters. In reality, each chapter went through 
numerous transformations in terms of what material it would cover as many of the 
issues explored in this research are interrelated. Therefore, great care had to be 
taken to ensure that each theme was dealt with in detail on its own but also 
remained connected to other themes throughout the other analytical chapters. 
Testimonies included in the analytical chapters were often long. Ethical 
considerations for the research process to be as transparent as possible and for the 
voices of participants to be heard meant that it was important to include as much 
of what people said as possible (which are outlined below). However, in addition 
to this, the complexity and ambivalence of many of the themes and perceptions 
discussed necessitated the inclusion of long quotes and a series of appendices with 
lengthy testimonies. This helped illustrate participant thought processes, how they 
came to the conclusions they did, as well as researcher-respondent dynamics and 
knowledge production. Ideally, the material in the appendices would have been 
included in the main text as they were considered to contain important material 
that closely related to the discussion of certain key themes. However, word 
constraints and the potential disturbance to the flow of arguments necessitated the 
movement of longer testimonies into a series of appendices that are referred to in 
the main text. 
The methodologies employed in this research were crucial as they were 
intimately involved in allowing the research questions and theoretical concerns to 
be taken into account. They needed to be able to allow the subtle nuances and 
ambivalences of Palestinian lives in Athens to be explored, allowing complex 
issues to be dealt with. A 'bottom-up' ethnographic approach is useful, as 
advocated, for example, by Wong (2002: 72), who promotes a "postcolonial 
epistemology of location" where "ethnography becomes a site where multiple 
voices are brought to light and negotiated". Ethnography is committed to 'deep' 
and rich understandings of people and cultures in ways that are sensitive,, 
respectful and that recognise the inevitable partiality of knowledges and 
meanings. Ethnographers spend prolonged periods of time 'in the 
field' and there 
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has been a great deal written on this arbitrary distinction between the 'here" of the 
researcher's work and the 'there' of the field, whereby the idea that the two can be 
neatly and objectively separated has been criticized (see, for example, 
Professional Geographer Issue on Women in the Field 1994). 
Although ethnographically based fieldwork can become very intensive 
for everyone involved, it has been extremely useful within this research because 
it has helped to understand the everyday lives and emotions of Palestinians in 
Athens and how these may have changed over time. Contemporary or so-called 
'new') ethnography advocated by anthropologists such as Clifford and Marcus 
(1986), recognises that ethnographies are 'constructed narratives' that are neither 
fully representative nor objective and that they are "historically grounded and 
politically aware" (Banks 1998: 9). Such anthropologists have come a long way 
in acknowledging and critiquing the unethical and distinctly eurocentric 
representations of 'Others' that their earlier colleagues used (see, for example, 
Edwards 1992). Collections such as those by Okely and Callaway (1992), Ellis 
and Brochner (1996), and James et al. (1997) are acutely aware of this and are 
promoting new and more reflexive ethnographic research. Pink's (2001: 180) 
definition of ethnography is useful: 
rather than being a methodfor the collection of 'data'. ethnography 
is a process of creating and representing knowledge (about society, 
culture and individuals) that is based on the ethnographers own 
experiences. It does not claim to produce a 'truthful' account of 
reality, but should aim to offer versions of ethnographers' 
experiences of reality that are as loyal as possible to the context, 
negotiations and intersubjectivities through which the knowledge was 
produced. 
Human geographers have also increasingly used and advocated 
ethnographic methodologies in a wide range of research projects 
(see, for 
example, Cook and Crang 1995; Chapters 10-12 in Limb and 
Dwyer 2001). In 
terms of researching those in diaspora, ethnography provides the researcher with 
a unique tool for understanding the more complex and 
difficult aspects of their 
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lives and feelings. Palestinians have been and still are largely 'on the move' , 
displaced, often precariously and ambiguously caught between 'here' and 
'there', the past and the present, memory and reality; research methods that allow 
such tensions to be explored are, therefore, extremely useful. Ethnographically 
inspired approaches, such as migrant stones (Lawson 2000, King et al. 1998), 
oral histories (Miles and Crush 1993) or 'transnational spatial ethnographies' 
(Mitchell 1997a) provide a much-needed alternative to more quantitative 
analyses of diasporic lives, especially when little or no information is available 
on them. This is especially the case in Greece, where up until very recently, 
migrant, especially women and refugee voices have been largely silent (Lazaridis 
2000). Ethnographic methods, such as participant observation and repetitive 
informal interviews allow a much more open, trusting and transparent 
relationship to develop between researcher and participant. 
Within this research, the use of repeated informal contact with certain 
participants as well as the attending of numerous social, political and political 
functions meant that it sometimes used ethnographic methods, such as 
participant observation. It has also used many of the ideas and theories behind 
ethnographic approaches, in terms of, for example, the production of 
knowledges, representation and ethics during the research process, which are 
outlined below. For example, several respondents were met on multiple 
occasionsl either at their home, caf6s or during events. I was also in contact with 
gatekeepers regularly and attended as many meetings at the Parikia as was 
possible (which took place every Saturday afternoon) as well as other cultural 
and political events associated with the Palestinian diaspora in Athens. For 
example, I was present at a Greek-Palestinian social, cultural and political event 
in December 2003. During the same month, I was also invited by some 
Palestinians to attend a political meeting with them. This was the launching a 
new far left Greek political party. I also accompanied a woman living in Athens 
illegally to various NGOs in the centre of Athens as she tried to obtain medical 
attention, in order to help deal with language issues. On another occasion, I 
repeatedly visited a Palestinian family living in Athens illegally as they 
experienced the daily difficulties of living in squalid conditions in one room. 
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It has to be noted that given the location of this research in a large city 
and the nature of the research, the opportunities to engage 'in the field' and in 
sustained, 'deep' ethnographic research were usually limited despite my best 
intentions. Rather than focus exclusively on a number of households, for 
example, and conduct much more in-depth ethnographic research, such as living 
with them, or visiting them every day for a period of time, this research was 
aimed at talking to as many Palestinians as possible. This was deemed especially 
important given the paucity of information on the Palestinian diaspora in Athens. 
Therefore, the sole use of ethnographic methods might not have been as 
effective, given the time-frame of the research. 
Visual methods were also employed during some interviews. However, 
the instigation and use of such methods normally arose from participants 
themselves rather than the researcher and as a result were not used consistently 
but as and when the situation arose. For example, one respondent drew a map to 
help explain his family's displacement and several commented on artwork in the 
forin of paintings and embroidery in their homes as part of their discussion on 
their identities. Another respondent used a photo of her son dressed in a 
traditional kuffiyas to outline how proud she was to be Palestinian and how 
important it was for her son to feel the same way. Others also used books on 
Palestinians they had at home to help illustrate what they felt were key issues of 
the Palestinian diaspora and cause. Reading material such as leaflets and objects 
such as badges were sometimes also given to me apparently as a means to help 
highlight the Palestinian cause and to help in the research. For example, one of 
the participants gave me a t-shirt with the logo of a charity she had helped set up. 
Despite the intermittent use of such visual and material culture methods, 
where they were used, they were extremely useful in helping to understand 
Palestinian identities. Such methods were actively considered in the planning 
stages of this research, as an important research method alongside oral 
communication as they were considered useful in the exploration of complex, 
difficult and potentially ambivalent notions such as home and belonging. In 
particular, it was intended that the methods of photo-elicitation and auto- 
photography were to be used during the interview process. During the actual 
implementation of the research, however, it became apparent that such visual 
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methods would be extremely difficult to carry out. The main reasons for this 
were the difficulties in arranging meetings with what were often extremely busy 
individuals and the fact that I did not feel confident enough as a result to ask 
respondents to get involved in such time-consuming methods. In particular, one 
of the gatekeepers actively discouraged the use of such methods for this reason. 
It was felt that it might limit the number of people who would be willing to be 
involved as it would involve meeting them on many occasions and would 
necessitate them finding time to carry out the tasks during busy schedules, which 
could have proved problematic for many potential participants. Therefore, as the 
aim of this research was to try and speak to as many Palestinians in Athens as 
possible, such methods were decided against. The sporadic use of some visual 
research methods, as outlined above, demonstrated the potential use and 
significance of such methods to research on diasporic and migrant identities, 
belonging and politicisation. Had more time been available, these would 
probably have been used and in any future research on the Palestinian diaspora, I 
would ensure that enough time was scheduled to carry out such important 
research methods. 
Ethics, representation and positionality: issues and realities 
In the case of research on diasporas, detailed studies are needed to 
counterbalance perceptions of diasporas as distinct and homogenised or 'unified' 
entities and to allow their diversity to be taken into account. It is necessary, 
therefore, to couple theorisations on diaspora with grounded research on the 
materiality and everyday realities of those in diaspora. It is only as a result of 
such research that essentialising and arbitrary categories of 'identity', 'tradition', 
and 'nationalism' can be pulled apart. Such research does not negate the 
importance of forming feelings of 'shared consciousness', cultural traditions and 
belonging that undoubtedly exist. Rather, it forces us to consider how they have 
been constructed unevenly and dynamically through time and space as a result of 
complex power relations and inequalities and negotiations of similarities and 
differences. Therefore, the way in which the research has been conducted is 
crucial, in terins of ethics, positionality, reflexivity and representation. 
Many 
geographers have written candidly on these issues 
(see for example, McDowell 
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1992; Sidaway 1992; Madge 1993; Duncan and Sharp 1993; Limb and Dwyer 
2001). Feminist geographers, in particular, have worked hard to understand their 
own positions as researchers and academics and the implications of this in terms 
of power relations, as well as how the personal and political aspects of research 
are interrelated (see, for example, McDowell 1992; Professional Geographer 
Issue on Women in the Field 1994; Laune et al. 1999). Although the difficulties 
of doing this are acknowledged, (see Rose 1997, for example) there is strong 
consensus that such concerns must form a central tenet of any ethically aware 
and critically engaged research (Katz 1992,1994; Ramirez 2000). 
The salience of conducting research that is ethically aware must be 
stressed. This can enable a research process that is dynamic, reflexive, intent on 
interrogating power relations and that is historically as well as contextually 
aware. As Valentine (2001: 50) notes: "while ethical issues may seem routine or 
moral questions rather than anything that is intrinsic to the design of the research 
project, in practice they actually underpin what we do". In addition, ethical 
awareness can help ensure the protection and well-being of participants with the 
use of anonymity and informed consent, ensuring that the production of 
knowledges occur fairly as well as sensitively and without harm, prejudice or 
discomfort to the participant. In addition, it has to be remembered that the 
researcher is a 'positioned subject' (Rosaldo 1989). Not only must the 
researcher's position be recognised as situated and far from innocent or objective 
(Haraway 1988; Rose 1997) but the interpretation and representation of the 
participants' voices will be partial and subjective, despite all efforts to decrease 
the power inequalities between researcher and researched. 
Within this research, issues of ethics, positionality and representation 
were of utmost importance. To begin with, participants were approached very 
carefully, usually with the help of gatekeepers who were known to them and 
whom they trusted. Great care was taken to ensure participants did not feel 
obliged to take part in the research and that they could refuse if they wished. 
Although informed consent forins were not provided, the aims of the research 
project as well as the use and dissemination of data collected were all 
fully and 
clearly explained to respondents. Interviews were only taped with the pen-nission 
of participants and their anonymity and confidentiality 
has been ensured with the 
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use of pseudonyms throughout. It was made clear to participants that they could 
refuse participation at any time during the interview process and their rights and 
privacy were taken into account at all times. As such, sustained efforts to ensure 
that respondents were always at ease and did not feel pressurised, exploited or 
mistreated took place. An example of this was the participants' choice of where 
and when they felt most comfortable with the interviews taking place. The 
research involved dealing with multiple sensitivities, including how respondents 
perceived me. It is interesting to note participants' reactions to me as a white, 
young, half Greek-half English (and not Palestinian or Arabic) researcher. To 
begin with, most Palestinians assumed I was a supporter of the Palestinian cause 
and people, or that I was at least sympathetic to their problems. This seemed to 
form a firm reason for them to talk to me. This was problematic for a number of 
reasons. Their assumption that I was on their 'side' made it hard for me to ask 
questions or discuss issues that may have appeared antagonistic. Although I was 
able on occasion to ask questions that may have been more difficult for them to 
answer (such as for example, on whether they thought suicide bombing could be 
justified), I had to be very careful how I asked these questions. They often took 
the form of 'Some people have criticized Palestinians for ... What 
do you think of 
this? ' 
In addition to this, as the interviews were more like discussions or 
conversations, I often had to answer as many questions as I asked. This was 
especially the case when I spoke to people in their homes, which was seen as a 
social event and they were clearly trying to get to know me as well. This raises 
all sorts of issues for ethnographic research, as it is often impossible to remain an 
(outsider' looking in and merely asking questions. In such two-way more 
discursive interviews, the researcher is required to open up and be honest about 
her intentions and her background. At the same time, however, the primary 
objective of meeting participants is to carry out research. Problems can anse 
when the researched and researcher forin close relationships and 
have built up 
networks of trust. As participants become more trusting of the researcher, they 
tend to open up more and will often say things 'off the record'. 
These are often 
what the researcher feels are the most important parts of the research, especially 
within this research, where I was trying to understand the 
tensions, conflicts and 
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disunities within groups that outwardly want to appear united. Being allowed to 
use quotes made in private is often a matter of intense negotiation and can be 
very frustrating for all parties involved. As researchers, we appear to be torn at 
times, between protecting our participants and representing them in a manner 
that is both fair and that allows an in-depth portrayal of as many issues the 
research is dealing with as possible. Such issues were dealt with by ensuring the 
respondents were asked whether what was said in private and off the record 
could be used and published. 
During open and transparent interviews and ethnographic research, the 
participants often learn as much about the researcher as they do about them. 
Therefore, the fact that my official nationality is British (despite feeling half 
Greek, half English) and that I represent a British university with funding from 
the British government quickly became known. This was met with a variety of 
attitudes. Some Palestinians appeared to feel honoured that the British 
government thought them important enough to 'do' research on but many others 
were sceptical of the funding I was receiving and were quick to point out 
Britain's infamous role in the creation of the state of Israel and the plight of 
Palestinians. I was constantly aware of the potential for their (indirect and subtle) 
use of me as a way to get political messages across to Britain. As a diasporic 
population, which is very politicised on the whole, Palestinians in Greece were 
very keen to tell me about the issues surrounding what they called the Palestinian 
cause and I certainly felt on many occasions that they were trying to influence 
me even though they assumed I was supportive. This highlights the problematic 
and complex nature of power relations within research, and illustrates that power 
inequalities work both ways. These issues are discussed in more depth below. 
There were also Palestinians who refused outright to talk to me and this 
raises the very important issue of trust. I feel that I was disadvantaged by the fact 
that I did not speak Arabic and that I was not Palestinian. This was partly 
because I felt that many participants did not trust me as much as they would have 
done had I been Palestinian, or actively involved in solving Palestinian problems. 
They often assumed that I was trying to find out as much as possible on 
Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza or the Middle East and often said that if 
I really wanted to find out what it meant to be Palestinian that I should go there. 
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On the whole, they appeared convinced that they, as members of the diaspora 
were not as important as their Palestinian counterparts in the West Bank and 
Gaza or in the refugee camps in Lebanon and so forth. They found it hard to 
understand that I was in fact interested primarily in them and their opinions, 
identities and experiences. This, coupled with the fact that I am not Palestinian 
meant that quite a few Palestinians who refused to talk to me did so because they 
could not easily 'place' or understand either my research or myself I also had to 
deal with Palestinians who thought I may be a spy, perhaps for Mossad. Issues of 
trust and surveillance are crucial to Palestinians and such opinions made me 
acutely aware of how such issues have influenced their lives. On the other hand, 
the fact that I am half Greek and that my father and his family were Greek 
refugees from Smyrni on the coast of Asia Minor who lost everything in the 
Population Transfer of 1920/21 meant that participants felt an affinity with me. 
They often said, for example, statements such as "So, you come from a refugee 
family too... "" and so on. There are two sides to the issue of trust, however. Just 
as they felt they could potentially not trust me or my motives and background, it 
was often equally hard for me to fully trust them, especially if I could not back 
up their stories, which I often could not, given the nature of the research and 
participant anonymity. This raises the issue of the validity and accuracy of 
information sourced, particularly when there has not been a great deal of 
research done on the group that is being studied. 
The issue with the GUPW is described in detail in Chapter Five. To 
summarise the situation, at the time of the research, the legality of the GUPW, 
which I was led to initially believe was legal, was cast into doubt by a group of 
Palestinians. These Palestinians were trying to create their own what I call 'new' 
Workers' Union with the support of the embassy who were supposedly against 
the first or what I call 'old' Union because of its communist leanings. 
Given that 
I was in contact with both sides who were both trying to persuade me that they 
were right and the other side was wrong illustrates the 
difficulties of knowing 
who to trust in a situation when two sides are trying to win you over. 
It also 
highlights the difficult positions researchers can be put into through no fault of 
their own, as well as how difficult it may 
be potentially to come out of the 
situation unharmed in terms of relations of 
trust. In this case, the situation 
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became so bad that towards the end of my fieldwork, I felt it was very hard to 
trust anyone involved and I tried to distance myself from what appeared to be a 
very complicated highly politicised, personal and intense affair. Incidentally my 
attendance at the launch of a Greek political party, mentioned above, illustrates a 
situation where I was invited along by representatives of the 'new' Union to see 
the leader of the 'old' Union who had been invited to talk at the meeting and was 
claiming to represent all Palestinian workers. They were trying to undermine his 
position by showing how 'false' he supposedly was. A problem occurred when 
those representing the 'old' Union, such as the leader himself, whom I had 
interviewed at an earlier date recognised me and realised that I had come with 
'the opposition' so to speak. This did not mean an end of my association with the 
(old' Union. Rather, they too became involved in trying to persuade me of their 
innocence and their honest intentions (and at the same time, the dishonest 
intentions of those involved in trying to set up the 'new' Union). The end result 
was an increased understanding and appreciation on my part of the messy 
intricacies, power relations and conflicts that can occur within groups that may 
on the surface appear or portray themselves as united. Another more unfortunate 
result was the loss of trust on both sides, as my involvement or knowledge of the 
affair caused some Palestinians involved to turn against me and to spread 
rumours about my motives and whether I could be trusted. The issue of trust is 
certainly an important aspect of any research on people. We, as researchers are 
often obliged to trust our participants out of necessity and a need to gather 
concrete 'evidence' but at the same time, their perceptions of us and the trust 
they have in us influences what they are willing to tell us. Once relations of trust 
are broken, it is very hard to regain them especially for people within groups 
such as the Palestinians who feel that they have been subject to surveillance, 
oppression and marginalisation. 
The fact that I am female and look younger than my age had implications 
for power relations within meetings and discussions with participants, many of 
whom expressed surprise (and concern) that I 
looked so young. I often had to tell 
them my age and qualifications and I think that this also raised 
issues of trust 
too, and was another reason why I was asked so many questions about myself 
It 
sometimes appeared that I had to prove myself worthy of asking 
them questions. 
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I felt at a definite disadvantage when interviewing men, especially men who 
were older than me. Their attitude was sometimes arrogant and fairly dismissive, 
as if they did not take my research or me seriously. They also appeared to talk 
down to me and often tried to 'educate' me, assuming that my knowledge of 
many issues would be non-existent or lacking in some way. As I did not show 
my discomfort with their attitude, the positive side to this was that I gained a 
deep appreciation of how they were constructing certain historical and 
contemporary situations. Apart from a group of men who behaved in this way, I 
felt that the majority of Palestinians I spoke to did respect me, or if they did not, 
it was not overt. The advantages to being female and looking young were evident 
in my interviews with younger Palestinians, (and particularly students, who were 
very willing to talk to me) and with women who, unsurprisingly perhaps, 
appeared to find it easier to trust me and talk to me more freely. As I also 
interviewed couples, this raised issues of power relations amongst them and they 
would often talk animatedly in Arabic to each other at times during the 
interview. In many cases, the men appeared to be leading the discussions with 
the women 'adding' to the debate whenever possible. This research was not 
intended to be couple-based research but it was sometimes necessary to 
interview couples together as they did not want to be interviewed separately. 
Other women were, however, quite happy to be interviewed on their own but 
they appeared to be the ones who were successful professionals in their own 
right, either as businesswomen or teachers, for example. 
Crucially, ethical underpinnings also allow the important issue of 
representation to be constantly and vigilantly debated and thought about. This is 
especially important in research where the participants may feel they do not have 
a (voice) or have felt silenced and who have been or still feel subject to colonial 
oppression and occupation. In tem-is of research on the hybridity and 'in- 
between-ness' of diasporic people such as Palestinians, the research process may 
open up spaces of interaction in which knowledges produced are more the result 
of a dynamic sharing and negotiation of ideas and meanings. Within this 
research, the use of in-depth discussions with participants in this research rather 
than the 'expert' academic 'extracting' knowledges in the form of a rigid series 
of structured questions may have helped achieve this. 
It is imperative that the 
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voices of those people being researched are heard as fully as possible and that 
they are given every opportunity to comment and provide feedback on their 
input. 2 Ways to ensure that this is built into the research process are important, 
so that this 'opening up' of the representation process is occurring all the time,, 
not merely as an ethical and passive afterthought. This also means that a great 
deal of thought must be given as to how Palestinian voices, perceptions and 
experiences are depicted in this thesis. To this end, as much of the interview 
transcripts have been included in the analytical chapters as possible (as outlined 
earlier). As Pratt (2000: 649) stresses, geographers have to practice the radical 
theories and ideas that they have and to "search ... for ways of writing, for our 
own representational strategies, that challenge the hegemony of dominant ways 
of seeing"'. Being explicit about the rationale behind the use of qualitative 
methodologies and examining issues such as positionality in detail significantly 
decrease the likelihood of being criticised for a lack of 'rigour' and 'validity'. 
There have been claims that human geographers engaged in such types of 
research have not written extensively enough about how and why they interpret 
their findings and this has led to researchers such as Baxter and Eyles (1996) to 
promote the establishment of criteria for evaluation. Therefore, the political and 
socio-cultural contexts, such as regulation and funding, in which geographical 
knowledges are being continuously produced and consumed, always have to be 
taken into account (Sidaway 1997). 
Language is always an issue in research on groups whose first language 
is different to one's own. It is especially an issue in the context of doing 'third 
world' research (Sidaway 1992) and the benefits of leaming a language 
specifically for research cannot be underestimated (Watson 2004). Within this 
research, language was an issue that was carefully thought about, as my Arabic 
language skills did not extend to being able to carry out interviews in Arabic and 
discuss complex words such as 'home' and 'belonging' with participants, 
although this would have been desirable. I did undergo a period of Arabic 
language training in the UK before I started my fieldwork, but this was only a 
2A short report Will be distributed to participants to ensure that they are able to scrutinise 
how 
they have been represented. This allows them to raise issues they may feel are unfair or that they 
do not agree with. This will mean that their comments can 
be taken on board before work from 
this thesis is published. 
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basic course that merely enabled me to speak and understand a few words and 
phrases. Thus, interviews were carried out in either Greek or English (whatever 
the participants felt more comfortable with). I translated interviews carried out in 
Greek into English on the basis of my own bi-lingual skills. A Greek-English 
dictionary was also used on some occasions in order to help decide on the best 
translation of certain words that were either ambivalent or for which there was 
no clear-cut translation into English. The decision on which words to use in the 
event of ambiguity was made based on the context of the sentence involved. For 
example, the notion of home is one that posed some problems and that are 
discussed in more depth in Chapter Four. On the whole, translation proceeded 
with few difficulties although it is acknowledged that the need to translate in the 
first place is far from ideal. However, given the specific circumstances of the 
research, this was unavoidable at times. 
The fact that the participants were not speaking their first language was a 
definite limitation to this research but every effort was made to ensure that they 
were able to express themselves adequately and in ways that they were 
comfortable with. Carrying out interviews in people's homes also makes the 
discussion of themes such as 'home' and 'belonging' a little easier as they are 
able to show you photographs taken in the 'homeland', or personal research they 
may have carried out on the village they are originally from (such as who lives in 
the village now, the dimensions of the house their families had there and so on). 
It is also possible to question them about objects they have around the home as 
ways to stimulate discussion and understanding of such complex and often 
troubling issues. 
The issues of understanding and taking emotion into account within 
geographical and social science research are becoming increasingly 
important 
(see, for example, Davidson and Bondi 2004). Not only are we, as researchers, 
aware of our own positionality, we have to be prepared for emotion, particularly 
when dealing with issues that may be sensitive 
for participants. Many 
discussions involved intense portrayals of emotion and feeling and necessitated 
large amount of empathy, compassion and understanding on my part, whilst 
trying at the same time, to talk about the very issues that were causing them pain 
and anger. These were the two main 
feelings that appeared during interviews, 
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although confusion and ambivalence were also very much present too. It is. ) 
therefore, crucial to be aware of emotion within research on the part of both 
researcher and researched that influence the outcome of findings. These findings 
and empirical analysis are the focus of the next four chapters. 
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Chapter 4 
Negotiating ambivalent 'Palestinian-ness': home, belonging and 
hybridity 
This chapter discusses notions of home and belonging and how they 
are related to hybridity. They form crucial facets of 'being Palestinian' 
in Athens. A distinction is made between home as belonging and the 
house as a material space in which Palestinians inhabit. The first 
section discusses symbolic and cultural constructions of home and 
feelings of belonging. This is followed by an examination of the 
materiality and significance of hybridity as well as cross-border 
connections to Palestinian lives. The final section analyses the house 
(and cultural artefacts within it) as a material, domestic but also hybrid 
and gendered space in which 'Palestinian-ness' is negotiated. 
Introduction 
The notion of home is one that is central to many people's lives and identities. 
As Ang and Symonds (1997: v) state: 
there can befew terms so densely laden with passionately conflicting 
meanings than 'home'... the problematic of home, displacement and 
belonging has acquired a new historical acuteness in the current age 
of massive social and economic transformations, as processes of 
globalisation, transnational migration and postcolonial dislocation 
are foregrounding the precariousness of established and seemingly 
anchored definitions of home, identity and security. 
Home, as a contested space and of physical as well as symbolic attachment and 
importance (Papastergiadis 1998), may be even more significant to migrants and 
to those living in diaspora such as Palestinians who have been displaced, often as 
refugees. It can become both a problematic and comforting factor in their 
lives. 
According to Thomas (1997: 97), in the case of those in diaspora, one has to 
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problematise and be aware of the home as a secure or insecure space. It may 
constitute a "conceptual shift from debilitation to control" but at the same time 
become a space of unpredictability and fragile connections to the homeland. ) 
where experiences of ambivalence and confusion occur that are marked by 
feelings of "transience, impermanence and separation from family". In the 
process, the "home as sanctuary" may become a notion and reality that is more 
"ephemeral or continuously deferred" (ibid. ). 
Feelings of home and belonging within diasporic spaces are affected by 
the processes of migration and globalisation and can no longer be simplistically 
theonsed and analysed (Al-Ali and Koser 2002; Gilroy 2000). As Rapport and 
Dawson (1998: 17) stress: "in a world of movement, home becomes an arena 
where differing interests struggle to define their own spaces within which to 
localise and cultivate their identity". They have argued that home is a concept 
that is always in motion, moving in and between multiple locations. The idea of 
home is increasingly being seen as flexible, complicated and dynamic (Al-Ali 
and Koser 2002) and one that has been particularly affected by the processes of 
globalisation and de-territorialisation (Wong 2002: 169). This is especially the 
case for migrants and those in diaspora. As a result, this may mean that home 
entails "an actual place of lived experience and a metaphorical space of personal 
attachment and identification" (Armbruster 2002: 20). Thus, a notion of home 
as contested and relational is useful as it captures the sense of ambivalence that 
often surrounds feelings of home and belonging that can be hard for those in 
diaspora to define. As the following quote illustrates, it raises numerous 
questions about feelings of 'Palestinian-ness' that are often very difficult to 
answer, clarify and articulate: 
It is usually assumed that a sense of place or belonging gives a 
person stability. But what makes a place home? Is it wherever your 
family is, where you have been brought up?... "ere is home? Is it 
where our parents are buried? Is home from where you have 
been 
displaced, or where you are now? 
(Sarup 1994: 95) 
93 
It has to be pointed out here that there is no clear cut or direct translation 
of 'home I in Greek. Therefore, a note is needed on such language issues. In 
Greek, 'home' is translated as meaning either 'house' (spiti) or 'country), which 
can mean 'homeland' or where one comes from (patrida). None of these words 
carry the same connotation as that of the word 'home' in English, which has 
multiple meanings and can be rather vague. It is important to understand how 
such words, which have been much theorised academically, come to be used and 
understood by real people. In addition, Palestinian usage of the word home can 
mean any number of things ranging from state to a house. With respect to the 
notions of home and homeland in Arabic and for Palestinians, Turki (1988: 175) 
has the following interesting point to make: 
El Blad. This term, so uniquely Palestinian, literally means 'the 
countries' that is, where Palestinians live. In Palestinian idiom, 
however, el blad connotes the covert exaltation of a homeland 
without boundaries, a refuge of the national sensibility as itferments 
in exile before it is transplanted home during the awda - another one 
of those Palestinian words that belong to a language within another 
language: Return. 
'Palestine' itself as home is not, as Turki (ibid) indirectly suggests, clear-cut, but 
a deliberately expansive concept, a place that is seen as welcoming to those who 
rightfully belong there, an idealised land where the boundaries that prevent them 
from returning are not present and that is waiting for their eventual return. It is 
also confusing as it can mean historical Palestine, (which the land of Israel now 
occupies) the West Bank and Gaza only, or it can be both. This research 
highlights the problematic nature of language in respect to such complex 
concepts. 
Where is home? Memories and stories of Palestine 
Many Palestinians interviewed perceive home as being where they currently live, 
are Csituated' or grounded but at the same time, 
home is where they feel their 
roots are and where they feel they belong 
(often described as their 'homeland'). 
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For many respondents, thinking about and defining home and belonging appears 
fraught with tensions, confusion and ambiguity. As a result, such notions are 
extraordinarily difficult for Palestinians such as Edward Said (1986: 30) to 
articulate: 
Palestine is exile, dispossession, the inaccurate memories of one 
place slipping into vague memories of another, a confused recovery 
of general wares, passive presences scattered around in the Arab 
environment. The story of Palestine cannot be told smoothly. Instead, 
the past, like the present, offers only occurrences and coincidences. 
Random. 
1948, the year the state of Israel was created, is remembered by Palestinians as 
the Nakba or catastrophe and has been very influential in constructions of 
popular and official memories, narratives and discourses of Palestine. It marked, 
as Rosemary Sayigh (1998) puts it: "the birth of the Palestinian nation ... the 
beginning of a story". This is seen as the story of the Palestinian people, of an 
official ideology of collective constructions of Palestinian 'identity' to counter 
and resist the perceived loss of a homeland and ensuing occupation. At the same 
time, though, countless personal, individual unofficial voices and stones speak of 
displacement, exile, rootlessness, struggle, violence and statelessness and of 
apathy, hope, unity and fragmentation. They all, however, appear to centre round 
historical and contemporary territorial Palestine: "home is where you are not and 
where you cannot be" (Lindholm Schulz 2003: 94). 
Palestine as ambivalent 
The perception of Palestine as a home acts as a necessary prerequisite to the 
perception of Palestine as a homeland, which in turn can become a powerful 
strategic tool for political constructions of 'solidarity' and 'unity', key issues, 
which are discussed in depth in Chapter Five. Khalidi's (1997: 9,205) question 
of "What are the limits of Palestine? " is important. With this query, Khalidi 
illustrates the ambivalence (but also the perceived potential political strength) of 
defining belonging and a bounded homeland. He points to the difficulties 
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involved in imagining a homeland and the tensions involved in deciding and 
agreeing what constitutes its acceptable territory. He is also asking, however, 
what has made and makes Palestine and Palestinians distinctive, or uniquely 
Palestinian historically and leading to the present day. These are difficult and 
problematic questions Palestinians in Athens are having to negotiate on an 
everyday basis and to which there are no easy answers. 
This research echoes Khalidi's concerns and has found that when most 
participants talk about Palestine as home, they do not readily define where it is 
exactly in geographical terms. At the same time, the clarity and boundaries maps 
provide appear to be important to Palestinians and their constructions of home, 
belonging and 'shared consciousness'. Evidence from this research suggests that 
for the majority of Palestinians in Athens, having a defined piece of land or 
territory not necessarily to call home but to belong to and to originate from 
appears to forn-1 a large part of their constructions of what it means to be 
Palestinian. 
A rough map (Figure 6 below) drawn by Rafiq (40, restaurant worker) in 
order to try and explain his family's displacement from Israel in 1967 into the 
Gaza Strip provides a good way to introduce and illustrate the complexity of 
these issues. On the one hand, Rafiq is keen to visually depict his family's forced 
movement because he feels a map will lend credibility and clarity to his words, 
to his connections to 'there' and to the viability of a place called Palestine, where 
he feels he is from. On the other hand, his map also shows the way in which 
what happened is also now confusing, turbulent and unclear despite being 
embedded in his mind, constituting a swirl of names kept and places lost. The 
words and circle depicting 'Khan Younis', for instance, which is where he says 
his family are originally from in what is now Israel and which, according to 
Rafiq, was recreated as a refugee camp in the Gaza Strip, merge with the names 
of other places remembered, some written in English, some in Arabic. As a 
Palestinian who grew up in Gaza, it becomes evident as he draws the map that he 
is constantly adding layers of memories, in the form of areas that he feels are 
important historically to his family's story of displacement, as he remembers 
them. As a result, his process of drawing is not flowing or neat, but jolted and 
full of indecision, stopping and starting. At the same time, however, he is also 
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trying to show the political significance of his family's and other Palestinians' 
displacement by highlighting the West Bank and writing '1948' to show the area 
that constituted historical Palestine. 
Figure 6- Rafiq's drawing depicting his family's displacement in 1967 
--- 7 
Home as svmbolic attachment 
The difficulties of defining a concrete home to belong to also trigger the 
widespread use of maps as ways to symbolise, denote and solidify belonging to a 
defined territory that Palestinians are connected to. The cultural and political 
significance of the ways in which maps are used by diasporic Palestinian 
individuals and organisations cannot be ignored. The Right of Return to 
historical Palestine is still something many Palestinians in Athens appear to hang 
onto and insist will happen sometime in the future and it seems to be a goal that 
they are willing to work towards and not give up on. This is probably why maps 
of Palestine, which appear in leaflets or as embroideries in people"s homes in 
Greece illustrate Palestine as being the whole of the historical area of Palestine 
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(see Figure 7 below). For example, Abir (38, Arabic teacher) is keen to show me 
a carefully embroidered map of historical Palestine that is prominently placed in 
the main hall of her apartment and that is one of the first things a visitor to the 
house sees as they walk in. I As she points out how beautiful it is and how 
exquisite the stitching is, it becomes clear that it is an artefact she is proud of and 
wants to show off. However, it also highlights her symbolic attachment and 
connections to a Palestine that has been lost but is being kept alive in such 
images and imaginations. As she says: "this is where I am from originally". At 
the same time, such maps stress the political project of self-determination and the 
constructions of a bounded territory (and consequent state) in which to 
potentially unite Palestinians. This can be seen in Figure 7 below, which denotes 
the motif of the PLO in a locally produced leaflet on the Palestinian situation. 
The map represented below the Palestinian flag is that of historical Palestine. 2 
Figure 7- The symbolic use of maps of historical Palestine 
TO AOrOTYnO THE OPTANODfF TIA THN AflEAEYIBEPOM THY FIAAAEMNHI: 
(Source: Palestine, The Difficult Road 2002: 23) 
I The use of such possessions and cultural objects within the home as a material, domestic space 
are discussed later in this chapter. 
2 This image of historical Palestine has already been depicted in Figure I (Chapter One). I In 
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Palestinian activist websites, for example, also reveal an array of maps that are 
used to support their case and the Palestinian cause. 3 
Palestinians in Athens may use maps to symbolise and illustrate the 
Palestine they feel they belong to, but this belonging to 'there' needs to be 
analysed further. As Bowman (1993: 82) stresses, "'Palestine' will be imagined 
differently by Palestinians in different situations". In other words, he appears to 
be saying that Palestine (as a home and/or homeland) is a dynamic spatial and 
temporal construction. This, in turn, has implications for potential political 
visions for the future. 4 Interviews reveal that there are a number of ways in 
which Palestine is depicted and this is largely related to the geographical area 
they are from originally and the connections they imagine they have to this 
place. Despite this though, for many Palestinians in Athens, the idea of a shared 
Palestine that they can all relate to in some way seems to be pervasive enough to 
overcome individual differences and perceptions of where this Palestine is 
exactly because of the large effect the idea of territorial Palestine has had 
symbolically on their minds and lives. Therefore, it is crucial to appreciate the 
importance of such stories in creating and maintaining sentiments of 'shared 
consciousness' that all Palestinians can ascribe to in some way. 
Palestine may constitute where many Palestinians in Athens feel their 
'true' or 'original' home is. However, this may not allow them to fully accept or 
create 'new' homes in diaspora, despite the fact that the majority of participants 
feel Greece is a relatively friendly and supportive country for them to live in. 
Images, memories and stories of Palestine as home appear to haunt Palestinians 
wherever they go even if they are only constructed snapshots of a reality that is 
in the past. Although memories fade with time, they can be kept alive and for 
many diasporic Palestinians in Athens, have helped them maintain symbolic 
connections with home, thereby making the idea of a 'homeland' and ultimately 
of self-determination possible. 
3 See for example, www. palestine-net. co www. heileh. com/countries/Talestine. htn-fl, 
www. 4data. ca/palestine/I II largernaps. litnil, www. 4data. ca/palestine/Talestine. html, 
www. prc. org/uk/prcmap/MAP/MapMain. asp? MapLang=English, www. al- 
awda. org/therefugeeprime - 4 Differing Palestinian visions of a ftiture Palestinian state are discussed in more depth in Chapter 
six. 
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Evidence from interviews indicates that for Palestinians who originated 
in what is now called Israel, often the village or town from which their families 
came originally is seen as home. They describe with great detail the village and 
house in which their family once lived. These act as a powerful (yet often static) 
symbol and reminder of what has been lost and needs to be regained. For 
example, in response to a questions asking him where he felt he was from, Majid 
(35, a foreign company employee or FCE for short) says: 
I am from Palestine, from Safad, which is to the north. My grandparents left in 
1948. Well, my grandfather didn't. He refused to leave his home and his land 
and so he was killed. The rest of my family went to Lebanon where things are 
very difficultfor the Palestinians... The village I comefrom is close to the Golan 
Heights, on the side of a mountain. It is a green area and my grandparents 
always described how beautiful it is. I always wondered you know, if it was 
actually as beautiful as they described. But when I was in Canada I was in this 
jastfood place and I saw an employee with the same surname as me. I asked him 
where he was from and he said Palestine. It turned out that he was originally 
from a village close to mine. And some time later, I got a parcel in the post. It 
was a video of the area where I come from and of my village as well. And it 
looked so beautiful in real life. You know it reminded me of Parnitha 5 where we 
went recently because it is on a mountain and it is green. It was very emotional 
actually seeing the piece of land that I came from and I asked my parents for all 
the information they had on it, the dimensions and the exact location so that I 
would have a clear idea of it in my head and I have a large file full of 
information on it (laughs). This is where I comefrom, where my roots are, in the 
land. This is what is important to Palestinians - the land that they have and they 
have lost. It is mainly a territorial issue, based around land. I know that there 
are Polish Jews living on my land now and this really upsets me. Why come all 
the wayfrom somewhere else to take over land that belongs to someone else? It 
doesn't make sense. They had a home in Poland - why take over someone else's 
land and make them leave? 
' Parnitha is the name of the mountain at Mt Parnitha National Park, which lies around 30 kin 
north of Athens. 
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Here, home appears in idealised form as a concrete space of security and 
somewhere to hold onto in the midst of exile, insecurity and (im)mobility. 
Palestine becomes a romanticised place where all problems can disappear. Such 
stones often come hand in hand with painful narratives of forced displacement 
and can heighten perceptions of the situation prior to exile as 'good' and 
subsequent realities as 'bad', which can also help trigger problematic desires to 
return to a mythical homeland that in reality is very different to the one 
imagined. Ibrahim (32, construction worker) has a story similar to Majid's to 
tell: 
From 1948, those who left then, even they cannot go back. So only those in '67 
who are in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank who are allowed to come and go. 
Those who left in 1948, their land is called Israel now. The Green line separates 
the two areas. From the same town that myfather isfrom, which is called Safad, 
which is to the North, close to Lebanon and there is a lake, there were some 
people who went to America and they got American citizenship and they went 
back and they have taken photos of the area and myfather saw them and he was 
so excited. The door of the house was still as it was because the Israelis haven't 
touched some villages yet. You know what this meant for my father. My father, 
when he left, he was 14,15 years old and he has been wounded by a Jewish 
bullet and so he remembers and he wishes so much that he could return to his 
wonderful country. This is why it is etched into our minds that this country 1. s 
ours. We have to get it back because let's say you have your house with its 
rooms, kitchen and bathroom and someone comes with force and says I'm going 
to live and stay in your house now. I'm going to take these two rooms and the 
kitchen and you can have the toilet. Would you accept that seeing as the house is 
yours? You have tofight to get it back. 
What emerges from both voices is a sense of injustice and having been 
wronged, which they feel is very hard to forget. These seem to be words that 
have been repeated again and again, like a mantra of suffering and loss that 
refuses to go away, keeping the idea of a home and of a homeland alive 
in 
people's minds. In Athens, stones about where they come from are retold 
by 
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Palestinians of all classes and financial situations and it is this perhaps that 
explains why they are felt to be so important for unification purposes and held 
onto so much. The metaphor of a house is often used to denote or explain what 
Palestinians in Athens feel has happened to them and to Palestine. Such 
descriptions illustrate the conflations and connections between symbolic and 
material notions of the house, home and homeland. The use of the image of the 
house is, however, more than just a metaphor as it stresses the material 
dispossession of Palestinian homes many Palestinians in Athens feel is unjust. 
As a result, it is also then used to demonstrate the broader issues of displacement 
and loss Palestinians in diaspora feel. The symbolic and political importance of 
Palestine or 'Filastin 6 as a homeland, the Nakba and of displacement is 
illustrated by Lina (38, businesswoman), who has never been to Palestine: 
My father was from Yaffa, Jaffa. When he was sixteen, he went to the United 
States to study. His father, my grandfather, he had 22 stremmata 7 of land of 
oranges, the area is famous for its oranges and of course he was very well off 
and after 1947, or '48 or '49,1 don't remember exactly, the Israelis they kicked 
him out indirectly. I will tell you how and he was walking with my grandmother 
and my other uncles, they were trying to leave Palestine and go to the borders 
with Jordan because they left with only one shirt and a pair of trousers and 
Israel took all our property and they went to Jordan and they started from 
scratch. Now, why I said they left by force but indirectly, because Israel at that 
time, when they established their country in Palestine, they didn't force you to 
leave and push you away from your house, but they stopped you taking 
advantage of your land, like all the oranges, the products that were coming out 
of our land, they were taking it. 
Liz: By force? 
Lina: Of course by force and nobody could stop them or tell them anything 
because they had the weapons and they - you know the Arabs, all their 
lives, 
6 Tilastin' is the Arabic word for 'Palestine'. 
7 Here, Lina uses the Greek word, 'strenunata' in order to illustrate the siZe of the 
land her 
grandfather had. One strenuna is a quarter of an acre. 
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they are with stones. no has the weapons? The organisation, the groups, not 
the people, because my family had nothing to do with politics and plus 
psychological war and it was difficult, like myfather at that time was 17, or 18 1 
don't remember, but his brothers who were younger, they were still children, 
students and my grandfather was very worried about them, because the Israeli 
military, the police, sometimes what would happen, they would go to the area 
and collect all the boys of this age whether you did something or not and my 
grandfather was afraidfor his sons, so that was why he left plus they were living 
infear, plus they couldn't touch anythingfrom the land. 
Liz: They couldn't make a living? 
Lina: Nothing, nothing. They didn't have, plus some of their money in the bank 
wasfrozen - they couldn't take it out. From a very well offfamily in Jaffa they 
went to Jordan with just one pair of shoes and they started from scratch. My 
father never went back to Palestine, because after the States, he started working 
in an American-Lebanese company and then he went to Africa. Andfrom the rest 
of myJamily, no-one has gone back because they have nothing there, we have 
nothing left. no would go there now and askfor our land? And to be honest, I 
don't want ever to go there until it's free land and we believe, and I believe 
strongly that one day it will come back to us and after maybe the third 
generation, maybe my grandson's generation, because all this blood, they say in 
Arabic that blood never becomes water, so the land is built on the blood of the 
Palestinians, so I think one day it will come back. It's like the Greeks - they had 
400 years of occupation from the Turks - they said we are Greeks, it's our land 
and the Turks were there 400 years. It's like now if I tell any person from Israel 
that it is my country they will say no, we are there, it's called Israel. It's not, you 
arejust occupying us. 
it is highly likely that Lina's story of her family's displacement and the 
creation of the state of Israel would ring true or at least arouse sympathy for 
many Palestinians in Athens. Even if families of interviewees have not had 
similar experiences, they know families who have and they are often acutely 
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aware of the circumstances (from a Palestinian perspective) surrounding the 
creation of the state of Israel. Those from historical Palestine who have never 
been there are less likely to want to return unless they can go back to the village 
from which they originate, which for the majority of Palestinians interviewed 
appears to be largely inaccessible. This may be an incentive not to return and to 
make do elsewhere but this does not mean that they do not want self- 
determination - many Palestinians in Athens do in principle. They feel that all 
Palestinians should have a recognised country to which to belong, go back to 
live in or visit when and if they please. 
The majority of Palestinian respondents whose families originated in 
what is now Israel have never been back. Yet, for many, Palestine is still 
perceived as home, despite the fact that they have never been or lived there. This 
is because, as Nisreen (23, President of GUPS), points out: "You know, I know 
that I'll never go there, or if I go, I'll go as a tourist, or I'll never go and live 
there, but still I can't say that I am Greek, even if I will be here 30 years". For 
Palestinians from the West Bank and Gaza, home can also be problematic. 
Karim, (24, student), who has only recently moved to Greece and whose family 
originates from the West Bank, feels his home is in Jordan. However, he still 
feels Palestinian because: 
you can't forget your origin. There is a saying in Arabic, which says that "he 
who doesn't have an origin, doesn't have a present". But I can never forget 
Jordan either, and thefact that I was born there and that I grew up there. Jordan 
has been good to me and myjamily. I cannotforget that, but I also can'tforget 
Palestine. When people here ask me where I am from I say I am a Palestinian 
from Jordan. I love both countries. 
Sa'id (25, student) also finds the question of where his home is "very tricky". He 
says that at a conference organised by the International Union of Socialist Youth 
on peace, at which Israelis were also present, he was asked the same question by 
a German psychologist: "And I said, because the Israeli was looking at me, that 
your home is where your roots come from. And for the first time, the Israeli 
agreed with me". For Sa'id, Palestine is: "the whole of Palestine, pre 1948. 
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That's my hope. But I'll settle for the lands of 1967 now,, the way things are. 
Because I think, let's not kid ourselves - we cannot get the whole of Palestine 
now". Said feels that he belongs in pre 1948 Palestine and that his home is 
there, despite the fact that he is originally from the West Bank. This illustrates 
the salience of a historical and territorial Palestine as home (or a homeland) to 
8 which to belong, whether Palestinians are from there originally or not. 
Belonging as rootedness 
The importance of roots for those in diaspora is described by Thomas (1997: 95) 
as: "the often profound desire of those who have left a homeland behind to be 'in 
place' and to be connected and rooted to the landscape [and] has for most part 
been ignored by social analysts". The idea of being 'rooted' to the land from 
which they have come appears to be an important one in many negotiations of 
'Palestinian-ness' and perceptions of home and homeland. Lindholm Schulz 
(2003: 99) points out, however, that for Palestinians, the ties and the romantic 
fixation to this land often remain static and unchanging and it is "portrayed as 
'primordially', essentially Arab". Turki, for example, (1988: 203) stresses that 
Palestinians are the 'native' people of Palestine. Such notions of a specific land 
or territory to which they can belong appear to be powerful and pervasive 
amongst Palestinians in Athens. As Heela (female, 40, FCE) stresses: "everyone 
needs roots... your identity, where you belong is a very important aspect of your 
life, of who you are ... 
it defines you as a person". For Turki (1988: 65), 
Palestinian land or 'el ard' has always been a "common centre" that has held all 
Palestinians, a womb ftom which all Palestinians emerged, before "the - 
essentially Western - concept of nationhood was added to (their) repertoire of 
historical consciousness". He stresses what he feels is a "mystical affinity 
between people and their land ... without it a 
Palestinian could not establish his or 
her identity" (ibid. ). As a self-proclaimed Palestinian revolutionary, he stresses 
the significance of the symbolic attachments to a territorial homeland as the basis 
for resistance and 'identity politics'. 
8 Despite Sa'Id's diasporic existence and the fact that he has never been to Palestine, politics 
seems to form an important aspect of his life. Thus, it may be true that political involvement 
for 
Palestinians is closely associated with the perception of Palestine not only as home, but also as a 
homeland and political goal, so that self-determination can eventually occur. 
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The majority of Palestinian respondents who have never been to Palestine 
keep themselves aware of what is going on and have an idea of the historical 
issues that have led to the present state of affairs. As a result, they often do not 
feel completely 'separate' to Palestine, even though they may personally 
experience such emotions occasionally. In fact, unlike Palestinians in other 
European countries, such as in Sweden (according to Ghani 2000), many 
Palestinians in Greece do not portray themselves as feeling detached from 
Palestine. Despite their exile, Palestine as a homeland and space to which to 
belong, either materially or metaphorically, appears to remain an important part 
of their hearts and minds, an integral part of their everyday lives and sense of 
'Palestinian-ness'. This may be linked to Greece's geographical proximity to 
Palestine and support for Palestinians and their cause, allowing feelings of 
belonging as well as cross-border connections to persevere. This also appears to 
feed the appetite for politicisation displayed by many Palestinians in Athens. 
'Palestine' as a material reality 
Palestinians who originate from the West Bank and Gaza and who have lived 
there have particular stories to tell as do those who are refugees within these 
areas and who were displaced in 1967. Palestine is usually a material reality for 
them as they will have often lived in the land that they call home. Their Palestine 
may not be wrapped in a mythical haze but for those living in Greece it is still a 
memory, which for some may be recent but for many others is distant. This is 
especially the case for those who have not been able to return because of their 
political affiliations and activism. Many Palestinians who have lived in the West 
Bank and Gaza feel they know the 'real' Palestine because they have 
experienced living there. They can describe where they come from in detail and 
have seen the situation there with their own eyes. As Tamara, (32, researcher) 
who often travels to her home in Gaza says: 
You feel welcomed there. There's a very warm atmosphere, but the 
levels of 
poverty shock you and how people live but they do cope and this 
is surprising. 
There are children running around in the street. There are 
both big nice 
buildings, which are modern, and old dilapidated houses. People there 
feel that 
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they are able to unite together and survive together, but there are many 
difficultiesfor them. There are explosions and the children are too hyper as a 
result; they have a very different upbringing to other children. 
Those who have lived there often feel 'closer' to events and feel more able to 
understand and explain the situation. Two men, the first from Bethlehem and the 
second from Hebron describe how their town has changed over time: 
It's an old city. It has a lot of history and character as you can imagine. But it 
has changed over the years - it's got bigger as there are more people, buildings. 
It's becoming more modern with the tall buildings and shops. When I was a child 
things were very different in the sense that then, there were no checkpoints, 
before 1989. Then, after, you had the temporary checkpoints and now they have 
become permanent. Now, it's so difficult. There are so many restrictions. Many 
who live in one place have to work somewhere else and it's hardfor them to get 
there every day. It is a catastrophic situation. 
(Abdul, 28, casual office worker) 
I am originally from Hebron, in Palestine. I grew up there. I was born in 1962.1 
went to school there; I have many memoriesfrom there, from my childhood, from 
the town, ofplaying with myfriends; they are all good memori . es ... Well, we gave 
up a lot of things because of the Occupation. We couldn't travel; there were 
restrictions. We were always in fear, so there were many psychological 
pressures on us growing up and on our families. We lost many days of school 
because it was closed so often. We saw so many things. Also, there were no 
opportunities or possibilities there. We, those of us who lived through it, we 
really know what it was like, but I think, in a way, we got used to the 
bad 
situation; it was our life and we dealt with it and got on with our 
daily lives as 
well as we could; we didn't have any other choice. 
(Mustafa, 42, unemployed) 
Mustafa's use of the word 'Occupation' highlights the symbolic and political use 
of words such as 'Palestine' or 'Occupied Territories'. 
The former often 
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represents historical Palestine (that most respondents wish to see a return to) and 
the latter the West Bank and Gaza (as a space that is occupied and needs to be 
liberated); both, however, highlight the land as problematic and for many 
participants, uses of these words can be blurred. 
For those from the West Bank and Gaza, perceptions of the 'reality' of 
the situation can also make things more emotionally difficult for them. In 
response to a question on the building of settlements, Maha, (29, housewife) 
from Nablus, explains: 
I will be much more emotional [than Palestinians who have not lived there] 
because I lived there, myjamily lives there, they are suffering every day and Igo 
through difficulties when Igo to my town ftom Jordan every year, I could not go 
since 1997 because of this. I have 2 children and I don't want them to see this 
suffering. "en I see the wall, when I see the people going through these 
checkpoints, I am ftom the people that they don't want, who even accepted or 
thought that we could live in one state, 2 peoples under one state but now I 
cannot see that, no way can I see that after this and I cannot see a state with 
22% of the land, I cannot, because every time we ask, they ask more, every time 
we want, they want more, so with this, we cannotfind a solution, we cannot. 
The situation takes on a new, much more potentially personal meaning, and as 
Maha illustrates, this proximity psychologically can have a deep impact on how 
they perceive the political climate in the region, as well as their thoughts on how 
to solve the problems. Rania (38, FCE),, another mother of two, also stresses the 
fact that she knows "what it is really like there, because I lived there and I saw 
how it was. I lived through the stages of the occupation". According to her, it is 
both important and painful for her to have experienced this, as the events that 
unfold in the region take on a different meaning for her and as a result she feels 
she is better equipped to comment on what the situation is 'really like'. Such 
descriptions and the emotions they often trigger may serve to strengthen 
attachments to their place of origin and former residence. Those who have lived 
there are also more likely to have more substantial and frequent contact with 
friends and relatives who, as Rania says "can tell me exactly what's going on, 
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which the news does not always show". This psychological proximity to events 
there despite living in Greece seems to have a role to play in Palestinian feelings 
of hybridity discussed subsequently in this chapter. 
Visiting Palestine, the area where their family is from originally, or 
where relatives live in the West Bank and Gaza can also have a potentially 
significant impact on perceptions of home, belonging and Talestinian-ness 
Dina (17, still at school) remembers: 
the little th ings ... going hunting with my uncles in the middle of the night ... we 
walked there. It was in the middle of nowhere. It was a different world. I 
remember the Israeli troops were always trying to come into the town. I 
remember feeling like an outsider. The other kids were really aggressive, 
throwing stones ... 
but eventually we became part of it. I realised that the land 
was rooted in us, so we were related to it in the end and Ifound myse4f throwing 
stones ... another time, I was sitting on the steps of my house there in my shorts 
and t-shirt and a young Palestinian girl came up to me. She wasJully covered. I 
can't remember exactly what she said, but she disapproved of what I was 
wearing. I couldn't understand why she and others were like that. I respect what 
they choose to wear and they should respect what I want to wear. I am 
Palestinian, but I have grown up in Greece, so I am different I suppose and this 
has influenced me. But I try to understand them, so they should try and 
understand me and what being Palestinian means to me. 
Dina's visits to Qualqilya, in the West Bank, are etched in her memory and have 
altered her perceptions of what it means to be Palestinian over time and space, 
which are both problematic and empowering for her. Omar, Dina's brother, (20, 
student) who was with her when she visited Palestine, describes his feelings on 
his first visit as a child: "It was how a newborn baby sees colours. I felt myself 
staring, trying to grasp the fact that I was in Palestine, that I was Palestinian, 
despite growing up in Greece". Visits to Palestine are very important 
symbolically for Palestinians in diaspora. Barghouti's (2004) book, 'I Saw 
Ramallah', which describes his visit to the West Bank after thirty years of exile 
is a good example of this. 
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Differentiating between home and belonging 
Of those respondents who feel that their home is in Greece, or anywhere apart 
from historical Palestine or the Occupied Territories, the majority still feel 
Palestinian and a sense of belonging 'there'. The land of Palestine is where they 
feel their roots lie and where they feel that they are from originally. Home and 
belonging do not necessarily go hand in hand and, therefore, must be 
differentiated. Majid and Fadila, a couple with two children, who feel that 
Greece is their temporary home and would like to move back to the Middle East 
to live, discuss their sense of belonging, explaining that, "Palestine is in our 
blood" (Fadila, 30, housewife). For them, however, Palestine is not home, 
because: "We have never lived there, but it is where we are from, even though 
we do not live there and have never been there" (Majid, 36, FCE). They, like 
others, believe that even though they live in one place and their immediate 
material home is there, they can feel they belong in Palestine. This highlights the 
issue of the differences between symbolic and material understandings of home. 
For Majid and Fadila, their house in Greece is their material home, but Palestine 
is their symbolic home, where they feel they belong and which constitutes a 
territorial space to which to form attachments over time and space. Ibrahim, (32, 
construction worker) displays similar views to Fadila and Majid: 
You may live here, but your country, Palestine, still exists and you feel you 
belong there. Because there are Greeks that live in America, in Germany, but 
they don't stop being orfeeling Greek do they? They don't change. 
Liz: So you would say that you were from Palestine? 
Ibrahim: Well, yes, of course. Palestine, for us, is a question of life. 
Sam', (57, politician) another man who has lived in Greece for over 30 years and 
who is a Greek citizen, feels that home is in Greece. At the same time, however, 
he maintains that he is Greek-Palestinian and that he can never forget where he 
came from originally. Abir, (female, 38, Arabic teacher) who is heavily involved 
in fundraising activities to help Palestinians, raises an interesting point: 
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I feel that my home is in Lebanon, but if someone were to ask me where I'm 
from, I would say Palestine. Youfeel guilty ifyou don't mention Palestine, like if 
you don't mention it, it will be cancelled or wiped out andforgotten. 
Abir is making a political point about not denying the existence of Palestine. At 
the same time, the guilt she feels is indicative of the need Palestinians have to 
belong to a territory called Palestine. This raises the issue of whether Palestinians 
differentiate between home and homeland, a point similar to the one discussed 
above, on the difference between home and belonging. Sa'id, (25, student) for 
example, does not feel that there is a difference between his home and his 
homeland because "it's inevitable; in the end we're all going back". For Sa'id, 
therefore, home as homeland is inherently a political notion. His material and 
domestic everyday surroundings in Athens appear to pale in significance to 
Palestine, his 'true' home. Abir and Sa'id's views both highlight the use of a 
territorially defined Palestine as political tool. Strong convictions about eventual 
return appear to need a strong and committed awareness of the ties that bind a 
person to his or her land. At the same time, statements such as Abir's illustrate 
the insecurity that exile and the political situation in Palestine triggers, which 
means that it is very difficult for Palestinians to forget where they have come 
from. This feeling appears to be exacerbated because of the continuing conflict 
there and the historical factors leading to the present situation. It is interesting, 
however, to note the differences between Palestinians who do and do not feel 
that Palestine is home in terms of their political thought and involvement. 
Palestinians who do not feel that Palestine is their home still advocate the 
Palestinian cause, because they identify with it. 
Negotiating the realities of everyday hybridity in diaspora 
As discussed in Chapter Two, it is increasingly common to conceptualise 
migrants and those in diaspora as 'travelling' (Clifford 1997) or 'on the move', 
in order to denote the transgression of boundaries that such people may be 
involved in psychologically as well as materially. Although such views are 
welcome because they are committed to emphasising the connections between 
people and places, they sometimes have a tendency to over romanticise or 
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emphasise movement. This may come at the expense of an appreciation and 
exploration of power inequalities and feelings of rootlessness, potential 
immobility and vulnerability, which may be far from celebratory for those 
involved. Therefore, movement and conceptions of home and belonging as 
bounded and unbounded can be useful. For those in diaspora, perceptions of 
home and belonging, like the effects of hybridity and globalisation, may also be 
positive and negative; what is certain is that they are complex and problematic. 
The identities of those in diaspora and exile are often seen as hybrid because of 
the ways in which such peoples consciously and subconsciously deal with living 
'here' and 'there' or 'in-between', where they are at present and where they have 
come from or their perceived homeland. Their displacement and exile often acts 
as a starting point for feelings of home and belonging as hybrid and 'in-between' 
that then become the basis of them feeling, being and acting as hybrid 'subjects'. 
Although hybridity as a term is used in a very general sense throughout 
this thesis, it is very useful because it seems to accurately describe the 
ambivalence and liminality of Palestinian existence and identities in Greece. 
Palestinians may live 'here' in Greece, but their minds and lives are connected to 
'there'. For many Palestinians in Athens, therefore, their home is in Palestine yet 
at the same time, their everyday lives and material spaces of residence in Athens 
serve to both reinforce and undermine such conceptions and attachments. 'Being 
Palestinian' involves the hybrid and daily use of disjointed symbolic and 
material spaces, times, memories, stories, attachments and connections. As a 
result, they often have to deal with their inherent 'in-between-ness' and the 
complex issues of home and belonging that are often integral to such feelings of 
hybridity. For example, Said (1986: 6) believes that "essentially unconventional, 
hybrid and fragmentary forms of expression should be used to represent us". 
This is because "all residence is exile. We linger in nondescript places, nether 
here nor there" (ibid.: 2 1). As a result, he feels Palestinians are "migrants and 
perhaps hybrids in, but not of any situation in which we find ourselves" (ibid.: 
164). 
There are differences in the extent to which Palestinians in Athens feel 
in-between' and it is unsurprising that Palestinians in Athens negotiate such 
feelings differently and dynamically. One good example of this is through the 
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use of language. Shapiro (2000: 90) has noted how the multiple use of language 
may weaken the "system of national myth". For example, participants may use 
Greek, English and Arabic interchangeably and this can encourage feelings of 
hybrid and dynamic constructions of what it means to be a diverse group of 
people. Such use of languages by some Palestinians in their everyday life may, 
therefore, be seen as ways in which diasporic negotiations of 'being Palestinian' 
are subverting and disjointing narratives of a homogenised Palestinian 'Identity'. 
In addition, this may also serve to influence their dealings with Greek people and 
society; both their ambivalent feelings of 'Greek-ness' and Talestinian-ness' 
present a rupture to the 'national' languages and 'cultures' of both Greece and 
Palestine. 
For those Palestinians who do not work for foreign companies and who 
speak more Greek than Arabic in their daily lives, Greek may become easier to 
use than Arabic and their speech may be punctuated with both Greek and Arabic. 
At a meeting of the student Union, for example, the members talk a mixture of 
Greek and Arabic as they discuss situations in Greece and in Palestine. For 
students and respondents who speak Greek, such a mixing of languages appears 
to be common. Yet, for others, speaking Greek, although seen as a necessity for 
working in Greece, is actively discouraged in the home (even though children 
may go or will go to a Greek school). Palestinians who work for foreign 
companies, for example, may try to learn Greek as they also encourage their 
children to speak Arabic and often admit that their children may speak both 
Greek and English better than they do if they go to an international school. 
However, these Palestinians are less likely to learn Greek than those who are 
self-employed or who work for Greek businesses or organisations. 
9 
Repercussions of cross-border connections 
The families of the majority of Palestinians in Athens are spread around the 
world, or certainly the Middle East; they are with and without roots, making do, 
surviving, remembering and imagining Palestine. Although theories of identities 
9 There are numerous other examples of such uses of language. The registration form that 
has to 
be filled in by Palestinians who would like to join the Parikia is written in both Greek and 
Arabic. Also, respondents speaking in English during discussions often used Greek or Arabic 
words on purpose to try to better explain what they meant, but more often 
did so without 
realising. 
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a 'travelling' or 'in motion' are usef fa s ul, practically, many Palestinians ce 
numerous restrictions in terms of their physical mobility, as a result of their 
citizenship statuses. 10 Such immobilities do not mean, however, that Palestinians 
do not feel they are 'in-between' or disconnected to Palestine; physical 
immobilities do not erase or make psychological and symbolic mobilities 
impossible. Such physical lack of connection" may also strengthen the resolve 
to remain connected and feel Palestinian at all costs. At the same time, 
constructions of 'Palestinian-ness', home and belonging appear to be largely 
influenced by cross-border connections, in terms of communications (such as 
phone-calls and emails), media (satellite television and the internet) and 
monetary transactions (sending money to support one's family). 12 Cultural 
artefacts, personal possessions and diasporic spaces can also act as symbolic 
attachments and forms of connection to Palestine. 
Cross-border connections have a crucial role to play in Palestinians 
positionings as hybrid as they make sense of finding out and listening to what is 
going on 'there' and 'here'. As I interview Bilal, (33, FCE) for example, he 
receives a phone call from his family who infonn him that a cousin of his has 
been killed. He stresses that whether they like it or not, he and his wife are 
always connected to Palestine. His apparent shock and sadness coupled with his 
pragmatism and feelings of being lucky at being given the opportunity to live 
and work in Greece that emerge later in the interview illustrate the opportunities,, 
difficulties and tensions inherent in living 'in-between' 'here' and 'there'. Whilst 
interviewing another family, the parents of the wife, Samira, call from the West 
Bank and both husband and wife take it in turns to speak to them at length 
10 This is despite the fact that many Palestinians and their families have moved around the 
Middle East before arriving in Greece. Such movements are not necessarily voluntary and may 
be problematic because of the often complex and ambiguous citizenship statuses many 
Palestinians have. Chapter Six describes such issues surrounding citizenship in more detail. 
11 Immobilities are often imposed, created and enforced by nation-states; therefore, one could see 
hybridity as a 'threat' to such attempts. If one perceives the world as being interconnected and 
mobile, due to globalisation and cross-border connections, it is often impossible to think of 
spaces/times as separate. Yet, the nation-state and constructions of 'national identity' are 
attempts to do just that - to imagine, construct and keep people's dynamic negotiations, 
representations and positionings of who they are and where they belong static and unchanging so 
that the state's carefully crafted and maintained hegemony and viability is not threatened (see 
Chapters Two and Five for more on this). 
12 Theoretical aspects of cross-border connections have already been discussed in Chapter Two; 
however, their material effects on Palestinian feelings of belonging and hybridity are also 
exarnmed in more detail subsequently in this chapter. 
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(interview with Samira, 38, artist/housewife and Mound, 38, FCE). They 
apologise but point out that it is important to them to have their weekly talk and 
that it is not always easy for the parents to ring; the call, therefore, has to be 
taken. Watching the news, reading newspapers, looking on the intemetl talking 
to family, friends and colleagues are all activities that solidify these connections 
that are very hard to sever, especially given the seventy of the situation in 
Palestine. In relation to this, Sana, (34, housewife) stresses: 
I am connected to there, always. During the Arafat incident, when he was 
surrounded, I couldn't sleep, I was sick. I was in pain, I couldn't eat -I was very 
tense. Ifeel that I belong byfollowing what is happening there ... all my mind was 
there. If there is something bad, we are all glued to the TV, calling each other, 
saying what is the news, did you see it? 
Rafat (48, FCE and PLO representative in Athens) also appears to relate to such 
negative feelings of attachment: 
Every time the phone rings at I Ipm, I tremble and imagine that something bad 
has happened to my family, my friends, so although I know that I am not in 
danger here, I'M affected by what is going on there all the time. I speak to my 
family every day. But it's tragic that I can't see them and have to phone them. 
Such connections are problematic for some Palestinians in Athens. Other 
Palestinians feel they must resist the temptation to always feel connected to 
there, because they are not there physically and it is hard to feel as if they are: 
Ifyou watch the news all the time - well you can't can you? I can't be connected 
to there all the time because I am here. I need a change. I can't watch it all the 
time. I'M busy. I have a lot of responsibility. My husband is away a lot. I have 
time to watch the news more, but I don't always want tofocus on it. I need to get 
awayfrom it. (Ghada, 32, housewife) 
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All these cross-border connections, both sporadic and continuous (which 
are experienced as positive and negative) are important in negotiations and 
constructions of 'Palestinian-ness' in Greece. How Palestinians in Athens relate 
to and negotiate hybridity may depend on the strength and nature of these 
symbolic and material cross-border networks and relations, as well as specific 
and strategic temporal and spatial cultural, social and political subjectivities. 
This research has found that Palestinians who do not work for Arabic-owned 
foreign companies or who are married to Greeks and have children who are 
raised in Greece appear to feel more established. This may also be because of the 
length of time they have lived in Athens. They seem to be more likely to feel 
torn between Greece and Palestine and to live out and negotiate lives and spaces 
as hybrid and more of a fluid mix of 'here' and 'there'. Despite this, as outlined 
above, they (and often their children) still perceive themselves as Palestinian 
and/or as belonging to Palestine. As Lindholm Schulz (2003: 173) points out: 
"intermarriages have introduced an additional aspect of hybrid or mixed 
identities, even though the children of such couples frequently are considered 
and see themselves as Palestinian". 
For Palestinians who work for foreign companies, life appears to be more 
transient as well as perhaps more insecure, yet their lives too can be seen as 
hybrid as they position themselves as transient 'foreigners', while taking 
advantage of what Greece has to offer them. Their employment in Greece, the 
affection many appear to have for Greece and Greek people and their way of life 
has allowed them to feel 'at home' in Greece whilst still actively maintaining 
their 'Palestinian-ness' through cross-border connections to the homeland and 
the Middle East. Despite their less frequent social association with Greek people, 
poorer knowledge of the Greek language and 'sheltered protection' of their 
foreign company employment, their perceptions of themselves as Palestinian are 
intimately tied up with the fact that they do live in Athens and have these cross- 
border connections. In addition to this, as many Palestinians in Greece have lived 
or passed through one or more Middle Eastern countries on their way to Greece 
and many have never been to Palestine, their political, social and cultural 
identities have to be seen as situated, dynamic and open to temporal and spatial 
influences and positionings. For example, those Palestinians who have moved to 
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Greece from Lebanon (or the West Bank and Gaza), where the situation for 
Palestinians is hard are more likely to feel that the freedom to speak and act is a 
crucial aspect of what it means to be Palestinian in Greece. ' 3 
Palestinians without legal status and the realities of living 'in-between' 
The realities of hybridity are often especially difficult for those Palestinians who 
are refugees without legal status from Lebanon and Palestine and who have only 
recently found themselves in Athens. They live lives that are 'in-between' but 
unsurprisingly, they appear to feel more insecure, vulnerable and threatened than 
other Palestinians living in Athens do. Many are 'in-limbo' or in a 'no-man's 
land', separated from friends and family with little means to keep in contact with 
them. The undocumented refugees interviewed live in extremely dire poverty 
and overall, seem to have very little control of their lives. Most seem trapped 
living a miserable existence, dependant on help from fellow wealthier 
Palestinians and Greek charities. I spoke to some members of a large group of 
around thirty Palestinians who live together in a large basement room, without 
adequate or satisfactory kitchen and bathroom facilities; some have been living 
in this way for close to a year. For them, home is a long way from their present 
situation. Hala, a young mother tells me in broken English, as I sit on the rugs on 
the floor next to her and numerous children of different ages, which make up the 
sleeping area: "here is not our home, Palestine is home". When I ask her why she 
left, she replies: "very hard there, too difficult". 
Yet, the situations in which such Palestinians find themselves in Greece 
also seem to be very hard and they feel torn from their home in Palestine as a 
result. Moving away from their home is seen as a necessity or necessary evil, a 
means to an end; a better life and a new home in tenns of location but not 
emotionally or psychologically. As Tarub, (39, unemployed) who has been 
living with her three boys in one room for months,, explains: "things are hard 
here, but hopefully we will not be here forever; there it was difficult too, but at 
least it was home". 14 It appears that Tarub has a brother in Athens, which is why 
she came here in the first place. Like many other refugees in her situation 
13 The issues surrounding feelings of empowerment within diasporic spaces are 
discussed in 
Chapter Seven. 
14 As Tarub did not speak English or Greek, an interpreter had to be used to speak to her. 
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though, she prefers to try and move to another Western European country, in her 
case, Germany, where she has another brother. Those who want to move on are 
also destined to remain without legal status because they perceive that legal 
status would necessitate applying for asylum in Greece, and thus permanent 
residence. Therefore, movement and exile, in particular, can make people feel 
extremely powerless and perhaps lost. 
For these Palestinians, movement has been an unpleasant if necessary 
experience and although it could symbolise or create new opportuni I and a 
better life, this does not always happen in reality. One must also not forget, 
however, that they too are involved in dynamic cross-border networks as they 
move, as they also negotiate 'Palestinian-ness' in relation to their current 
surroundings. The fact that they have made it to Greece illustrates their potential 
ability to move and although living and feeling 'in-between' may be particularly 
hard because of their economic limitations, one should not automatically 
perceive them as passive victims. As they seek to make a living and get used to 
life in Greece, they may position themselves in hybrid, strategic and ambivalent 
ways. As Petronoti points out (personal communication, July 2003) in light of 
her research on Eritrean refugees in Athens, 'integration' or contact with Greece 
and Greeks is inevitable. As a result, even mundane, everyday acts such as 
shopping, contribute to and can, therefore, be seen as important contributions to 
their situated and dynamic perceptions of who they are as Palestinians in relation 
to each other, to Greeks and to their homeland. 15 For example, Tarub's anxiety 
that her fourteen-year-old son is taking drugs and "is up to no good" with his 
new friends (who appear to be mainly of Arab or African origin) also illustrates 
the difficulties involved in such 'integration'. However, as she and her two 
younger sons (who do not go to school) often have no money and nothing to do 
during the day, they often go for long walks around central Athens, getting used 
to their immediate environment in the process. One of Tarub's main observations 
as a result of these walks is how different the squalid conditions and area in 
15 Thus, even those who are the poorest and potentially most excluded and marginallsed may 
create hybrid spaces in which to make sense of living 'in-between'. Their accommodation, their 
meetings with other Palestinians, Arabs and so forth, walking around, dealing with charities such 
as Medicins Saris Fronti&res and Doctors of the World, with their Greek employees, can be seen 
as diasporic spaces in which they are negotiating themselves as Palestinian in Greece. At the 
same time, it is within such spaces that physical and material cross-border connections between 
themselves and their homeland may be tenuous but strong symbolically and mentally. 
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which they live are to the 'better' areas of central Athens, such as around 
Kolonaki and Syntagma. 1 6 She is also acutely aware of her family's own 
poverty in relation to the affluent Greeks she sees. She is also aware that there 
are many Palestinians who, unlike her, are wealthy as it is they who donate food 
and money to her family. 17 
Specific positionings of Talestinian-ness' and dealings with Greeks are 
illustrated further by my experiences with Nafeesa, a young pregnant Palestinian 
woman. Whilst accompanying her to various charities, it becomes apparent that 
she is using her knowledge of the legal system to portray a particular 
construction of herself in order to potentially make life better and easier. 
Although it is clear that the man who accompanies us is her husband and father 
of her children, she represents herself strategically to the charities as a single 
Palestinian mother from Gaza (with all the connotations and associations this 
might raise) who is in Greece on her own completely and in need of immediate 
help. This is despite the fact that she and her family do not intend to remain in 
Greece and her consequent negative reaction to the suggestion by the Greek 
Council for Refugees that she should claim political asylum. Indeed, as has 
already been noted, most illegal Palestinians interviewed do not wish to remain 
in Greece, but see it as a stepping-stone or gateway into Western Europe where 
some have relatives (also see Papadopoulou 2003 on similarities with Kurdish 
refugees). This appears to be because they do not like it in Greece, find it hard to 
live and get a job there and because the asylum process is seen as being 
extremely long, complex and difficult. For those refugees without legal status 
still 'on the move' then, home may be where they have come from, but also 
where they aspire to be. At the same time, all Palestinians who move (arid 
perhaps particularly those who do so illegally) do so in the hope that their lives 
will improve in some way, or that they will be able to help their relatives and 
homeland more if they do. Going back eventually may also be a dream to which 
they aspire. 
16 Syntagma. is one of the central squares in Athens; Kolonaki is a wealthy suburb of central 
Athens. 
17 Tensions surrounding perception of such undocumented Palestinians are presented in Chapter 
Five. 
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Home and 'in-between-ness' as problematic 
Palestinians in Athens may not describe their feelings of home and belonging as 
'hybrid' per se, but they often reveal that they feel 'in-between' in some form or 
other, which can be seen as related to the cross-border connections they have. 
This can have varying material and emotional repercussions for them. Mustafa, 
(42, unemployed) for example, who has lived in Greece for over seventeen years, 
discusses his feelings of home and belonging: 
Liz: Where do you feel your home is? 
Mustafa: Ifeel that I am in two pieces; that I am here and there. My presence 
here in Greece is out of necessity. I don't have so many opportunities here. 
There are restrictions for me and I have many problems and difficulties. And 
when things are difficult they affect you and how you feel about a place; they 
affect you psychologically. You start thinking: what makes me different? Why am 
I being treated like this? And because you feel pain you can understand other 
people's pain and all the injustices of the world. 
Liz: So you feel in-between? 
Mustafa: My home is in Palestine. I grew up there with Palestinian culture all 
around me. The first things you learn and that influence you are from your 
immediate surrounding environment, from the people around you. At the 
moment I'm searching for my future. There, in Palestine, there is no future at 
the moment. You can't live your everyday life with ease. Unexpected things 
happen all the time. You never know what's going to happen. It's very insecure. 
But at least I know that I have somewhere, somewhere to bury me. It was never 
my plan to stay here, but I am here at the moment so I have to live and get on 
with my life as best as I can. But as I said before, it is very hard. I do oddjobs; I 
don't have a steady job despite the fact that I have been to university and it's 
very difficult for me to find a job and get IK, 4 [social insurance for employees] 
and I am unemployed at this moment in time. I dofeel veryfinancially insecure, 
but here, Greeks do help. I have friends who help me to find jobs. Something 
120 
will come up, but I would prefer something stable. Luckily my brothers and 
sisters help me out. It's so frustrating applying for jobs. Although I speak 
Greek, language is always an issue and they will always choose Greeks over 
me. 
Mustafa aptly sums up the difficulties of living 'in-between'. He feels his home 
is there in Hebron because he grew up there, yet his life is in Athens at the 
moment whether he likes it or not. He, therefore, seems caught between the two. 
Abdul, (28, casual office worker) also from the West Bank displays similar 
tensions: 
Here, life's not easy. It's not as good as I expected it to be. It's difficult to make 
money, but the situation is better than there I suppose, but I'M not always sure 
about that because at least there, it's your country. Your parents are there. It's 
your homeland, where you grew up. It's a balance really. You have to appreciate 
that both places have their good and bad points. Here, it's easier to find a job, 
but here you are always a foreigner. 
Perceptions of home are seen as important by Palestinians in Greece 
important because they signify where they can 'feel at home', feel safe and 
above all, belong and not feel like a foreigner or overly different. This is an 
important point for those Palestinians who feel that Palestine is their home. The 
idea of Palestine as home can perhaps heighten or enhance feelings of being 'in- 
between' because of the refusal to let go of a place where a person feels their 
proper 'home' is. At the same time, despite being in a positive environment, as 
they are in Greece, on the whole such feelings prevent Palestinians from feeling 
they are fully participating in Greek society. 18 Even if they do feel at ease in 
Greece, it is often with a heavy heart and for many, guilt is a major issue and 
another aspect of living 'here' and feeling connected to 'there': "I do feel guilty, 
yes. The people there are suffering a lot, much more than me, that's true and it's 
hard to be away from my family" (Abdul). Ghada (32, housewife) has similar 
18 Such feelings are also linked to the lack of acquisition of Greek citizenship that is 
commonplace amongst Palestinians in Athens. 
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feelings: I always feel guilty, all the time - even in the happiest moments of my 
life I feel guilty". Palestinians in Greece perceive themselves as lucky compared 
to many other Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza and around the refugee 
camps in the Middle East. Their guilt is also a continuous reminder that they are 
in Greece living a reasonably comfortable life, whilst many fellow Palestinians 
are not. 
Feelings of home and belonging as ambivalent are problematic for many 
respondents, even for those who have been in Greece for over 40 years. Despite 
such ambivalence, many Palestinians in Athens see the maintenance of 
connections to the homeland (and the Middle East in general) as important, as a 
way to ensure continued feelings of belonging to Palestine. For example, Tariq 
(60, doctor) who despite saying that he does not feel like a foreigner in Greece, 
explains that: 
I have my family here. My parents are not alive, but all my brothers and sisters 
are there and Ifeel that I have to go there -I go every year to Jordan to see my 
relatives, to have contact with them and to see them, not because I want to see 
Jordan. I don't want to lose contact with them; I want to feel that I belong there 
as well, notjust in Greece. As time passes and ifyou don't go to where you came 
from or used to live, then things change and you will end up saying that you only 
belong here. 
Bilal (33, FCE) also portrays this inherent ambivalence. When asked where he 
feels his home is he says: 
For sure I would like to go back. 
Liz: But where would you say your home was? 
Mal: I understand but let me tell you an exercise. If somebody were to take all 
my clothes and put them on the road, this means that I am out of 
Palestine and 
this is how Ifeel. Because I have lived in Lebanon and grew up there and now 
I 
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live here, okay, but I like to say that Palestine is my land, that it is Pýy 
grandfather'S land. 
For others, such as Tamara (32, researcher), feelings of home, belonging and 
hybndity appear to be a part of life that they have accepted or come to terms 
with. Like Tariq, she is married to a Greek, but unlike him she often travels back 
to Gaza and has only lived in Greece for 6 years: 
Myfirst home is in Gaza... I do feel at home there. MyJamily is there and they 
love and support me, but my second home is here. Because I have lived there, I 
know the reality of the situation because I have seen it and experienced it. I am 
now starting to feel that I belong here but I've never felt like a foreigner 
although I have language problems. I do feel both here and there. Ifeel at home 
in both places. We have restrictions etc but at the beginning it's always difficult. 
When I was doing my PhD I was alone in the sense that I was working alone so 
it made it difficult to integrate and it delayed my learning the Greek language, 
but after Ifinished, Ifelt more stability and I stayed tojeel more integrated, but I 
would have liked it to have happened quicker. 
Tamara is lucky enough to have material and concrete connections with Palestine 
in terms of visiting often, something many Palestinians in Athens do not have. 
This also seems to have made her less insecure, a feeling a large number of 
Palestinians experience, particularly if they have been forced to move or have 
experienced difficulties. Faeq, (45, FCE) who originally came to Greece from 
Lebanon, has lived in Greece for over 15 years and who has also moved around 
the Middle East, stresses that he does not feel that Lebanon is home because of 
the way in which Palestinians are treated there. Likewise, he does not feel his 
home is in Athens. Instead, he stresses that: 
I have a homeland and a home in Palestine. I came here originallyfor 2 years 
and I have stayedfor 15. My identity is problematic. What does living here do to 
your identity? Mmmm, I think it's insecurity that plays a large role, the issues of 
where to go, where to settle - or where you can go and where you are able or 
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allowed to settle, likefor example, my parents had to go though. They have been 
travelling and moving around their whole lives. When you get to a certain age, 
you want to build a home to retire in - god knows where I will retire. 
Exile and hybridity can instigate insecurity, as well as provoke extreme 
unhappiness, especially for those who are not allowed to go back. Haleef, (55, 
embassy official) whose last visit to his home in Qualquilya was in 1976, vividly 
describes his emotions: 
My mother died and I couldn't go to herfuneral, myfather died and I couldn't 
go to hisfuneral. I have sisters I haven't seen in years ... 
how much can I endure? 
How long can I talk to you like this and not show anything. How strong can I be 
and how long can I be a rock that doesn't understand? How can I be happy in 
my relations with the Greeks, for example? I have Greek families who are 
friends, who love me as I am their child and Ifeel this as well. ... If they allowed 
me to come and go, maybe I wouldn't have this bitterness inside me, which 
through the pressures of work and my dealings with people, does not show and is 
not expressed. But it exists inside me though. There are times when IM in my car 
and I hear a song which you know could be Greek; it doesn't have to be Arabic 
and this song or a linefrom this song can make me start crying on my own and 
you would look at me and say what's wrong with this person? Although 10 
minutes before I was laughing. Because you know this is inside me. It's always in 
me and it weighs me down. So many years offeeling this injustice, however much 
you say never mind, I'm putting up a struggle, inside you there is always this 
bitterness, sadness. 
Feelings of grief, loss and suffering are often problematic and intense for 
Palestinians living in Athens. On the one hand, they can strengthen feelings of 
attachment to Palestine (and perceptions of solidarity with the Palestinian cause) 
materially and metaphorically. On the other hand, such feelings are also painful 
and hard to deal with on an everyday basis. According to Jamila, (20, student) 1, 
who have never lived there, feel much more intensely the Palestinian blood that 
runs through my veins. Because I haven't lived there, it's much more intense for 
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me". Therefore, separation and exile can breed very strong feelings of belonging. 
At the same time, however, Jamila's perceptions of home are very difficult for 
her to deal with. Later in the same interview, she says: "Where is my home? 
(silence) I feel that inside me, there's a metal, which has 2 ores in it. There are 
two things inside me, Greek and Palestinian ... I can't say I'm fully Greek, 
because I feel more Palestinian than Greek, but I also feel both Palestinian and 
Greek. I have to remember Palestine because it's like an open wound". 
In the small basement flat Rafiq (40, restaurant worker) shares with 
another Palestinian man, he shows me the few photos he has of his family that he 
has not seen for over twenty years. The photos look much-handled and are a 
reminder for him of times when he was with them. He says he often sits and 
looks at the photos, remembering how different things were then. His vision of 
Palestine as his homeland as nostalgically remembered, may be momentarily 
static and unchanging as he looks at the people in their 1980s clothes and 
hairstyles in the photographs. At the same time, however, his weekly phone calls 
to his family in Gaza and his role as eldest brother and person to whom his 
younger sisters look to for advice, support and decision-making (despite his 
absence for over twenty years) have made him acutely aware of what is going on 
there. With a good command of Greek, and numerous Greek friends, he admits 
his 'Palestinian-ness' is flexible in the sense that although he always feels 
Palestinian, he strategically represents himself as "more Greek than Palestinian" 
when he feels it is necessary. At the same time, despite the fact that he enjoys 
life in Greece, he also feels that there is always sadness or a "weight" in him as 
part of him "is always there, whether I like it or not". He feels that since the 
beginning of the second Intifada, he has felt "more Palestinian" and started 
associating and meeting more Palestinians because he felt it his duty to do so. ' 9 
We can see how difficult (and impossible even) it is to arbitrarily 
separate cultural, social and political elements within Palestinian lives, feelings, 
experiences and actions in Greece. Rafiq's inability to go back to Gaza because 
'9 As a result, although he says he has always been politicised, his current perceptions of his 
'Palestinian-ness' are even more politicised and more likely to be coupled with political activism. 
For example, he has personally helped injured Palestinians brought from Palestine to hospitals in 
Greece and he has spoken to numerous Greek radio and television programmes on what he calls 
the "Palestinian question". 
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of his former PLO actions and affiliations coupled with his extremely ambiguous 
legal and citizenship status have made him construct his 'Palestinian-ness' to suit 
his current situation and adapt successfully to life in Greece, yet at the same time 
feel very ambivalent about where his home actually is. At first glance, it appears 
to be Palestine, the Gaza he left behind all those years ago, but he likes his life in 
Greece and he does at times feel Greek and that Greece is his home. This is 
something he does not want to easily or readily admit: 
Sometimes (Pause)... I do feel Greek and that Greece is my home -I have been 
here so long but I know that's wrong because I am Palestinian and I do feel 
Palestinian too but it's hard not being there. I want to be there so much but at 
the same time, it's good here. I will go back one day, I know I will. I must 
believe it, we have to have hope that a solution will befound, but here I must do 
what I can. 
Rafiq also believes that his PLO connections will ensure him a high 
position when he finally does return and in a way such wishful thinking may be 
the manifestation of his insecurity and ambivalence in Greece and of his need to 
remain connected and be 'as Palestinian as possible' in case of such a return. For 
him, the few important objects he carries around with him serve to remind him of 
what he has left behind and of where he is now and of the cross-border 
connections he has. The same can be said of all cross-border networks and of 
possessions such as key rings and broaches, t-shirts and badges with the 
Palestinian flag, kufflyas worn round the neck as scarves that form tangible and 
embodied links to Palestine and that are symbolic, culturally and politically. 
Many Palestinians in Athens own such items and carry them around 
either visibly or discreetly. At the same time, they may drink frappe 
20 when they 
go to a caf6, eat at Goodys or Everest 21 , they may speak a mixture of 
Greek and 
Arabic,, eat a mixture of Greek and Arabic/Palestinian as well as international 
food, smoke Greek cigarettes and so forth. For example, Muslim families may 
have Christmas trees up because of the fact that they are in Greece. As Walid, 
20 A frapp& is an iced coffee drink very popular in Greece. 
21 Goodys and Everest are both Greek owned fast food chains. 
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(35, FCE) despite his staunch belief in his 'Palestinian-ness', points out: "I know 
I'm not Christian, but having a tree at Christmas is a Greek thing and I am living 
in Greece now, so why not? " Feeling 'in-between' often involves mixtures, the 
merging of different 'cultures' and 'customs' in different and particular ways; 
there is clearly no 'set' way to feel Palestinian in Greece and it can be a positive 
and negative experience at the same time. 
For some Palestinians in Athens, the notion of home may be an unhappy 
and fruitless thought that they try to block out. Mahmud, (24, student) who has 
lived in Greece for just under 6 years, explains with great honesty: 
You do feel that in some way you do belong here because at that moment your 
life is here, so what can I say? In the time I have been here, I have gone to 
Palestine for a total of 30 days ... I 
have been two times in total ... when you're 
here for 4 years continuously and I didn't have much contact with Arabs here, 
then you do start to feel that you belong here, but when you go back, you get 
confused. So from the first time that your feelings for your country, you start to 
feel confused and when I came back here, it took me 2 weeks to recoverfrom the 
atmosphere and the experience of being back there and toforget because there is 
a law here. If you want to live and stay here in Greece, you have to forget 
everything there. 
Liz: What do you mean? 
Mahmud: I mean that ifyou start thinking about yourfriends, your relatives, you 
willfind life here very difficult and you will start thinking oh I wish I was there 
right now with such a such afriend doing such a such a thing and these thoughts 
start to torture you because youfeel that you want to go and do it at that moment 
in time and when some opportunities arise to go there you would go ignoring 
important things that you have to do here and you will go there and you will get 
lost. Me, now that my brother has come here and we've been talking, 
I've told 
him that he has to forget everything back there and sometimes Iforbid him to 
talk to his friends there and I said to him, that's enough, you will cut links with 
127 
them and yourfriends will be myfriends that I have here andfrom now on you 
live here and that'S how it is. 
For Mahmud, home needs to be seen in a realistic light. Although he also feels 
Palestinian and that Palestine is his 'true' home, his immediate environment in 
Greece takes precedence within his everyday life, out of necessity. This 
highlights the importance of home as material and bounded in Greece despite 
symbolic and physical connections to Palestine. 
The use of domestic space and symbolic artefacts in constructions of 
'Palestinian-ness' 
Feelings of 'being Palestinian', home and belonging are intimately connected to 
the house as a domestic (and gendered) material space. This research has found 
that Palestinians in Athens use their domestic possessions and spaces materially 
and symbolically to connect them to Palestine. In the process, they are actively 
positioning themselves between 'here' and 'there' through their domestic spaces 
and cultural artefacts. Tolia Kelly (2004) has written about the importance of 
cultural artefacts and re-memory within the processes of identification amongst 
British Asians. She argues (ibid.: 317) that possessions within the home 
operate as material nodes that symbolize, refract and resonate with 
the diaspora journey; they are connective markers to geographical 
nodes of identification. Through their prismatic nature, 'other' lives, 
lands and homes are made part of this one. 
For Palestinians in Athens, the processes of negotiating 'being Palestinian' that 
occur within domestic spaces are complex and ambivalent. Their houses may be 
seen as hybrid spaces, in which the 'here' and the 'there' come together in an 
uneasy yet original co-existence. The objects and actions within these houses 
signal a creative, but also necessary, mixture of memories, traditions, stones and 
places. 
It may be tempting to view the home as a 'homeplace' (hooks 1990), in 
which 'identity' may become reinforced through spatial practices and 
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performances, such as 'national' or religious celebrations (such as Nakba day, 
Christmas Day or Eid for example), the collection and display of Palestinian 
cultural artefacts or through raising Palestinian children. However, the house 
must not be seen simplistically as a space in which Palestinians are passively 
creating or reinforcing a stereotypical 'identity'. 22 If we are to understand the 
house and 'Palestinian-ness' as 'in-between', symbolic conceptions of domestic 
space as assertion of self and 'Identity' have the potential to become problematic 
as they may reinforce differences and a homogenised 'culture', 'identity' and 
specific (and more acceptable) ways to be Palestinian. Such conceptions could be 
seen as a form of resistance to colonial occupation and destruction of Palestinian 
'Identity'. Advocating a distinct and definable 'Identity' that can somehow 'be 
solidified' within spaces and people's lives appears to hold appeal for those who 
feel they have been marginalized and oppressed, such as Palestinians, for 
example. This does not mean, however, that we should uncritically accept such 
constructions as necessary or accept them as 'reality', but focus instead on the 
dynamic spatial and temporal constructions and subjectivities that are occurring. 
The use of cultural artefacts and possessions within the house 
The material and symbolic use of objects and possessions in articulating 
'Palestinian-ness' changes over time and space. As Karim (2002) points out, 
objects that have become and are emphasized as core symbols of Palestinian 
culture were not seen as nearly as important before 1948. The "caftan", for 
example, had been the "badge of peasant identity" (ibid.: 23). Yet, "this despised 
peasant costume would become a symbol of the homeland, worn with pride by 
the very same women who had previously spurned it. In exile, it became 
obligatory for each Palestinian woman to have her own caftan". For those who 
are married and have children, home becomes even more significant as many 
Palestinians believe that upbringing and living in a Palestinian environment are 
crucial to family life. Many Palestinian homes are visibly Palestinian and often 
22 The processes of 'identity politics' and politicisation within the house, which can become a 
political space in the process, are complex and are discussed in Chapter Seven. As has already 
been noted, it is often difficult to separate out the political, social and cultural facets of 
'Palestinian-ness'. The same applies to the symbolic and material spaces they occupy and are 
engagedin. 
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Arabic too, and there are both discreet and indiscreet ornaments, flags, maps, 
pictures and so on that are a constant reminder and link to Palestine. As Karrni 
(2002: 24) explains: "it has become usual for well-to-do Palestinians [who live in 
Europe and America] to display ... embroidered cushions and hangings in their 
lounges and to explain their origins at length to visitors". This is not only to 
display the fact physically that they are Arab and Palestinian but also allows 
parents to feel that they are bringing up Palestinian children in a Palestinian 
home; the two appear go hand in hand. 23 The home is, therefore, often associated 
with Palestinian tradition and culture and in some cases, an essentialised 
Palestinian 'identity'. Lindholm Schulz (2003: 178) describes how objects and 
ornaments "authenticate and certify the fact that you are in a Palestinian home". 
(Said 1986: 58) also states that: 
Many Palestinian households in the diaspora ... recreate Palestinian 
homes in the way they decorate their houses. For example, with 
pictures and models of the Dome of the Rock and the Al-Aqsa 
mosque, posters of Yasser Arafat, embroidery, pillows, plates with 
mother-of-pearl. Palestinian flags and other cultural and national 
'icons'. people build little Palestines in their homes. 
Said (1986: 58) stresses that "we keep re-creating the interior - tables are set, 
living rooms furnished, knick-knacks arranged, photographs set forth - but it 
inadvertently highlights and preserves the rift or break fundamental to our lives". 
As Faeq, (45, FCE) for example, points out some old black and white 
photographs of Jerusalem in his living room, he laments the present situation, in 
which Jerusalem does not belong to the Palestinians and that he does not live in 
Palestine. 
Possessions in view at home may be a problematic and constant reminder 
of a political, social and cultural situation that Palestinians are not happy with 
but they can also be a positive, if sometimes emotional part of Palestinian lives 
in Athens. Abir (38, Arabic teacher), for example, is keen to show me an old but 
23 The politicised teaching of children to be 'Palestinian' is discussed in Chapter Five. 
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enlarged black and white photograph of her father of whom she is evidently very 
proud. She explains that he was involved in fighting the British in Palestine in 
1936, after which he was forced to leave; from the manner in which she 
describes him and his actions , it appears that he was fairly influential at the time. 
In her sitting room, she notices me looking at an impressive piece of 
contemporary art that hung above her fireplace. She explains that it represents 
the diversity of the Palestinian people and is an image that she particularly likes 
and that gives her strength. Therefore, constructions of 'being Palestinian' and of 
Palestinians themselves as diverse are what she can relate to, as she also admits 
to "sometimes feeling Lebanese as well as Palestinian" because she grew up in 
Lebanon. 
Art is also something Samira (38, artist/housewife) is enthusiastic about 
as she discusses the pieces that hang in her living room. She analyses one 
painting in particular, which is divided into three different large rectangular 
canvases. Bright reds and oranges depict buildings on the top and bottom halves 
of the canvases. In the middle part of each canvas, in between the buildings, 
there is a space, which for her, portrays the separation and feelings of 'in- 
between-ness' between two places, 'here' and 'there'. Samira feels that "her 
identity and creativity go hand in hand". Her perceptions of her home are hybrid 
and problematic. For Samira, home is a space in which she feels torn but that at 
the same time, has allowed her to express herself creatively, illustrating how her 
exile has made her feel. The house can be a material space in which Palestinians 
can 'feel at home' in because it symbolises the home they feel they have in 
Palestine. As such, it may be 're-creating the interior' (Said 1986). At the same 
time, the house is influenced by different and dynamic understandings of 
Palestine through time and space, leading to a complex variety of cultural, social 
and political identities and actions. 
The house also acts a physical space that is used to counteract feelings of 
transience , instability and insecurity 
for many Palestinians in Athens. Thomas 
argues (1997: 97) that the house can be a secure and insecure space. As a result, 
it can be seen as one that is positive and negative. Therefore, the home, as a 
domestic, private space can appear to provide security, sanctity, stability and 
familiarity to people 'on the move'. At the same time, since the home they have 
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created is not where they would like it to be ideally, it can also be a source of 
despair. Yet, for many Palestinians, it provides the backdrop or backbone of their 
lives and 'Palestinian-ness'. It is their own Palestinian space where they can talk 
Arabic, eat Palestinian food, socialise and so on. The house forins the space 
where the family can gather, where relatives can come and stay and according to 
Lindholm Schulz (2003: 172) "the family has been the major remaining 
institution to which to turn to for some kind of stability and security. " 
Home as a gendered space of 'Identity' 
Domestic spaces appear to encourage particular strategic and gendered 
understandings of what it means to be Palestinian. For example, the house 
appears to be where many Palestinians interviewed show others that they know 
how to be 'good' Palestinians and where they carry out many of the 'customs' 
that they feel are Palestinian. Ibrahim (32, construction worker), for instance, is 
very eager to explain that his Palestinian family have a certain way of doing 
things; they have Palestinian "habits" as he calls them. By this, he means that: 
there are certain ways of acting towards each other and their relationships. -for 
example, if a stranger comes to my house, first my wife has to be decent. For a 
man it doesn't matter what state they are in, butfor a woman it does. The women 
should be in one area and the men in another - this is how it should be. 
Despite male views such as Ibrahim's, it is Palestinian women (who often remain 
at home while their husbands are at work) who appear to have a large role to play 
in such constructions of 'Palestinian-ness' as it is traditionally their job to raise 
children and look after the home. The home, therefore, as a gendered space and 
the effects this may have on individual, family and group perceptions of 'being 
Palestinian' must also be considered. For Dwyer (2002), the practice of 'making 
home' (drawn from the work of Hall 1996) serves as a framework for 
understanding how young British South Asian Muslim women negotiate their 
identities on an everyday basis. She argues that 'home making' plays an 
important role in the politics of identity making (ibid.: 187) as hybrid and 
postcolonial in the sense that it unsettles dichotomies such as 
'here' and 'there' 
132 
allowing the complexities of positioning to be reallsed. Such re- 
conceptualisations of home and the processes of creating personal and political 
spaces of belonging are potentially very useful. For Palestinian women in 
Athens, 'home-making' means they are involved on an everyday basis in 
connecting the 'here' to the 'there'; they are articulating what it means to them 
and their families to be Palestinian grounded in Greece but linked to Palestine. 
This ranges from cooking Arabic and Palestinian food and sweets, putting up 
artwork or cultural objects that are symbolic of Palestine and their forced exile to 
raising Palestinian children and speaking Arabic at home. Such acts do not 
appear to equate to stereotypical reinforcements of Palestinian 'identity'. Rather, 
they can be seen as attempts to make sense of diasporic life in exile and cross- 
border connections to Palestine. 
The perceived role of the woman and the importance of maintaining a 
Palestinian home abroad may be why many single Palestinian men in Athens 
(especially those who work for foreign companies) will actively seek to marry 
Palestinian women. Often their families in the West Bank or Gaza or around the 
Middle East locate (suitable' young women who will often be from the same 
place of origin and social class. This is precisely because women are often seen 
(mainly by men) as central to the making of home and of the maintaining of 
home for their husbands and families. In reality, however, creating a sterile and 
(pure' Palestinian home in Athens is impossible, despite some attempts to do so. 
Palestinian women can be seen to be influential in determining the 
family 1) s positionings of hybrid and strategic 'Palestinian-ness'. However,, this 
can also be seen perhaps as them carrying out a male stereotype of what is 
expected of them. 24 Perceived this way, they are still subordinate to men who 
may judge them based on their domestic attributes and how 'Palestinian' their 
family is. As Ibrahim (32, construction worker) notes disapprovingly about a 
fellow Palestinian: "now his wife, she is more Greek now and look at their 
children, they feel more Greek than Palestinian and it is because of her. She 
2' The relationships and power relations between women and men may have crucial implications 
for social, political and cultural constructions of 'Palestinian-ness'. Although these matters are of 
great importance (and could form the subject of further research), they are 
beyond the scope of 
this thesis (apart from occasional brief references to them). For more on this in reference to 
Muslim women see, for example, relevant entries in Falah and Nagel 2005). 
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smokes, she is always with her Greek friends, going OUtý,. 25 At the same time, I 
notice that he speaks Greek to his own son and when I question him about this, 
he looks distinctly uncomfortable and admits he finds it problematic: "It is a 
problem, but he is learning Greek now but he is also learning Arabic; he will go 
to a Greek school so he must also learn Greek". In addition, although he himself 
wears a traditional kalabia or long-sleeved gannent, his own wife prefers western 
clothes, which he also appears to find difficult to deal with. His discomfort may 
reveal that although he wants his child and family to remain Palestinian, he is 
grudgingly accepting his material life and its consequences in Athens. It is hard 
for some Palestinians and their families in Athens to come to terms with change 
and their immediate (Greek) environment; as outlined earlier, negotiating 
hybridity is not always easy. Incidentally, a discussion with the woman Ibrahim 
refers to, Sunya (31, housewife) reveals that she is happy and comfortable with 
her life in Greece and the fact that she and her husband have Greek friends and 
relations. 
Although women may be perceived to be in charge of the home, often 
what happens within it constitutes negotiations between husband and wife and 
other members of the immediate and extended family. For example, it is Khalid 
43, (self-employed garage owner) who cooks the falafel for me after my 
interview with him and his family and it is he who arranges them on a plate for 
me in pitta bread with salad. It is then also he who asks his wife, Sunya (3 1, 
housewife) if she would cut fruit for us all. Yet, in another house I visited, the 
husband, Bilal (33, FCE) apologises for what he felt was inadequate hospitality: 
((my wife normally deals with these things and the food, so I'm not really sure 
where things are". Men are also just as likely as their wives to try and ensure that 
their children speak Arabic, or that they are aware of their 'roots' and belonging. 
It is difficult, therefore, to come to conclusions about such relationships and 
power relations within the home here. Men may be just as influential at trying to 
shape their family's sense of what constitutes 'Palestinian-ness'. 
Rania, (38, FCE) her family and the house they inhabit, provide a good 
example of the realities and difficulties involved in 
'home-making' and 
25 The realities of tensions and constructions of difference and consequent tensions are 
discussed 
in more depth in Chapter Five. 
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negotiating their 'Palestinian-ness'. During her interview, Rania is keen to stress 
the role of conservative and very religious Muslim Palestinian women in Athens. 
They, in her opinion, are bringing up their children in much too strict and 
religious a fashion and have been influential in persuading other women to adopt 
the same highly religious lifestyle and values. " Rania, as a Christian, feels very 
differently and stresses the fact that as Palestinians living in Greece, they have to 
be aware of their immediate surroundings. It also bothers her that they are 
representing and depicting Palestinians in such a way and she feels that 
differences in religion, which (according to her) have never been a problem 
before are beginning to create rifts and difficulties. Interestingly Rania puts this 
increased tension she feels is occurring down to the increased availability and 
possession of Arabic satellite channels, which she feels are influencing these 
women. As she stresses: "they think they are there when they're not". She 
appears to be indirectly acknowledging the fact that living in Greece has meant 
necessary adaptations and 'fitting in' to a certain extent. At the same time, she 
and her family still feel very Palestinian, a feeling that may have been reinforced 
by the fact that she has her elderly mother staying with them. Incidentally, the 
only things her mother can say to me in English are "Palestine good, I miss 
Ramallah ... Jewish people very 
bad". Rania is also keen to stress how great she 
thinks it is that they are all living together and how her children are able to hear 
stories of Palestine from their grandmother at their family home. This echoes the 
re-telling of 'Palestinian stones' of exile and displacement from generation to 
generation, which many Palestinians in diaspora feel are crucial ways for them 
and their children to remain connected to Palestine. As Lindholm Schulz (2003: 
172) notes: 
the family has ... 
had an important task to Ju4fil in constituting the 
pri . mary source of storytelling and thus reproducing the implications 
of the nakba as well as the image of the homeland ... the task of telling 
the history of the catastrophe and of life as it used to be in Palestine 
has belonged, first andforemost, to mothers and women. 
2' 1 tried to interview one of these ladies but it proved impossible as she never returned my calls. 
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Rania's family existence appears to be hybrid -a mixture of 'here' and 
'there'. While their house is not decorated in an overtly Palestinian or Arabic 
manner, she has a large collection of books and material on Palestine and the 
Palestinian cause and they all clearly speak Arabic. At the same time, the 
family appears happy and settled in Athens; they all speak Greek, as well as 
English and the fact that Athens is clearly part of their everyday lives is 
reflected in how Rania talks about herself and her family. Therefore, in line 
with Dwyer's (2002) observations, Palestinian houses and processes of 'home- 
making' can often be seen as hybrid or a mixture of 'here' and 'there' that is 
both symbolic and material. 
Conclusions 
Lindholm Schulz (2003: 177) points out that: "everyday life and concerns appear 
to replace both the dream place of Palestine and social relations defined by that 
place". Living and feeling 'in-between' involves such strategic positionings in 
order to deal with displacement and separation from one's homeland. 
Negotiating home may then become a subconscious and conscious survival 
strategy (Lindholm Schulz 2003) and a way of adapting to daily life in Athens as 
best as possible by 'picking and choosing' elements of 'here' and 'there' as 
necessary, but also randomly and in disjointed ways. As Ashcroft and Ahluwalia 
(1999: 139) point out: 
Exile does not mean the total separation from your place of origin 
but is rather a condition where one never abandons the old nor 
completely accepts the new. It is not a state in which one can become 
completely comfortable and secure. Rather it is a state that hones 
your skillsfor survival. 
Although many Palestinians do feel 'in-between', they may negotiate 
their Talestinian-ness' in a way that "represents a fluid use of cultural styles and 
norms" (Lindholm Schulz 2003: 198). This may be a way to come to terms with 
the fact that although many feel Palestinian, their everyday life is grounded in 
Athens. This, as illustrated by numerous examples above, may not always be 
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easy or straightforward to do. For Palestinians in Athens,, negotiating hybndity 
and being in diaspora with the cross-border connections this entails are mixed 
blessings. Such connections allow them to survive in Greece and potentially to 
integrate, to participate culturally and socially and at the same time to keep all 
avenues to Palestine open. Above all perhaps, it allows them to be adaptable and 
flexible. They have no choice but to make the best of their current situation. 
The majority of respondents appear to feel that Palestine in some form is 
their home and that they belong there. In such a context, it may be useful to think 
of perceptions of home and belonging as integral to (material and symbolic) 
spaces and networks that connect and 'ground' Palestinians, but that are also 
potentially problematic. These feelings may appear strong but a closer look 
reveals the reality for many Palestinians is more ambivalent. Such definitions 
and difficulties illustrate the salience of notions of home and belonging as 
relational, simultaneously bounded and unbounded or as situated, in motion and 
in-between. Palestinians in Greece have to continuously negotiate their own 
complicated and liminal understandings and realities of the home as a lived 
everyday and material experience. At the same time, many appear to articulate 
the notion of the home as an often idealised, more static, bounded and politically 
strategic and symbolic 'Palestine'. 
The loyalty to Palestine many Palestinians have is, perhaps, a 
manifestation of the inherent insecurity those displaced often feel. Loss and exile 
are often perceived as leading to fragmentation and vulnerability, yet at the same 
time, particular grounded conditions (such as the support of the host country and 
people, a crisis in the homeland and so forth), as well as cross-border 
connections that change over time and space can alter perceptions of home, 
belonging and 'Palestinian-ness'. It is these constructions, that may take on new 
much more powerful meanings and become symbols and constructions of 
' shared consciousness', the homeland, 'unity' and 'solidarity', which are the 
subject of Chapter Five. The temptation to view and analyse such Palestinian 
negotiations as static 'identity politics' needs to be avoided. Constructions, 
representations and performances of politicised 'Palestinian-ness' and difference 
are contested and replete with tensions and conflicts. This, in turn, can strongly 
influence the political thoughts, commitment and actions of diasporic 
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Constructing strategic Talestinian- n ess': evoking 'shared 
consciousness' and dealing with difference 
The previous chapter explored the importance of home, belonging and 
hybridity to negotiations of 'Palestinian-ness'. This chapter develops 
this discussion by considering the political facets of 'being Palestinian' 
in Athens. The feelings and realities involved in Palestinian evocations 
of the homeland, 'shared consciousness' and 'unity' are examined in 
order to interrogate constructions of nationalism and 'identity'. In the 
process, tensions and conflicts over representations and differences are 
explored in order to illustrate how Palestinians in Athens, far from 
merging into a defined and stereotypical Palestinian 'Identity', are 
strategically making sense of their dynamic, ambivalent and politicised 
subjectivities. 
Introduction 
Said (1990: 359) highlights the appeal notions of nationalism and 'Identity' can 
have to diasporic, peoples: 
Nationalism is an assertion of belonging in and to a place, a people, 
a heritage. It affirms the home created by a community of language, 
culture and customs and by doing so, it fends off exile, fights to 
prevent its ravages ... all nationalisms 
in their early stages develop 
from a condition of estrangement. 
Here, Said appears to accept that constructions of nationalism need a defined 
territorial homeland, common 'culture', language and 'identity'. Yet, elsewhere 
he has stressed the importance of recognising the hybrid and diverse nature of 
what it means to be Palestinian (Said 1986), as well as what 
he calls 'extreme' 
forms of nationalism (ibid.: 2001). Said recognises how nationalism can 
be 
exclusive and create us/them relationships that can be very 
difficult to dissipate 
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after the "early stages". What emerges from Said's work is the problem of how 
to ensure the creation of potential politicised Palestinian subjects of change (in 
order to make self-determination and statehood eventually possible) who are 
'united' or at least possess feelings of 'shared consciousness' and at the same 
time accept and recognise the inherent liminality and complexity of Palestinian 
diasporic existence (LeBlanc 2002). In relation to such issues, Werbner (2002: 
120) has noted that "diasporas, it seems, are both ethnic-parochial and 
cosmopolitan. The challenge remains, however, to disclose how the tensions 
between these two tendencies are played out", which is partly what this chapter 
attempts to do. 
Lavie and Swedenburg (1996: 12) respond to such tensions in the 
following way: 
essentialism is a political necessity, particularly when the group or 
culture is threatened with radical effacement. Hybridity therefore 
does not appear to be a viable strategyfor Palestine. 
Implicit in such political statements is the perceived need for the creation of 
unity' and 'solidarity' and the establishment of a stable Palesti III 
with concrete ties to the homeland. The role that diasporic Palestinians are felt to 
play in such constructions of 'national identity' and 'unity' must be noted. Turki 
(1994: 160) comments that (. (our name was born in exile, not the homeground". 
Said (1990: 360) also feels that "Palestinians ... 
know that their own sense of 
national identity has been nourished in the exile milieu". Therefore, experiences 
and realities of exile and statelessness can be seen as playing a crucial role in 
political articulations of what it means to be Palestinian in diaspora. 
The need for politicised constructions of Palestinian 'unity' and 
connections to Palestine may explain why some Palestinians in Athens seem 
convinced that there is no Palestinian disunity or disharmony: "We 
have our 
problems, but we are united. It's Palestine united" (Sa'id, 25, student). 
Such a 
view is also portrayed (perhaps unsurprisingly) by Haleef, an official at 
the 
embassy. He compares the Kurdish case to the Palestinian one. 
The Kurds, 
according to him: 
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don't have a base or a platform which unites them all. All the leaders do what 
they want; the go down their own separate roads. There is no Kurdish PLO. We y 
have Unions; we are united. They have Unions that belong to all the different 
groups and leaders ... they are not united. There is no common ground that unites 
them all-it has nothing to do with embassies. It's not our embassy that unites 
people; it'S the PLO. 1 
The PLO has been a key player in the construction of narratives and discourses 
that have become meaningful to Palestinians in diaspora and it seems that the 
purpose of such narratives has been to try and unite diverse and dispersed 
Palestinians around a Palestinian 'identity' and the liberation of Palestine 
(Bowman 2003). For example, Khalidi (1997: 195) claims that the PLO have 
succeeded in using what he calls a "narrative of failure as triumph", as an 
effective tool for political mobilisation, centred around Palestine and self- 
determination. Another such narrative can be clearly seen in the Palestinian 
Declaration of Independence, constructed by the PLO on 15 November 1988. In 
it, the careful and strategic use of notions such as the homeland, history, 
liberation can be seen as attempts to justify and solidify the existence of the 
Palestinian people and consequently, a Palestinian state on Palestinian territory. 2 
Such attempts to create feelings of 'solidarity' may be why the Palestinian 
diaspora is often seen as playing a crucial role in constructions of a 'national 
identity' and belonging. However, one could also see such attempts to create and 
solidify a united Palestinian 'Identity' as discourses and dominating narratives 
that drown out alternative voices, visions and diverse 'Palestinian-ness'. 
Political constructions of 'unity', 'identity' and the homeland 
The Palestinian embassy in Athens appears to encourage specific constructions 
of Palestinian 'identity' as resistant and 'united' through its advocacy of the 
Palestinian cause. For example, it supports writers whose books promote the 
cause and predicament of Palestinians in Palestine in certain ways. In 
1988, for 
1 The embassy as a diasporic space is discussed in Chapter Seven. 
2 An in-depth analysis of it as a discourse is beyond the scope of this thesis. It can 
be found at 
www. palestinecenter. org/cpap/documents/dec-Independence. 
htrnl. 
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example, the *Diplomatic Representation of the PLO in Athens, as the embassy 
was then called, published a book by a Palestinian called Ahmad Sahin titled 
'Israeli Colonialism and the Intifada' with a prologue by Fwad Al-Bitar, the head 
of the 'Representation' at the time, which ends with the sentence: "Resistance 
until victory" (see Figure 8). 
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(Source: Sahin 1988) 
The symbolic outline of historical Palestine appears, a highly charged and 
apparently meaningful image to Palestinians in Greece and one that stresses the 
highly political role of such books. The embassy, as a political actor, also has a 
large role to play in how the Palestinian cause is portrayed to the Greek media 
and public. Therefore, it is not surprising perhaps, that in 2003 a book titled 
'Palestine: It's not just land" was published by a Greek journalist called Hristos 
Halazios in what appears to be close cooperation with the embassy. This book is 
filled with images of Israeli aggression and Palestinian resistance (see Figure 9). 
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(Source: Halazios 2003: 1,41) 
The beginning of the prologue in this book echoes the one described abo've. Its 
first lines consist of a quote by Palestinian poet, Tawfik Zayiad: 
We fill the prisons 
with pride 
we create children 
the resistance generations 
one after the other 
(quoted in Halazios 2003: 2, my translation) 
On the back cover, a list appears of 'Laws - copies of Nazi ideas' that Halazios 
claims Zionists in Israel are guilty of. Such books appear to stress the image of 
Palestinians as resistant, defiant, but also as victims and oppressed. They also 
illustrate the close networks that exist between certain Greeks and Palestinians 
who are actively involved in advocacy. 
Werbner (2002: 121) stresses the importance of understanding the 
political as well as social and cultural elements of diasporic existence that may 
be imagined and played out collectively and individually, arguing that: 
diasporas are not simply aesthetic communities: nor are they merely 
flections (? f the displaced or hybrid consciousness ofindividual re, 
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diasporic subjects: on the contrary, diasporas are usually highly 
politicised social formations ... connected by ties of 'co- 
responsibility'. 
For Palestinians in Athens without official PLO affiliations, being Palestinian 
often means being politicised and collectively unifying around belonging to 
Palestine, as well as the cause and in some cases appear to reflect official 
discourses of Palestinian 'identity': 
We have to be united, not only in Greece, also in Palestine, okay there the 
situation is different, but outside Palestine, we have to be really united because 
outside Palestine, we have only one duty. A personal duty and a general duty. 
The personal duty is to be a good person so that you represent your country in a 
good way. The general one, I have to speak to people, to tell them about the 
truth, I think this is my duty, something I can do to help Palestinians. 
(Layla, 38, FCE) 
Layla's use of the word Palestine signals her use of it as more than just a 
symbolic home. Palestine is her territorial homeland, the material land where she 
feels she belongs and that she feels unites her with all other Palestinians in 
diaspora but also in the West Bank and Gaza. This is despite the fact that she has 
never been there. As Gupta and Ferguson (1997: 39) point out: 
Remembered places... often serve as symbolic anchors of community 
for dispersed people. This has long been true of immigrants who use 
memory of place to construct their new world imaginatively. 
"Homeland" in this way remains one of the most powerful unifying 
symbolsfor mobile and displaced peoples. 
The homeland, as a political construction, that is both real and imagined 
is a place where the relationship between people and their 'proper' place is 
naturalised (Kempey 2002: 117). Thus, the salience of concepts such as 
"'collective memories" (Said 2000), language or collectively imagined 'identity' 
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become apparent as ways to encourage dispersed peoples to focus on belonging 
to an area of land that is invested in symbolically and politically. For many 
Palestinians, constructions of 'shared consciousness" are usually seen as 
important in attempts to unify them. For some respondents, for example, unity is 
the result of a shared language first and religion second (Islam) (Sana, 34, 
housewife). For many participants, notions of shared 'culture', language, 
'traditions' and so forth seem to form part of such larger political narratives 
centred around nationalism. This appears to be mainly because of the 
associations between 'national identity' and citizenship within a defined territory 
(a future nation-state). This may explain why the majority of Palestinians 
interviewed spoke of 'Palestine' as though it were a fully established country. 
Palestine as the homeland could be said to be a substitute for the nation-state in 
the case of many Palestinians. It is the land that is longed for, on which to found 
the Palestinian state (and all the rights and protection that citizenship is supposed 
to guarantee for its citizens) and where relationships between 'national identity' 
and citizenship can be encouraged and formalised. 3 
Feelings of a shared 'Identity' can be triggered in numerous ways. For 
example, Khalidi (1997: 194) has argued that certain events, such as the Nakba 
and its ensuing trauma and dispossession have "cemented and universalised a 
common identity". He also points out (ibid. ) that "If the Arab population of 
Palestine had not been sure of their identity before 1948, the experience of 
defeat, dispossession and exile guaranteed they knew what their identity was 
very soon afterwards: they were Palestinians". The feeling that the Nakba and 
the suffering and injustices many Palestinians perceive it spurred often forms 
part of constructions of what it means to be Palestinian. It is not surprising, 
therefore, that many Palestinians in Athens perceive themselves to be a 
ccommunity' of suffering, exile, and dispossession: "while, we are suffering, we 
will remember" (Bilal, 33, FCE, italics added). Sana (34, housewife) also 
stresses: "All Palestinians have lost someone they know, so they will remember. 
You cannot forget, the future generations will see the photos of those 
lost. You 
don't forget your own blood". In this way, ironically, their problems are seen as 
3 Perceptions and constructions of the relationships between 'identity', citizenship and a 
territorial nation-state are discussed in Chapter Six. 
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their strength, in the sense that it is their problems that are potentially uniting 
them, which explains why they also tend to see themselves a gToup that is 
4 
resistant . Abir (38, Arabic teacher) exemplifies such perceptions of injustice and 
consequent importance of 'unity' when she responds to the question of what 
makes her feel Palestinian: 
My family and the situation there, the fact that I was born there; that I am from 
there originally, that my parents are from there and the unfairness, the injustice 
there, that there is always something wrong with the situation. This injustice 
against my people and me always nags me; it's always on my mind. It bothers 
me so much; it's hard toforget or block out ... The thing is there is this obsession 
when you don't have a country, when you can't go back and when youfeel that 
you and your family had something that was taken away from you which makes 
Palestinians even more united and makes them feel that they are Palestinian 
even more. If all this is solved, you won't have this; it won't be the same. 
For Abir, it is clear that Palestine as the homeland forms the centre stage not 
only for her own narratives of injustice and displacement but for Palestinians 
together, as a 'united' whole. 
In a similar fashion to Khalidi above, Said (1994) uses the example of 
the battle of Karameh in March 1968 to illustrate how such an event manages to 
create in Palestinians a sense or a feeling of discontinuity in the place of what 
was once a void. He claims that to be Palestinian is to rediscover how to be 
Palestinian: "And the difference between void and discontinuity is crucial: One 
is inert absence, the other is disconnection that requires reconnection" (Said 
ibid.: 8). According to Said, for Palestinians, a connection between past, present 
and future social, cultural and political times and spaces is needed. Such 
reconnections between 'here' and 'there', colonial and postcolonial, appear to 
be seen as prerequisites to action, resistance and ultimately to change. This may 
be why Palestinians in Athens perceive connections between Greece and 
4 Such perceptions seem to resonate with the PLO's use of the "narrative of failure as triumph" 
outlined above, in which negative hindrances to the cause are used in positive ways. 
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Palestine, but also between Palestinians as so important. When asked what she 
feels unites Palestinians, Fadila (30, housewife) says: 
Identity and religion. We are a community of people who feel that we are 
Palestinian and that we arefrom the same place. We all want the same thing -a 
Palestinian state. And moving around, living in the West ... you 
feel that you are 
different. 
Many respondents appear to believe that 'identity', 'unity' and political 
action need to go hand in hand. Yet, they also realise the inherent problems in 
this. As Jamal (34, FCE) points out: "it is very difficult. Even if we have 
different opinions ... we have to be united because of the situation we are in - 
there are enough problems without people disagreeing and having different 
opinions. " Layla (38, FCE) also outlines this in her own thoughts on ways 
forward in terms of political representation and participation, highlighting the 
ability and the need of both to make things easier for Palestinians. In response to 
a question on whether she feels Palestinians are united, she says: 
Yes, but Palestinians are always having problems amongst themselves. All these 
years that we have had problems with the Israelis, our blood is always boiling. 
My brother, for example, has problems with his brother because of the roots that 
we have inside us and these problems we have don't let us ever be at ease. This 
problem with the Jews - everyday, they kill 1,2,3 of our people and this has 
deep consequences within us, so this is why there are always problems between 
us because we have been so deeply affected by all these problems. Politically, 
everyone has their own opinions and come from particular political streams. 
One is al-Fateh and the other is whatever. 
Liz: Yes, it seems very complicated. 
Layla: Yes it is. There are many political issues. This is why, we as Palestinians 
have not managed to make many any significant steps all this time. This is the 
problem. We don't have a common goal. Each person wants tofightfor what he 
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believes in. Recently, we have managed to achieve some common goals, but you 
see, like Jihad doesn't want to do this, Hamas doesn't want to do that. The 
Palestinian Authority wants something else, so there is no common opinion and 
thisforces us apart as Palestinians as a people. 
Liz: But within any group of people there will be differences surely? 
Layla: Yes, but our differences are strange. We do need to find some common 
ground though. 
Other participants also construct 'unity' as synonymous with the 
Palestinian cause but do not necessarily find diversity and fragmentation 
problematic: "We have a common cause. We have many different opinions, but 
along general lines, we agree on things. Our identity is very important to us" 
(Mustafa, 42, unemployed). Other Palestinians also recognise their own 
diversity and feel that 'unity' is not about 'being the same' but about supporting 
fellow Palestinians. Faeq, (45, FCE) for example, feels that "socially, 
Palestinians are scattered and diverse, but they are all supportive of each other". 
It is comments such as these that illustrate what 'shared consciousness' may 
actually mean to many Palestinians in Athens. Both men makes it clear that 
there are differences amongst Palestinians and that they are diverse, yet at the 
same time Mustafa, in particular illustrates the strategic and political use of the 
cause (and indirectly of Palestine as the homeland) and of 'Identity' to 
constructions of 'unity'. For Mustafa, 'identity' is not about conforming, but 
about agreeing on what it means to be Palestinian and on notions such as the 
cause for political reasons. 
The emphasis Palestinians place on the symbolic reconnection to 
Palestine outlined by Said (on page 147) above is crucial to their diasporic 
existence. Such connections can have positive and negative implications for 
Palestinians in terms of security/insecurity, hope/despair, and 
attachment/separation. Networks to the homeland help most participants feel 
'Palestinian" and potentially 'united' but at the same time, can instigate feelings 
of hybridity that have been seen as detrimental to their cause. This is why 
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notions such as 'national identity' or 'long-distance nationalism' (Glick-Schiller 
and Fouron 2001; Skrbris 1999), with their emphasis on territorial attachments, 
may appear to hold great appeal for those in diaspora. However, they may mask 
and inadequately describe the processes and feelings of ambivalence, confusion 
and 'in-betwecri-ness' groups SUCh as the Palestinian diaspora in Athens appear 
to be undergoing. 
This is why the idea of 'shared consciousness' may be a more suitable 
description for such processes. It invokes the feelings of shared and 
remembered times, experiences and spaces (such as the homeland, the Nakba 
and exile) many Palestinians in Athens can undoubtedly relate to and find 
important. At the same time, because of its loose association with territory, 
'culture' and 'nationalism', it can become a more dynamic, flexible and open- 
ended notion than 'national identity'. It thus invokes the idea that people in 
diaspora negotiate multiple and hybrid positionings as well as feelings of 
belonging in response to their immediate surroundings because of their evolving 
, in-between-ness' and cross-border connections, as both individuals and groups. 
As a result, collective thoughts and actions that may occur are not seen as 
essentialised or stable. Rather, they are seen as constituting situated and 
strategic processes that may be disjointed, empowering and/or disempowering. 
, rhe notion of 'shared consciousness' does not assume that there are 
bonds between people that are steadfast and unchanging but that such ties do 
exist and are negotiated at specific times and spaces for particular reasons. As 
such, it also allows for the existence of power relations and struggles as well as 
tensions over representation and differences between groups and individuals in 
diaspora. It may then be possible to understand the complex workings and 
tensions of individuals belonging to a group trying to make sense of their 
changing Talestiman-ness' within the context of 'here' in Greece, whilst at tile 
same time perceiving that self-determination and statehood 'there' requires a 
stable and historicized 'identity'. 
Learning to be Palestinian 
A good way to aid the discussion on the grounded, politicised and strategic 
nature of 'being Palestinian' is by exploring a perception that many Palestinians 
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in Athens seem to share. This is the notion that children have to be actively 
'taught' how to be Palestinian from an early age. The importance of such 
concepts is the implicit understanding and realisation that 'Palestinian-ness' and 
'shared consciousness I involves political, social and cultural constructions and 
positionings (and that may pose as or feel like an 'authentic' Palestinian 
'Identity') to which all Palestinians can relate. Thus, 'being Palestinian' can be 
something that is 'learnt'. For example, Tanq (60, doctor) explains: "In 1948,1 
didn't understand what being a refugee was ... It was here, when I met other 
Palestinians, that I woke up and realised ... that my homeland ... was Palestine, 
that I was Palestinian... my eyes were opened here". 5 In the same interview, he 
also talks about the fact that he has lived in Greece for over thirty years and has 
to actively 'remain connected' to his homeland and his roots as he feels he is 
becoming 'more' Greek over time. For him, being Palestinian (and married to a 
Greek woman) is an active process. He is positioning himself continuously 
between 'here' and 'there', the past (that he has left behind but that is part of his 
present political imagination) and the future, as he tries to make sense of what 
'being Palestinian' means (and will mean) to himself and his Greek-Palestinian 
children. 
Teaching children 'identity' and the Palestinian cause 
The contextual nature of 'Palestinian-ness' is crucial to understanding the 
Palestinian diaspora (Lindholm Schulz 2003: 199). As has been pointed out in 
Chapter Four, 'being Palestinian' is not straightforward or necessarily easy for 
Palestinians in Athens and it is often difficult to distinguish between the political, 
social and cultural aspects of what it means to be Palestinian. This could explain 
why many Palestinians interviewed feel that being politicised is part of their 
everyday lives, as Mahmud (male, 24, student) explains: 
Palestinians are very politicised. Ten-year-old children know more about 
politics than adults. They grow up with politics; their whole life is politics. 
5 Incidentally, Tariq went on to become politically active within the GLTPS soon after he came to 
Greece. 
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AnYthing thal happens has to do ývilh politics. War, imemploYment, death, 
inam . age, evetý'thing and it's good. 
Mahmud is indirectly stressing the political significance of children being 
politicised. It Is they, as the next generation, who are seen as responsible for 
keeping the Palestinian cause alive. As Faeq (male, 45, FCE) notes, "they are 
the key to the future... the next generation will be more committed". The 
upbringing of children and an instilment in them that they are Palestinian 
appears to be an investment for future political advocacy of the Palestinian 
cause and it is not seen as something to be taken lightly. Thus, the teaching of 
children to be Palestinian is an inherently political act and duty as well as an 
integral part of 'being Palestinian'. As Layla (38, FCE) stresses: 
If you (ire a good person, You will raise good Palestinians and a new 
generation ... also I 
have to tell mY children about Palestine and if I am a good 
Palestinian I will. 
As I was interviewing Layla, her 8-year-old son appeared and sat with us for a 
while. She said: "Ask him, ask him about Palestine, he knows everything. I've 
told him everything; he knows where he is from". Layla has purposefully taught 
him her version of what it means to be Palestinian, but this does not mean that 
her son will feel the same way that she does. He was bom and has been brought 
up in Greece and now has Greek citizenship. As a result, he is dynamically 
negotiating 'being Palestinian' in response to many different factors, such as his 
mother's perceptions, his Greek surroundings and the international school he 
attends. Despite her attempts to teach him her understandings of 'Palestinian- 
ness' and her need for him to feel Palestinian, she admits that having Greek 
citizenship will be good for hirn and her own feelings of ambivalence, insecurity, 
, in-between -ness' hope and disillusionment have undoubtedly had an impact on 
her son's 'identity'. Many parents appear to feel they are teaching their children 
their own versions of 'Palestinian-ness' and that their children will somehow 
become replicas of themselves. As Abir (38, Arabic teacher) points out whilst 
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talking about her daughter, "She feels she is Palestinian because I am 
Palestinian' 
Such teaching of 'shared consciousness' and connection to Palestine in 
diaspora is far from straightforward or easy, even for Palestinians married to 
Palestinians: 
Ahmed: 
... now this with our 
kids, we are really facing problems, when it comes, 
lets say, like now with the Olympic games, they say, why don't we see Palestine? 
They go to the school, Nabil, who is 9 years old, they have posters, flags and 
maps of all the countries and he was searching for the Palestinian flag and he 
neverfound it and then what he did was he drew it on a piece ofpaper and stick 
it there. He got approval from the principal and he stuck it there together with 
the other ones; he wasfeeling bad about it. 
Maha: He put this issue of identity - 
Ahmed: The issue of identity is really, we don't, for me, I long to hear our 
Palestinian anthem, to see the Palestinian flag, we never felt this before and I 
think our kids are getting to this stage where they reallyfeel 
Liz: So you are teaching them to be Palestinian? 
Ahmed: Of course 
Maha: My daughter when she's angry, she says, I hate you, I hate dad, I hate the 
cat, I hate the house, I hate everybody, but I don't hate Palestine and God 
(laughs). (Ahmed, 34, FCE and Maha, 29, housewife) 
Maha and Ahmed illustrate the difficulties involved in such politicised 
negotiations of what it means to be Palestinian (and to have a homeland called 
Palestine) to them, and to their children. Other mothers such as Sana (34, 
housewife), for example, find such teachings necessary, but difficult at times: 
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I teach my children about Palestine, about what is going on there. I let them 
watch the news and they get scared and they say they don't want to go there. So 
perhaps it's wrong that I show them, but I want them to know, to see the 
suffering. And, they have Israelifriends at school and they say mama, but they're 
not bad as the ones we see on TV, because they don't have guns and I said, when 
we talk about Israelis, we talk about Israelis inside Palestine, not outside. But 
they should know that we have enemies. 
Despite perceptions that what parents are instilling in their children is a 
Palestinian 'identity', it appears to be their own dynamic and situated 
understandings, experiences and negotiations of 'being Palestinian' that are 
being passed on. Therefore, they may or may not realise or be aware of (or may 
choose to ignore) the impossibility of imposing their dynamic, hybrid (and also 
potentially ambivalent and fractured) constructions of 'shared consciousness' 
upon their children. Parents seem to ignore that as their 'Palestinian-ness' is 
being continuously (dis)located, so too is their children's. Nevertheless, one 
could also see this teaching of how to be Palestinian as an important aspect of 
parents' own unstable identities in diaspora. 
Palestinians married to Greeks (or non-Palestinians in general) may find 
the issue of teaching their children to be Palestinian even more acute: 
For me, my children and the children of myfriends, who are born in Greece and 
who live here, we need to teach them Palestinian history, to keep them close to 
the cause, so that they live and understand it, so that we can guarantee that if 
you generation does achieve our goal, the next generations will be able to. This 
is a very importantjob we have outside Palestine. 
(Rafat, 48, FCE and PLO representative in Athens) 
As for Palestinians married to other Palestinians, such attempts may also not 
always be easy. As Sami, a doctor-tumed politician explains: "my son doesn't 
see himself as Palestinian. He doesn't like it when I talk about Palestine and he 
does not want to go there and there's not much I can do about this; he lives here 
and his mother is Greek". Other Greek-Palestinian 
families see things 
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differently, however. One Greek woman married to a Palestinian man feels 
proud to be married to a Palestinian - she does not see it as problematic and is 
pleased that they often go as a family to Palestine because she sees her children 
as primarily Palestinian, not Greek (Maria, 31, housewife) as this is how they 
have been brought up. As a result, she is also learning Arabic (as do a number of 
other Greek women married to Palestinian men). This position (mirrored in other 
Greek-Palestinian families) may be explained by the popular support of the 
Palestinian cause in Greece. 
Haleef (55, embassy official), a father who is divorced from his Lebanese 
wifle and whose children grew up in Athens describes how he sent them to the 
West Bank on their own because he is not allowed to go: 
I put them on an 01 mpic Airways plane, like a package, on their own to Tel y 
Aviv and my brothers picked them up and took them to Qualquilya, where I'm 
from. I didn't need to say anything to my son or my daughter in order to make 
them aware or understand the problem. When you send them on their own and 
the Israelis at 3 in the morning come and knock an the door of our house and 
they drag out their uncle, my brother and my other brother in order to get rid of 
the writing on the wall of our house and my brothers refused and they got beaten 
up and my children woke up with all the shouting and the screaming, you don't 
need to say many things to them. "at are you going to say to the child? What 
do you need to say? The child, on his own, will make sense of it all, search for 
answers and an image will beformed in his mind. 
For Haleef, it is very important that his children are seeing and experiencing 
where he is from originally. Despite the fact that he has been living in Greece for 
over 30 years, his home is very much there, a feeling he seems keen to pass onto 
his children. He wants them to know the reality of where they have come from 
so that they can better understand the political and humanitarian situation there. 
He is also aware that such a visit will help influence certain notions of what it 
means to be Palestinian. 
The passing on of 'Palestinian' knowledges and Infori-natIon has led, 
according to Fawaz, (40, self-employed worker) to what he calls a "burden" on 
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the shoulders of children as young as 12. He feels this is because they are very 
aware of not only of where they (should) belong and they are living in exile but 
also of the political situation (or their parents' political thoughts on the situation) 
in Palestine. At the same time, they have to make sense of 'being Palestinian' 
and growing up in Greece whether they go to Greek or international schools. 
Fadila, (30, housewife) stresses she is teaching her children about Palestine: 
so they would not forget where they were from originally ... it is so important to 
educate your children about their culture and where they are from and this is 
why we want to move back to the Arab world - to be closer to where we come 
from. 
It is clear that Fadila, as a mother who does not feel at all settled in Greece,, 
(despite liking it as a place to live) feels insecure about bringing up her young 
children in a non-Arab country. Her efforts to reinforce her children's 
connections to "where they are from" can be seen as crucial aspects of her own 
need to remain connected to Palestine and the Arab world. This may explain why 
Heela, (40, office worker) finds it upsetting that her son and daughter do not 
know a great deal about Palestine because they have grown up in Greece. When I 
ask if I can interview them, she appears to make excuses, saying that they are 
"not politically minded". She seems slightly embarrassed by this and her 
reluctance to let me interview them (even though they are adults) seems to signal 
her discomfort and dissatisfaction with the fact they are not as 'in tune' to their 
roots are perhaps she feels she is and they should also be. 
It is important to consider the ways in which Palestinian children brought 
up in Greece negotiate their identities. Dina, (17, still at school) whose mother is 
Lebanese, has gown up in Greece. She is ambivalent about where her home is 
but admits that although she has connections to Palestine through her father, (and 
because she has visited it) her upbringing in Athens and close ties with her 
mother (and Lebanon) have diluted her perceptions of Palestine as home and 
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7 homeland. Dina is content to live in Athens spending time at each of her 
parents' homes (they are divorced) and has friends from all over the world as she 
goes to an international school. At the same time, however, she fondly recalls her 
father cooking Palestinian food, talking about Palestine and she is proud of the 
photo of him dressed in military uniform that she shows me, when he was "Part 
of the resistance" in Palestine. Her ambivalence about her Talestinian-ness' is 
evident: 
I'Ve thought about the fact that I am Palestinian but not that much, because I 
also feel Lebanese. I'm starting to think about being Palestinian more as I get 
older I think. Sometimes it's hard not to though because of my father and what 
he tells me about the situation there. But it's not something I think about all the 
time. Well, I accept the fact that I am Palestinian I suppose, but it's also hard, 
because I was born here and I grew up here and myfriends are not Palestinian. I 
really don't know actually. I'M really not sure. 
Dina appears to be beginning to acknowledge that she feels I in-between' and 
express political feelings that are based on her particular upbringing and 
immediate surroundings. As discussed in Chapter Four, specific artefacts or 
possessions, such as photographs, appear very important to constructions of 
'Palestinian-ness' and belonging. As she tells me about a project she carried out 
at school on the situation in Palestine, she explains her satisfaction in being able 
to find out more about her roots and admits that she has a great deal more to 
learn. These are actions she feels will enable her to tell people about the 
historical and political situation in Palestine, something she does not feel 
confidant doing at present. As if to prove her feelings of political awakening and 
potential to advocate the Palestinian cause in the future, she gives me a book of 
photography on Palestinians, which she insists I have as they have many copies. 
What Dina illustrates very well are the complex and often difficult processes of 
negotiating 'Palestinian-ness' that such children and teenagers have to deal with. 
6 Dina's situation has already been mentioned in Chapter Four, where her memories of her visit 
to Palestine and her consequent perceptions of herself as Palestinian are presented; here the 
political implications of her negotiations are discussed. 
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In particular, her testimony appears to aptly demonstrate the merging of political, 
social and cultural aspects of Palestinian lives, feelings and emotions. 
Dina's brother Omar, (20, student) who attends Greek university, appears 
initially to be very decisive and clear about who he feels he is. He expresses his 
'Palestinian-ness' in terms of resistance to oppression and as a student of 
political science is keen to frame Palestinian issues in the context of 'universal 
basic rights', justice and UN declarations and resolutions on the right to self- 
determination. These are all issues that he has specifically researched as he has 
become older. As our discussion continues, however, the certainty with which he 
started begins to falter and his confusion at being Palestinian in Athens appears. 
Although he believes that he should feel Palestinian, he was raised in Athens and 
the fact that he enjoys his life in Greece is a source of guilt for him, as he feels 
'different' to Palestinians in Palestine, even though he clearly wants to be 
politically active and help Palestinians there as much as he can in the future. 
However, he is aware of the difficulties (and whether he will want to) of being 
able to do this in the future. Both Omar and Dina appear to portray the feelings 
of hybndity and ambivalence outlined in Chapter Four. Here, however, the 
implications of such 'in-between-ness' can be seen in terms of feelings of 
politicisation. 
Having children in itself can also be perceived as politicised (but also 
social and cultural) and strategic acts of 'Palestinian-ness'. Bahira, (36, doctor) 
for example, who has four children, feels that she is contributing to the 
Palestinian cause by having as many Palestinian children as possible. She has 
made a conscious choice to do so and it forins a large part of her being and 
acting as a Palestinian. The reason she is doing this is because she knows that 
such strategies are employed in the West Bank and Gaza. Although it may 
appear as if she is blindly 'copying' specific ways to be Palestinian from the 
homeland, her decision has to be based and situated within her own everyday life 
in Athens. She is a busy professional, who speaks Greek and has a great 
deal of 
contact with Greeks. Her children go to an international school, she 
is active 
within the Palestinian Doctors' Union, and has her own specific cross-border 
family, medical and charitable connections and relations to Palestine, as well as 
to Greeks and Greece. Decisions such as Bahira's cannot be seen as objective, 
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isolated actions, but are processes of performing, embodying and re-enacting 
hybrid and diasporic 'Palestinian-ness) in Greece. The fact that those 
Palestinians in diaspora who have never been to Palestine and who grew up in 
exile, either in Greece or around the Middle East often say they feel Palestinian 
testifies to the appeal such politicised feelings (and teachings) and acts of 'shared 
consciousness' and belonging hold to them. 
Articulating and debating differences: tensions and conflicts 
If 'unity' between individuals and amongst groups is seen as being continuously 
debated and constructed, the reason for such debates is the inevitable diversity 
and differences between the people involved. The positioning and 
representations of 'Palestinian-ness' can also be seen as the continuous struggle 
to deal with differences and similarities over time and space. Valentine's (1999: 
57) assertion that "throughout our everyday lives, we constantly negotiate space, 
positioning ourselves physically, socially, morally, politically and 
metaphorically in relation to others" appears to ring true for Palestinians in 
Athens. Therefore, Palestinians have to make sense of their own daily realities,, 
experiences, emotions and actions and those of fellow Palestinians within 
diasporic spaces. This includes the narratives and discourses of 'Palestinian- 
ness" created and disseminated by those in positions of relative power such as 
officials, elites, and leaders but also their own friends, acquaintances and those 
constructed as 'enemies' (both Palestinian and not). As Werbner (2002: 123) 
points out: 
diasporic groups are characterised by multiple discourses, internal 
dissent, and competition for members between numerous sectarian, 
gendered or political groups, all identifying themselves with the same 
diaspora ... what 
is subsumed under a single identity are a multiplicity 
of opinions, 'traditions'. subcultures, lifestyles, or to use Avtar 
Brah's apt terminology, modalities of existence. 
Amongst Palestinians in Athens, conflicts stem from diffenng 
Greece socially, culturally, perceptions of what it means to be Palesti I 
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religiously and politically. Disagreements on whether Palestinians are 4 united' in 
Greece, globally and within the West Bank and Gaza echo Said's concerns 
outlined at the beginning of this chapter. These appear to stem from tensions 
between the perceived need for a united 'identity' as a prerequisite for 'united' 
political action (influenced by official PLO discourses of strong Palestinian 
(unity' and 'solidarity') and their own personal, often ambivalent, hybrid and 
confusing notions of what it means to be Palestinian. To be Palestinian, 
therefore , is to negotiate all these tensions and articulations of difference on an 
everyday basis. These are tensions that are acknowledged at times, but for the 
most part, they form underlying currents that simmer and impact upon actions 
and opinions subconsciously. This seems to have resulted in some respondents 
having to negotiate personal fears, apathy, and disillusionment with public and 
politicised displays of 'unity' and 'solidarity', in order to advocate the 
Palestinian cause. As Samira 38, (artist/housewife) explains: 
We have to show a unitedfront to the outside to the outside world. Maybe to you, 
we will admit privately that we do have doubts andjears, that wefeel insecure, 
but we must not show this to the Greeks or the media. It is important because this 
is how we get the message of our cause across. 
Many interviewees perceive 'disunity' as negative, problematic and 
counterproductive to the political advocacy of the cause. Constructions of 
'disunity' also appear to make some of them feel disconnected from each other. 
Sana, (34, housewife) for example, points out that she is not 
hopeful for unity there - there is too much conflict within Palestinian 
organisations, so it will not work. It's the same here. There is internal conflict 
among us. We don't know how to be one hand, how to get together. Palestinians 
organisations are too much against each other. They agree on 2% of things. 
Yet, in the same interview, she says: 
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In Greece, we all have the same beliefs. "en we meet all together, we talk in 
one tongue and we are against the Israelis. I don't see people with a different 
point of view here, we all agree on things. 
There appears to be a tension between admitting that disunity is a reality and 
portraying Palestinians as resistant and united. This clearly exposes that 
constructions of 'unity' are purely political in nature. In reality, tensions and 
conflicts are commonplace and to be expected. It is not surprising, therefore, that 
Rania, (38, FCE) like Sana above, feels that Palestinians in Athens are not 
united: 
There is unity there [in the West Bank] and it is a pity that we don't have this 
here. You will not find this unity people have there anywhere else. People help 
and support each other. This we lack outside, here people are more isolated. 
Here, people come together temporarily in crises, but it's not sustained. 
Such tensions also manifest themselves in Palestinians feeling torn between 
depicting Palestinians as united and disunited. Rafat, for example, (48, FCE and 
PLO representative in Athens) is aware of disunities, but seems very keen to 
downplay them: 
There are disagreements, disunities amongst Palestinians here. This is to be 
expected ... 
but I am thankful that despite these disagreements amongst ourselves 
that we haven't become disunited even though there are intense disagreements. 
But above all, being united is the most important thing. 
Embassy and Union constructions and negotiations of difference 
Disagreements and tensions can be seen as emanating from official (and non- 
official) constructions of differences between Palestinians in Athens. For 
example, the attempts by the Palestinian embassy in Athens to define what it 
means to be Palestinian officially may have led to them to try and classify (and 
control) what they see as distinct groups or categories of Palestinians in Greece 
and Athens. Haleef, an official at the Palestinian embassy divides Palestinians in 
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Athens into the following groups. The first is students whom he splits into those 
with Greek government scholarships about whom "everything is known" and 
those without, who come on their own. The second is the group he classes as 
workers, which he divides into those who are self-employed, those who are 
professionals (mainly doctors) and those who work for foreign companies. He 
also defines them in relation to the embassy and how 'close' they are to it in 
terms of the contact each group has with it. This seems to be directly related not 
only to having similar beliefs, but also to need. There are groups and individuals 
who feel they need the support and help of the embassy and those who do not. 
It is difficult to ascertain how willing Palestinian support for the embassy 
is, as there are claims by some Palestinians, such as Masud (26, construction 
worker) that the embassy will only support (and, therefore, represent) those who 
have similar beliefs to it. This seems to be a potentially dominant (and 
influential? ) way in which those in positions of power in Athens are articulating 
constructions of Palestinian 'identity'. In the absence of a country and, therefore, 
of a 'proper' embassy, the existing embassy may have taken it upon itself to 
define the 'Palestinian-ness' to which Palestinians in Greece ascribe. It is, 
therefore, an important and powerful political actor and the officials in charge 
seem to be some of the most significant 'gatekeepers' of Palestinian 'identity' 
amongst the Palestinians in Athens. Unlike other embassies that should support 
and help all their citizens regardless of their political beliefs, the situation in 
Athens may be that support is linked to political belief 
A group that appears to have continuous contact with the embassy is the 
GUPS, who work closely with the embassy. However, even their relationship 
is 
not without conflict because of differing beliefs on representing what means to 
be Palestinian. The discussion with the Nisreen, the President of the Union 
illustrates this: 
Liz: So the Union has a close relationship with the embassy? 
Nisreen: Well, we're not the same, we're different, they can't tell us what to 
do 
and we don't tell them what to do, but we are independent, even when 
they say 
they want to help us, we say okay we are independent. 
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Liz: So they don't interfere? 
Nisreen: Well, they like to tell us what to do, go there and go here and do that, 
because of that we tell them what we want to do and what we don't ivant to do. 
Liz: So what do they tell you to do? 
Nisreen: You know sometimes, e. g. the Dimo 8 of Kriti, they give us an invitation 
to go there and they give it to the embassy and they tell the Union that we need 
them to come on that day to do something and they have like a paper which will 
help us with that, maybe we go sometimes and we do everything and okay we say 
we arefrom the Palestinian embassy, it's the same because both the Union and 
the embassy are Palestinian, but we like to say that we're from the General 
Union ofPalestinian Students. 
Liz: So, they try to make you represent the Palestinians here? 
Nisreen: Yes. There's also other Unionsftom other countries, likefrom Tunisia, 
Morocco, Syria, but they're like 2 in the Union only and they're with the 
embassy, they have their offices in the embass and they are not independent, y 
they do whatever the embassy tells them to do, if the embassy doesn't like it, then 
they don't do it. We are different; we are not like that. You know sometimes, 
there are events which we get involved in such as the anti-racist festival, but the 
embassy doesn't like that because there are gay groups there and they don't like 
to be associated with those things, but we don't have a problem so we go, we 
don't have a problem with blackpeople, with whitepeople, gaypeople. 
Haleef, the embassy official sheds some more light on the role the 
embassy plays on reconstructing 'unity' and official versions of Talestinian- 
ness' (as well as dealing with representations or beliefs that threaten this 'unity'), 
when he discusses the embassy's relationship with the Unions that exist in 
Greece: 
Municipality of Crete. 
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It's not necessary for the Union to agree with me and we don't require them to 
do so and I don't have a problem whether they agree or disagree wi . th me. What 
i. nterests me is that they respect the rules and laws of the country that they're in, 
that they do not create political problems for the country. I may argue with them 
and they may argue amongst themselves and we'll discuss things and our 
different viewpoints, but they should portray the official political image that we 
have to the Greek people. You can't as a doctors Union lets say, go out into the 
streets during a demonstration and swear about Arafat. You can express a 
different political image. They can say that they have a different political 
opinion, it's a personal matter but to begin to create problems - this we don't 
allow and they respect that. Also, don't forget that the constitution of the 
Palestinian Unions states that these Unions are politically affiliated to the PLO; 
in other words, politically they have to be PLO. The PLO, as you know has all 
the organisations. It's a mixture. It has whatever you want in it. One 
organisation may have its different viewpoints or its disagreements. All the 
groups, however, agree to the decisions made. So, in reality, you are tied to the 
political standpoint of the PLO and you express your differences as the 
Democratic Front or the Popular Front, like I don't know Ba'ath, whatever you 
are. However, the politics you pursue and that you follow is the politics of the 
PLO. And this makes things easierfor us. If, at the present time, the Palestinian 
issue is to survive, resist, be politically relevant and to be listened to in the 
International Community, by the Europeans, the Americans, we have to be 
united. 
The embassy also seems to have been involved in a curious and complex 
problem regarding the creation of a GUPW in Greece. A brief description of it 
follows to illustrate the tensions evident between the parties and individuals 
involved, which seem to boil down to differences in political beliefs. It has to be 
noted that this cannot be an official record of what happened, as it was very 
difficult to ascertain exactly what was going on and who was telling the truth. It 
was, therefore, a problematic situation to follow and one that was easy to get 
caught up in as interviews were carried out with both 'sides' that consequently 
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developed. According to Issam, the Leader of this Union (53, interviewed in 
June 2003): 
We thought about creating a Union of Palestinian Workers in order to help on 
two levels. Thefirst is to ensure that the workers are getting their rights and the 
second is the Palestinian Cause. We are interested in uniting diaspora 
Palestinians behind a movement to create a Palestinian state. This is very 
important to us for the following reason. Other migrants may go to other 
countries, integrate into them and become fragmented. Because there is a 
national cause - we have lost our homeland - we have to keep these rights that 
we have ... so we established this Union to protect these people so they don't get 
lost into Greek society. 
It is important to note that the Union is being set up as a political act, although it 
is not clear whether it is following PLO politics and standpoints, which as 
observed earlier in the quote above, Haleef, the embassy official claims is 
necessary. Several months later, during an interview with Haleef, it emerged that 
there was a problem with this Union. Apparently, it had been set up illegally, 
according to one interviewee who had links to the embassy. As a result, a new 
Workers Union was proposed and the wheels were put in motion to set it up. 
This is the version of what happened according to those who were involved in 
this new Union. Those who are involved in the old union have a very different 
story to tell. According to them, their Union was not illegal. This was a fictitious 
claim that would enable a new Union to be forined. The supposed reason for this 
was that the old Union is not overtly PLO affiliated with socialist leanings, but 
communist and, therefore, an undesirable basis for a Union. Apparently the 
embassy had a problem with this and instigated the creation of a new Union, one 
with members who thought along similar lines to their own (and who, perhaps, 
they could exert influence and control over). The potential for such conflict can 
also be seen by the Masud's (26, construction worker) view that there are 
apparently many 
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Palestinian workers who go to the offices of thefirst Union, but will not publicly 
or officially admit that they do because they don't want to spoil their good 
relationship with the embassy because they need it to get papers, for example. 
Recurring problems surrounding elections (and indirectly, representation) in 
Unions (and other diasporic spaces) also create conflict. According to Sa'id (25, 
student): 
Um, there's a Palestinian Workers' Union but it's not 100 % legal; there was a 
problem with the election and it's not legal. Now they'reforming a new Workers 
Union. I think they're going to have elections in a month. Of course we're going 
to have problems. Palestinians always have problems in elections. He may be 
your brother but in the end you're goi . ng to fight because we speak openly. We 
speak our minds even if it means we argue. Most of the time we stopfor a couple 
of hours to relax and in the end we're all friends. You say what you want to 
say... the people voting in the elections... decide whether you're right or wrong 
and whether you get elected or you don't get elected. We have to fight; it's in our 
blood; that's how we discuss and decide things in elections. 
Sa'id illustrates that the inevitable propensity for tensions and conflicts is high 
amongst such a diverse group of people. His feeling that they are easily dealt 
with portrays and is based within Sa'id's own position as politically active and 
his need, therefore, to construct 'unity' within diversity and potential 
fragmentation. 
At the end of the fieldwork, there appeared to be two Workers Unions, 
each with similar functions and to this day, there is no way of knowing or 
proving exactly what happened. The whole situation illustrates the messy nature 
of situated representations and constructions of strategic 'Palestinian-ness' 
within diasporic spaces in Athens, as well as the potential for conflicts and 
power struggles. It provides a glimpse of how groups and people within them 
attempt to control situations that threaten what they see as their group 'Identity'. 
In the process, it appears that within this particular diaspora, there are those who 
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are included and those who are excluded because of their beliefs. 9 As Werbner 
(1998: 12) highlights, diaspora communities can "remain deeply rooted in highly 
localised struggles", which are where power inequalities are played out. At the 
same time, Werbner also notes that this occurs in tandem with the influences of 
global (and cross-border) factors such as the global mass media. Such 
observations appear relevant to the Palestinian diaspora in Athens. 
Non-official constructions of re-presentation and difference 
Just as the embassy attempts to officially define the different groups of 
Palestinians that live in Athens, so do Palestinians themselves. Not only do they 
define themselves as a group called 'Palestinian', they also define themselves 
according to social, economic, citizenship and religious differences that they feel 
represent them and as a result, they feel they belong to groups, social circles and 
spaces with Palestinians who have similar backgrounds or beliefs. Despite the 
fact that the embassy claims the groups are quite separate from each other, this is 
a generalisation and in reality, there are connections between people, both 
physically and mentally. For example, Palestinians in Athens may be linked in 
some way by the diasporic spaces they are involved in and the other Palestinians 
they meet there. Some of the tensions that may arise from differences in political 
beliefs have been examined. There are also, however, many other tensions that 
may occur as a result of economic, social, religious differences (which are often 
inter-related) that are explored below. ' 0 
Palestinians (and their families) who work for foreign companies in 
Greece seem to perceive themselves in particular ways. When Abir (38, Arabic 
teacher) talks about Palestinians living in Athens, it seems that in reality she is 
describing the Palestinians within her own social circles: "Here, Palestinians are 
united and financially, we are independent so we don't have to be tied to one 
group, which is good". She feels free, financially and politically, which enables 
her to do what she wants. Above all, she is able to feel this way because she does 
not have citizenship problems, which as will be seen in the following chapter, 
8 Palestinian perceptions of inclusions and exclusions within diasporic spaces such as the 
embassy are discussed in Chapter Seven. 
9 Differences in citizenship status are discussed in depth in Chapter Six 
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can have profound impacts upon people's everyday lives. Her perceptions of 
reality and of those involved with these foreign companies is very different to 
those who are self-employed or who have married Greeks; an obvious difference 
is the much higher wages and, therefore, standard of living enjoyed by those who 
work for foreign companies. 
It could also be said that this group's greater access to resources and 
information has perhaps heightened their attachment to where they have come 
from originally. According to Dorai (2002), such Palestinians are more realistic 
and aware, although their social and economic status could also make them more 
money and business-orientated. This could be why they have been criticised and 
resented by other less well-off Palestinians for only caring about money and 
having a good time, "showing off that they have it all" (Ibrahim, 32, construction 
worker). The fact that foreign company employees also seem to keep to their 
own social circles may also have encouraged misunderstandings or stereotypes 
by Palestinians of different class and financial status (and vice versa). However, 
Rania as a foreign company employee herself also feels that those who work for 
such companies 
only care about the pleasure of their lives here. That's all they care about. This 
is why we are not united. We live too far away and some of us are not 
emotionally connected to there. Plus those who workfor these companies are not 
all the same, we do not allfeel the same about things. 
Therefore, there are also social differences amongst those who work for such 
companies. For example, this discussion with Layla, a single mother who works 
for such a company illustrates the differences gender can create: 
Liz: Do you like working there? 
Layla: It's okay. No, the problem is, as afemale, you don't gain much money. 
Liz: Really? 
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Layla: Not only in the company I work for, everywhere in Greece, as a 
Palestinian. The problem, for me is that I am a single parent and as a single 
parent, I need to be paid as a man because I am supporting me and my son; I 
have to pay everything. I can't say that I'm happy but thank god I've got a job. 
It's better than nothing. 
Palestinian men who studied in Greece and then went on to marry Greek 
women are also seen and see themselves as a particular group. Such Palestinian 
men (many of whom are doctors) married to Greeks are not free from criticism. 
According to Ibrahim (32, construction worker): 
These doctors, the people who came a long time before us, I mean there are 
some Palestinians who have been here over 30 years. They have become Greek 
now at all levels. I think it's true to say that they have forgotten Palestine. They 
may have been fighters when they were there but they don't care much about it 
now, about the problems their fellow Palestinians are experiencing. They care 
about their own lives. They have forgotten everything. They have forgotten the 
simple things that mean so much. Greece has changed them completely. For 
example, I will not ever change certain things. 
Liz: How do you know that the same thing won't happen to you? They probably 
didn't think they were going to change, or perhaps it happened subconsciously, 
without them realising, over time. 
Ibrahim: Yes, people do change but it depends on the person and their 
personality. Those who came earlier, you can differentiate them, you can see 
they're different at all levels. You know, we in the Arabic countries, we have our 
own customs. 
Liz: Yes 
Ibrahim: But they do notfollow them now. 
Liz: And I've heard that some have married Greek women. 
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Ibrahim: Most of them, yes. And they have had children and their children are 
Greek. They have not got Greek citiZenship because they are living in Greece, 
but because their mother is Greek. 
Liz: But as time passes and you don't go back? 
fbrahim: Yes, but I'm very careful to maintain contact with my family in Syria. 
This contact creates links that I could not live without. I guess they have 
completely lost contact with theirfamilies. There are Palestinians who are not 
Palestinian. They have lost touch completely with their Palestinian past. 
Ibrahim clearly demonstrates the importance of having links to his family (even 
though they are not in Palestine and he has never been there). As a result, he 
feels he is 'more I in touch with his "Palestinian past" than other Palestinians are. 
Whether Palestinians have lived in or visited Palestine or not can also 
have implications for the creation of tensions. The following quote by Abdul 
(28, casual office worker) illustrates this: 
You know the Palestinians who have never lived there, they don't know so much. 
They have not lived through the problems; it's differentfor them. They may not 
understand or know so much because they have not experienced what it's like 
and they have not seen it. They don't know so many details and realities of the 
situation. They don't know exactly where the places are or they can't describe 
them like we can. They are different to us. 
This difference can also be extended as a perceived division between 
Palestinians who at the moment are 'inside' Palestine (which, for such purposes, 
appears to be defined as the West Bank and Gaza, not historical Palestine) and 
those who are 'outside', or where Palestinians are from originally. As Sana (34, 
housewife) points out: 
You can see the differences coming from the refugees who left in '67 and who 
never visited Palestine. Some suffered, some didn't. This is the 
difference 
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between all of us. I have afriend who isfrom a refugee camp and she says that if 
people talk, then she should talk, because she believes she has more right to talk 
more on beha4f of, because she says we suffered more. I don't listen, because I 
say, perhaps she has more right to talk... 
Although the physical lives of Palestinians in Athens are better and they are not 
in immediate danger, some respondents still feel they suffer psychologically, 
because of the fact that they live in diaspora. Jamila (22, student) says: "I know 
it must be more difficult for the Palestinians who live inside; it is terrible for 
them, but you know we also suffer because we are here; they have to deal with 
everything on an everyday basis, whereas all we can do is watch and wait". She 
goes on to claim "I don't feel different to those Palestinians who have lived 
there. I've spoken to so many Palestinians who have lived there, my love for 
Palestine is the same; it's just as strong as theirs". Lina (3 8, businesswoman) also 
feels that being away from Palestine makes it harder because they are foreigners 
in Greece, whereas those 'inside' are 'home' at least. She also highlights the 
perceptions of distinction between 'real' Palestinians who are there and 
Palestinians who are somehow less real because they live in diaspora: 
I don't know if I can speak like a real Palestinian, because I've never suffiered 
like the people down there, but we suffer in different ways. For example, I always 
wanted to have my own country because I am always a foreigner everywhere so 
this gives us a little bit ofpain. When I see any Arab celebrating in his country - 
we don't even have the right to have ourfolklore, or if we have it, where to show 
it, so we suffer like that. 
This issue of defining who is a 'real' Palestinian can also create ftirther problems 
for Palestinians such as Abdul (28, casual office worker), despite the fact that he 
grew up in the West Bank and has lived there fairly recently: 
My friends tell me off sometimes for not knowing things that have happened or 




The issue of refugees who are not legally residing in Greece is one that 
needs to be highlighted here. It is interesting to note the embassy's Position on 
such Palestinians living in Athens. According to an embassy official, there are no 
Palestinians without legal status in Greece and those who claim to be are 
pretending to be Palestinian because they feel they will be treated more leniently. 
This insistence on the absence of undocumented Palestinians appears to be 
related to the fact that the embassy is nourishing and promoting the image of 
Palestinians in Greece as law-abiding and legally resident. The embassy does not 
appear to want to associate itself with undocumented immigrants whether they 
are Palestinian or not so that this carefully constructed image is not tarnished. 
Although it does appear that on the whole, Palestinians in Greece are 
law-abiding, legal 'resident aliens' with the right documentation, I came into 
contact with over thirty refugees without legal status who claimed they were 
Palestinian during the fieldwork. When confronted, the embassy gave its full 
assurances that they were not in fact Palestinian as they make it their duty to talk 
to all undocumented immigrants who claim to be Palestinian. It is,, as a result, 
very difficult to come to any conclusions about the presence of Palestinians 
without legal status in Greece. This insistence on the legality of the Palestinian 
diaspora in Athens also hides the increasing difficulties Palestinians are 
experiencing in renewing their documents that allow them to live there legally. 
This is not surprising given the problems many migrants in Greece are facing in 
terms of bureaucracy and complicated and ineffective immigration policies. " 
The presence of Palestinian refugees who are residing in Greece illegally 
and who often appear to be in a dire situation financially have triggered differing 
emotions and tensions amongst other Palestinians in Athens. Some Palestinians 
(mainly women involved in charitable activities) who have heard about them and 
have visited them are saddened and angered by their predicament: "you can't 
believe how they are treated" (Sana, 34, housewife), so are moved to try and help 
them. At the same time, they appear to recognise their own positions as more 
financially secure and their role in helping those less fortunate than themselves 
(which may have the impact of lessening feelings of guilt about their own 
10 These issues have already been outlined in Chapter One. 
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financial status). However, other Palestinians who have been in contact with 
such individuals, either personally or indirectly are critical of them. Some feel 
that they do not really need as much help as they claim to need (Mohammed, 43, 
teacher) and others, such as Masud (26, construction worker) are also negative: 
I kept trying to find them jobs. I would tell them to go to a certain place at a 
certain time and they never turned up. So I have given up trying to help them. I 
can't understand why they're like this. They should need help theoretically, they 
should need money, they should need to work, but they don't seem to want to. 
Plus, they don't want to stay in Greece, they want to move on to Western Europe, 
but how will they get there? Like this (moves his hand in a zig-zag, to denote that 
they would do so illegally). They are just waiting here. So, I have come to the 
conclusion that they must have money, how else would they get here? And they 
are not refugeesfrom Gaza as they claim to be, they arefrom southern Lebanon 
and they have money. But to go to Scandinavia and Western Europe, they need 
money, don't they? But they want to be here and not work. 
Liz: How do they get money then? 
Masud: They will waitfor the Palestinians here to give them money. 
Masud has become disillusioned with them and, therefore, has started to resent 
them, illustrating the fluid nature of constructions of difference amongst those in 
diaspora. 
Religious constructions and tensions 
Palestinian Muslims in Athens provide a good example of how Palestinians use 
and negotiate differences and similarities as well as definitions of who they are, 
in relation to each other. The majority of Palestinians in Athens are Muslim, 
although there are also some Christian Palestinians. Religion appears to 
influence certain traditions and customs of Muslim Palestinians,, as well as their 
senses of 'Palestinian-ness'. However, religion seems to be something many 
Palestinians in Athens 'dip into' or feel at will. Many do not see them themselves 
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as extremely religious people, but at the same time, religion can fon-n a key 
aspect of who they feel they are as well as cement links to the Arab world. 
Above all, they feel that to be Muslim in Greece is to be different, a way of 
signifýing that one is different and that one does things differently. 
Some interviewees also perceive that Islam unites Palestinians with other 
Muslims and Arabs around the world and the Middle East. In Athens too, it 
provides a way for men to come together at regular intervals, which they do at 
the numerous underground Mosques that exist in Athens. 12 Knowing about one's 
religion is seen as very important and many participants are keen to demonstrate 
their religious knowledge despite claiming not to be religious. Yet, unlike many 
other European countries, in Greece, religion has not become the basis for so 
called 'identity politics'. This could be because Palestinians do not see it as a 
viable or useful strategy. The support that they do receive is based on Greek 
perceptions of Palestinians as being under occupation as well as the cause. It is 
not based on religion and many Palestinians are acutely aware of Greek 
perceptions of Muslims-' 3 As the following two interview extracts illustrate, 
Palestinians are acutely aware of how Greeks have interpreted and represented 
Islam: 
Majid: I think that religion is very important. I don't think that people realise 
how important religion is to us. The people here, the Greeks, they don't really 
understand what Islam is and they don't really care about the world and what's 
going on. People stereotype Islam. There is no difference between the Christians 
" According to Tzilivakis (2005b: 3), there are plans for an official mosque and Islamic Centre, 
which are being funded entirely by King Fahd of Saudi Arabia, to be built in Peania 
(NE of 
Athens). However, there has been much opposition to this by the Greek Orthodox Church and 
local residents: "This is one of the reasons why construction has yet to begin. Plans 
for it were 
approved by Greek Parliament five years a go, after more than twenty-five years of negotiation. 
Athens is the only capital in the fifteen 'older' EU states that does not have an official place 
for 
Muslim congregational prayer". 
12 Many Palestinians in Athens feel such perceptions are based on the bitter Greek experience 
with Muslim Ottoman Turks and on what Memardus (2002: 
81) calls the "Greek-Turkish 
complex", which he feels is "part and parcel" of the question of the 
Muslim minority in Greece. 
This is usually seen as a result of the Ottoman occupation of 
Greek speaking (and Greek 
Orthodox) lands; Greece, as a modem nation-state, was established at the end of the Occupation 
from 1821-33 (Close 2002). 
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and the Muslims; we originate from the same people but when people know that 
there is a question mark over it, over Islam, they get suspicious of Muslims 
Fadila: I hate this stereotypical impression people have of Islam, like that all 
women wear headscarves or areforced to wear them. I don't wear it and I don't 
have to as a Muslim woman 
Maj id: And I can 'tforce her to; Islam doesn't say that she has to. 
(Fadila, 30, housewife and her husband, Majid, 36, FCE) 
But this and the occupation and the violence has nothing to do with the Islam 
that is here now and that is believed in by the Muslims here. It does not preach 
violence - Islam preaches the opposite but probably Greeks still have this image 
of1slam as violent and the [Greek Orthodox] Church still maintains that they are 
scared of1slam. (Ibrahim, 32, construction worker) 
Although religion does not appear to be the main factor defining and informing 
constructions of 'Palestinian-ness', for some Palestinians it is still very 
important. This seems to be because religion helps them to negotiate themselves 
as Palestinian, through the maintenance of religious traditions and customs they 
feel are crucial: 
We keep these traditions and customs. If we don't do these, then we lose our 
personalities, who we are as Palestinians, our identities. This is our identity 
there, it is based on such things, these things. So there is this danger for 
Palestinians living outside Palestine of losing this identity that they have. They 
slowlyforget thefact that they are Palestinian ... I'm very worried about my son 
and thefuture and what will happen because things do change. But hopefully it 
will be fine ... my generation 
is different to the older one. They have forgotten 
everything. We are not like that. We are keeping our traditions and customs ... we 
are thinking and acting as Palestinians so there is nofear that our culture and 
identity will be lost. (Ibrahim, 32, construction worker) 
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Ibrahim's view seems to be focused on preserving as many of these 'customs' 
and 'traditions' as possible and not becoming 'lost' within Greek society and 
way of life. Although such views appear to be indicative more of a 'holding on' 
to an 'authentic' Palestinian way of being and they can, therefore, be exclusive 
and stereotypical, they exist as strategic constructions of 'Palestinian-ness' for 
some Palestinians triggered by feelings of exile, insecurity and difference that 
can be associated with living 'in-between'. Ibrahim goes on to air his concerns 
about other Palestinians in Athens who are not practicing Muslims like his 
family or who, according to him, have lost or forgotten what it means to be 
Palestinian: 
In other European countries, it's religion that unites Palestinians and keeps 
them together but you don't have that here. Palestinians here have nothing to do 
with religion but religion is very important. It can influence people not to change 
their principles but when there is no belief in religion then everything changes. If 
you change or you get influenced, how do you know who you are? no are you 
ifyou do not stick to your principles and morals? We have every right to be who 
we want to be and believe what we want to believe and we are not harming 
anyone. In other European countries, religious groups are much more organised 
because the Arab communities there are much older and England, politically is 
different to Greece in that they support religious freedom more. Now here in 
Greece, there have been steps recently to support different religions but before 
there was nothing at all. 
Such views also serve to illustrate certain tensions amongst Palestinians 
in 
Athens, between those who seek to preserve their own religiously inspired 
constructions of 'Palestinian-ness' and those who see themselves as more 
integrated into Greek society. Despite this potential conflict, 
however, in reality 
both groups live out lives that are a mixture of both, whether they 
like it or not. 
Religion is an Issue that divides as well as unites certain Palestinians 
in 
Athens. Palestinians who see themselves as more 'moderate' and for whom 
religion is important but does not necessarily permeate all aspects of 
their lives 
sometimes have a problem with those 
Palestinians for whom this is not the case. 
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For example, Rania, (38, FCE) a Christian, stresses her disapproval of what she 
calls "extreme behaviour" of certain Palestinian Muslim women: 
Recently, since September the I Ith I think, there have been some women at the 
school my children go to - in fact, there is one woman who started it all off, 
saying that all the girls must wear the veil to school and at other times.... people 
are listening to them, but they are not representative of all the Palestinians here. 
They are defining their way to be Palestinian, what they think is important, not 
what the rest of us think. I do not agree with many of their views and attitudes 
but what can I do? I don't want to create problems. 14 
Rania points out that in Ramallah, where she is from: 
We never differentiated between Muslim and Christian, never, ever. During 
Christmas in Ramallah, everyone celebrates. During Ramadan, everyone 
celebrates. You neverfelt this tension with the religions, we are all the same. 
Rafat (48, FCE and Representative of PLO in Athens) agrees with her views: 
In Palestine, there are no disagreements between Christians and Muslims. Here 
too - for example, our children from the Parikia went to Hristodoulou 
15 and 
sang the Christmas carols. Out of 11 children, 8 were Muslim, but it doesn't 
matter. It'S very important to remember that we are open-minded about religion. 
For other Palestinian Muslims, religion is not seen as a way of preserving 
Palestinian 'traditions' or about being Palestinian in a certain way. For example, 
Nadia (24, housewife and part-time student) tells me why she wears a headscarf- 
13 Rania's perceptions of tensions as a result of religious differences are also discussed in Chapter 
Four. 
14 Hristodoulos is the leader of the Greek Orthodox Church. 
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I wear it because of my religion. It says that from the age that a girl has her 
period, she must wear it. You know, it is not such a big deal; many Palestinian 
women do not wear it but I have been wearing it for II years. It depends on 
where you arefrom, your background, yourfamily. In some places, many women 
wear them and it is their decision. 
Nadia does not feel that her headscarf, despite visually depicting her as different, 
is problematic for other Palestinians or Greeks. She sees her headscarf (and her 
religion) as a personal choice that she is entitled to practice. As she respects 
other religious choices and Muslim women who choose not to wear a headscarf, 
she expects the same in return. 
Perceptions of Greek sLipport, discrimination and representations of Palestinians 
The issue of negotiating similarities and differences is also important in 
Palestinian relations with Greeks and Greek society. Greek support, sympathy, 
help and hospitality all have a role to play on individual and group constructions 
of 'Palestinian-ness'. Palestinians perceive this support in many ways and the 
following two quotes provide examples of this: 
They believe us and it give us more hope. You remember in 1982, Greece was the 
only country that received Arafat. nen they opened their doors to us, none of 
the Arab countries allowed Arafat to go, only Greece. This is fact; we can't 
ignore it. "y don't we do something about it? We are in a really goodposition 
here 
... there's something very good in 
Greece, that ifyou want tojoin the Greek 
university, there are 3 nationalities that don't pay, Greek, the Cypriots and the 
Palestinians, this is very good, it's great. I was really surprised when I came 
here and they told me that. I tell you, I love Greece. Let me tell you something 
that happened to me a long time a go. I took a taxi to go somewhere and the taxi 
driver asked me where I wasfrom and he said great, so I reached the place and I 
went to give him the money and he refused to accept it - he said this is the 
minimum I can dofor Palestine. 
(Layla, 38, FCE) 
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I have never felt like a foreigner here, never. Sometimes I get pulled over by the 
police and when they ask where I am from, I say I am Palestinian and they say 
Palestinian? Arafat? And I say, yes, I am Palestinian and they say okay, go. 
(Mahmud, 24, student) 
Although Khalid (43, self-employed garage owner) acknowledges such support 
that Palestinians receive, he also describes how Greek perceptions of foreigners 
have changed over time and how this has affected him: 
I have been here over 15 years and only recently have I startedJeeling that I'm a 
foreigner and it's really affected me, it really bothers me now. They swear at us 
because we are foreigners, just because we are different and it's since the 
Albanians came. The attitude of Greeks has changed. They judge you just 
because you look different. 
Khalid's wife, Sunya (32, housewife) also depicts feelings of Greek prejudice,, 
which she finds upsetting: I went to the hospital to donate blood because I knew 
they needed blood. But when they realised I was Palestinian, they didn't want 
my blood. I couldn't believe it". Rafiq (40, restaurant worker), who has lived in 
Greece for over twenty years, has a similar story to tell: 
I painted this apartment I was about to rent, but when I gave the owner my 
name, she asked me where are you from? I said I am Palestinian. She then said 
that she would talk to her son and the next day she said that her son was going to 
live there, so I couldn't. Before, when I spoke to her on the phone, she thought I 
was Greek, you see, because I speak Greek so well but when she found out I 
wasn't she made up excuses so that I wouldn't rent the apartment. These are the 
sort o things that we have to deal with sometimes, as well as police stopping us !f 
in the street as they do with all foreigners and those who look different. This is 
how it is now. It never used to be this bad. Even though they may support the 
Palestinians politically, they see us foreigners as all the same, they don't trust us 
sometimes. It's difficult to be a foreigner here in Greece now, even if you are 
Palestinian. 
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Despite feeling politicised and Palestinian, Rafiq does not want the fact that he is 
Palestinian to cause problems with Greeks. This is why he feels he is involved in 
a constant struggle between 'integrating' into and respecting Greece and Greek 
society and negotiating himself as Palestinian with a political cause to 
advocate. 16 
There are Palestinians who, despite acknowledging the support they have 
from Greeks, cannot help feeling different or foreign. Suzanna, (37, housewife) a 
mother of three girls is trying to bring up her children "to respect people as 
individuals, regardless of their race or religion", yet at the same time she 
acknowledges the difficulties she feels she will have: 
We have to set boundaries or limits that they have to stick to and they see that 
what they are allowed is different to theirfriends and they say it isn'tfair, but on 
the whole I think they understand why. My sixteen year old, for example, wants 
to go out to clubs and come back very late or wear provocative clothing because 
she sees herfriends doing so but after I have explained why such things are not 
acceptable, she understands, but it is hard sometimes, living here. 
Ghada (32, housewife) also displays similar worries: "I will have a problem with 
my daughter when she grows up, because we are Muslim. When she is 17,18, 
she will want to go out with boys and do what her friends do, but we do not 
approve of such behaviour". Both women acknowledge the tensions that 
differences (in their case, religious) can create as a result of their living in Greece 
as foreigners. Although they are both willing to uphold their religious beliefs as 
far as possible, they also seem to be aware that their future relationships with 
their daughters will involve intense and sometimes hard negotiations because 
they live as a religious minority. 
Perceptions of difference are also triggered by representation of 
Palestinians in the Greek media, which can also create tensions between Greeks 
and Palestinians. Despite being appreciative of Greek support, some Palestinians 
15 Rafiq's feelings of ambivalence and 'in-between-ness' as a result of such struggles are 
discussed in Chapter Four. 
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also feel that the Greek media does not represent them fairly and actively 
constructs them as 'different' or as dangerous: 
The news that you see here in Greece and I mean no disrespect to the Greeks, 
but unfortunately some of the channels here, like Mega, Antenna are sold to the 
Israelis, in other words, the Israelis have a large influence on them and they can 
say whatever they want through those channels. There is no in rmation - f) 
sometimes the call us terrorists, or whatever even thought the presenter mal, Y 
disagree with what she has to say, but she has to say it or else she loses herjob 
and this has happened. Three, four months ago there was a scandal amongst the 
journalists here. They fired 5,6 journalists ftom some newspapers who 
discovered that when they write an article about Palestine, or Iraq, and then 
send the article to the editor, the next day in the newspaper, they would see 
another article that was different to the one that they had written. And, 
sometimes instead of where was written 'the poor Palestinians' instead was 
written 'the Palestinians the terrorists. ' (Mahmud, 24, student) 
As a result of such representations, some Palestinians feel that Greeks are 
misinformed about the historical and contemporary situation in IsraelAPalestine: 
I know that Greeks are supposed to support the Palestinian cause but there are 
some people who do not know very much and who do not understand. I had a 
discussion once with a group of Greek students who were saying that Israel was 
for the Israelis not the Palestinians because of religious reasons - that they 
could prove that their religion said that they should be there and I was trying to 
tell them and to prove to them that the land was Palestinian. I said to them give 
me evidence that Israelis belong there - there is still no hard evidence that they 
have a right to be there, but the Palestinians were already there, living there. I 
told them about 1948, how the Israelis came there andforced the Palestinians to 
leave. (Kanrn, 24, student) 
Karim who has recently moved to Greece from Jordan (where he has lived his 
whole life) has never been to Palestine. At the beginning of his interview, he 
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claims not to feel Palestinian, but as the interview progresses, it becomes clear 
that he does feel Palestinian and that he is willing to advocate the cause. It also 
becomes apparent that he has started to feel 'more Palestinian' and to leam more 
about Palestinian history and the cause since coming to Greece and associating 
with other politicised Palestinian students. 17 At the same time, his perceptions of 
himself as Palestinian have also been influenced by Greek attitudes towards 
Palestinians and their cause. He feels compelled to leam more about his own 
Palestinian history in order to counter and deal with Greek misrepresentations. 
The propensity for the creation of us/them relationships may be evident in such 
testimonies, but at the same time, it should also be clear that Greek and 
Palestinian subjectivities are inextricably tied as a result of the processes of 
negotiating differences and similarities both groups undergo during their daily 
lives. Different levels and kinds of conflicts and tensions exist amongst 
Palestinians and between Palestinians and 'others', some of which are perceived 
as very severe and potentially create large rifts and others that are seen as less 
significant and to be expected. However, tensions must not be over-emphasised; 
rather they and their consequences in terms of politicisation and political actions 
have to be explored and understood because they are a reality within and 
amongst diasporas. 
Conclusions 
Lindholm Schulz (2003: 87) claims that for Palestinians, "the condition of being 
Palestinian ... is to move". 
At the same time, she (ibid.: 204) argues that there has 
been a 'thinning out' of Palestinian identities and of attachment to homeland 
within the Palestinian diaspora. She claims that this "runs the risk of diminishing 
the political strength of the Palestinian movement, which is why stories ... (of 
difficulties, disillusioninent, apathy, integration and so forth) are kept out of 
official deliberations on what it means to be Palestinian". Her views and 
approach appear to equate 'identity' with 'unity' and political action. However, 
her apparent conflict between the need to construct a politicised and united 
Palestinian 'identity' as a necessary aspect of the "Palestinian movement" and 
16 This is rermniscent of the discussion earlier in this Chapter on 'leaming to 
be Palestinian'. 
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the realities of multiple Palestinian positionmgs highlight the tensions ordinary 
Palestinians in Athens also feel. The conflicts and complexities surrounding 
'being Palestinian' in Athens are crucial in depicting how difficult it is for such 
diasporic Palestinians to deal with personal and official constructions and 
narratives of 'identity', difference, politicisation, political 'unity', representation 
and citizenship. Palestinians In Athens may have different loyalties and can act 
and imagine themselves collectively for strategic or unifying purposes but at the 
same time, they are unique and diverse individuals with intricate and changing 
constructions of what it means to be Palestinian in Greece that can be difficult to 
pin down. Therefore, constructions of 'shared consciousness' may be usefill in 
attempts to understand and explain Palestinian collective attachments and 
feelings of belonging. 
It is important to deconstruct arbitrary notions of Palestinian 'identity' to 
take into account and explore the ways in which Palestinians may position and 
construct themselves as Palestinian strategically in political, social and cultural 
ways. It is also crucial to examine and appreciate how, In the process, they may 
feel empowered, disempowered, 'in-between' and ambivalent and potentially 
engage in political activities such as advocacy, within diasporic spaces as 
discussed in Chapter Seven. At the same time, as Chapter Six shows, the formal 
aspects of citizenship status (and related issues of security, rights, justice, 
political participation) as well as the associations between Palestinian 'identity' 
and citizenship within a future Palestinians state hold great appeal for many 
Palestinians in Athens. It is such perceptions and realities of citizenship (and 
statelessness) that also play an important role in the material ability and tendency 
of Palestinians to feel politicised and be involved in political activities. 
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Chapter 6 
Perceptions of the coupling and decoupling of citizenship and 
6national identity' 
This chapter aims to add another dimension to the discussion on what 
it means to be and feel Palestinian in Athens. Palestinian articulations 
of belonging and politicisation have to be placed within personal 
material realities of statelessness and exile as well as ensuing feelings 
of injustice, discrimination, suffering and the paucity of a political 
voice and participation. In this chapter, perceptions of the 
relationships between citizenship and 'national identity' are examined 
in order to understand how the Palestinian diaspora in Athens may 
use symbolic narratives and articulations of citizenship as part of 
their constructions of 'being Palestinian', and to potentially frame 
(and strengthen) their cause and related political actions. I 
Introduction 
Migrants and those in diaspora with informal or ambiguous citizenship statuses 
highlight the need for re-conceptualisations of citizenship, as well as the 
relationships between citizenship, 'identity' and belonging (Croucher 2004). 
People who have an ambiguous relationship with the 'nation-state' or who are 
not 'nationals', a concept that Castles and Davidson (2000: 84) call an 
"intrinsically particularistic and exclusionary category", are often excluded or 
discriminated against. The majority of Palestinians interviewed for this research 
are not Greek citizens but are dependent on work and residence permits in order 
to live in Greece. This chapter outlines their different legal statuses that are often 
complicated and unclear. This appears to play a major role in their feelings of 
injustice, discrimination and ambivalence, as well as their constructions of 
'Palestinian-ness',, belonging, political engagement and citizenship. For many 
Palestinians in Athens, it is the physical effects and consequences of non- 
' Material political actions and advocacy that occur within diasporic spaces are discussed in 
Chapter Seven. 
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citizenship that they often experience. This may be why many Palestinians in 
Athens see citizenship as a set of processes that are inclusive and can provide 
rights, benefits and protection for citizens in defined nation-states but that can 
also be exclusive for foreigners and those with complex residency statuses and 
feelings of home and belonging, such as themselves. 
Joseph (1999: 4) comments on the importance of citizenship. She feels that: 
nile there is no simple definition of what citizenship is, or who can 
be a citizen, we are constantly impinged on as citizen -subjects, 
operating between the legal, the cultural and the political, often in 
tandem, in our everyday gestures. 
Imaginings and realities of citizenship (as well as the lack of citizenship) can 
thus be seen as a constant part of Palestinian daily lives in Athens, whether they 
are Greek citizens or not, greatly influencing perceptions of Palestinian 
citizenship in a future Palestinian state. Although contested, constructions and 
perceptions of citizenship are crucial components in the understanding of 
diasporic (individual and group) legal, cultural and political positionings in 
relation to the state (or states) and to one another. For Palestinians in Athens, 
articulations of citizenship may influence their negotiations of home, belonging, 
'identity' and difference as well as tendencies and abilities to resist5 feel 
politicised and politically active. Joseph's quote also highlights two notions and 
spheres of citizenship. The first is the idea of citizenship as more symbolic or 
cultural. The second is citizenship as legal and official (as well as its material 
consequences). As Joseph points out, these versions merge within everyday 
performances and constructions of citizenship and belonging. This also seems to 
be the case for Palestinians in Athens with and without formal citizenship status. 
Within Palestinian understandings of future Palestinian citizenship, 
relationships between citizenship, a territorial state and 'national identity' are 
often portrayed as 'natural' and desirable. For example, Rafat's (48, FCE) 
opinion, as representative of the PLO in Athens, is revealing: "We are entitled to 
an independent Palestinian state. We are entitled to an identity". Many 
respondents see the nation-state as the provider of rights and access to necessary 
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resources to its 'ethnically' and 'nationally' defined citizens. This mirrors 
Tambini's (2001: 196) observation that "the status of citizen has been allocated 
to individuals according to their 'ethnicity', or 'national identity' ... as the main 
determinant of access to resources, rights and to the institutions of political 
participation". This also echoes the discussion that an 'identity' is needed in 
order to 'unite' as a prerequisite to potential political advocacy of self- 
determination (as part of the Palestinian cause) outlined in Chapter Five. 
In this chapter, the intricacies surrounding participant constructions of the 
relationships between Palestinian citizenship, 'national identity' and Palestinian 
statehood are examined. The future state of Palestine can be seen as the space in 
which they will invest their current perceptions of the relationships between 
citizenship, statehood and Palestinian 'Identity'. The principles of self- 
determination and the Right of Return for Palestinian refugees, as key aspects of 
the Palestinian cause, are all based on such relationships and "the creation of a 
Palestinian land for Palestinian people, where they can be free and have all their 
rights" (Abbas, 26, student). Thus, to reiterate, Palestinians in Athens appear to 
be constructing relationships between Palestinian citizenship and 'national 
identity' in a future Palestinian state. 
At the same time, this chapter illustrates that a decoupling of Greek 
citizenship and (Greek) 'national identity' also seems to be taking place for those 
Palestinians who have obtained Greek citizenship status. Being a citizen of one 
country does not necessarily mean that one 'fully belongs' and that one can 
identify oneself to other identities, which are still state based (Isin and Wood 
1999). As Nagel and Staeheli (2004: 4) argue: "it is possible to claim identity as 
a citizen of a country and to negotiate membership within the bounds of 
'belonging', even without claiming to 'be of that countryY% thus breaking the 
assumed congruity between citizenship, state and nation. It is important to stress 
"the distinction between cultural and national identity" (Welsch 1999: 198). In 
response to such claims, Soysal (1998: 210,209) has argued that "the idea of 
nation becomes insignificant, a mere trope of convenience for claims to 
collective rights and identity". For Soysal, post-national membership is a more 
relevant notion, whereby "an identity politics energised by narratives of 
collective pasts and accentuated cultural differences, becomes the 
basis for 
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participation and affords the means for mobilising resources in the national and 
world polities". In a similar vein, Tambini (2001: 212) also explains why he feels 
that the concept of what he calls 'post-national citizenship' is becoming more 
important: 
No-one can seriously propose that the nation as an institutional form 
is about to disappear. Neither, however, can it continue in the 
classical nineteenth centuryform. Rather, the meaning and content of 
national belonging will be transformed as the structural basis of 
national citizenship continues to be undermined. Clearly, a strong 
sense of identity is important for the action, participation and 
solidarity that citizenship involves. But active citizenship in thefuture 
may rely more on bureaucratic policing of belonging than on 
I national' or cultural identity. 
Such views advocate the reconfiguring and re-thinking of the relationships 
between citizenship, 'identity' and statehood. To this end, Ong (1999: 6) 
highlights the concept of 'flexible citizenship', whereby, as a result of 
globalisation, "individuals as well as governments develop a flexible notion of 
citizenship and sovereignty as strategies to accumulate capital and power". Such 
notions have implications for the practices and processes of citizenship within 
and beyond states; they may be able to make citizenship more relevant and 
inclusive for those with complex relations to the state. As Nagel and Staeheli 
(2004: 4) stress: "geographies of community, identity and citizenship are more 
complex and are in greater flux than much of the contemporary debate [on these 
issues] implies". In reality, it may not be easy to determine whether Palestinians 
are experiencing a decoupling of citizenship and 'national identity'. This chapter 
examines whether a dynamic and complex coupling and decoupling of 
citizenship and 'national identity' may be occurring for political, social and 
cultural material and symbolic purposes. 
The acquisition of citizenship status (of Greece and other Western 
countries, in particular) as a strategy for security, protection and mobility 
highlights Palestinian perceptions of the use and importance of formal 
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citizenship status to their future. The strategic processes, feelings and actions that 
lead to the granting of citizenship, either in the host country or homeland have to 
be explored. It is here, between legal citizen and legal alien that we can place the 
articulations and activities of many Palestinians in Athens as they struggle to 
make sense of their 'Palestinian-ness',, spaces and networks, in-between Greece 
and Palestine. At the same time, the acquisition of non-Palestinian citizenship 
status whilst in diaspora demonstrates that citizenship may no longer be 
synonymous with 'national identity'. The possession of a passport from Greece 
or any other Western country may not initially appear to affect constructions of 
belonging to Palestine and a Palestinian 'Identity. ' However, the instability and 
ambivalence of such constructions means that feeling 'in-between' can 
undermine the naturalised relationships between citizenship and 'Identity'. 
Those in diaspora are increasingly finding themselves in complicated 
situations, with fluid, multiple, strategic and situated feelings of belonging and 
ways of acting that are not limited to bounded nation-states. As Nagel and 
Staeheli (2004: 6, citing Mandaville 1999) note: 
Immigrant groups (or diasporas and transmigrants) are said to exist 
1. na new global market ofpolitical loyalties, engaging in a complex 
politics of 'here and there'and resisting attempts by the state to 'fix 
parameters of political community and territory Pf and to assimilate 
newcomers into a national culture. 
Unfortunately, many western-centric notions of citizenship do not often take 
such concerns and realities into account. McEwan (2005: 3) stresses that: 
Dominant conceptualisations of citizenship still rest largely on an 
abstract, universal and western-centric notion of the individual and 
are consequently unable to recognize either the political relevance of 
gender or of non-western perspectives and experiences. 
At the same time, abstract notions of what McEwan (ibid. ) calls "political 
citizenship (in terms of an instrumental notion of political participation)" appear 
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to hold great appeal for diasponc Palestinians in Athens because of their 
statelessness and lack of formal citizenship (and consequent lack of ability to 
participate politically). This is despite their numerous negative experiences of 
how exclusive such notions of citizenship can be in reality. 
The importance Palestinians in Athens attach to 'political citizenship', 
theoretically and materially stem from its continued relevance to the 
contemporary world. The salience and use of citizenship may be explained by 
ideas such as those of Arendt (1973, cited in Benhabib 2004: 47-61), who 
believed that citizenship gave a person all of the rights they needed to function 
within a society. Being stateless, therefore, amounted to the loss of all rights, 
displacement, potential exclusion and being in a state of 'limbo', trapped 
between territories. Arendt equated citizenship with 'the right to have rights' as 
well as statehood and felt that belonging entailed recognised membership within 
a group, where equality and equal human and civil rights could occur as a result. 
The problem arises when one tries to define the borders and associated identities 
of territories in which this can occur. These are extremely difficult issues to 
solve but they highlight the salience of citizenship theoretically because of the 
issues of rights, freedom, political participation, as well as political 
representation and democracy, which can be associated with it. Statelessness 
brings all these issues to the surface and forces a critical interrogation of them, 
through time and space. 
The issues of statelessness, membership, exclusion and rights are 
especially applicable to Palestinians in Athens. The numerous examples 
presented below show how Palestinians feel persecuted, not necessarily by 
Greeks but by Greek and other institutional systems that may ban them from 
belonging and travelling. Even the few who do possess Greek citizenship may 
not be perceived to have the 'correct' cultural, social, religious characteristics in 
terms of prevailing perceptions of Greek 'national identity 5. Greeks have lived 
under occupation in the past and are very protective of their citizenship, which is 
defined by blood, not birth (Rozakis 1996); Greek citizenship is tied to ethnicity, 
guarded closely and given frugally to those perceived as foreigners as a result 
(Fakiolas 1999). As outlined in Chapter One, the Greek state appears quite happy 
to allow migrants and those in diaspora to stay and to benefit from work as long 
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as they do not demand riots or citizenship. 2 Although this is beginning to 
change with the influence of the European Union, it is still the prevailing attitude 
with which Palestinians in Greece have to contend. 
Coupling citizenship and 'national identity': consequences of the material 
realities of statelessness and perceptions of injustice 
Palestinians in Athens perceive the benefits and problems associated with 
citizenship as a formal status through and because of feelings and experiences of 
exile, statelessness, injustice, marginalisation and discrimination. At the same 
time, westem-centric and abstract notions of citizenship and its relationships 
with 'national identity' and statehood influence their cultural, social and political 
positionings of belonging and 'being Palestinian". 
The widespread need amongst Palestinians in Athens to prove and define 
themselves as Palestinian by official means suggests their need to clarify that 
they are 'genuine' Palestinians with the right to belong to a homeland called 
Palestine, in order to be considered viable Palestinian citizens in a future 
Palestinian state. It is still unclear, however, which Palestinians in diaspora will 
be entitled to claim Palestinian citizenship in such a state. The defining of 
oneself as Palestinian in Athens may thus be seen as a crucial political project 
that will eventually enable participation and access to rights and resources that 
they do not currently have. At the same time, such definitions can also be seen as 
a response to their feelings of marginalisation, discrimination and non-existence 
in Greek official categories. In response to a question on what makes him feel 
Palestinian, Faeq (45, FCE) describes how "They [the Greek authorities] don't 
write that I am Palestinian, when I am. They don't have a Palestinian category; 
we don't exist". There appears to be a need to show proof that they are 
Palestinians as a defensive mechanism. Mahmud (24, student), for example, 
stresses that he is a "genuine Palestinian. I have a Palestinian identity card and 
passport". Tariq, (60, doctor) who has been in Greece for over thirty years, is a 
Greek citizen and is married to a Greek, still calls himself Palestinian because 
2 Even for those Palestinians who do acquire Greek citizenship status, political participation is 
not guaranteed and they may, therefore, still feel excluded or marginalized. 
As Nagel and 
Staeheli (2004: 5), stress: "it ... 
becomes necessary to distinguish between formal citizenship and 
substantive citizenship - that is, between one's legal status and one's ability to realise 
the rights 
and privileges of societal membership". 
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"this will never change. My roots, my origins are Palestinian. And my papers 
write this,, I'm not just saying it". Such justifications may be a manifestation of 
the fact that Mahmud and Tanq as well as many other Palestinians in Athens, 
feel threatened and vulnerable, as well as insecure; having a defined 'Identity' 
that they can prove by official means is, therefore, being continuously negotiated 
as important, because it can become a source of security, as well as pride. 
Palestinian residency and official statuses are complex, often confusing 
and consequently difficult to generalise about. However, I provide Palestinian 
responses to their legal status in order to understand the perceptions, insecurities 
and realities of injustices and difficulties in terms of mobility, residency and 
political participation as a result of their legal status (and lack of formal 
citizenship status). This is because such perceptions and realities may have 
encouraged Palestinians to stress the importance of the acquisition of forinal 
citizenship, either in a host country, or in a future Palestinian state. At the same 
time, the resulting implications of feelings of being 'different' and discriminated 
against in terms of imagining and constructing relationships between citizenship, 
'identity' and statehood also have to be examined. 
Statelessness and restrictions on mobilit 
Palestinians originally from the West Bank and Gaza face considerable 
restrictions in travelling, both within the Middle East and elsewhere because they 
hold a Palestinian passport. It has to be noted here that Palestinians in Athens 
perceive this passport differently. Some see it as a legitimate and official 
document, legalising their status as Palestinian. Others are more pessimistic, 
arguing that it is a fake document, that does not mean very much because Israel 
controls who is and is not allowed to have one, which for them nullifies 
its 
validity. Indeed, there are those who do not call it a passport at all, 
but an 
identity card and some, like Mahmud, (24, student) who use the terms 
interchangeably: 
Liz: And these passports - how long have they been issued 
for? 
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Mahmud: In 1996 and when I came here, the residents who were in Bethlehem 
and its surroundings, the West Bank and Gaza got the passport and identity 
card. Okay, they are Palestinian but they have to go through Israel. 
Liz: So it's not a proper one? 
Mahmud: No, they are, but the passport, when they issue it in Gaza, because 
that's where they are issued, they are sentfirst to the Israelis who keep a copy 
of the number, the details on file and then after they've checked everything and 
put you on file you can collect your passport. 
Liz: So with this passport do you encounter difficulties travelling? 
Mahmud: At Tel Aviv airport they single you out of 1000 people. Sometimes it's 
good, sometimes it isn't. The good thing is you don't have to wait in any queues 
(laughs). As soon as they see that they have a Palestinian -for example, the last 
time I went, they had been informed that a Palestinian was coming. 
Liz: Really? 
Mahmud: Yes, of course, this always happens - they know everything. They 
know from when you go and get your ticket at the travel agency. I phoned 
Olympic airways when I was there and told them I was travelling but I only had 
the old ticket - the one for 5 days earlier - because of the permit I had to get 
from the Israelis. Because you have to get this permit, they know you're 
travelling; they don't have to check with Olympic to see who's travelling. From 
the moment you get a permit they know that you're travelling on that day at that 
time. They lookedfor me at the airport. They look at yourface and they ask you 
what passport you have. But because of the number ofJourneys since 1996 that 
I have made, I knew this so I made it easyfor them to find me, and they carried 
out a special check on me. They check everything, your clothes. They ask you 
questions to which they already know the answers, just to see if you're telling 
the truth. I remember the first time I went from Greece to Palestine, it was 5 
months after I had gone there. They knew the name of my flat mate; he was a 
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guyftom Syria. They knew the address of where I lived; they knew everything. 
They had a description of my house - they even knew the contents of my room. 
Liz: Really? 
Mahmud: Yes. I had been at the airport for 2 hours and I was the only 
Palestinian who was there and they were asking me about girls I had been out 
with - they said to me you went out with a blonde girl on such a such a date at 
such a such a time -I mean the were asking me details that I hadforgotten. Y 
You can't hide anythingfrom them. 
Liz: I didn't realise they checked everything quite so thoroughly. 
Mahmud: Yes. They check everyone who's on thefirst year away at university to 
see what they're like, what sort of a risk they are - they want to find out if 
people are really studying or involved in political issues, You see. 
Liz: But how are they able to find out all this infonnation? 
Mahmud: They have a large amount of informants and secret police. 
Liz: Even here in Greece? 
Mahmud: Ha4f of them work here. 
While there are always issues of accuracy regarding personal testimonies, 
feelings of persecution and surveillance appear very strongly 
3 here. Being 
singled out because they are different is something Palestinians have had to get 
used to but that is still hard for them to deal with. For example, Mustafa (42, 
unemployed) says: 
Issues of accuracy are outlined in Chapter Three. 
192 
I have a Palestinian passport. It's not like a proper passport, it's more of a 
travel document; it's difficult to get a visa with it. (He shows it to me. On it, the 
words 'Palestinian passport' and 'travel document' are both written). It's hard 
because with every application you make, every procedure, you are in another 
category; you're singled out as different, needing special treatment. 
The families of other Palestinians fled historical Palestine after 1948 and went to 
various neighbouring countries. This has had varying repercussions in terms of 
4 
their citizenship and mobility in Athens. They can be split into two groups. 
There are those who went to Lebanon, Egypt, Syria and other parts of the Middle 
East and those who went to what is now called Jordan. In Lebanon,, their fate has 
been especially hard. They have been given travel documents, which create 
problems for them in terms of mobility, but more importantly, they have been 
subject to high levels of discrimination. 5 Ahmed (34, FCE), whose family settled 
as refugees in Lebanon, describes the situation and the material consequences for 
his documentation, which he himself finds confusing: 
we have travel documents in Lebanon, Syria, Jordan and Egypt - they gave 
them to Palestinians who left in 1948 and then in 1967 they give another travel 
document but whoever registered in Lebanon in 1948, they have these travel 
documents and those who left in '67 don't have the travel documents that we 
have. 
Liz: They have something different? 
Ahmed: Actually, I don't know exactly. For example, they have the right to go 
back to the West Bank. We don't have this right even with these peace 
negotiations. 
' For an overview in terms of their citizenship statuses in the 
Middle East and beyond see 
relevant sections in Karmi and Cotran (1999). 
' For more information on Palestinian realities of 
discrimination in Lebanon see, for example, 
Uglerud (2002); Shiblak (1997) and Saylgh (1994; 2001). 
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It should also be noted that they have no right to go to the Occupied Territories, 
let alone visit the land they lost and came from originally, which is now Israel. 
Faeq (45, FCE) also stresses his anger at what he perceives as the injustice of 
this: 
I don't have the right as a 1948 refugee even to askfor the Palestinian passport. 
I can't get it. I don't have the right to get that passport because you know that 
passport i's better than what I'm having now, the Lebanese travel document. It's 
ridiculous and that's why they don't want to give us the right to go back there. 
Both quotes also highlight the number of categories from which Palestinians 
have the potential to be included and excluded. The mobility restrictions they 
face are well illustrated by Layla, (38, FCE) as she responds to a question on 
how easy it is for her to travel: 
(Laughs) It's impossible! Because I remember, before 6 or 7 years, myfriends - 
they were immigrants to Canada, so Ijust wanted to go there to Canada. They 
gave Hassan 6 the Greek passport, this is another story (laughs) - they told me 
that my son could go without a visa, but that I do need a visa. Okay, I appliedfor 
a visa but they refused to give me one so I couldn't go to see myfriends. Also, ifI 
want to visit my parents in Abu Dhabi, I need a visa but Hassan doesn't. My 
parents applied to go to Canada to but they didn't get in but my brother and 
sister did. There are a lot of difficulties for Palestinians. When we talk to other 
nationalities, they always ask are you crazy? Nobody can believe our situation. 
Bilal (33, FCE) also describes the difficulties he has encountered: 
Mal: I was a Palestinian living in Lebanon, which is Palestinian 
Lebanese. 
Actually when you get this passport, it means that you are a refugee 
living in 
Lebanon but not a lot of governments recognise this travel document and 
it's a 
shame to say this but it is mostly the Arabic countries who 
don't recognise it. 
Actualtv, let us say the truth - when the PLO was in Lebanon, maybe the 
Arab 
Hassan is Layla's son. 
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countries were afraid of it or whatever, I don't know exactly what the case was, 
but I know that secret intelligence there knows everything and they know who's 
i. n and whose out and they co-operated a lot, but actually it affects our life and 
our work a lot - we can't go here, we can't go there. 
Liz: Can you travel freely here in Europe? 
Mal: Here, with my residence permit I can. Otherwise, if I was in Lebanon, for 
example and I needed to come to Europe for whatever reason, I would need to 
go to the embassy every day and it would be very difficult, you would need to 
prove that as a refugee you're not looking to move to the country permanently 
and so on. 
Bilal's situation in Greece, like all those without Greek citizenship, is precarious 
at times. For Palestinians displaced in 1948, it is especially so, as there may not 
be anywhere else for them to go to easily. Those without a Palestinian 'identity 
card' and without citizenship from a Western country are especially hard hit by 
this lack of alternative places to live. They appear to live where they can as best 
they can. Even within families, citizenship statuses can be confusing, and this, as 
Ahmed (34, FCE) and his wife, Maha (29, housewife) explain below, can be an 
issue not only for them, but for their children as well: 
Ahmed: I carry a Syrian passport. It was granted to my dad by a general who 
became the president of Syria and he granted very few of them, so he's carrying 
a Syrian passport, my son, but he knows that he is not Syrian, you know he asked 
me, how come I have a Syrian passport when you say I am Palestinian. 
Sometimes youfeel it must be sofrustratingfor him 
Maha: And confusing. 
Ahmed: He cannot understand, it's very difficult and we both say that we are 
Palestinian. 
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Liz: This is something that Palestinian children have to deal with from an early 
age, unlike other children, I suppose 
Maha: Yes, andfor them it's always strange. 
In Egypt, Palestinians have also been given travel documents, that has 
also meant mobility restrictions and difficulties, which seem to have followed 
them to Greece. 7 Jamal's testimony (Appendix Two) provides a good example of 
this, as it illustrates the very complex and problematic situations such 
Palestinians can find themselves in as a result of their status. These Palestinians 
(such as those whose families fled to Lebanon) are not allowed to enter Israel or 
the West Bank and Gaza, conditions many find particularly unfair. Their future 
situation is also precarious; as already noted, it is yet unclear whether diasporic 
Palestinians not originally from the West Bank and Gaza (as well as those from 
these areas originally who have moved away) will be allowed Palestinian 
citizenship in an eventual Palestinian state. This issue is one that Palestinians in 
diaspora in Athens have started thinking about, but no easy solutions appear to 
be in sight and it constitutes a very emotive and frustrating issue. Jamal (34, 
FCE) discusses his own feelings on the matter (see also Appendix Two): 
Liz: And if a Palestinian state is created, will Palestinians such as yourself in the 
diaspora have the right to go and live there if you want to? 
Jamal: This is under negotiation. How can they have the right to say and decide 
whether I am Palestinian or not? This means they can take your rights and, 
therefore, your hope, away from you; somebody is doing your negotiation on 
your behalf and they will pay you money. "at is this? no has the right and 
the idea to do this? And nobody can claim that it [the land] is not ours. But the 
Israelis have the American support. They insist that we have to gi . ve away the 
right of return and what I am afraid of is that our authorities will accept this and 
this time I don't know what will happen because I can't imagine what will 
7 For more information on the situation of Palestinians in Egypt see Yasin 
(1999). 
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happen to me if they claim that I am not Palestinian. So what kind of 
compensation can they give to me and by whom? 
The ability of Palestinians to enter and reside in Greece also illustrates 
the issues surrounding mobility, legal status and feelings of insecurity (and 
injustice) as a result. Many Palestinians (men, in particular) came as students, as 
this appears to have been a relatively easy way for them to enter. As Layla (38, 
FCE) explains: 
Greece was the only country that would accept me ... my parents were told at the 
time by friends that it was very easy to get a student visa to come to Greece, so 
we went to the Greek Embassy in Abu Dhabi where we were living at the time 
and they gave me a student visa for 3 months and they gave my mother a 
visitor's visa. 
Indeed, some interviewees claim that they pretended to be students in order to 
enter and then found jobs after they had done so. All Palestinians who are not 
Greek citizens need to have a work and residence permit to live and work in 
Greece. There appear to be contradicting accounts of how easy it is to both 
obtain these and to renew them. Some say they have encountered no difficulties 
at all or even that they are favoured or helped whenever they have anything to do 
with Greek officials. Others have more difficulties and it is not clear why this 
may be occurring. A possible explanation may be the level of contacts and skills 
of persuasion individual Palestinians have in terms of their networks with people 
who may be in a position to help them, such as embassy or Greek official 
employees. 
Foreign companies in Greece that are allowed to employ non-Greek 
nationals also provide ease of mobility and residency for their Palestinian 
employees. These Palestinians, such as Bilal (33, FCE) usually get their work 
and residence permit through the company: 
Liz: So it helps you to be part of the company you work for in terms of 
travelling? 
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Mal: Yes and I am happy that I am workingfor the company because otherwise 
1. t would be very difficult and I am getting a chance that veryfew people getfrom 
my area. I am lucky. I am a professional in my work but I have also had good 
luck. 
Residency is not something that they have to deal with, although some noted that 
these companies are having difficulties renewing their permits: 
Liz: Have you ever had any problems renewing it? 
Mal: Actually, there is a problem but I don't know much about it because the 
company usually takes care of these things - this is what they do. For example, 
once for two, three, four months, I didn't take the risk travelling out of Greece 
because I wasn't sure whether they would let me return. 
Bilal highlights how beneficial such companies are for Palestinians in terms of 
residency and standard of living. At the same time, he demonstrates their 
vulnerability and dependence on their jobs for residency (and often the ability to 
travel more fTeely). As a result, many Palestinians in Athens who work for such 
companies feel they are lucky and are thankful that they are able to live and work 
in Greece. 
All Palestinians without Greek (or other Western country) citizenship 
status are plagued by feelings of insecurity, despite the fact that many appear to 
quite like living in Greece. Residency issues also appear to be becoming more 
problematic for them in Greece and as Layla (38, FCE) says: "we are at the 
mercy of Greek law; if it changes, we are lost". Lina (38, businesswoman) also 
points out: 
Lina: Now, that I have the Greek passport, I am okay, but before it was a big 
problem. 
Liz: I've heard that it's difficult. 
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Lina: Yes, the Arabs - let's talk about the people ftom Palestine, Lebanon, 
Jordan, Syria - these Arabs they never take residence permit unless they are 
students orfrom Law '89 companies ... otherwise there's no way on earth to get 
the residence. 
Lina is lucky; students and workers are well aware of the dally realities of 
obtaining and renewing residence pen-nits, such as queuing and waiting outside 
Ministries. Karim (24, student) explains his situation: 
Karim: Well, I have a problem now with my residence. 
Liz: Oh, what sort of problem? 
Karim: I had to collect all these papers - to say that I am a student, that I get a 
scholarship and that I am not in trouble with the police, which I did, and I gave 
them in on the 22 nd December 2002. You have to give in all these papers to get a 
residence permit and I had to wait hours in line, 8 hours I had to wait, but still 
they haven't given me my residence permit which I am supposed to have and 
which I should be given. I don't understand why they have not given it to me. 
Liz: Are any of the other students experiencing the same problem? 
Karim: Yes, all of them. 
Liz: Can't the embassy do anything? 
Kanm: No, they said they can't - theres nothing they can do. It's a matterfor 
the Greek authorities. So now Ijust have this paper that says when I appliedfor 
a residence permit and that shows that I am waiting to get one and this is what I 
have to show the police when they stop me. (He shows it to me) 
Liz: So have you been stopped many times by the police? 
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Kanm: Quite afew times. 
Liz: Do they make things difficult for you? 
Karim: No, not really. I just show them this paper, but you know I do feel 
insecure without the residence permit. And I had to pay 14 7 euros as well when 
I applied but I still haven't received anything. 
Residency and mobility issues highlight and are a good example of the 
difficulties and injustices many Palestinians feel they have to endure as a result 
of their often confusing and complex formal status and the fact that they do not 
have fonnal citizenship in Greece. Although all non-European 'foreign' residents 
in Greece may have difficulties with residency, problems surrounding ease of 
movement and Right of Return are particularly acute for those in exile or 
displaced such as refugees, and especially for those such as the Palestinians, 
without an official state to belong orreturn to. As Said (1986: 52) stresses: 
Although to Palestinians today the word awdah ('return ) is crucial 
and stands at the very heart of our political quest for seýf- 
determination, to some it means return to a Palestinian state 
alongside Israel, yet to others it means a return to all ofPalestine. 
The realities and perceptions of insecurities, injustice and suffering (in 
which the issues outlined above result) are crucial aspects of the need to belong 
to an official Palestinian state, which would protect their rights and provide 
benefits to them as Palestinian citizens. These include ease of mobility and 
political representation and participation, such as voting. As Sana (34, 
housewife) states, "Palestinians outside Palestine are often left with nothing, 
nothing formal, no citizenship ... if you can't travel as a result or 
do the things 
you want to do, you will say why me? It's not fair". Haleef (55, embassy 
official) also highlights the feelings of persecution and discrimination 
Palestinians feel subject to that extend beyond their own personal experiences. 
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At the same time, these feelings serve to strengthen their resolve to deal with the 
injustices they feel they are facing: 
So, let's say you see a successful, a great doctor at a conference and his 
hospital, the Greek government chooses him to go to represent Greece. Now 
listen, because he hasn't got Greek citizenship and he can't go, he gets rejected 
as a candidate because he is Palestinian and he can't get a visa immediately. He 
has to wait a month before he gets an answerfrom the Americans, before he can 
get a visa. This is unfair. This, inside you, it doesn't make you become a bad 
person because you have reached a level where you know who you are and 
people accept you. You know, you got recommended, not someone else. They 
didn't have a problem with you going (I'm talking about the example of the 
doctor). They didn't look at You with hate because it was you going to this 
conference. In reality, this gives you strength. I don't mean physical strength. 
This strength is related to your soul and how much you are able to endure, even 
when you're talking to the American who won't give you a visa. You're still the 
one that's winning; you'll come out on top even ifyou're not given a visa. This 
attitude of not wanting to show who you are is not something you can learn as a 
lesson. It's something you're born with. As you become more educated and your 
level of education rises, the more you become correct and skilled in dealing with 
and solving your own problems. 
Such stories and realities serve to remind Palestinians of the importance of 
formal citizenship status and rights, as well as the significance of knowledge and 
education to help deal with the problems they will potentially face because they 
are Palestinian. Although there are material impacts as a result of the lack of (or 
confusing) formal citizenship status from a Western country, such as Greece, the 
strength that Haleef mentions also demonstrates how citizenship and what it 
stands for can have positive repercussions as well. 
Both Haleef and Sana (referred to above) have defined citizenship 
statuses; Haleef is a Greek citizen and Sana is Jordanian. Such status affords 
more security and ease in terms of mobility and Sana and Haleef do not feel 
overly vulnerable or discriminated against, personally. This, however, does not 
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stop them from highlighting, knowing and being angered or upset by the 
injustices and suffering they feel Palestinians as a people have to endure. Such 
highlighting and knowledge of suffering can also be seen as politicised acts of 
advocacy as a consequence of their own exile and displacement. Perceptions of 
suffering and injustice are crucial to constructions of the importance of 
citizenship and statehood. These are depicted by the majority of Palestinians in 
Athens regardless of citizenship status. At the same time, they understand the 
political need to link ftiture statehood with a defined Palestinian 'identity' and 
this has played a major role in their articulations of citizenship despite any 
personal feelings of ambivalence they may have. 
Lindholm Schulz (2003: 88) explains Palestinian understandings of 
formal citizenship and its relationships to (or coupling with) 'national identity' in 
the following way: "the Palestinians are constantly faced with suspicion, 
harassment and exclusion because they cannot prove a national identity, a 
citizenship legally inscribed in their passports". Yet, as has already been noted, 
she also claims that "the condition of being Palestinian ... is to move" (ibid.: 87). 
This may help explain why Palestinians feel so insecure and why they are 
continuing to persevere and resist; they cannot help the fact that they have to 
move around but at the same time, this breeds vulnerability and a desire for 
security and stability which many Palestinians feel only a Palestinian state can 
provide. This, as discussed, is because the state is seen as the provider of the 
rights and protection that people perceive they need to feel secure. Movement 
and travelling is for them, more often than not, far from easy, yet they often have 
no choice but to move because of their statelessness. This is a reminder of the 
need to ground accounts and theories of movement and mobility. Despite the 
importance and symbolic attraction of the transgressing of borders, the realities 
of travelling and living 'on the move' may be problematic and far from 
empowering for those involved-8 
8A recent issue of Identities (2004) highlights the complexities surrounding the material mobility 
and immobility of people at borders, stressing the need to take into account and explore the 
realities of power relations, opportunities as well as hindrances posed by institutional systems 
and states. 
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Suffering, representation and 'national idenfity: 
The cross-border connections that link Palestinians in Athens to the situation in 
Palestine, and the constant relaying of information from Palestine to Greece 
through the mass media and telecommunications, has ensured that most 
Palestinians in Athens are well aware of current events and problems both in 
Palestine-Israel and in the Middle East. 9 This has manifested itself into popular 
images of Palestinian suffering and above all, injustice and discrimination that, 
in turn,, influences perceptions of the need for formal citizenship, statehood and 
belonging. Palestinians in Athens appear to have a catalogue of injustices, about 
which they know a great deal. For some, like Lina, (38, businesswoman) this 
anguish also turns into anger, indignation and frustration at the injustices they 
perceive Palestinians are undergoing. Lina's testimony (Appendix Three) 
exemplifies the despair and sadness many Palestinians in Athens feel. She, like 
many others have numerous stories of suffering that they have heard through 
personal and media accounts. During the discussion (part of which is provided 
below), Lina becomes very emotional and starts to cry, which illustrates that 
these are often very difficult issues psychologically for Palestinians to deal with: 
I knew this girl; she was afriend of mine. She lived in Ramallah; she was 38 and 
suddenly they discovered that she had cancer and herfather wanted to send her 
for chemotherapy and it was the time last year in March, they had troubles in 
Ramallah, so she couldn't reach the hospital and she was suffering because she 
needed surgery. Anyway, she died 2 months after, so you see, the human being in 
Palestine has no human rights, nothing, nothing (starts crying). 
Lina's testimony also shows the intimate relationships between personal and 
media accounts in people's perceptions, the coming together of 'here' and 'there' 
and the difficult disjointed amalgamation of colonial and postcolonial worlds. 
Feelings of what could be called 'collective suffering', which go hand in hand 
with perceptions of 'collective memories' and 'shared consciousness' 
(as 
discussed in Chapter Five) form part of dynamic constructions of what it means 
These cross-border connections are discussed in Chapters Two and Four. 
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to be Palestinian living in Athens but also connected to 'there'. Such images and 
perceptions of injustice and suffering, therefore, have a large role to play in 
constructions and realities of Palestinians as persecuted, marginallsed and as 
victims of a situation that needs to be resolved. Media representations are often 
seen by Palestinians in Athens as not only a source of injustice but also as a 
means to advocate their cause and, therefore, to create what they see as changes 
for the better. This may be because, as mainly non-citizens, they do not have 
many fon-nal channels they can follow to ensure that what they feel is fair 
political representation of their rights and problems. Arafat was the closest 
symbolic leader whom non-Palestinians assumed represented Palestinian 
interests. In the years before his death, however, support for him appears to have 
decreased amongst some Palestinians in Athens, as accounts of Palestinian 
Authority corruption have increased. 
The majority of diasporic Palestinians interviewed feel that they do not 
have a political voice with which to speak and be heard, either in Greece, 
Palestine, or globally. This research also suggests that many Palestinians in 
Athens feel that they are not being adequately represented politically and that 
there is insufficient organisation around this issue. This appears to be because 
many Palestinians in Athens do not possess formal citizenship, which excludes 
them from the official public political arena. Even those with Palestinian 
'identity cards' feel isolated and find it hard to have their voices heard 'there'. 
As Said (1986: 158) stresses: "there are very few of us who can avoid the fate of 
every Palestinian, which is to be both there, and yet not to be accounted for 
politically". For Palestinians in Athens, representation is, therefore, an issue at 
the forefront of many of their debates and often a dilemma, as it is linked to ideas 
of democracy and political participation. Fair representation can be seen as a 
major aspect of citizen rights within a democratic state. For Palestinians who are 
effectively stateless, political representation is arguably perceived as even more 
crucial because they may feel more isolated and excluded as they 
do not have 
access to formal channels of representation, such as voting. 
Many Palestinians are restricted and frustrated by their inability to vote 
'there' and their wish to see a Palestinian state is linked to their need to 
be able 
to potentially participate as Palestinian citizens within such a state in 
the future. 
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It is important to stress that these issues often provoke intense reactions of 
injustice, which seem to merge into general feelings of suffering and difference. 
For example, in response to a question on not being able to vote, Rafat (48, FCE 
and PLO representative in Athens) says: 
All these details, not being able to vote reminds you that you are different, that 
you don't have the same rights as everyone else ... you are always reminded ... that 
you are not trulyfree, so that you cannot vote, that is just one part of everything, 
ofpeople here at Easter going to their villages to see theirfamilies. I'm jealous, 
that they can eat all together. All these things remind us that we're different. 
Another problem in terms of representation that is frequently noted is the 
potential for disagreement and disunity amongst Palestinians in Athens,, 
especially within political beliefs and solutions for the future. As Tamara (32, 
researcher) points out in response to a question on whether she feels all major 
Palestinian political organisations are represented in Greece: 
Yes, you can find Al - Fatah, the Popular Front, The Democratic Front and 
Hamas, but it is hard to have a say whatever your ideology because we are not a 
country so there are no formal places here where you can go and be heard 
politically. If it was then we could. We are all in-between really in this respect, 
because we have organisations and networks but they can never be fully 
functional because we are not a proper country. The embassy in its capacity is 
supposed to represent all the Palestinians here but the people there are PLO or 
PNA and some people do feel that these organisations don't represent them, but 
there is not much they can do about this now really is there? 
Many interviewees feel that they should be in charge of representing 
themselves and that they can and should be allowed to sort things out on their 
own. As Lina (38, businesswoman) argues: 
Leave us alone; let us make the revolution. Let us sort out our political 
problems, our social problems; you take care of your problems. 
I'm not saying 
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we have the best leaders, we don't but they are not criminals. I mean we prefer 
them to anybody else. 
Currently, such notions of control and self-representation seem to be more of an 
ideal than a reality. Political representation is a difficult and problematic issue. 
As the majority of Palestinians in Athens are (classed' as foreigners, they have 
few official rights in Greece, as the two quotes below illustrate: 
"at can we do? We are not Greek citizens, so we cannot influence the Greek 
government or politics. We are helpless here as foreigners; we cannot vote or 
get involved in politics. All we can do is tell people about the situation. The only 
thing we can to is introduce and talk about our cause to others; this is very 
important. (Majid, 36, FCE) 
The only thing that we can do, as Palestinians who live outside and who have 
never been there is to let the people know that truth about our history, because 
we have a history and we're not terrorists. On the contrary, we are the victims, 
we are the people who are getting killed, we are the people who are in pain. 
, ný (Lina, 38, businesswomai. 1 
As outlined above, the majority of ordinary Palestinians living in Athens have no 
rights in Palestine; their voices cannot necessarily be heard there unless they are 
involved in official circles. Therefore, even having the formal citizenship status 
of any other country also does not help them much in terms of physical ability to 
participate 'there', even though it gives them more security, peace of mind and 
more options for the ftiture, as well as the right to potential political 
participation. It is however, in a Palestinian state that most would rather 
participate in politically. Many Palestinians in Athens feel abandoned by the 
political processes currently in place in the West Bank and Gaza. Feeling 
Palestinian is clearly not enough to guarantee official representation and political 
participation: 
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Liz: Do you feel that it's problematic that you don't have many means available 
to you to have a say in what's going on there politically? 
Faeq: Yes, here we don't have the means or the opportunity to affect what's 
going on there or to influence the situation. Here we have contact with NGOs 
that are based there. We support them and they are neutral. Theyjust see the 
problem as it is. They arejust concerned with helpingpeople, which is what they 
should be doing. For example, there is an NGO that is concerned with replanting 
uprooted trees and another helping people whose houses have been demolished. 
They are all humanitarian organisations. But thefact that we cannot vote is a 
problem. They don't care about Palestinians living outside Palestine and it is a 
big problem. The PNA doesn't take into account the Palestinians who live 
abroad of which there are so many. I think now the PNA is starting to realise 
how important we are. (Faeq, 45, FCE) 
One discussion with a married couple (Appendix Four), Ahmed (34, FCE) and 
Maha, (29, housewife) illustrates succinctly the complex issues surrounding 
cunity', representation and participation (as well as the spatial and temporal 
issues involved). Neither respondent has Greek citizenship; Ahmed has Syrian 
travel documents and Maha has a Palestinian 'Identity card'. They discuss how 
they feel representation for Palestinians in diaspora has changed over the years. 
They believe that it is currently very difficult for Palestinians in diaspora such as 
themselves to have their voices officially heard in Palestine and to be adequately 
represented there. Ahmed feels that: "It's difficult for the Palestinians. Now with 
this current situation, I don't think our opinions would be heard - it's very 
difficult for us". Later, he adds: "like with this Geneva thing, let's say we don't 
like it, how do we let our voice reach, or be heard? "10 They point to what they 
call the "dissolving" of the PLO by the Israelis and the Americans, whom they 
see as trying to weaken Palestinian 'unity'. At the same time, it is also clear that 
10 Ahmed is referring to the Geneva Accord of October 2003, which was an attempt to resolve 
the situation in Palestine/Israel (see www. palestinecenter. org/cpap/documents/geneva. html 
for 
details of it). 
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they are actively debating and negotiating the Palestinian political situationI 
which they see as complicated and dynamic. 
Maha feels that they and Palestinian refugees 'outside' have to depend on 
Palestinians 'inside', as she puts it in order to resist. She feels it is up to them, as 
they currently live there and she appears to have faith in their decisions. Ahmed, 
however , is not so sure, pointing out that more Palestinians 
live in diaspora. 
Although he appears disillusioned in terms of Palestinian representation, he also 
seems resigned to the fact that as they and others such as refugees are limited by 
their physical separation and their lack of adequate representation and that they 
must depend to a large extent on groups within Palestine to speak on their behalf 
The ma . ority of respondents are extremely aware of what it means to be a j 
citizen of a defined state, in terms of rights and duties (as well as of 
constructions of Palestinian 'identity'). As Mahmud (24, student) stresses for 
example, "the most significant thing for us is to have a solution to the issue of a 
country, for a country to exist to feel that you have the rights that every person 
has and is entitled to". It is this hope of the positive aspects of the rights and 
benefits associated with citizenship, statehood and democracy that often spurs 
their feelings and perceptions for change, for their own personal lives, but more 
importantly, for Palestinians as a nation of people and in paiticular, those who 
are living in the West Bank and Gaza. The Palestinian cause can be seen as being 
advocated mainly as a means to create a Palestinian state for these reasons. The 
associations between citizenship, statehood and 'national identity' can be seen by 
the political advocacy of a 'Palestinian state for the Palestinian people' as 
articulated by many participants and can also be seen in Palestinian visions of 
their future state, outlined below. 
Many participants, generally speaking, would like to see a return to pre- 
1948 Palestine (or historical Palestine). This is seen as the 'original' or 
'authentic' Palestine and would, therefore, constitute a return to a 'proper' or 
desirable relationship between 'national identity' and territory, in other words 
that Palestinians should live in a country called Palestine based on its historical 
territory. The idea of historical Palestine appears to remain as a nostalgic, 
symbolic and powerful notion of what has been lost and what needs 
to be 
regained; namely a state for the Palestinian people to call their own, where 
they 
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can be citizens, vote, have political rights and so forth. Some of these 
Palestinians argue, as Layla (38, FCE) does, that the "Jews should go back where 
they came from", because "they have not always lived there". This argument 
appears to be based on the idea of self-determination,, which proposes that each 
nation of people can have and are entitled to their own nation-state. For 
Palestinians ascribing to these views, the notion of citizenship appears to be one 
of I jus sanguinis', or membership based on ties of blood and "ethnicity'. It also 
appears to be based on exclusive notions of nationhood, where Israelis or Jews 
would perhaps be unwelcome, or if they did stay would have to do so within a 
Palestinian, not Israeli state. It may be easier for those Palestinians who feel 
comfortable and safe in diaspora in the West to nostalgically reminisce and 
imagine such an independent Palestinian state than those living in the West Bank 
and Gaza and in refugee camps there and around the Middle East. 
Haleef (see Appendix Five), an embassy official, who believes in an 
eventual return to pre-1948 Palestine, is indicative of the thought processes and 
dilemmas, as well as anger and frustration Palestinians in Athens often have to 
deal with in terms of injustice and suffering: 
I can't make my child commit... to a solution now, that we've sorted it out and 
that You can forget that you had a house in Tel Aviv. I can't tell them this 
Elizabeth. I don't have the right. I have to make sure thatfuture generations of 
children have the opportunity and have the right in thefuture when conditions 
may be different or the situation will change to say to the Israelis, gentlemen you 
were strong then, you took our houses, you made us sign a paper that said that 
this is the Palestinian land that we are entitled to, to say no this is not 
acceptable. Just like you and in the same ways, using violence and dominance, 
that you took itfrom me, I will take itfrom you. I don't have the right to sign on 
beha4f of the refugees who live today in the refugee camps of Lebanon inside a 
house the size of this room, to people who have been waiting 50 years for this 
issue to be resolved. I can't say to them forget about it, forget about going back. 
We have to be patient. I'M going to sign to create the sort of state they are 
suggesting now to put my mind at rest, so that this situation can end? 
No, 
because it's notfairfor them. 
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Some Palestinians also feel that although they accept that Israel is 'here to stay', 
they would ideally like to see a return to pre-1948 Palestine. They do, however, 
accept that this is not possible. They are prepared to accept a Palestinian state of 
sorts, based on Palestinian land in the West Bank and Gaza (although some do 
see this as a stepping stone to eventual pre-1948 conditions), as a two-state 
solution. As Sa'id (25, student) states: 
If we get the land of '67, we can at least put down the foundations and establish 
ourselves for the future in order to have a strong economy, companies, people 
can go back and provide for their country and their country can provide for 
them. Good strong foundations for the future so that no one can take us away 
from there again and as soon as we're established there, God knows. 
Sa'id's position is one of practical steps to solve the current situation; for him 
and many others in Greece, a state based on 1967 borders is not desirable but 
merely realistic given the present state of affairs. 
The diasporic stressing of the need for a Palestinian state is politically, 
culturally and socially infused. For Palestinians in Athens, the need to belong to 
a defined country in order to feel 'at home' and be around people with similar 
constructions of 'shared consciousness' is extremely strong. At the same time, 
the injustices and suffering they believe they and their fellow Palestinians 
undergo as a direct result of not having such as a state appear to form a firm 
basis for the political advocacy of self-determination and statehood. As a result, 
the coupling of 'national identity' and citizenship can be seen. However, some 
Palestinians in Athens have acquired (or are in the process of acquiring) fori-nal 
citizenship status; this highlights the need to also take the decoupling of 
citizenship and 'national identity' into account. 
Palestinian acquisition of formal citizenship: the decoupling of citizenship 
and 'national identity' 
The acquisition of Greek citizenship raises questions about the decoupling of 
Palestinian 'identity' from explicitly Palestinian citizenship. Palestinians in 
Athens attach great importance to the acquisition of citizenship from Western 
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countries such as Greece as they feel such passports afford more protection and 
security. As Lindholm Schulz (2003: 188) points out: "what appears to be 
significant to Palestinians living in Western countries is the sense of security 
provided by the passport and by the political system". A passport proves official 
and legal belonging to those who are stateless and who often have little means of 
political participation. Therefore, those Palestinians in Athens with a defined 
citizenship status, such as Jordanian, or Greek (the two which appear to be the 
most common) seem to feel less marginalised and discriminated against and 
more secure (financially and psychologically) and more mobile. Such positive 
repercussions of legal citizenship status also fuel Palestinian belief in the 
importance of the acquisition of formal citizenship, particularly of Western 
countries. 
Out of those Palestinians who have Greek citizenship status, many are 
married or have been married to Greeks and they seem to be settled in Greece 
(although for many the acquisition of Greek citizenship appears this has been out 
of necessity not choice and has been their only or best option). It is often very 
hard to obtain Greek citizenship and commitment in doing so is vital, as it takes 
ten years of residency before they can apply and even when they do, it appears to 
be a very long, complicated and drawn out process. It is also expensive, 
especially if one pays one's way to quicken the process, as some Palestinians 
appear to have done. Abdul (28, casual office worker) highlights the cost and the 
difficulties of obtaining Greek citizenship: 
It would be good to have a Greek passport, but you have to pay about ha4f a 
million just to apply and they ask you so many ridiculous things during the 
application process and you have to prove that you've been here at least 10 
years, I think. It's difficult. And you have to be employed, I think. 
Despite such difficulties, there are Palestinians with money and connections who 
seem to find it easier to get what they want if they know people 'in the right 
places'. As Khalid (43, self-employed garage owner) reveals: "it only took me 
three years, because I know someone. Others wait 10 years". One Palestinian 
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also pointed out when I asked him how easy it was for him to get citizenship, "'If 
you know people here, anything is possible" (Nabil, 37, engineer). 
Layla's (38, FCE) story also illustrates the role of having the right 
'connections', obtaining Greek citizenship as well as the strange and difficult 
position people can be put in as a result of their citizenship status: 
Let me tell you the story of my son - how we got his passport. I am Palestinian 
with the Lebanese travel documents. My ex-husband, he's Palestinian with 
Syrian travel documents. I don't have the right to give my son the Lebanese 
travel documents. I mean I can't put his name on my passport. Also my ex- 
husband, he lost his civil rights in Syria, because he was against the government 
so he had the Yemeni passport. These passports were given to the PLO as 
presents to make life easier for these people in the PLO but they were not 
allowed to give them to their children or theirfamily so as you can understand, 
the conclusion of this was that my son was without a nationalqy. 
Liz: Where was he bom? 
Layla: Here in Athens; this was what helped us so one of ourfriends said, you 
know guys I had a similar problem with my son and my daughter; he was with 
the PLO too, so we said please tell us what to do because our son has no papers 
to say who he is, so he said we can go and applyfor Greek nationality because 
he can't get yours and he can't get his fathers but he was born in Athens and 
something in the Greek law says that if a person was born in Greece and he 
can't get either his mother's or his father's nationality, so he can get a Greek 
nationality, so this is what happened. It was very difficultfor mefor 2 and haýf 
years until he got it; it was a nightmarefor me. Sofor 2 and ha4fyears I couldn't 
travel, I couldn't go anywhere; he had no papers, just the birth certificate. But 
all this happened, and now I'M really happy that this happened because he got a 
goodpassport; he can go and do whatever he wants; it's goodfor hisfuture. 
Layla also illustrates how such acquisition of citizenship can have financial 
benefits: 
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Layla: Even though I get paid less than my male colleagues because I am a 
woman, my job is better than nothing and I am a single mother, I have to pqv 
everything myse4f 
Liz: You've never looked for anything else? 
Layla: It's difficult, because of the residence permit. I've heard that so many 
times, that it's not easy to find a Greek company to payfor your work permi . t; at 
the foreign company I workfor they do it because it's a Law '89 company and 
they have so manyJacilitiesfOr us, to help. Maybe ifI get the Greek nationality, I 
think I will most probably look for another job... but I have no choice. nen I 
get the Greek nationality, maybe I'll go back to live with my parents because I'm 
also so tired of being on my own, doing everything by myseýf, it's so difficult... 
So, if I am able to find a good offer in Abu Dhabi I will go and live with my 
parents. 
Liz: But you can't go now? 
Layla: If I go now, maybe I can maybe I can't, I haven't looked in to the 
possibility. As a European, I will gain triple the money. 
Liz: Really? 
Layla: If Igo as a Palestinian - my brother, he is married, he works there. He's 
a human resource manager. If he works with his Palestinian travel document, he 
would gain 3 or 4,000 but with his Canadian nationality he earns about 13,000 
just because he's Canadian, it's ridiculous. He said to me, please don't come 
back until you take the Greek nationality, because otherwise you will not live 
like us and ou will live like you live in Greece, with little mone . 
With our yY 
names, our nationality, we cannot live a good lifestyle. 
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Layla's account also highlights the important issue of gender within the 
Palestinian diaspora as well as within the workplace of such companies. " 
Although an in-depth analysis of this is beyond the scope of this thesis, there is a 
need to understand the particular ways in which women are affected by and 
perceive citizenship and political participation. 12 
Even Palestinians with Greek citizenship appear to encounter difficulties 
and find it hard to travel. Tanq (60, doctor), who has been politically active in 
the past, explains: 
It was hard to go across the borders - they wouldn't let us. This was before Igot 
Greek citizenship and even now when I went the last time, I still had problems at 
the borders, because we were heldfor 2 hours while they interrogated us. 
Liz: Even though you had Greek citizenship? 
Tanq: Yes, that didn't make any difference; all that matters is that you are 
Palestinian. 
Liz: How often do you go back to Jordan and Jerusalem? 
Tariq: To Jordan, Igo every year. To Palestine - we are not allowed to go. 
Tariq outlines his perception of always feeling 'different' because he is 
Palestinian as a result of the problems he has had travelling. His Palestinian 
name is both a source of pride and problems for him and only a Palestinian state 
is seen as a solution to such persecution and marginalisation. 
The acquisition of citizenship from Western countries increases 
Palestinian access to Israel/Palestine, an issue many Palestinians in Athens find 
crucial. Many want to be able to go back, either to visit or to live and for many 
" This illustrates the need to explore and understand the specific, gendered experiences of 
diaspora and exile - for example, see Ghada Karmi's autobiography (2002), Blunt (2005) and 
Buijs (ed. 1993). The gendered nature of diasporic spaces, such as the home, is touched upon in 
Chapter Seven. 
12 See, for example, McEwan (2000,2005); Lister (1997); Staeheli and Cope (1994). 
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this is an active strategy that is relentlessly pursued, however long it may take. 
As Ibrahim (32, construction worker) explains: "We cannot go there; it's 
difficult for us to go, that's why we need to get Greek citizenship - so that we 
can go there") . 
13 Even if they do not get to see a Palestinian state in their lifetime, ) 
the chance to visit either or both historical Palestine and the West Bank and Gaza 
is often an important force behind the acquisition of Western country citizenship. 
This is especially the case for those Palestinians who actively imagine 
themselves returning on a more permanent basis, although as already mentioned, 
it is unclear whether they would actually be able to settle in a ftiture Palestinian 
state. Even those Palestinians with Greek citizenship in Athens, such as Tanq, 
who are more settled in Athens strongly believe in the salience of self- 
determination and statehood, despite the fact that they do not see themselves 
returning to live in a future Palestinian state. For them, it is the principles 
surrounding the cause that matter. Sa'id (25, student, see also Appendix Six) 
illustrates the complexity of the issues surrounding the acquisition of citizenship 
very well. He points out institutional barriers and opportunities to citizenship 
strategies carried out in order to improve Palestinian lives: 
So, they [Palestinians] go to these [Westem] countries, they say they're going to 
stay 3 years. If they have problems with the Israeli government, prosecution or 
anything, they know that when they leave that they cannot go back to see their 
family with the Palestinian passport they have. So then they askfor asylum and 
as soon as they get the citizenship they go back. " 
Palestinians who have lived in or have come from Jordan and have 
Jordanian citizenship do not necessarily find it any easier to enter Israel or 
Palestine. 14 As Sa'id, who has Jordanian citizenship, points out: "I'm not 
13 For those Palestinians involved in current or former political activities, the situation is much 
more difficult. As Tariq's case above illustrates, Greek citizenship is no 
help for these 
Palestinians. For them, the need for a Palestinian state into which they are allowed to enter may 
be even greater. 
14 Palestinians make up around 70% of the Jordanian population. Even though Palestinians who 
fled there were granted Jordanian citizenship, there are differences in opinion as to whether or 
not they are perceived as second class citizens or not (for more on this, see 
Karmi and Cotran 
1999). There are Palestinians in the West Bank who also have Jordanian citizenship, given 
to 
them when Jordan was in control of the West Bank before 1967. 
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allowed to go. I have to get another citizenship in order to go. " His personal 
strategy to overcome this is studying political science to become a diplomat, in 
which case he believes "the Israelis won't be able to touch me". It is of course, 
very ironic that many Palestinians appear to need Western state citizenship 
before they are allowed to enter their homeland and this is something that many 
Palestinians in Athens seem to find unfair. 
The acquisition of forinal citizenship from a Western country can also 
help Palestinians feel politicised, empowered and able to participate politically. 
Mustafa (42, unemployed) notes how his Palestinian friends with Greek 
citizenship are in a better position to participate politically than he is as a non- 
Greek: 
Of course I would like to be involved here politically. I am politicised and 
politically minded and as I said in the future I may go back and I would 
participate politically there but now I can't really living here. I would like to 
participate like I see my Greekfriends doing and of course I think there are quite 
a few Palestinians who have Greek citizenship who have run for Parliament and 
others who are in the Mayors Office, so it is possible, but they have Greek 
nationality and I don't. 
As Mustafa says, a few Palestinians with Greek citizenship have become 
politicians and mayors but their role appears to be far from straightforward and 
potentially even more delicate. Although they arguably have the most power 
politically to effect change, they are undoubtedly caught between the intricacies 
and debates within local Greek politics and their constructions of 'Palestinian- 
ness . 
As Greek nationals in public positions they have to show their 
commitment to Greece and some, therefore, may have changed their 
Palestinian 
political commitment in favour of political advancement in 
Greece. In the 
process, however, the fact that they are of Palestinian origin may inadvertently or 
subtly bring the political and material issues surrounding the Palestinian cause 
to 
a wider Greek audience. 
Acquinng the citizenship of a westem country can make Palestinians 
who are not involved in the formal political sphere feel more able to participate 
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politically, advocate the cause and facilitate their potential return to Palestine or 
the Middle East. Fadila (30, housewife) describes how her Canadian citizenship 
helped her and husband Majid feel more organised and politically active when 
they lived there, compared to Greece: "we felt we were helping more in Canada 
and it is easier there because things are more organised and we are Canadian 
citizens so at least you have the potential to get involved and influence politics". 
She also feels their citizenship may help them return to Palestine: 
It is easier with our Canadian citizenship to return and you know we were 
thinking last year of going to the West Bank or Gaza, so that we could be on 
Palestinian land, at least, even if it's not exactly where we're from - this 
wouldn't bother us, but at the moment the situation is very difficult there. 
They both still feel Palestinian despite their Canadian citizenship. Majid (36, 
FCE) explains: 
We have never lived in Palestine, but it is where we arefrom ... we will always be 
Palestinian 
... if you were Greek, lets say and you went to live in France, for 
example and you even got French citizenship, you would still feel Greek 
wouldn't you. You wouldn'tfeel French, like the Greeks who live abroad - they 
stillfeel Greek don't they? 
For Palestinians in Athens, such strategies of citizenship acquisition 
appear to be decoupling relationships between (Greek, Canadian or Jordanian, 
for example) citizenship and (Palestinian) 'identity'. In other words, many 
Palestinians interviewed still feel Palestinian regardless of their formal 
citizenship status. As Jamal (34, FCE) points out in response to a question on 
where he feels he belongs: 
I don't want to give up my belonging, that I am Palestinian. I love my country; I 
love being Palestinian. I love my homeland. This is something I cannot give up. 
If they would give me any nationality or any kind of compensation I would not 
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give it away because it's notfor sale; it cannot be changed. It's a human right to 
feel that you belong to someplace. 
Jamal also illustrates the important intimate relationships between homeland, 
belonging, 'national identity' citizenship and ftiture statehood, which create and 
will probably continue to create a variety of complex problems for Palestinians 
in Athens. Although Jamal appears to be advocating the decoupling of 
citizenship and 'national identity', elsewhere he also stresses the need for 
Palestinians to have a state to which to formally belong and hence reasserts the 
coupling of citizenship and 'national identity'. This latter point highlights a very 
important issue, which Ibrahim (32, construction worker) also alludes to: 
Liz: So would you ever get Greek citizenship? 
Ibrahim: I wouldn't have a problem getting it. Getting it doesn't change where 
you're from and who you are though. I would still feel Palestinian. I could 
become Greek and get involved here and do everything Greeks do but people can 
belong to two countries. 
Having the formal citizenship of a Western country appears to hold many 
benefits for Palestinians. At the same time, it can strengthen views that a formal 
Palestinian state is needed as they see the material benefits formal citizenship 
status may potentially provide. However, the fact that they may still feel like 
'outsiders' despite their formal citizenship status also encourages them to 
promote a Palestinian state for Palestinians, in order to counter such feelings of 
alienation and difference. This may help explain why Palestinians with a defined 
citizenship status in Greece also actively advocate the Palestinian cause. Thus, 
for diasporic groups and individuals with citizenship of the country in which 
they live (and with access to rights and a good standard of living), the perceived 
need for self-determination and the ability to belong to a state as non-minonty 
citizens with the 'correct' cultural, social and ethnic 'identity' and characteristics 
is powerful and unsurprising. There is evidence of a pragmatic decoupling of 
citizenship and 'national identity' in Greece but at the same time, many 
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respondents also feel the need for citizenship based around constructions of 
Palestinian 'identity' within a future Palestinian state. As a result, there appears 
to be both a coupling and decoupling of citizenship and 'national identity'. 
Strategic ambivalence: the coupling and decoupling of citizenship and 
'national identity' 
Theoretical notions of the decoupling of citizenship and 'national identity' are 
useful, but the complex ways in which such processes are occurring in reality 
need to be explored and understood. In different ways, both Jamal and Ibrahim 
(mentioned above) point to certain issues associated with the decoupling of 
citizenship and 'national identity', which for the Palestinian diaspora in Athens, 
cannot be ignored. Jamal's insistence on keeping his feelings of 'Palestinian- 
ness" and of belonging to Palestine alive (despite the acquisition of non- 
Palestinian citizenship), whilst at the same time, claiming the need for a 
Palestinian state for Palestinians appears to illustrate that for Palestinians in 
Athens, a coupling as well as a decoupling of citizenship and 'national identity' 
is occurring. Such processes of expressing both at different times may be seen as 
forms of strategic ambivalence. 
The notion and realities of the decoupling of citizenship and 'national 
identity' may be double-edged. As this chapter has shown, Palestinians in Athens 
appear to construct and encourage arbitrary relationships and associations 
between Palestinian 'identity' and citizenship within a ftiture Palestinian state as 
part of their politicised advocacy of the Palestinian cause, in order to bring about 
an end to feelings and realities of suffering and injustice. At the same time, 
however, this also seems to encourage the disassociation between Greek 
citizenship status and feelings of belonging to Greece, as they are emotionally, 
socially and politically connected to 'there'. Therefore, while strategies of 
citizenship acquisition may serve to decouple citizenship and 'national identity', 
at the same time, they may help reconnect ties Palestinians have with the 
homeland, as with their new citizenship status, they may be able to visit Palestine 
more easily. While there may be a material decoupling of citizenship and 
'national identity' in Greece, there is often still a symbolic coupling of the two 
'there' in Palestine. 
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The assumption that there are neatly defined ways in which Palestinians 
may live and possess citizenship status 'here' and belong 'there' ignores feelings 
of 'in-between-ness' and ambivalence many Palestinians in Athens also 
experience,, as well as how problematic such liminality may be for them to deal 
with on an everyday basis. As Ibrahim points out above, theoretical notions of 
the decoupling of citizenship and 'national identity' need to take into account the 
complexities of home and belonging for those in diaspora. It cannot be assumed 
that Palestinians are rationally and simplistically dismantling the relationships 
between fon-nal citizenship status, belonging and 'national identity'. Palestinians 
in Athens appear to be both reproducing and deconstructing the relationships 
between citizenship and 'national identity' simultaneously. As Stasilius and 
Bakin (1997: 119) have pointed out in their criticism of de-territorialized 
approaches to citizenship: "citizenship [as well as 'identity' and the relationships 
between them] is negotiated, and is, therefore, unstable, constructed and re- 
constructed historically" across and within borders. There can be no simplistic 
notions of what constitutes the decoupling of citizenship and 'national identity' 
for diasporic Palestinians in Athens; their negotiations of 'Palestinian-ness', 
(shared consciousness', citizenship, home and belonging are situated and 
dynamic. 
The partial and complex dismantling of the relationships between 
citizenship and 'national identity' appear related to feelings of hybridity and 
fluidity. Feeling 'here' and 'there' or 'in-between' as a result of living in 
diaspora can help break down associations between 'national' or 'ethnic' 
identity, citizenship and statehood despite the perceived need of political 
attempts to connect them for the sake of advocating the Palestinian cause and 
self-determination. Although such attempts may be understandable, in reality, 
the multiple subjectivities and positionings of Palestinians in Athens illustrate 
how difficult and conflict ridden the merging between the personal and political 
can be. 15 The tensions between political displays of 'unity', optimistic and 
resistant commitment to the Palestinian cause and personal feelings of 
15 As outlined in Chapter Five, there are tensions between personal feelings of ambivalence, 




helplessness and despair are, therefore, also evident in discussions of the 
relationships between citizenship, 'national identity' and statehood. 
The issues of refugee status and the claiming of political asylum provide 
another example of these tensions. Although many Palestinians in Greece could 
be theoretically considered refugees, most are not in practical terms. This is 
through either choice or necessity. Some Palestinians, such as Issarn (43, 
engineer and Leader of 'old GUPW) actively choose not to be considered 
refugees: 
Issam: All the Palestinians, we don't want to askforpolitical asylum. 
Liz: Why is that? 
Issam: For lots of reasons. We are not escaping ftom our state. We have a 
national problem, because after the political asylum, they will try to get the 
citizenship of this country and stay here and you know and we are trying to keep 
them far way from this and sometimes to get political asylum, you have to 
confess something which is false, to give a reason why you need political 
asylum. Sometimes, all this information, it doesn't gojust to the United Nations, 
it goes to the police of different countries and it's like our people supplying 
information. We want to stay away from this circle. We want to continue 
encouraging Palestinians to be here legally with the help of the government. We 
don't need to have political asylum. 
Liz: Can this go on indefinitely though? 
Issam: Yes, Palestinians will get as normal as the others, they may get 
citizenship, but not political asylum; they are not accepting being given political 
asylum because Israel is hunting them. There are a lot of Palestinians in this 
condition. Why do they not give political asylum to the Palestinians in Lebanon 
or in Jordan? So, it is complicated. I know some cases, where they have whole 
I. nterrogations and where they are forced to give problems with the Palestinian 
Authority in order to get it. The don't get it because of the national problem y 
221 
that we have. Palestinians are leaving because they have a problem with the 
Occupation not because they have problems with their brothers or with 
Palestinian political groups. They don't have problems with their own people 
Palestinians are also discouraged by those in power, such as Issam, from 
claiming asylum in Greece because of the fact that it is seen as a long and 
arduous process, as well as for the reasons outlined above. Jamal (34, FCE) 
explains why the process of asylum is so difficult. For him, it is because "they 
only give political asylum to a few people. They pick and choose. And this is not 
fair". In the following extract, Sa'id (25, student) echoes Issam's position and 
explains why he does not want to be seen as a refugee; it appears to be a mixture 
of not wanting to be classed as a refugee for political reasons and the fact that the 
asylum process is perceived as being too long: 
Liz: So you could be considered to be a refugee? 
Sa'id: No, no. I don't consider myse4f as a refugee. It sounds bad. 
Liz: Why? 
Sald: Becausefrom my point of view being a refugee means 2 things -you either 
left your country because ofyour government or I consider it, it may sound bad 
but it's like a kind of betrayal. Don't ask me why but... 
Liz: Is it bad to be a refugee then? 
Sa'id: No, it's not bad but in my opinion, for Palestine, I don't consider myseýf a 
refugee - if it was in the hands of my government, 
I would be back but it's not. 
Maybe in Iraq, there's no problem with them considering themselves as refugees; 
they are trying to flee away from the problems, the persecutions 
but in Palestine, 
I'm not trying tofleefrom my government. MyJamily left because of the 
Israelis. 
Liz: But there are a lot of Palestinians who have claimed political asylum. 
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Sa'id: In other countries yes, in Greece no -you p re not going to find that. From 
a hundredpeople, you mayfind one. 
Liz: Is the reason for this the difficult process? 
Sa'id: Here in Greece, it's a really difficult process. You can claim that you are 
a political refugee because our country is in war but it's really hard but we look 
forward to the next years and we say that we're going to have a country one day 
and we're going to go back, even if it's the state of Israel and the state of 
Palestine, we're going to be in the state of Palestine. Iprefer not to claim that I 
am a refugee because my papers are not refugee papers since I was about 11. 
For some Palestinians in Athens, refugee status is not desirable politically; it is 
seen perhaps as giving up on the Palestinian cause and they do not feel the need 
to claim political asylum, preferring instead to continue living as they have done 
so, as students or economic migrants. What remains unclear is whether their 
refusal to accept refugee status will in some way harm their chances of being 
allowed Palestinian citizenship in the future. At the same time, their lack of 
refugee status may allow them to bypass any future restrictions or conditions 
places upon registered Palestinian refugees, such as compensation instead of the 
Right of Return. 
Others Palestinians in Athens are quite happy to have refugee status, 
although there are very few who do. 16 For example, Nisreen (23, student, 
President of GUPS) and her family are registered refugees and she has no 
problem with it: 
Liz: So are you a registered refugee? 
Nisreen: Yes, here in Greece, yes I am a refugee. 
16 This is because, as pointed out above, claiming asylum in Greece is perceived 
by most 
Palestinians as near impossible. Most potential asylum seekers spoken to wanted to move onto 
other countries in Western Europe, where they perceived things to be easier and 
better for them. 
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Liz: Is that easy to do here, get refugee status? 
Nisreen: Here, no, it's very difficult, maybe in other countries it's easy, but here 
no, here because they don't have any laws, they ask you - they don't know them, 
the government places, they don't know them, you know more than they know. 
Liz: So there aren't many Palestinians who are registered refugees then? 
Nisreen: No, those who are married they take itfrom their wives, because he is 
married to a Greek woman, they get the nationality, but otherwise, it is not easy. 
Liz: I've heard that it is easy for Palestinians to claim political asylum. Is this 
true do you think? 
Nisreen: What is political asylum? I am not sure ... 
but even if you get it doesn't 
help you get, be a Greek citizen, like the refugees, they have a residence permit 
for 5 years, after, we have it one year, now 5 years and after 5 years they say you 
have itfrom 10 years, okay and after that, what, 5 years and 5 years and 5 years, 
that's stupid, it's like being a Greek citizen. 
Liz: Do you think you will ever get Greek citizenship? 
Nisreen: I'm not interested. You want to give me, okayfine, but it doesn't bother 
me. I will alwaysfeel Palestinian and because with the passport I have now, it's 
like, you take it but it's for two years, the passport that refugees take, after two 
years you go and renew it. It says on it Elliniki Dimokratia 
17 and so on, but every 
2 years we go, its not a Greek passport, but you can go anywhere you want with 
that, even Israel, they don't say nothing. 
Liz: So it doesn't prevent you from travelling? 
17 'The Republic of Greece'. 
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Nisreen: No, but I don't know about Israel, I don't know if I can go to Palestine. 
Liz: So you've never been there? 
Nisreen: No, I've never tried. 
This testimony is interesting because a note of ambivalence about Nisreen's 
own position can be detected. On the one hand, she is a registered refugee, but 
on the other hand, she does not think she has claimed political asylum; it is 
clearly a confusing situation. She also appears to be talking about asylum as if it 
is nationality - perhaps this signals the fact that both are merely seen as 
strategies or ways to remain in Greece legally. At the same time, she appears 
quite happy to continue living indefinitely in Greece in the position she is in 
currently. As a refugee, whose family were exiled initially in Lebanon, she is 
not even sure whether she can go to Palestine. Yet, as the President of the GUPS 
in Athens, she is politically minded as well as active in advocating the 
Palestinian cause. She seems to be representative of those Palestinians in Athens 
who are ambivalent about citizenship and its relationships to 'national identity'. 
On the one hand, they feel Palestinian and that they should have a state of their 
own to protect their rights, in principle. On the other hand, they may be quite 
happy to continue living in Greece with ambiguous or difficult citizenship 
statuses and not be overly concerned about visiting or returning personally 
despite recognising the importance of such issues for other Palestinians in 
diaspora. Again, personal feelings of happiness and adjustment to life in Greece 
may rest uneasily with political constructions of Palestinian 'identity', 'unity', 
belonging and returning 'there' that many Palestinians perceive are necessary to 
attain statehood, which forins part of the cause many feel they have to or want 
to support. 
The situation as regards political asylum and refugee status appears to be 
very complicated and there are conflicting accounts; what does seem clear, 
however 
, is that there are 
few Palestinians in Greece who are registered refugees. 
At the same time, many Palestinians in Greece agree, generally speaking, that 
they are refugees as a group because so many of them are living in exile in 
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diaspora and lost their land and homeland in the process. Abbas (26, student), 
despite being from the West Bank, stresses that: 
all Palestinians are refugees and it is politically important that we are seen as 
refugees, so that something is done to help us, by the UN and the international 
community. We are refugees because we have been displaced and our land has 
been taken over and we have no-where to go. 
Abbas highlights the strategic use of names as part of the cause and the 
importance Palestinians attach to representations of themselves in the process. 
The notion of the refugee is extremely important ideologically and politically as 
it allows Palestinians to frame their injustices and hopes for the future in terms of 
human rights and appeals to such international bodies such as the UN, that 
transcend the nation-state to a certain extent. 
The term Palestinian 'migrants' or 'diaspora' does not have the same 
connotation as 'refugee', which implies persecution, loss, exile and so forth, all 
of which are extremely powerful discourses. At the same time, to be a refugee is 
also to be vulnerable and at the mercy of the country one is living in, but it is 
also a way to escape problems in the country one is from. As illustrated, it can be 
seen as unproductive politically, as it may signal or symbolise dissatisfaction 
with or disconnection to Palestine. The same can also be said of the acquisition 
of citizenship of Western countries. Both may be seen by Palestinians as 
attempts to weaken the Palestinian cause. The Palestinian diaspora in Athens 
clearly reveals the tensions involved in personal strategies to improve livelihoods 
and feelings of 'in-between-ness' and the need to ensure the best for Palestinians 
as a group of people who are mostly in exile and stateless. Rafiq, (40, restaurant 
worker) for example, has found that claiming political asylum is a relatively 
straightforward task but that it is dependent on speaking to and knowing the right 
people. Incidentally, he is claiming political asylum because he runs the risk of 
being deported and it is the only alternative he can think of The claiming of 
political asylum in his case is, therefore, being employed not in terms of a denial 
of human rights or persecution but as a strategy for continued but indefinite 
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existence in reece; he feels ambivalent about his own feelings of belonging, but 
is an active advocate of the Palestinian cause. 
A positive repercussion of the realisation that the relationships between 
citizenship and 'national identity' are unstable and arbitrary can be seen in 
Palestinian understandings of how the lives of Jews and Palestinians are 
intricately connected. As a result, some Palestinians in Athens feel that a single- 
state solution to the present situation in Palestine, in which Jews and Palestinians 
live together and tolerate their differences and those of others too, is best and 
may be a potential step in such a direction: 
Liz: What are your hopes for the future in Palestine? 
Faeq: I think that the future should be a mixture of both; I think we should live 
together. We are both mixed anyway; we arejoined whether we like it or not, so 
we should have a countryfor everyone. Eventually I think this will happen. Many 
Palestinians and Israelis would like this. There are a few people in Israel who 
control everything with absurd ideas. (Faeq, 45, FCE) 
Ahmed (34, FCE) also appears convinced that such a solution Is possible, as do 
other Palestinians in Athens: 
I think the most important issues facing Palestinians at the moment are the 
strugglefor the Right of Return, a stop to the building of settlements, the issue of 
Jerusalem and the wall that is being built at the moment. The ultimate goal, I 
think should be all of Palestine for both Jews and Palestinians together. I think 
that if they create a Palestinian state in a two-state solution, it will be so small 
that it won't survive. It will be too weak. It won't be practical and it will not be a 
juýfllmentjbr all the hopes we have hadfor all this time. My ultimate hope is to 
be able to go to Jaffa and to anywhere and everywhere there in historical 
Palestine with the same rights as the Jews; to have equal rights with them, so 
that we can all live together. However, a Palestinian state is a step in the right 
direction, but I am not hopeful that there will be a state. There will only be 
isolated ghettoes or islands. This Apartheid wall that they are building has to be 
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pulled down. The thing is there, they have to be united in order to survive. It's a 
matter of life and death. 
Liz: Would you be happy with a two-state solution? 
Ahmed: Well, I think, let's live together and create a democratic state, where 
both Israelis and Palestinians can live together. Israel will not go away; we 
have to live together, with everyone enjoying religious freedom. And I think that 
many others share my views. It's not easy to forget where you comefrom or all 
the problems and the suffering you and your people have had to go through. I 
really don't think a two-state solution will work because what you will get and 
what you are already getting is the creation ofPalestinian islands or ghettoes in 
an Israeli sea where you need a ferry to cross from one island to the other. It is 
I. mpossible. 
Ahmed's use of the word 'ghettoes' is interesting; he purposefully relates 
present Palestinian suffering, injustices and hardship that he feels Israelis are 
responsible for with the ghettoes Jews themselves suffered in. He inadvertently 
suggests that the victim has become the aggressor, creating, in turn, new victims. 
At the same time, however, his rationale in using such an argument is important, 
because it highlights the interconnected lives and fates of Jews and Palestinians 
within a highly contested, problematic piece of land that is emotionally and 
symbolically invested. In relation to this, Shapiro (2000) uses Ronit Matalon's 
novel 'The One Facing Us' (1998) to depict such an understanding - that Jews 
and Arabs are inextricably tied in a Levantine world. Others, such as Alcalay 
(1993 - cited in Shapiro 2000) have also used the contemporary Hebrew novel to 
imagine "a shared Arab-Jewish cultural formation - that modem Hebrew was 
invented to erase" (Shapiro 2000: 88). Mustafa (42, unemployed) also points to 
the importance of removing boundaries: 
I think there needs to be a solution that can satisfy both parties. So many 
innocent people are dying. We are fighting for the right to live, for our human 
rights. The thing is you can't get rid of a people or have one country win at the 
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expense of the other. We have accepted unjust negotiations like Oslo and the 
road map. We want peace, because I don't know how long the Palestinians can 
take it. The Israelis have the power to do whatever they want but we have to 
depend on the UN, Europe and the rest of the worldfor help and support. We 
also depend on Israeli public opinion to understand and realise their point of 
view and to pressurise their government in order to influence Sharon ... I don't 
have anything against Jews. I have Jewish friends, but Israelis who came and 
settled are different. You know, I believe there should be no borders anywhere. 
They don't do any good. They are like obstacles. People should befree to move 
around wherever they want. 
Liz: It's ironic then, isn't it that this whole conflict is about borders, defining 
concrete borders and a defined territory called Palestine. Aren't borders 
important in some contexts? 
Mustafa (Silence): Yes, you need to define areas, but they shouldn't be restrictive 
or limit travelling. 
The material and symbolic dismantling of borders and of negatively constructed 
differences between people and the consequent recognition of a joint destiny 
within the same land are very powerful notions. The potential, however, for the 
creation of new boundaries, tensions and constructions of difference is always 
present. For Palestinians in Athens to come to such conclusions involves an 
understanding of the importance of diversity, tolerance and the instability and 
multiplicity of negotiated identities, as well as the decoupling of citizenship and 
4 national identity'. This also highlights why notions of 'shared consciousness' 
may be more useful, as shared feelings of belonging and attachment, which are 
not based on exclusive relationships between distinct identities and territories, 
can be taken into account. At the same time, political advocacy of the Palestinian 
cause appears to demand the static use of a more homogenised Palestinian 
'identity' and 'unity' with which to create a Palestinian state, as a result of 
Palestinian exile, displacement and their need for justice and rights, which many 
Palestinians can also relate to. They are, therefore, also advocating the coupling 
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between citizenship, statehood and 'national identity' out of necessity, despite 
the tensions and conflicts involved in such incongruities. This may manifest into 
complex processes and negotiations of strategic ambivalence, where perceptions 
of the relationships between citizenship and Palestinian 'identity' are dynamic 
aspects of what it means to be Palestinian in Athens. 
Conclusions 
Although the processes of citizenship are increasingly becoming de- 
territorialised in manner, they are still state-based. The pertinence of nationalism 
and the institutional constraints imposed by countries (Bailey et al. 2002) and 
how the lives of those in diaspora are affected as a result must also be recognised 
and cannot be ignored. As Itzigsohn (2000: 1148) stresses: 
While there is undoubtedly a process of decoupling of nation, 
territory and citizenship related to migration, this process is for now 
far from superceding the territoriality bounded state as the main 
locus for the exercise of citizenship rights and for participating in 
political processes. 
Those in diaspora, as citizens or not, may be in a difficult position as they realise 
the importance of cross-border connections and boundary transgressions, but at 
the same time are limited and hindered by the borders protected and enforced by 
nation-state institutions and the coupling of citizenship, and 'national identity'. 
Despite social and cultural lives, emotions and experiences that may be hybrid 
and 'in-between% Palestinians in Athens understand that access to the rights and 
benefits (and ease of mobility) that they see others around them (such as Greeks) 
having are tied to the nation-state, formal citizenship status and 'national 
identity'. It has to be remembered that 'national identity' itself is a construction, 
which is situated as well as dynamic. This chapter has illustrated how 
Palestinians in Athens may construct and deconstruct relationships between 
citizenship and 'national identity' for particular politicised and material reasons 
in and in relation to particular locations. 
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It may be more useful to re-conceptualise states (and peoples, religions, 
cultures and so forth) as interrelated and not as distinct and separated, while at 
the same time providing protection and citizenship to the people living within 
them that is not based on exclusive notions of 'national identity' or 'ethnicity' or 
'religion'. People feel 'attached' to where they live but such constructions of 
belonging have to be explored. They also need to be exposed as interconnected 
to other times, spaces and peoples. Attachments to locations are not necessarily 
problematic. It is only perhaps when people perceive such attachments to be 
under threat that conflicts may arise and such threats are normally seen to be 
caused by movement of people into such areas. It is the role of the state as it 
currently stands, however, and its insistence on 'national identity' and 'national 
heritage' and so forth that may be accentuating the differences that inevitably 
exist between people from different parts of the world but also within states 
themselves in negative and unproductive ways. The intention here however , is 
not to romanticise the world before the creation of states or to suggest an 
abandonment of forms of state-related governance but to encourage explorations 
and understandings of people, places and political actions as connected and 
hybrid. In turn, this adds to current re-conceptualisations of current western- 
centric and often arbitrary notions of citizenship and its relationships with 
'national identity'. It is within diasporic spaces (discussed in the following 
chapter) that Palestinians struggle to position themselves as culturally and 
socially 'in-between' whilst politically and strategically advocating unity, 
Palestinian 'identity' and the Palestinian cause. Their experiences and 
perceptions of citizenship as well as the relationships between citizenship and 
'national identity' may serve to help appreciate and explore the complexity and 
relevance of such changing relationships in the contemporary world. 
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Chapter 7 
Processes of resistance and advocacy within contested diasporic 
spaces 
This chapter examines contested and gendered informal diasporic 
spaces in which Palestinians in Athens, with and without formal 
citizenship status, are advocating the Palestinian cause and in the 
process, able to be politically active, feel empowered and resistant. 
To begin with, a brief outline of positive and negative Palestinian 
perceptions and realities of political advocacy as helping is provided. 
This is followed by an in-depth focus on specific diasporic spaces and 
political activities within them are concentrated on, starting with 
demonstrations and cultural events, the Parikia (or 'community' 
house), followed by the Unions, embassy and finally, Palestinian 
houses. 
Introduction 
For many Palestinians in Athens, diasporic spaces are culturally, socially and 
politically important, for symbolic and material reasons. Strategic and dynamic 
processes of resistance and advocacy occur within gendered and contested 
diasporic spaces that may not necessarily be forinal or official. Diasporic 
statelessness, exile, cross-border connections and non-citizenship have different 
outcomes in terms of feelings of empowerment and potential engagement in 
advocacy and material political activities. Thus, there may be varying 
perceptions of agency, despair, apathy, inclusions and exclusions amongst the 
Palestinian diaspora in Athens as a result of involvement within such spaces. 
Political spaces and empowerment 
The fact that the Palestinian cause appears to be well-known and supported in 
Greece strongly suggests that Palestinians in Athens have been and are being 
politically active because of their politicised constructions of 'Palestinian-ness' 
even if they talk about what they do as simply 'helping', or 'doing what they 
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can7 and not as being politically active. Although advocacy of the Palestinian 
cause through 'helping' and lobbying in diasponc spaces can be theorised as 
forms of political resistance and empowerment, and Palestinians see themselves 
as politicised, they may not necessarily perceive themselves as politically active. 
This may be because they associate political activism and participation with 
formal and official political spaces, which they as non-citizens and stateless, feel 
excluded from. Non-citizens or those with difficult relationships to the state in 
which they are living are often ignored in studies on the relationship between 
citizenship and political participation. As Kofman (1995: 134,123) argues, 
"there are obviously some groups that are far less able to participate" ... 
"immigrants and those with ambiguous relationships to territory have been left 
outside the solidarity and communities found at the heart of many of the 
normative models of citizenship". Faulks (2000: 142) also stresses that the lack 
of official citizenship also leads to a lack of a political voice and, therefore, of 
political rights, which means that "non-citizens... are objects of state policy 
rather than active participants") - 
Political spaces in which people find themselves are crucial to notions of 
empowerment, which involves: 
moving out of constrained places and isolated spaces, widening the 
scope for action and multiplying potential sites for engagement, and 
about growing in an organic, self-realizing way - in confidence, in 
capacity, in wellbeing. (Cornwall 2002, quoted in McEwan 2005: 5) 
Cornwall appears to stress that empowerment can only occur if a person is aware 
of the positive aspects of their political actions and that it is more likely to take 
place within spaces that are more visible and inclusive. Therefore, the extent to 
which Palestinians in Athens feel their diasporic spaces are inclusive or 
exclusive is crucial. Cornwall's views also appear to mirror 
Massey's (1999: 
283) plea for spaces to be perceived as multidimensional, interrelated and open- 
ended: 
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spacelspatiality ... is the sphere of the meeting up (or not) of multiple 
trajectories, the sphere where they co-exist, affect each other, may 
come into conflict. It is the sphere both of their independence (co- 
existence) and of their interrelation. Subjectslobjects are constructed 
through the space of these interrelations ... and, precisely because it is 
the product of relations, relations which are active processes, 
material and embedded, practices which have to be carried out, 
space is in the process of becoming. It is always being made. 
This has important implications for theoretical understandings of diasporic 
political spaces (and identities) as bounded, unbounded, continuously dislocated 
and disrupted. If the 'opening up' of spaces is integral to empowerment, the 
cross-border connections and networks that Palestinians in diaspora rely on mean 
that the 'open-ness' and transgressive qualities of diasporic spaces (as a result of 
these connections) may allow them to feel empowered within such spaces. 
Processes of resistance and advocacy cannot be seen in isolation to such cross- 
border relations. 
The hybrid subject, cross-border and postcolonial/colonial connections 
It is important to note the connectivity of diasporic spaces and the informal 
networks between them in Athens,, but also between these spaces, other 
Palestinian diasponc spaces in the Middle East and politicised spaces within 
Palestine. Formal, semi-official and infom-lal/unofficial diasporic spaces and 
networks can, therefore, merge at particular times. This appears to demonstrate 
the 'relational' sense of place authors such as Massey (1999) and Amin (2004) 
have theonsed. Connections between people and places need to be analysed as 
relational because cross-border networks are increasingly connecting spaces that 
may be geographically separate. For instance, Palestinians in Athens may have 
more connections to towns, cities and villages in the West Bank, Gaza and 
around the Middle East than to people and places within Athens and Greece that 
are closer to them physically. Processes of resistance and advocacy in Athens 
have to be seen in relation and as connected to events and perceptions (and 
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processes of resistance and advocacy) that are occurring in Palestine and the 
Middle East even if they take on different forins. 
Bhabha (1994) also stresses the connectivity of colonial and postcolonial 
times and spaces in his notion of 'Third Space, in which the subject of change 
and resistance is hybrid and necessarily 'in-between' the colonial and 
postcolonial. As Chapter Two discusses, the lives of Palestinians in Greece may 
be seen as postcolonial in the sense that they are not physically living under 
occupation. At the same time, their connections to what they see as a colonised 
homeland stresses the merging of colonial and postcolonial worlds. The viewing 
of strategies of resistance as postcolonial means that as Palestinians in Athens 
are physically disconnected from oppression or occupation and the situation in 
Palestine, they may be more able to engage in resistance strategies that are less 
hindered by or attached to colonialism. 
Bhabha's Third Space of 'enigmatic questioning' celebrates the unstable, 
original and subversive nature of the subject, which refuses to be categorized or 
to belong completely to either 'here' or 'there', the colonial or postcolonial 
world. Its strength lies in its hybridity or "creative ambivalence" (Lindholm 
Schulz 2003) and highlights the positive repercussions of 'in-between-ness' in 
ten-ns of feelings of resistance and empowerment. One can view hybrid diasporic 
spaces as sites of resistance in which Palestinians may become active 
participants involved in shaping their own futures and are not passive victims. 
The "recovery of those hidden spaces occupied and invested with their own 
meaning, by the colonial underclass" (Crush 1994: 337) as well as their 
connections to their colonisers appear integral to understanding and exploring 
the realities of postcolonial resistance. At the same time, however, the diversity 
and power relations within the 'colonial underclass' have to be taken into 
account, despite their perceived need to consolidate a subject-position with 
which to posit change. 
As outlined above, Massey points to the potential for inclusion and 
exclusion within spaces, which may be seen as the result of positive and negative 
constructions and realities of difference and power inequalities. As Palestinians 
strategically negotiate their multiple subjectivities, cross-border connections, 
power relations and the need for unity within diversity tensions can result over 
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difference and representation (as discussed in Chapter Five). Thus, the diasporic 
spaces in which such politicised negotiations occur as Palestinians advocate their 
cause (and engage in what could be called political activism) may be perceived 
as inclusive and exclusive, with repercussions in terins of feelings of 
empowerment, marginalisation, and helplessness. Therefore, diasporic spaces in 
which Palestinians may be placed very differently can be seen as hindering 
and/or encouraging perceptions of advocacy and political participation. 
In reality, processes of decolonisation (in the form of postcolonial 
resistance or anti-colonial liberation struggles) are complex as well as contested 
(Lambert 2005) and played out spatially and temporally. The times, spaces and 
tensions involved are crucial in understanding and exploring the intricacies of 
such processes. For Palestinians in Athens, diasporic spaces 'here' in Greece 
may act as the starting point for resistance and empowerment (usually perceived 
as the resolving of the Palestinian cause) and are dependant upon 'there' (in 
Palestine). The connections between Greece and Palestine result in constructions 
of 'Palestinian-ness' and processes of resistance and advocacy that can be seen 
as 'in-between' and ambivalent. Palestinian connections to 'there' (and to one 
another) may encourage political advocacy of the Palestinian cause9 but at the 
same time, non-citizenship and feelings of 'in-between-ness' can also trigger 
feelings of ambivalence, insecurity and loss that are seen as problematic and 
counter-productive to Palestinian 'unity' and resistance. 
Outlining Palestinian advocacy as 'helping' 
This section provides a brief outline of how Palestinian understandings of 
advocacy as 'helping' are complex and hard to generalise about because there are 
both positive and negative factors involved. The educating of others (and Greeks 
in particular) about the Palestinian cause within diasporic spaces is seen as one 
of the major (and few) ways many respondents feel they can help fellow 
Palestinians, by their spreading their understanding of what is meant by the 
Palestinian cause to as many people as possible. Maha (29, housewife) explains: 
I think it's very importantfor Palestinians to spread the word, to give the other 
side, our side of the story. I mean the people here in Europe are influenced 
by 
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Jewish people and the media, they don't tell both sides of the story and this is 
our role, to try and get people to listen to our story, so it's very important and 
1. t's part of the struggle. 
Maha's statement of the importance of educating Greeks and Europeans can be 
seen as a direct link to the situation in Palestine that she and other Palestinians in 
Athens are negotiating and portraying as part of their advocacy of the Palestinian 
cause. Advocating and helping 'here' in Greece forms a way to remain 
connected and committed politically to Palestine whilst in diaspora. Maha's need 
to 'struggle' and 'spread the word' can also be seen as an active forin of 
resistance to what she feels are powerful Jewish discourses and narratives within 
the media on the situation in Israel/Palestine. 
An interesting, symbolic and important political aspect of diasporic 
spaces is the perceived freedom of Palestinians in diaspora in Athens to speak 
and act in them. Many respondents talk of how grateful they are for the freedom 
they feel in Greece, psychologically and practically, which they may also see as 
related to Greek support they receive. Their perceptions of freedom may be seen 
as the prerequisite they need psychologically to feel that they are being 
politically active. The freedom they talk of seems to be symptomatic of their 
physical separation from what they perceive as the site of colonialism 
(Israel/Palestine) and oppression but despite possible agency, they are still very 
much affected by and connected to it. For those in diaspora, such as Palestinians 
in Athens, who feel they have been persecuted and discriminated against, and 
who want to try and change their own lives and the lives of others, such 
perceptions of freedom may be crucial symbolically. Palestinians may see such 
freedom as related to notions of citizenship and democracy and for them, it may 
be the combination of all three that give them hope and willingness to resist and 
be politically active. The following discussions depict this sense of freedom, 
which many interviewees appear to find empowering and has allowed some, 
such as Sa'id (25, student) and Lina (38, businesswoman), to feel more secure 
and able to think about their situation as Palestinians in exile more easily: 
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Sa'id: Well, I want to leave but I want to leave to work but I know that anjvt, here 
else in the world, I'm not going to be asfree as here. 
Liz: When you say free, what do you mean? 
Sa'id: I mean, free to express myseýf- I can do whatever I want. I have no 
problems; the Greeks don't look at me as if A he's you know, the Greeks feel 
that we're related from way back in Crete 1000 years ago and when I talk to 
Greeks they say did you know that there were Palestinians in Crete? The Greek 
people are really into politics, you see them marching in the Israeli newspapers. 
I am free in Greece to shout. I am very free to cry, to let the people know how 
much I am sad, how much I am angry about all these children that they are 
killing down there every day and every hour. No, we can express ourselves here, 
ourfeelings. (Lina) 
Other respondents, such as Mustafa, (42, unemployed) admit that they feel they 
are more able to think about the situation there objectively as a result of the 
peace of mind they get from freedom of expression: 
You have to be open-minded and objective in order to understand all points of 
view and you know I learnt to be like this here. Before when I was in the West 
Bank and I think it's the same for others too who are stuck there, facing very 
difficult daily circumstances, who are under tremendous pressure. It's very hard 
to think openly and objectively there because you are so close to the problems, 
the stress, you are in it all the time and it doesn't allow you to think or analyse 
things properly and you are not free to express yourse4f. You are always 
restricted and this influences a person and their mind and how they think about 
things hugely. It's different here. 
Living in Greece, with the freedoms it provides and the support Greeks have for 
Palestinians, has also encouraged some Palestinians to feel more able to advocate 
their cause through inforinal diasporic spaces as well as through personal 
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strategies of resistance that are a mixture of different diasporic spaces and 
processes of advocacy and are hard to generallse about. For example, Mahmud's 
(24, student) testimony (Appendix Seven) illustrates such a personal strategy and 
its complex relationships with his everyday life in Greece: 
I'll have to see what the situation is like there; here, everyone is after their own 
best interest aren't they? Even though I would really love to go back and give 
something to my country. I came here on a scholarship, my country sent me here 
on a scholarship so I came as a result of my government, so sometimes I think 
that even if I stay here, I want to do something to help. I have already talked to 
the representative of the company that I work for about opening a department 
there and seeing what we can dofrom here to help. 
Mahmud explains that particular events made him start thinking about helping 
and advocating. For him, this has meant joining the GUPS, but at the same time,, 
he is also trying to help using the profession he is studying and the contacts he 
has made through working. Many respondents see lack of time as a major 
restriction to engaging in advocacy and only those who are extremely committed 
find the time to help on more than a superficial basis. It does appear, however, 
that at times of specific need, many Palestinians in Athens are willing to go to 
great lengths to actively help. Mahmud exemplifies the very real tensions and 
guilt Palestinians in Athens experience as a result of their hybrid and cross- 
border connections and existence, how these spur them to get involved 
politically and also simultaneously depresses them because they feel that they are 
not doing enough. Yet, they may be doing all they feel they can, given their 
situation. This does not necessarily stop them from feeling guilty, however, even 
if it is because they are not going through the daily hardships and fear they 
perceive Palestinians are going through in the West Bank and Gaza. 
Many Palestinians in Athens feel they can help the cause through NGOs 
such as charities (Greek and Palestinian or a mixture of both), mainly through 
the giving of money, food, clothes and attendance at chanty events. Involvement 
in such activities shows active support for fellow Palestinians perceived as 
suffering in Palestine; in the process, this may help them feel that they are part of 
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the resistance to what they feel is Israeli aggression and occupation in the West 
Bank and Gaza. Advocacy and helping can also be seen as concrete ways for 
Palestinians in Athens to feel connected to a homeland they may never have 
visited. Individual financial situations highly influence how involved and 
politically active Palestinians are able to feel. To help financially, Palestinians 
must have money to spare, so those with insecure or low-income jobs find it 
hard. Therefore, the extent to which Palestinians may be politically active within 
diasporic spaces is dependant on personal factors such as financial and 
citizenship statuses. Lina (38, businesswoman), despite the freedom she feels 
(outlined above) and the fact that does a great deal to help fellow Palestinians, 
outlines the fact that such help and advocacy is not straightforward. Thus, her 
perceptions of helping are both positive and negative: 
There are many Palestinians who have money, so they don't have the problem to 
think everyday how to get money to survive and many others, they don't have 
mone and thefirst thing that comes to their mind - they're worryl . ng how to get y 
mone to live, so these people, the first thing that is on their mind is how to Y, 
support their families financially and then in their free time they participate in 
other things, but in general I can see that most of the Palestinians here are very 
close to each other. They help each other a lot, a lot, but even me and most of my 
friends we hear about a family who came from Palestine and we don't know 
them and they are having some trouble byfinding a house or putting their kids in 
school. Many people would like to help. 
ings of advocacy and 'helping' are dynamic and hard to pin down Her feel* I 
ranging from optimism, pessimism to guilt; this is neatly illustrated by the 
different view she gives later on in the same discussion: 
Lina: I wonder if we are helping in the right way or if we are helping through the 
right people? Or if talking about our cause is enough, do you see? 
Liz: Yes. Does that make you feel helpless? 
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Lina: Yes, like Elizabeth, I would like to put every month say one or two hundred 
euro to support onefamily there, I would do that because I can afford it but I'm 
not sure that this money would go to thisfamily butyou're never sure. 
Liz: So there are no organised charities? 
Lina: There are, but I wish I could talk to the people face to face to make sure 
that they are really taking this money or they are taking part of it, you see, 
because there are many, manyjamilies in Palestine who are poor and originally 
they were not poor, they had land, they had properties, but things are not really 
coming to them or let's say not the amount that we hear is going down, see what 
I mean? 
Liz: Do you think that Palestinians here could do more? 
Lina: No. I believe that we should keep on trying or keep on supporting and 
when I said that there's always more we can do, I meant continuously, to 
continue support because really there are many Palestinian families who need 
supporting big time. And there is much more we could do politically, I suppose, 
although it's hard being here. 
Positive views of diasponc political spaces and advocacy have to be 
counterbalanced with the fact that Palestinians in Athens may also find diasporic 
spaces exclusive, which contribute to feelings of helplessness, disillusionment 
and political apathy. Ibrahim's testimony (Appendix Eight) illustrates the 
complexities involved in advocacy and helping and represents one of the most 
negative views encountered. For example, in response to a question on whether 
demonstrations are helpful, he says: 
Yes, but what good do they do? Do you see them doing any good? 
Liz: Perhaps people feel that they are doing something or they feel empowered in 
some way. 
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Ibrahim: Okay, perhaps they may have some influence in thefuture. So a leader 
who comes into power will know perhaps that he will not have the support of 
certain groups ofpeople who have demonstrated their opinions. But there's not 
that many and they don't do that much because things are so controlled, you 
know what I mean. It's like the Karayiozil - it Is all a show, we are puppets of the 
state. So I don't really believe that much in demonstrations although I have 
taken part in a few that have led to the Israeli embassy but it doesn't do 
anything. The struggle, for me is when you give 50 euros to a struggling family 
in Palestine so that they can live for 10 days and resist for longer - this is true 
support. This actually helps people - because there is a lack offood, medicine. 
Just saying I'm on your side, that doesn't do anything. Okay his heart is in the 
right place. But what good is saying that I am with you when the other person's 
starving? 
Ibrahim's testimony illustrates the perceived difficulties surrounding 
involvement in overtly political activities, the fact that Palestinians may want to 
help but feel unable to and that they have different perceptions of what this help 
should actually entail. This disunity is also depicted by Tamara (32, researcher), 
who highlights the fact that although many Palestinians admit they feel 
politicised, they are not usually aware that they are being politically active 
through the informal (political) activities and spaces they are involved in: 
I do feel that I am politicised. I wish I could do more but I don't feel bad about 
what I am doing at the moment because I am just at the beginning of my career, 
I'M just getting established. I would like to be an activist though; that would give 
me great satisfaction. But we go to demonstrations. We sometimes help people 
financially, or children who need help in institutions. There are many NGOs and 
Unions and there is a lot of networking going on between them there and they 
have many supporters like when there was the first Intifada, you had a lot of 
student Jundraising I remember. It's hard sometimes to support others because 
although you want to feel an affinity with them, you can't necessarily because 
I Karayiozi is a puppet character in a popular Greek satirical puppet theatre of the same name. 
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they have different backgrounds socially andfinancially which makes it difficult, 
especially here where you don't have the closeness between Palestinians that 
youfind there. We are more isolated here. 
Therefore, advocacy can be problematIc. Many respondents feel that a lack of 
organisation and formality is associated with advocacy and helping; this may 
also be a factor influencing whether Palestinians feel they are doing anything 
useful to help as well as feelings of being politically active. As a young student 
recently arrived from Jordan, Karim feels unable to help: 
Liz: Do you feel able to do anything to help the situation there? 
Karim: No, not really. I can't do anything to help the situation there. Every 
beginning is difficult and I am still at the beginning so there is nothing I can do 
to help. Later on, I will do more. I want to go there, to help, to do whatever I 
can, but the future is uncertain. Nobody knows what will happen there and 
nobody knows what the future will be so I don't what I will do or what I will be 
able to do to help. 
Liz: Do you feel hopeless living here; that you're not able to do anything to 
help? 
Karim: Yes, I do feel that I can't say or do much. I talk about things to my 
friends and we discuss what we see, what's happening, but what can we really 
do? Okay, we go to demonstrations. We can only talk and discuss our cause. I 
suppose the only things we can do is tellpeople what has happened to us to show 
the world what what's really going on there. We cannot get involved in politics 
here like the Greeks. Like with the presentation the students did before 
Christmas. They tried to educate people about the Palestinians, who they are, 
the problems we arejacing and our culture so that people understand. 
Therefore, despite the fact that he goes to demonstrations, talks to Greeks and 
tries to 'educate' them, (and which can be seen as processes of political 
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advocacy) he still feels hopeless because he does not view the infori-nal spaces 
and activities he is involved in as politically useful. 
Processes of resistance and advocacy have to be put into context as they 
are dynamic, and often dependant many positive and negative factors such as 
crises and the situation in Palestine and the Middle East (Shawa, personal 
communication, 2004) as well as support by those in the host country. In the 
Palestinian context in Athens, helping one's fellow Palestinians is a politicised 
act, which cannot be separated from other social and cultural aspects of 
'Palestinian-ness'. Conceptualising resistance and political advocacy as dynamic 
spatial and temporal processes is important as this highlights how power 
relations, differences, similarities and tensions involved may be negotiated as 
unstable and ambivalent. This then allows us to potentially dismantle the notion 
that a defined (national, or group) 'identity' is the prerequisite to political action 
and that as a result of the fluid Palestinian subjectivities, Palestinians may feel 
positive and negative, included and excluded, enabled and hindered within 
informal diasporic spaces as a result of their material political activities. A 
detailed focus on some of these diasporic spaces may allow further exploration 
into these issues, highlighting the perceptions, use and repercussions of specific 
spaces for acts of and processes of resistance and advocacy. 
Cultural events and demonstrations 
Cultural events and activities that are carried out in a variety of (mostly Greek) 
venues can be seen as crucial ways in which advocacy in the form of 'educating 
others' is carried out. For example, an event the researcher attended in December 
2003 involved a variety of activities that were cultural, social and political. There 
was a display of Palestinian dancing, a student presentation on what they called 
the 'Apartheid Wall I in the West Bank (delivered in Greek), the selling of 
literature related to the Palestinian cause (such as the 2001 Greek edition of 
Marwan Bishara's 'Palestine/Israel: Peace or Apartheid'), the reading of 
Palestinian poetry (in Greek) and a political speech by an embassy official (in 
Arabic). It was also clearly a social event which enabled Palestinians to socialise 
and meet other Palestinians they did not normally see, as well as interact with the 
few Greeks who attended. An example of the Palestinian dancing can be seen in 
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the photos below, taken at various cultural events in Athens in 2001-2002 in 
Athens and around Greece. 
Figure 10 - Images of Palestinian dancing 
r 
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(Source: booklet titled 'Athens - Palestine 2002ý) 
Many interviewees see such dancing as an important cultural link to Palestine, 
enabling them to engage with what they call 'real' forms of Palestinian culture. 
Lindholm Schulz (2003: 180) stresses that "social gatherings, commemorative 
events, cultural festivals ... and other events [are] intended to preserve a 
supposedly genuine Palestinian culture" occur in Kuwait. The same may be said 
of Palestinians in Athens. As Nisreen, (23, President of GUPS) one such 
Palestinian dancer, points out: 
We are very lucky. We were taught these dances by a Palestinian studentftom 
the West Bank and it's very important to us here, because many of us have never 
been there, we need to learn these things as they are part of our culture that we 
must not forget. If we do not know about the real customs and traditions and 
what is going there, then how can we tell people here about our culture and 
politics? How can we talk about our cause? 
Nisreen highlights the important merging of the cultural and political in such 
activities and events; the two appear to go hand in hand as crucial aspects in the 
advocacy of the Palestinian cause, but also in the reinforcement of Palestinian 
'traditions' and particular meanings of Talestinian-ness' to Palestinians 
themselves in Greece. Yet, despite the politicised nature of such events, most 
Palestinians in Athens do not see them as overtly political. Such events may 
serve to solidify connections to the homeland, particular notions of what it means 
to be Palestinian and the need for the continuing existence and advocacy of the 
Palestinian cause. At the same time, they may serve to strengthen constructions 
of 'shared consciousness' and affinity with fellow Palestinians, in both Athens 
and Palestine. 
Demonstrations constitute diasporic spaces and events where such 
'shared' feelings may be encouraged. Dina, (17, still at school) for example, 
describes her feelings as she attends demonstrations. Her active negotiation and 
embodiment of what it means to be Palestinians as an individual and as part of a 
group at particular moments in time and space are evident: 
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When Igo, I don't feel like the person I am normally, who lives in Greece. We 
were there, in the centre of it and most were men, they were carrying dummies of 
Bush and Sharon. There wasn't anything violent. It was organised bY the 
embassy. They were ripping up the doll and I did too. Suddenly, I started to feel 
this rage. It suddenly hit. I reallyfelt I related; Ifelt so Palestinian at that point. 
That was so me; that is me. It didn't feel wrong. It's a rage that every single 
Palestinian feels. 
Here, the personal implications as result of attending such spaces can be seen. 
The role such diasporic spaces have in helping trigger shared feelings of 
suffering and injustice is clear. 
Most Palestinians in Athens view demonstrations as one of the main 
ways in which they can physically do something to help the situation there. Bilal 
(33, FCE) points out his personal reasons behind attending demonstrations: 
I've been to every one - it'S like my duty. 
Liz: How do you feel when you go? Do you feel that you're making a 
difference? 
Mal: We are trying to say what we need to say, to show that I am not happy with 
the situation. I am expressing myseýf and I am showing my support for our 
President, Yasser Arafat. If there are any changes, we will be the ones to make 
or to force that change, not America or somebody else; we have to be in charge 
of our own future. 
Bilal also stresses the issue of political representation (as outlined in Chapter 
Six). By going to demonstrations, Palestinians feel they are being involved in 
one of the few overtly political acts they are able to in Athens. As a result, they 
feel they are representing themselves and their political opinions as well as 
trying to get their messages of advocacy across to a wider audience. The 
hindrances to participation in such overtly political spaces must also be noted. 
For example, although Maha (29, housewife) feels that demonstrations are 
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important, she also points to surveillance 
involvement: 
as a problematic barrier to 
The life is so... the day is running, there is so much to do, you don't have time. 
The only thing is demonstrations - we can't do anything else. There is nowhere 
we can go and give our vote, we have no voice and this is what they want and we 
can't do anything also because the intelligence in Europe, in the US, in the 
Middle East, it's all connected with each other, so everyone is scared from 
everyone outside. If a Palestinian wants to say something or do something and 
go back home, his name will be on the borders, he did this, he did that, so he has 
afamily outside, he is living outside, in Greece, wherever, so this is the way it is, 
this is the truth. 
Demonstrations are informal diasporic spaces and activities that are very 
visible to the Greek public. They are set up and organised occasionally, when it 
is felt they are needed in order to advocate the Palestinian cause and to respond 
to certain issue. Although grounded in Greece, they cannot be separated from the 
ongoing political and humanitarian situation in Palestine and the Middle East. 
Examples of Greek/Palestinian demonstrations are shown below. They were 
organised in coordination with a rally to advocate opposition to the war in Iraq, 
and to globalisation. In Figure 11, Arabs, Greeks and Palestinians are marching 
along Leoforos Kifissias, a major avenue in Athens that goes past the American 
and Israeli embassies. The black and white signs in Greek read 'Freedom to 
Palestine' and have 'Genoa 2001' written on top. The red, white and black signs 
are those of the 'Stop the war' coalition. 
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Figure II-A Greek/Palestinian demonstration organised in remembrance 






Figure 12 -A Stop the War demonstration (20th March 2003) 
(Source: www. sek-ist. gr/photos/20m/martil. htm) 
Even though Figure 12 is a photo of a demonstration specifically aimed at 
portraying opposition to the war in Iraq, the presence of Palestinians is evident, 
as, for example, they display Palestinian flags and wear their kuffiyas. Here, they 
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(Source: www. sek-ist. gr/photos/yasin/l. htm) 
are walking down Vasilisis Sofias, another major thoroughfare, which leads off 
the square of Syntagrna in the centre of Athens. The networks between specific 
Greek left wing and communist non-governmental groups and the Palestinians in 
Athens appear to be well established. At the same time, demonstrations may also 
constitute spaces that some Palestinians feel excluded from because of static 
portrayals of very specific and narrowly defined versions and images (in the 
form of posters, chants, clothing and so on) of what it means to be Palestinian. In 
this sense, diversity is occluded by the perceived need for a strategic political 
position. 
As gendered spaces too, one must not forget how men and women may 
perceive them differently, but also how women and men may be negotiating the 
relationships amongst themselves within them. Abir, (38, Arabic teacher) for 
example, feels it is important to arrange demonstrations that highlight women's 
needs in the Arabic world in particular as well as the Palestinian cause in 
general. To this end, she has become involved in demonstrations that do this 
together with other women in Greece (Palestinian and non-Palestinian) that are 
different to those described above as they focus specifically on and are organised 
by women. In the process, they are carving out and claiming political and 
gendered spaces in which they are able to 'unite' as women and have their voices 
and needs heard as women, distinct from men. 
Palestinian men do not seem to mind their wives get involved in the 
'mixed' demonstrations described above. Palestinian women are often seen as 
symbolic of the 'mother' that is the Palestinian homeland (Lindholm Schulz 
2003: 102) and the particular roles in advocacy and constructions of the 
Palestinian 'nation' and homeland are important. Yuval-Davis (1997) also 
highlights the importance of considering the role women play in constructions of 
nationalism and 'identity', which are crucial to advocacy. As Lindhom Schulz 
(2003: 136,139) also notes: 'struggle' "is a gendered concept"... Palestinian 
women "reproduce the nation both biologically and culturally". For example, the 
idea of 'womenandchildren' (Enloe 1990, cited in Yuval-Davis 1997) implies 
that it is women who are constructed as attached to and embodying the 
homeland. Their presence at visible spaces of advocacy such as demonstrations 
may be seen as part of this. For example, at one demonstration attended by the 
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researcher, it was clear that a Palestinian woman wearing a headscarf was 
actively pushed (by the male Greek and Palestinian orgamsers of the 
demonstration) towards the front of the march. She Joined two men and they 
proceeded to hold up the Palestinian flag all together in full and clear view of the 
Greek media. When Rafiq (40, restaurant worker), a participant present, was 
asked why this was done, he responded as follows: 
It's important to show our identity and that women are part of the cause too, not 
just men. It is our women who give birth to Palestinian children and bring them 
up; they are part of our struggle and I'm sure this ladyfeels happy to be there at 
thefront. 
Liz: But her clothing represents Muslim Palestinian women only, surely? 
Rafiq: Yes, but there are more Muslim Palestinians than Christians here. 
Liz: And what do you mean by 'showing our identity'9 
Rafiq: That our religion and identity is important to us, that it is very important 
to our cause. 
Such comments may reflect the view that political 'unity' is seen as 
encompassing religious differences. They also suggest that women carry the 
'burden of representation' and are "constructed as symbolic bearers of the 
collectivity's identity and honour, both personally and collectively", an identity 
that may be constructed as essentialised and static (Yuval-Davis 2001: 127, 
citing Mercer 1990). As a result, women may become passive objects rather than 
subjects of dynamic change in such diasporic spaces. 
It is difficult, however, to detennine the extent to which Palestinian 
women feel empowered by such participation. Sana (34, 
housewife), for 
example, feels she is more politicised than her husband is, because she 
feels that, 
unlike her husband, she was brought up to be. As a result, she 
has encouraged 
her husband to go to demonstrations with her and become more aware of the 
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importance of advocacy of the Palestinian cause. Most women appear happy to 
attend but (like men too) this may have more to do with duty (or what their 
husbands expect them to do) and the need to support the cause rather than 
encourage genuine feelings of empowerment and the ability to effect deep and 
meaningful change. At the same time, their domestic role also prevents many 
from attending as much as they would like to, hence the likelihood that it is men 
rather than women, who are more likely to attend. One could argue, perhaps, that 
this domestic role women are expected to (or want to) take on is both demanding 
and very time consuming and that the resulting lack of time is a potential 
hindrance to political action in such spaces. They may still, however, feel 
politicised and be politically active in other diasporic spaces, such as their 
house. 2 Mothers and wives who feel they are politically active and who try to get 
involved in advocacy may find the pressures and stress of doing so much greater 
than for men, who may be more expected to be active politically and publicly 
and who are often less involved in the day-to-day practicalities of child-raising 
and domestic duties. This does not mean, however, that men do not take an 
active interest in their children's upbringing, as the family as a unit is seen as 
very important to Palestinians, both in Athens and elsewhere. 
Palestinians (both men and women) who get involved in demonstrations 
describe feelings of pride at being Palestinian, their happiness at holding up their 
flag and banners and their ability to shout for justice (and have an informal 
political voice) when they go. They also, however, appear to be spaces, 
superficially at least in which Palestinian and Greek women, men and even 
children can stand and walk together recreating images of 'unity' and 'solidarity' 
and are appearing and feeling that they are showing their support for the 
Palestinian cause and their anger at injustices against them. At the same time, 
however, they are not necessarily always seen as political spaces or activities. 
For instance, although Samira (38, housewife/artist) claims she is not political, 
she emphasizes that she and her husband Mound (earlier, in the same 
interview), 
"of course we always go to demonstrations"". Such a division between what is 
deemed political (and linked to the formal sphere) and actions that advocate the 
2 The house as a diasporic space, in which women (and men) may 
be politicised and engage in 
processes of resistance and advocacy is discussed later on 
in this chapter. 
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cause (in informal spaces) seems representative of many Palestinians in Athens. 
As a result, they tend not to see the processes of advocacy they are involved in as 
political activism. The resistance or 'struggle' they may talk about being 
involved in is, therefore, rarely talked about in political terms but described as 
'helping'. This can result in them feeling apathetic or disillusioned about What 
they are actually doing or feel able to do, despite their politicisation and 
advocacy. 
The Parikia 
The Parikia (Jalia in Arabic) or community house is a diasporic space that is 
contested and gendered. It also constitutes a political space where Palestinians in 
Athens are negotiating and articulating their individual and collective identities 
and where they may feel hopeful, despairing, 'united' and fragmented in the 
process. Figure 13 depicts photos of the Parikia, which occupies a detached and 
unassuming house in the quiet middle-class Athenian suburb of Papagou. 
Figure 13 - Photos of the Parikia 
IN! 
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(Source: taken by the researcher, October 2003) 
it is a space that was conceived as being Palestinian, as well as Arabic. It 
allows Palestinians to socialise and interact with other Palestinians within a 
Palestinian (and Arabic) environment. It can be seen as integral to advocacy of 
the Palestinian cause in its role as a political space in which to make Palestinians 
feel politicised, construct notions of 'shared consciousness' , bring Palestinians in 
Athens together and solidify their cultural and symbolic connections to their 
homeland. Material political activities that take place within the Pankia and as a 
result of the Parikia encourage symbolic and material connections to Palestine 
and influence perceptions of what it means to be Palestinian,, socially, culturally 
and politically. 
The Parikia occupies a fairly old house and does not appear to be 
particularly well cared for, although a caretaker is chosen every year who is 
responsible for taking care of such things as bills, maintenance and so forth. The 
caretakers (who have been both men and women) also appear to be in control of 
what activities are allowed to take place there. They also play a role in 
organising and publicising activities and events associated with the Parikia, such 
as demonstrations, cultural and chanty events. Meetings take place every 
Saturday afternoon and evening. They appear to be open events; people 
(Palestinians and non-Palestinians) can just walk in and out. The number of 
people who turn up each week fluctuates dramatically and during summer, the 
house is closed and meetings do not occur. Formal events are also organised 
there, such as barbecues, speeches and chanty events. 
Inside, it consists of three main rooms, a hall, a bathroom and a kitchen 
with steps leading down onto a patio area for sitting. There is also access to this 
area from the front gate; people do not have to go through the house to get to it. 
There is also room on the first floor, which is used for both lessons (Arabic 
lessons to Greek women married to Palestinians). Inside, there are photos of 
Yasser Arafat on the wall as well as embroideries of historical Palestine. There is 
a board with details of events and a small library of books, many of which 
appear to have been donated. Most weeks, a Jordanian chef provides traditional 
Arabic food at a low price. Children often run around playing before and after 
Arabic lessons that are provided for them. 
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The Parikia can be seen as a unique product of Palestinian exile in 
Greece, created by members of a diaspora who wish to remain connected to 
Palestine, and help encourage Palestinian '-unity' and advocacy of the Palestinian 
cause through the specific and strategic use of space. Yet, interestingly. the 
Greek name for it, the *Parikia', translates into English as 'foreign quarter'. 
Thus, as well as being a space that is re-connecting Palestinians in Athens to 
their homeland, it may also be seen as a hybrid space, in which Greece and 
Palestine may come together, through cross-border networks and connections, a 
space in which Palestinians in Greece are able to make sense of 'being 
Palestinian' whilst living in Greece. Its hybridity can be seen, for example, in the 
registration form for membership, in which information is given in both Greek 
and Arabic and its stamp (see Figure 14) 
Figure 14 - Stamp of Parikia 
(Source: Thessaloniki GUPS produced book titled *Palestinian poetry) 
On the one hand, this stamp portrays the image of Jerusalem that many 
Palestinians in Greece wish to see as their future capital, which symbolises a 
politicised connection to Palestine and forms a very important aspect of the 
Palestinian cause. On the other hand, the writing on it is both Greek and Arabic, 
representative perhaps, of its position ýin-between' Greece and Palestine. It also 
points out that officially at least, the Parikia is a company: the banner in Greek 
translates as 'The Palestinian Parikia Company, Greece'. Its status as an 
economic venture must mean that it is run as a business, not as a charity or 
organisation. Although this does not change the fact that it is a political, 
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diasporic space, it highlights the importance and role of money in the material 
creation and maintenance of diasporic spaces and the political activities, such as 
advocacy of the Palestinian cause that occur within them. This may also explain 
its supposed connections with and representation of more wealthy Palestinians as 
is claimed by a number of participants, which is outlined below. The existence of 
such diasporic spaces does not automatically ensure that Palestinians feel 
resistant within them or as a result of their engagement with them because of the 
power relations, inequalities and constructions of difference and representation 
that occur. As Featherstone (2003: 408) stresses: "attention needs to be directed 
to the [multiple] ways in which political activity both negotiates and creates 
cross-cutting relations of power". This may explain why there appears to a strong 
divide amongst Palestinians who go to the Pankia and like it and those who do 
not go and do not like it. 
The Parikia as a political space? 
The following discussion illustrates what the Pankia means to one Palestinian,, 
culturally, socially and politically. Bilal (33, FCE), who regularly attends 
meetings feels: 
I can see a lot of Palestinians there. We can talk about our situation and we can 
also talk about how we can do something as a group. One person on his own 
cannot do anything; if we are a group then we can do something and I believe in 
the media a lot in order to publicise your case to the people and to let people 
know. 
Liz: So you think the Parikia is a good idea? 
Mal: Yes, yes. I think it used to exist before but it was different then; now more 
people go and there are more young people there too as there's a 
lot of students 
coming to study and they have ideas to talk about and they want to 
do things so 
1. t's good. 
Liz: Do you think it"s a political place then, as well as social and cultural place? 
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Mal: When you sit with people, you will understand something about Palestine 
when you're there, about, for example, when people went there, theil- 
experiences and I like to go and listen and learn things about Palestine. 
Bilal reveals the ways in which Palestinians may be politically active in the 
Pankia, through their social interactions. The fact that he feels he can "learn 
things about Palestine there" also highlights the importance of it as a space that 
is actively used to connect Palestinians to Palestine, through the bringing of 
politicians from Palestine as well as speeches by Palestinians who have been 
there recently. Therefore, he suggests that learning about Palestine is a political 
act in itself Those who attend, such as Bilal, appear to do so without any clear 
perception or admission that they are being political in the process because their 
activities may appear more social. Yet his ambivalence over the question of 
whether he sees it as a political space appears to illustrate how merged the 
political, social and cultural are within Palestinian lives, feelings and actions. As 
a result, it may be difficult for them to distinguish between them. For example, 
men appear more likely to discuss the symbolic and political significance of the 
villages they originated from and the homeland, Greek politics, cultural and 
political events that have taken place or will take in Greece, Palestine and 
worldwide and so forth. 
Women, who often sit separately from men, may also discuss such issues 
but they seem more likely to talk about domestic matters, although many are also 
politicised and interested in politics. They too may participate in more organised 
political discussions. For example, during a visit to the Pankia by the researcher, 
one woman who had recently visited her family in the West Bank describes her 
social, cultural and political experiences of her trip. Both men and women then 
ask her questions about her visit. In particular, she is asked her political opinions 
of the situation there and her feelings of living in Greece away from 
her family. 
Her responses are both optimistic and pessimistic, culminating 
in her expression 
of deep-seated feelings of guilt with her safe and relatively secure 
life in Athens. 
Palestinian men and women are negotiating what it means to 
be 
Palestinian in Greece as well as issues of 'identity', citizenship, statehood and 
representation in the Pankia. They debate injustices, their 
human and political 
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rights, demands, their needs as Palestinians and people of the world. As such 
discussions are dynamic, they do not always talk about these things, but 
Palestine and the Palestinian cause always appear to be present, are latent, 
always in the background, informing their judgements, discussions and 
arguments. They are also reminded of their connections (and commitment? ) to 
Palestine by the physical space and its banal (and symbolic) objects such as 
photos of Arafat on the wall, food that is eaten 'there' served in the kitchen 
'here', talking to other Palestinians they would not normally meet. It is also a 
space that Unions have used (the new Workers' Union have had meetings there 
and the GUPS have their base there). 
Palestinians, such as Bilal above, who attend the Parikia see such 
activities and relations as very important ways to resist and connect them as 
Palestinians and their lives in Greece to Palestine. As Featherstone (2003: 408) 
points out: "resistances are the products of multiple relations". Their actions 
within the Pankia and its material environment could also be seen as 
encouraging stereotypical or particular visions of what it means to be Palestinian. 
For example, men and women sitting separately is representative more, perhaps 
of Muslim Palestinians than Christian Palestinians, who may as a result, feel 
uncomfortable. This also illustrates how such spaces come to be seen as 
inclusive, exclusive, or misrepresentative by Palestinians. At the same time, their 
weekly consuming of 'Palestinian-ness' at the Parikia is always tempered and 
situated within their own daily realities of life in Greece. As some Palestinians 
interviewed also point out, the Pankia is also where they can discuss their 
different views; they are not necessarily conforming to a homogenised 
Palestinian 'identity'. As such, it is a space in which knowledges and 
constructions of Palestine are being formed and negotiated dynamically through 
the filter of being in Greece. 
The potential for the Parikia to be seen as representative of certain 'types' 
of Palestinians can be seen by Abir's (38, Arabic teacher) description: 
I go there if there is a meeting or a speech or there are events. 
It's a place to 
socialise, like a cqfiý. The men sit there playing cards, the women talk. 
7-here are 
Arabic lessons for children. These are children who are haýf Greek, haýf 
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Palestinian and they have another mentality. The Palestinians who go there 
speak Greek to their children you see. 
Abir inadvertently highlights the hybridity of the space, with its "half Greek, ) half 
Palestinian" children. At the same time, as an Arabic teacher, she approves of the 
Arabic lessons for children and there is a very slight hint of disapproval at 
parents who do speak Greek to their children. This may be because she feels it is 
important for Palestinian children to speak and remember Arabic whilst living in 
Greece, in order to ensure that this aspect of their 'identity' is leamt. Arabic is 
often seen as playing a major role in 'uniting' Palestinians in Greece, hence the 
political and strategic teaching of Arabic lessons at the Parikia. Abir's statement 
also highlights the perception some Palestinians have in Athens that it is more a 
space for Palestinian married to Greeks and who are more hybrid and somehow 
less 'pure' and who need to be encouraged to become and practice their 
'Palestinian identity' more. Like Abir, Nisreen (23, student, leader of GUPS) 
describes the Pankia in more cultural and social terms, as a space for families, 
nostalgic stones, gossip but she also hints at how such a space is perceived 
differently by men and women, highlighting its gendered nature: 
The Parikia is something different, a Palestinian who is married to a Greek 
woman, or a Palestinian woman married to a Greek guy, so they go just to 
remember the old stuff, oh when I was a student, when I was younger, and they 
take their wife to see another wife, it's like that ... there are morefamilies there, 
people who are working. 
Nisreen also sees it as a hybrid space in which Palestinians married to Greeks 
and their children are more likely to go. More importantly perhaps, both women 
do not see it as a space for political action or resistance. As a result, Abir, who is 
politically active, does not go. Nisreen, however, as President of the GUPS has 
organised Union meetings there, which although are proactive and very much 
politically infused, she appears to see as separate from what she perceives as the 
cultural and social space of the Pankia. What is interesting about these Student 
Union meetings is the continuous mixing of Greek and Arabic; the same applies 
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to all meetings that take place there. Although Arabic prevails, there are 
sprinklings of Greek words tossed into the conversation at regular intervals. This 
is not surprising given the fact that Palestinians who go there may have lived 
over 20 years in Greece, that their wives may be Greek and have children of 
mixed origin. 
There are other Palestinians in Athens who also perceive it as just a 
cultural and social space, but for whom this is problematic, as they would rather 
it be more politically active. Rania, (38, FCE) for example, feels that: 
there, it's just gossip, I don't like it. It's just sitting there, gossiping. No actions 
are done, nothing is taken into consideration, there are only words. We have to 
be active, they, there have to be more active, have more contact with people, 
organ ise fundraising, bazaars, events should take place every week. 
Rania's views suggest that the Parikia as simply a space as it is currently, despite 
its appearance as a political space suggested above, is not enough given the 
current state of affairs in Palestine. As a result, she does not go but is politically 
active in other ways, highlighting it as a space that is exclusive to those who see 
it as lacking in its political role. Layla (38, FCE) also describes her own similar 
feelings on it: 
Well, let me tell you something, these people go there just to meet socially, they 
celebrate things sometimes for Palestine, or they have people from Palestine 
talking. Why haven't I been there? 
Liz: Yes, I was going to ask you that! 
Layla: Why? (laughs) The thing is, I'm really very busy, so I can't just go an_v 
time they say they are having something, but I would have gone and I wouldfind 
the time to go if I thought that what they were doing was really useful. It's just 
only talking and talking and talking, just words. 
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Liz: What would you like to see happen here? 
Layla: Things should be more organised and what the are doing shoulc/ be Y 
directed to the Europeans. We have to tell the Europeans, come here and look 
and listen, to see the truth because Israelis they are really better than us in this; 
they do it better all the time. They go to each person and say see this is what we 
want and this i's what is happening. What about us? We are owners of the right, 
we are stronger than them because we have the right, so why don't have that? 
But we Arabs are so lazy. Also, we are not supported by the Arabs. 
Unfortunately, not the government or the people are supporting us - it's just 
words. They say we love Palestine and the Palestinians and we do whatever they 
want but nothing happens. And its not only that - me I can't go to Egypt, to 
Saudi Arabia, I can't go to Tunis, I can't go anywhere in the Arab world. It's 
much easier to get a visa to go to the United States than to an Arab country. Just 
words blah blah blah. We have to have good media, a schedule, a plan, to tell 
the Greeks the truth, what's really going on. Maybe after that, we might get a 
good support from Greece. If I want to know what's happening in Palestine, I 
have hundreds of channels to tell me, so I don't have to wait until someonefrom 
Palestine to come and tell me - they need to do things to help the Palestinians, at 
least the ones who are here. I need something stronger to be done, to help me 
practically. Something to change my life. I think this is my duty, something I can 
do to help Palestinians. 
Liz: And you don't feel that Palestinians do this enough? 
Layla: Our problems, I think are heavier than our weight, it's too much. Some 
people, I don't want to find excuses for them but all of us have our own problems 
and our problems are really so hard and so tough, so theyjust think about their 
own life, their own problems. 
For Layla, the Parikia as a space where political action and political participation 
may take place is inadequate and she would like to see it become more 
radicalised. At the same time, although she acknowledges the difficulties of 
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doing this, she is adamant that more must be done to practically help 
Palestinians, such as herself This is interesting, as she is not only talking about 
the advocacy of the Palestinian cause to help fellow Palestinian 'there' in more 
abstract terms, which is what the majority of Palestim I as ians in Athens do. Here, 
in so many Palestinian discussions on what they understand by the notion of 
6political', everyday, informal and disorganised acts of talking, dealing with 
problems, and generally living their lives as Palestinians in Greece are not 
overtly seen as political or resistant. It is such perceptions of everyday actions as 
non-political that may trigger feelings of apathy and disillusionment and that 
merely advocating the cause in such ways amounts to nothing. Layla's 
perception that not enough is being done in an organi I fashion to help 
Palestinians echo those of many participants. Layla also hints at an important 
perceived obstacle to inclusion at and involvement in such spaces: lack of time. 
This is a very important note and is one that affects perceptions and realities of 
political advocacy and resistance. As Lina (38, businesswoman) argues: 
They do activities and sometimes at Christmas, they do charity things, they do a 
party and they collect the money to send down there to different charities, to a 
camp or to a hospital. People here try but the thing is, what I told you before, a 
big percentage of Palestinians and, theirfirst worry is to work and support their 
family, which is maybe why not everyone can participate. 
Jamal (34, FCE) also points out what he feels the Parikia is lac ing in: 
It's a good start because people are gathering but you have to do more and you 
need a structure. "at they are doing there is more simple, not strong, 
superficial, more social. We have to make people understand our case more, to 
be able to argue our case, using the media, jundraising. We need something 
more long-term. 
Jamal, like Layla above is disillusioned by the Pankia's lack of political 
organisation and energy. As Palestinians who are politically active in other 
diasporic spaces and ways, they are viewing the Parikia from a particular angle. 
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For them, resistance and advocacy needs more commitment than those involved 
in the Pankia appear to have, yet they do not appear to be willing to help make 
those changes within the Parikia. 
Other Palestinians, such as Karim (24, student) go because they feel they 
have to: "you meet other Palestinians there, you talk, so it's good but I don't 
really have time to go often. I am doing other things. But I do feel that it is my 
duty to go there sometimes". Perhaps the Pankia is not so much a space that 
students such as Karim feel able to go to and feel included or comfortable in, but 
that they feel obliged to frequent. This may also be true of others who go there 
to. By going there, they are showing their commitment to the Palestinian cause 
and how they perceive Palestinians should be and act; they can be 'true' 
Palestinians, even if it is just for an afternoon. For Karim,, being Palestinian may 
be tied to attendance at the Parikia; the Parikia, as a space acts an important link 
to Palestine and may form a major role in his feelings of being and acting as 
Palestinian. This in turn, may have triggered his involvement in activism, which 
has ranged from going to demonstrations to telling Greeks the 'truth' about 
Palestine and the Palestinians, acts of resistance and advocacy which, before, 
coming to Greece he did not do. Thus the significance in the Parikia can be seen 
as political space which may encourage constructions of 'Palestinian-ness' to be 
negotiated as politicised and which may result in political activities. Tamara, (32, 
researcher) therefore, appears to be right in believing that the Parikia is 
especially important for students, who do not have their families with them, so 
that they may feel closer to the home they have left behind (bearing in mind, that 
for most, this will not be the West Bank, or Gaza 3): 
It could be a better place. There is diversity there in terms ofpeople who go but 
they don't have the capacity or the energy to do much. For the students, it's an 
important place though where they can go being awayfrom home. 
3 According to Haleef, an embassy official, most students in Athens are not from the West Bank 
or Gaza, but from wealthier families spread throughout the rest of Middle 
East. This is because 
being a student in Greece is often an expensive process, (despite the fact that they get their 
tuition 
paid for) due to living costs. 
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The potential for students to be politically influenced by places such as the 
Pankia appears to be high. However, Tamara's reference to 'home' is 
misleading; she may mean, on the one hand, simply that they are able to meet 
other Palestinians and speak Arabic at the Pankia, which may remind them of 
their families. On the other hand, she may be referring to the Parikia as a space 
that is able to reconnect them to their homeland and in the process, potentially 
make them more politicised and politically active as they 'rediscover' their roots. 
Tamara also points to the diversity she feels is present there, which she appears 
to see as a good thing, as for her, it seems to be an open, inclusive space. There 
are other Palestinians who do not seem so positive about this diversity and feel 
that it is misrepresentative of 'proper' Palestinians, and that too many 
Palestinians who are more 'integrated' into Greek society go there. 
Representation is an issue that Palestinians in Athens feel strongly about. 
In the case of the Parikia and other diasporic spaces, its importance is 
highlighted by feelings of inclusion and exclusion that occur within and as a 
result of such spaces. These feelings are often the result of perceptions of 
whether they are being fairly or inadequately represented by such spaces and the 
people within them. Unsurprisingly, there are those who feel that the Parikia 
does not represent them and as a result they may feel excluded from attending, or 
if they do, they may feel uncomfortable or restricted in terms of discussions and 
potential actions. As Ibrahim (32, construction worker) explains: 
We do go, but Ipersonally don't like it very much. 
Liz: Why not? 
Ibrahim: Because those who have set it up don't represent those Palestinians 
who are living this nightmare, who are resisting. They only set it upjustfor the 
I. mage, justfor people to see them doing something but they don't have anything 
to do with those who are involved in the struggle, so they are not really involved 
in or doing anything about it to help, in my opinion. And the leader, the 
chairman is a very rich Palestinian, okay he does care I suppose. Okay, 
I've 
been there a few times. I like being with the Palestinians but we are still at the 
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beginning here and it's still new so they don't do so much and there 1. sn't much 
there; they don't do many things. 
Liz: Do you think that the majority of people who go there are wealthy? 
Ibrahim: There are some poorer people who go but the people in the other 
category who have more money do whatever they want anyway so it doesn't 
make any difference ifpoorer people go. It represents certain people, a certain 
category ofpeople, not everyone. It represents their social circles. It'Sfor show, 
so that people can go and show off that they have it all. But that's just how it 
always is. It's always the rich who have the upper hand on everything. 
Liz: They do what they want? 
Ibrahim: Yes, they do whatever they want. 
Liz: Are there not other places that Palestinians go to? 
Ibrahim: That's the only place and as I told you it's new. 
Ibrahim suggests that money has a role to play in who goes there; consequently, 
it may be seen as elitist although his negative perceptions of it have not 
prevented him from going which he appears to do for his family's sake. His 
remarks also highlight what he feels is a lack of visible and representative space 
Palestinians can be involved in politically; yet it may be that those who do not 
find the current spaces inclusive decide to create their own alternatives. For him, 
this involves informal networks and connections with Palestinian families he 
feels he can relate to, which for him and other Palestinians are just as important 
as the Pankia. Ironically, therefore, despite the attempts to create the Pankia as a 
space in which to potentially unite Palestinians, it may actually also be 
fragmenting them. At the same time, though, this is not necessarily having an 
adverse affect on potential political activism, as those not involved in it are still 
politicised and may feel more able to pursue activities or constructions of 'shared 
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consciousness' that they feel are beneficial to Palestinians in Greece and beyond. 
For Ibrahim, for example, being Palestinian in Greece is intimately linked to 
Islam and living as a Muslim forins a very large aspect in his family's life. This 
is something he advocates to other Palestinians and Greeks he meets; he is, 
therefore, constructing and perpetuating his particular notions of what it means 
to be Palestinian. In the process, his concerns and political activities may be 
different to those Palestinians who are committed to the Parikia. For him, for 
example, the building of Mosques in Athens is of paramount importance and a 
priority in terms of Palestinian rights and needs in Athens. Likewise, in his 
discussions of the Palestinian cause, he may be more likely to highlight the 
religious aspects of what it means to be Palestinian. Although this is arguably 
leading to more diverse representation of what it means to be and feel Palestinian 
in Athens, it is also serving to create tensions amongst Palestinians, particularly 
those who are Christian, or who may not feel that religion forms a major aspect 
of being Palestinian (discussed in more detail in Chapter Five). 
Other Palestinians in Athens are even more negative about the Parikia as 
a representative space. Fadila (30, housewife) also illustrates how easily people 
are put off from attending and being involved in such spaces. One negative 
impression seems enough to deter some from further attendance: 
Fadila: There is no organisation here that gathers Palestinians. 
Liz: What about the Pankia in Papagou? The Community House? 
Fadila: Well, it's a social thing isn't it? But you know, there is no 
democracy 
there. We got an invitation several years ago saying come and votefor the 
leader 
of the community but it was ridiculous; there was only one candidate and we 
were supposed to votefor him, so we didn't go. 
This quote pinpoints how crucial the Issue of representation 
is for many 
Palestinians as individuals and as a group. The testimonies provided above 
appear to show that diasporic spaces such the Parikia, although 
theoretically an 
open and inclusive space, are at the same time, contested as well as 
closed and 
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exclusive. What is potentially problematic though is that the fact that some 
Palestinians feel excluded does not appear to bother those who do go a great 
deal. Thus, a self-perpetuating cycle of exclusion and possibly fragmentation 
may be occurring. It seems that because those who disapprove or who see it as 
useless do not go, their voices and perceptions are not heard by those who do and 
nothing is done to change the status quo. It seems that in the process of stressing 
and reconstructing the 'unity' of Palestinians in Athens, leaders and members of 
the Palestinian diaspora have ignored and suppressed vital differences. 
Constructions of Palestinian 'unity' in Greece tend to ignore the disunities and 
tensions that arise as a result of differences. Yet, these very disunities highlight 
the diverse nature of Palestinian lives and identities in Athens. This diversity and 
difference may be something Palestinians should expect, welcome and work with 
to promote tolerance and understanding within the diaspora in Greece. The 
Pankia, in particular, despite being an informal diasporic space, is one that is 
visible and supposedly open to all Palestinians in Athens. It, therefore, has the 
potential to fulfil such a role. It may constitute a site for 'action' and 
'engagement' (see Cornwall 2002, quoted in McEwan 2005: 5) needed to 
encourage feelings of empowerment and lessen feelings of apathy and despair. 
The Unions 
The GUPW, GUPS and their associated activities and events also constitute 
diasporic political spaces. They constitute spaces similar to the Pankia, although 
they are perhaps more exclusionary in the sense that they are limited in terms of 
who can become a member. Despite this, they must be considered, as they form 
well-known diasporic spaces in Athens and for those involved in them they are 
potentially very politically active. The GUPS, for example, played an 
instrumental role in abolishing tuition fees for Palestinian students in 1976. 
Haleef s memories (Appendix Nine) highlight the positive relationships 
between 
Greeks and Palestinians at the time, which are still evident in 
diasporic spaces. 
He describes the response of the Minister the students went to in order to ask 
for 
the removal of fees: 
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Fffe told us. - I, when I see Arabs, Palestinians speaking the Greek language, as 
you do, when they are studying and under the difficulties they are experiencing 
and the stress they have to go through and they thefact that they have learnt 
Greek - it is my debt to help you. I am obligated to; I'm not doing you a favour. 
Haleef goes on to describe the importance of the Unions: 
The Unions, be it the students or the doctors are very important. First of all they 
ease relations. Instead of me having to deal with all the students one by one, I 
have contact with the Students' Committee. They communicate to me all the 
problems they have. We gather them or many times it is their decision to gather 
and the Ambassador or I go and give them a political update and report. I can't 
call all the students one by one. The Union collects them when there is going to 
be a meeting. They all gather in a room and we inform them of events and so on; 
we have contact in this way. They take over our political role in their own space 
that they live in their universities, on their boards. They have boards in their 
departments where they put up our announcements, where meetings or 
demonstrations are going to be held. Their role, without exaggeration, is very 
important. We see their role as even more important than our role in reality and 
in terms of political activities and actions. This is because they are in the 
community. Don't look at me who's been herefor so long and who has relations 
and so on. There could be colleagues of mine who have come from another 
country who may not even know Greek - how is he to know what is happening in 
Greek society. The Unions, the doctors, the students, they are the ones who tell 
the embassy what is happening in the community. The representatives deliver the 
political messages to the Greek government. And we've never had any problems 
in their attitude as Unions or in terms of the jobs they do or with the Greek 
authorities. They are correct in their attitudes. 
As an official at the embassy now, Haleef feels that an important role that 
Unions have to play is promoting 'unity' and harmony amongst Palestinians and 
good relations with Greeks. He also clearly highlights what he feels is the 
political role Unions have to play, ideologically and practically, in terms of 
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understanding the political mood of the 'community' and relating its needs to the 
embassy and Greek goveniment. Sa'id (25, student) Is also very positive about 
the political, social and cultural spaces Unions constitute that he feels can be 
helpful and potentially empowering for those involved: 
Now, the basic element of the Union is elections, which you get elected, you're 
going to try and provide for your country and for the students of your countrvý 
what has been provided for you ... we try to bring out the Palestinian culture to 
Greece, through Palestinian dances, through pictures, movies, a couple of 
festivals, so we show the Greeks how they live and everything. The third thing is, 
we as students here have to keep our students together, united. Sometimes we 
have a party, sometimes a barbecue, sometimes we have a trip to get close to 
each other because all of us we'reforeigners here. We are Palestinians and we 
are allforeigners. 
Liz: Do students feel empowered then as a result? 
Sa'id: Yes, more so, I would say... 
Liz: As someone who is involved in the Union, do you feel that you are doing 
something to help the situation there? 
Sa'id: Yes. We all have a small role to play. As small as it can be, I don't know 
how much I can offer. If I work in a diplomatic area, I can offer more, but me 
helping the students here who comefrom there, Ifeel that when he goes back or 
calls his family, like this kid yesterday when he called his mum, he said mum, 
don't worry, I'm with my own family now, with another family now; they take 
care of me, everything. 
Liz: Do you think that Palestinians generally feel the same way as you, that they 
are doing something to help? 
S a'i d: Yes. 
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Liz: Are there opportunities here for Palestinians to help? 
Sa'Id: They're trying to help as much as they can. If a person has a problem, if 
one Palestinian knows that there is another Palestinian who has a problem, then 
he will help him out, just because he's Palestinian and we are supposed to help 
each other. We have to help each other because we are all outside of our 
country, so if we don't stick together and we don't help each other, no-one's 
going to help us. 
Sa'Id's discussion illustrates the complex political, social and cultural nature of 
diasporic spaces and the ways in which such spaces may serve to connect 
Palestinians within Athens. His comment of "we are Palestinians and we are all 
foreigners" points to his need to create spaces in which to help curb feelings of 
insecurity and alienation being a foreigner may invoke. Yet, at the same time, as 
someone who is deeply involved in the GUPS, he is also hopeful and aware that 
such a 'coming together' and helping can have political implications in terms of 
Palestinian students' propensity to help and act. 
The following quote by Mahmud (24, student) illustrates how both 
Unions' political activities based around advocating the Palestinian cause may be 
dependent on the interrelationships between Palestinians and Greeks within 
diasponc spaces: 
Liz: Are there many opportunities here for fundraising to raise money for 
Palestine within the Unions? 
Mahmud: There is and we did it. You hadfrom the Greek Workers Association, 
they were giving away coupons with one euro and they save up the money and 
they send it to Palestine. That happened last winter. That was the 
last big 
campal . gn, but in small organisations and NGOs it happens a lot. It 
happens 
from lay, everyday people just raising money, collecting food, sugar, milk. 
There's really a lot ofsupportftom the Greeks. 
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The importance of having material and inclusive spaces as locations where 
Palestinians feel they can gather, give each other advice and support as well as 
articulate what their rights and benefits should be, is illustrated by Issam (53, 
Leader of 'old' GUPW): 
At this moment, we are having difficulties in establishing a place, like a club let's 
say. Usually, they have the Parikia, the community house and it isn't enough. 
Now we are getting a place for the Union; we will start some activities there. 
The Community theyjust open their house one day a week, we are going to have 
ours open all week, some hours in the evening so that they can come, lookfor 
jobs, make connections. We are trying to do something different. And we hope 
that we are going to succeed. 
Issam continues by outlining the importance of the relationship between 
reconstructions of 'unity' and political action within such spaces: 
Now on the conditions of the workers here in Greece, we work here with pride, 
even if we are a small community. But we are active, we have a Students' Union, 
we have a Doctors' Union, we have the Parikia, we have the Workers' Union 
and soon we will have an Engineers' Union, so we are trying to unite ourselves 
with Unions and things like that. 
These words are echoed in a speech Issarn gives at the launch of the manifesto of 
a newly formed far-left Greek political party. He claims to speak on behalf of 
Palestinians in Greece and is well-received by the audience with whose party he 
appears to be trying to align himself Thus, symbiotic relationships of mutual 
benefit seem to exist between Greek and Palestinian organisations. It appears to 
be the norm for leftist groups in Greece to advocate Palestinian issues and this 
could also be seen as an attempt to gain popular support. For Palestinians, the 
relationship is positive as they gain allies in the advocacy of their cause. Yet, 
problems can arise when speakers such as Issam claim to represent and speak 
for 
Palestinians in Greece. As outlined in Chapter Five, there are certain Palestinians 
who see the Union created by Issam as illegal and as they watched 
him on the 
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stage, they became frustrated by his claims. The Greek organisers of the rally 
seemed oblivious to this conflict and were, therefore, happy to let Issam speak on 
behalf of all Palestinians in Greece. However, this also illustrates the relative 
success that Palestinians have had in portraying a united front in Greece; the 
Greek organisations with whom Palestinians are involved do not seem aware of 
the tensions that do exist within the diaspora in Athens. It seems that such rifts 
are dealt with internally as far as possible. 
There are Palestinians in Athens such as Layla (38, FCE) are not so 
positive about the present role and actions of the Unions; as a former member of 
the GUPS, she feels it is not as active as it used to be. As menti this ioned above5 
also highlights the fact that activism for Palestinians in Athens is indeed dynamic 
and changes in intensity and nature over time depending on factors such as the 
general political situation and climate, events in the Middle East and individual 
propensity to act and be involved. Layla certainly believes that the GUPS was 
more active in the past, when she was part of it: 
I used to be a member of the Students' Union - that was great because we used 
to do many good things. They are active, so when I was a student, it was so 
active you can't imagine. I used to bring my teachers from the American 
University, they were American, to listen to us. One teacher, she saw us dance 
our dances and listened to us and I asked her what she thought and she said, I'm 
so proud ofyou. It was really great, but unfortunately these days they're not. 
Liz: You don't think they're so active? 
Layla: Not like us. It was when the Palestinian camps in Beirut were surrounded 
by the Lebanese and many of the Palestinians were dying of hunger, 
it was 
horrible, so we did a hunger strike for 48 hours then - now 
it's not the same. 
They are trying to do some things and I hope they will succeed, why not. 
At the same time, and despite her initial pessimism, a glimmer of 
hope does 
appear, which is typical of the constant tension 
between hope and 
disillusionment that Palestinians in Athens experience. Nisreen, the President of 
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GUPS is awarel however, of certain obstacles to joining the Union. In response 
to a question on whether the majority of students in Athens are members of the 
GUPS, she says: 
Mmm, yes, or maybe they come, but they don't come another day, or they are 
afraid to be in the Palestinian Union. They think it's something like a political 
organisation and they don't want to keep in touch, they say because they go to 
demonstrations and so on, and maybe outside the Israeli embassy, they take a 
picture of them and send it down to his country and then he can't pass through 
Palestine, so they get afraid of that and they don't want to ... okay they will come 
tojestivals and things like that but they don't go to the demonstrations. They say 
it's nice, good, but I can't do it, I won't be involved. 
In response to a question on whether he feels he is helping, Karim (24, student) 
also describes how he feels surveillance is an obstacle to advocacy in Athens: 
Yes. Whatever I do for them it's nothing - they are giving a lot, their life, their 
fteedom, their everything and really you wish you could do something to help 
them but what can you do unless you have stronger organisations and they are 
united and really things are difficult. Now, its easy to say something that is not 
considered right and they can catch you - there are many organisations helping 
Palestinians in Palestine that have been closed because of this. So even if you 
have an organisation that is trying to give money or help they willfind you and 
say that you are doing something wrong, so we are losing hope sometimes, but 
we have to have hope because if we don't we will lose the battle but we are 
human beings, we havejeelings. 
Despite the fact that on the whole, Palestinians in Athens do feel safe and secure, 
some are always suspicious and scared of getting involved in anything that will 
Jeopardise their potential mobility. This surveillance they feel they are under is 
intimately linked to their lack of formal citizenship and the fact that they 
feel 
that, as Palestinians, they are subject to intense scrutiny especially 
by Israel, 
which controls their movements in and out of the West Bank and 
Gaza. At the 
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same time and somewhat ironically, those without a Palestinian 'identity card' 
and with other citizenship statuses such as Jordanian may feel freer to get 
involved in advocacy and activism, because they are not subject to as much 
scrutiny by Israel. A situation exists, therefore, that those who may wish to get 
involved the most in homeland politics and activism are the very ones who are 
most wary of doing so (and are the ones who are least likely to be allowed into 
the Occupied Territories). The issues of fear and anxiety as a result of control, 
surveillance and discrimination are ones that cannot be ignored as they have 
large impacts on present and ftiture political participation. These issues also 
highlight the particular difficulties associated with diasporic spaces that are more 
overtly political. The overwhelming perceptions by Palestinians in Athens that 
their actions do not constitute political activism may also, therefore, be linked to 
their fears (and realities) of surveillance and discrimination. They may not want 
to be seen as politically active as this may have negative repercussions for them 
if they wish to return or visit Palestine/Israel. Thus, spaces such as the Parikia 
that may appear less political may be more effective at allowing Palestinians to 
be and feel politically active. 
The embassy 
The embassy can be seen as a semi-official diasporic political space with distinct 
and continuous relations with the Greek government and political organisations 
in Palestine and claims to represent Palestinians in Greece. 4 The embassy 
provides documentation and advice to Palestinians on residency and citizenship 
issues. It also co-ordinates official relations between Greeks and Palestinians and 
has an important role to play in advocating the Palestinian cause and 
constructions of 'Palestinian-ness' to the Greek public, government and media. 
During an interview with Haleef, an embassy official, for example, it became 
clear that he was well rehearsed in explaining and promoting the Palestinian 
cause and issues to the Greek media (using talk shows and the news, for 
4 This discussion of the embassy as a diasporic political space has to be read and understood in 
tandem with its role in helping to construct and encourage particular notions of 'unity' and 
Palestinian 'identity' and the tensions this has resulted in, outlined in Chapter Five. Here the 
focus is more on the material political activities in which the embassy is involved (as those 
within it and associated to it strive to advocate the Palestinian cause) but also on perceptions of 
the embassy as a political space, which is inclusive, exclusive and active. 
274 
instance) and the goverriment (through close personal and official networks). 
Through its Greek and Palestinian networks, it is heavily involved in organising 
political activities that advocate and support the Palestinian cause such as 
demonstrations, chanty events and bringing political commentators and 
politicians from Palestine and the Middle East to talk both at the embassy and at 
the Pankia. 
It is a space, which occupies a detached house in a wealthy suburb of 
Athens, in which there are also many other embassies. It appears to be an area 
frequented more by men than women, although there are women working there 
in what seem to be secretarial and cleaning capacities. Nadia, (24, housewife) 
who has worked there, praises what she calls the "friendly and open atmosphere 
there" and claims to have "really enjoyed my time there" because of "the type of 
space it is. It is the best place to find out what is going on politically in Palestine. 
I found it very interesting and stimulating. " It seems relatively open to those 
Palestinians who want to visit it and there are Palestinians who are very 
supportive of it and its political actions and feel that it does what it can. For them 
it is a space, which actively enables them to discuss politics and help the 
embassy in its political role and activities. Bilal (33, FCE), Nadia's husband, 
discusses his relationship with the embassy and its importance as a political 
space, in which advocacy may take place: 
I know about computers, so if they need anything I go every week and I help 
them and actually because I like to go there and I hear the latest news there 
about what's going on in Palestine. 
Liz: Do you think that the embassy is doing a good job here? 
Mal: Yes, I don't know their budget but I believe that if they had more money 
that they could do more. It's important to be in groups for business, to raise 
awareness, for everything andfor Greeks and Palestinians to work togetherfor 
Palestine and do whatever it takes and I think if will do something like this, they 
will be more active and the Palestinians here will do something 
for the 
Palestinians there. But it depends on their budget. 
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Liz: So they do a lot of good things to help Palestinians both here and there? 
Mal: Yes, yes -I should tell you that the Palestinian embassy here brings 
people here to study, people for medical reasons, who have been wounded and 
they have brought children from Palestine to go camping in Greece so that they 
can forget the situation there for a bit and to experience something different; 
they do this every year, which I think is very good. They also take Greeks from 
here to go to Palestine to visit and I think usually, Palestinians expect morefrom 
the embassy. But I look at the whole image, the big picture; you can't put a big 
rock on a tiny pebble. They do a goodjob with what they have. 
Bilal is supportive of the embassy and feels it is doing what it can politically 
given the resources it has. Those Palestinians in Athens who support the embassy 
and its representations and definitions of Palestinians seem to do so willingly. 
This is because of personal relationships and networks and similar political 
beliefs (in other words, they are pro-PLO or at least tolerate it although this is 
not necessarily the case as they may have contact with the embassy because they 
need it for various reasons). Mound (38, FCE) also frequents the embassy, with 
which he is on good tenns. For example, as a result of his attendance at an event 5 
there in which a politician from the West Bank spoke, he felt both empowered 
and despairing. On the one hand, he was excited at being able to meet, listen and 
discuss the political situation in Palestine with this man. It made him feel 
"hopeful for things there, that there are people there trying to do things and that 
they are willing to listen to someone like me, who does not live there and has not 
visited it for twenty years. It was a great opportunity. " On the other hand, the 
event also made him think about the "amount of work that still needs to be done, 
which is depressing, both here, you know, with explaining the Palestinian cause 
to the Greeks and there". 
The embassy as a political space is contested. Palestine is not yet an 
officially recognised state. Palestinians living in Athens have not voted for its 
current leaders. It is, therefore, understandable that not all Palestinians may 
accept it as a legitimate political representative of Palestinian interests in Greece 
5 This appears to be an event in which a small number of Palestinians were formally invited to. 
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and Palestine. For example, the closed and restricted nature of the event Mounid 
went to, described above illustrates that the embassy can be inclusive and active 
politically for some and exclusive and politically inactive for others. Numerous 
respondents find the embassy problematic and inadequate as a political space and 
actor. Some Palestinians who do not feel they are supported by the embassy (or 
who have little or no contact with it) perceive that it excludes and does not help 
or represent. Masud (26, construction worker) describes a situation where he 
feels this happened: 
"en the embassy said I was allowed to go back to Palestine - they sent me via 
Jordan - but when I got to the border, I was told that I could not enter. I had 
been lied to, but when I got back to Greece, the embassy said 'we sent him to 
Palestine, but he came back', like it was myjault ... another time, I went to get a 
paper that I needed and they refused to give it to me. They said that it would 
create a lot of difficulties for them. I said okay, and I left but then I talked to a 
friend of mine who said that they give this paper all the time. So I got really 
angry and I went back and threatened them and in the end I got it. IfPalestinians 
don't help Palestinians who will? "y should I have to shout to get my rights, 
what I need from my own people? The people in the embassy are empty. They 
are not truly Palestinian, or with al-Fateh, or whatever. Theyjust say whatever 
will benefit them the most. And people feel that they have to maintain good 
relations with it because it has power, because it gives out papers people need, 
but it doesn't treat Palestinians equally. For example, if they find out you are 
from Gaza, they don't care but ifyou arefrom the West Bank, they welcome you, 
all smiles, so they help those who they think have more money. 
Masud also maintains that the embassy is always short of money and resources 
and for this reason is more likely to align itself and support those who are 
wealthy, such as the Palestinian owners of businesses. This can have important 
implications for those without large sums of money. For example, Masud claims 
that in the past, the embassy was not willing to help him with a pay 
dispute with 
his Palestinian employer because the employer was wealthy and the embassy 
did 
not want to upset him or lose his support. Therefore, there 
does seem to be some 
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form of favouritism. occumng although It Is unl1kely that the embassy would 
publicly acknowledge this. 
The embassy is also far from trouble-free in terins of perceptions of 
representation and political action. Fadila (30, housewife) feels that: 
The embassy does what it can I suppose with the resources it has, but we were 
not impressed at all with the Ambassador. We were at this demonstration and he 
was addressing the crowd of mainly Greek people in English! How can you 
communicate Palestinian issues to the Greeks effectively ifyou don't even speak 
the language? This isn't right - and he only got the job because of his 
connections to the PLO and Arafat. He's been here about 10 years and he 
doesn't know Greek! 
As a result, there are those Palestinians who feel that It is not fulfiffing Its role in 
advocating the Palestinian cause and engaging in political activities adequately 
enough. Tanq (60, doctor), for example, cites lack of time as a reason for the 
embassy and those involved with it not being politically active as they should be: 
Now that we have the PLO office, I mean the embassy, what we need is to be 
more active, because it's not like in the past when we had more time, now the 
problem is that we don't have time and in order to have a Union and keep it 
going, it's time consuming. 
What is more interesting about his comments is that he clearly sees the embassy 
as a PLO space and that he conflates the embassy with the Unions, as if they are 
the same thing. Clearly, he also expects both to be active spaces politically. 
Jamal (34, FCE) also talks about his disillusionment with the embassy as a 
political space for Palestinians: 
The community and the embassy should open channels for people to unite and 
they should make it as the plan because they are the authorities. 
If you don't 
make it as a plan, and more organised structure - they need more effort and 
wider minds, more global thinking, how to create these connections, 
but it is not 
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happening. They could do much more. They have a lack of resources and this is 
1. mportant to have. It makes everyone act personally and when you act personalli, 
you don't act enough; you have to act as a group. 
Abir (38, Arabic teacher) also points out the fallacy of the embassy being a space 
of the Palestinian National Authonty (PNA) and its consequent lack of 
representation of Palestinians in Athens: 
It's nothing special. They don't do that much. Maybe they prefer to be the only 
ones in contact with people there. They have to realise that they cannot be 
isolated and be the only ones with contact. They represent the PNA but not 
everyone supports them so what are they supposed to do; they embassy does not 
represent them. They need to realise this and renovate the staff of the embassies 
to make itfairer and more representative. 
In addition to this, some Palestinians in Athens feel that the embassy simply 
does not and cannot represent them as a result of its biased decisions and actions 
and the fact that it is PLO affiliated. Layla (38, FCE) asserts that "the embassy 
represents Yasser Arafat" without problernatising it but in response a question 
about those who do not like Arafat and who do not, therefore, necessarily feel 
that the embassy represents them, she acknowledges that this is indeed a problem 
for Palestinians in Athens. This is because there are a number of Palestinians, 
who despite agreeing on Arafat as an important symbol of the Palestinian people, 
feel that he has made many wrong decisions and that it is time for him to step 
down. They feel that that more needs to be done politically in Greece. For 
example, Layla feels there are numerous political activities the embassy could 
engage in to ensure better treatment for Palestinians in Athens, considering its 
close links with the Greek government and its relative position of power. In 
response to a question on what she feels the embassy could do to help 
Palestinians, she says: 
To begin with - why don't they make it easlerfor us to come to 
Greece, for the 
people who don't have anywhere else to go? "y don't our residence permits 
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take on a better procedure? One that's easier than for others. Why couldn't we 
have them for longer, for 5 years, let's say? 
Liz: Who should be responsible for making things better for the Palestinians 
here? 
Layla: The embassy, they have to do more but I think some people are doing a 
goodjob and others aren't; it depends on the person. You have to have one aim, 
but I believe that sometimes that there is more than one. We need someone to be 
in charge, like a volunteer. I think we need somebody who understands many 
different mentalities because we have many different mentalities; we are from 
everywhere; we are not all the same. We need someone who understands the 
Palestinian problem; he can deal with us as individuals but he will also need 
some money or find a way to get us money, because you need money, as a 
minimum. That might be a good start. 
Liz: But there are the Unions, the Doctors' Union and the Workers' Union 
Layla: But they are not strong. I have friends in them and they say that they are 
not strong. The problem is that we are stubborn as Palestinians so if we believe 
something we will not back down, so this creates Problems. We don't 
compromise. I don't think we can do that - not all of us. I couldn't be this leader 
but if Ifound someone whofound me things to do to help thatfitted my lifestyle I 
would help, I would be the first to help; this is what I mean - we need someone 
who knows us and can deal with all sorts ofsituations. Like, he could say: Layla, 
you're busy, but since you're at home why don't you do this and this, to tell each 
of us what we can do according to our lives and situations. "y not? But who is 
this Palestinian?! (laughs). 
Layla's testimony illustrates the complexities involved in advocacy of the 
Palestinian cause that take place within different but interconnected times and 
unofficial diasporic spaces. Her perceptions of what 'help' should entail involves 
a mixture of ideas, people and places and of optimism and pessimism. She also 
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hints at the importance of using the home as a useful political space for women, 
such as herself who spend large amounts of time there. 
The house as a diasporic 'site of resistance' 
According to Armbruster (2002: 32), home "as a physical space can be a state of 
agency and lack thereof' (ibid.: 32). The useful conceptualisation of the house as 
a 'state of agency' reiterates it as a site or space of resistance. The house (or 
immediate domestic environment) can be seen as a hybrid, diasporic space, in 
which Palestinians are negotiating being Palestinian in Greece, being politicised 
and potentially engaging in advocacy as a result of cross-border connections. 
The house is a physical space where processes of existence and self as well as 
shared constructions of 'unity' and similarities (but also differences) are being 
articulated and represented on a daily basis. The house, notions of belonging, the 
'homeland' and 'being Palestinian' cannot be separated because they are very 
much interconnected. As Thomas (1997: 111) points out: 
Dynamic intermeshing of difference reveals the complex ways in 
which domestic space is pivotal in the struggle of the dispersed to 
make a place within both a fractured relationship to the real or 
imagined homeland and within the wider society. 
The idea of the house as a political (but also social and cultural) diasporic space 
is a very powerful one. A house is a concrete physical space that surrounds 
people on an everyday basis and becomes their living environment. At the same 
time, a house can be symbolic of home and become a social and cultural space 
that is meaningful to people; it is the interaction of both that has the potential to 
make home a 'site of resistance' or political space. For those in 
diaspora, such as 
Palestinians, with ambiguous and often complex or problematic relations with 
the state and formal citizenship, the house can become an 
important informal 
political space. It is within such spaces that Palestinians 
in Athens may feel free 
to resist, express themselves politically and where activism in 
the form of 
advocacy may be triggered or carried out. Diasporic spaces may also serve 
to 
emphasize differences between themselves and Greek society. 
Palestinian houses 
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form material domestic spaces in Athens that "are never immune from the social 
and political worlds that enclose them" (Thomas 1997: 110). This influences the 
symbolic and physical relationships Palestinians in Greece have with Greek 
society as a whole as well as the situation in Palestine and the wider Midd East. le 
Palestinian houses in Athens constitute crucial political spaces, as they 
may be where advocacy and political activities are discussed, negotiated and 
carried out. However, the effects the spatial distribution of Palestinian dwellings 
in Athens can have on the tendency to be involved in material political activities 
must also betaken into account. Wealthier Palestinians who are married tend to 
live in large apartments in the more desirable middle to upper class outer suburbs 
of Athens such as Politia, Marousi, Melissia, Halandri and Glyfada. Their spatial 
location in the pleasant suburbs of Athens may be a factor in their tendencies to 
use their homes as politicised diasporic spaces, whether for meetings or as 
repositories for 'homeland' artefacts for example. At the same time, their 
physical distance from the venues of many demonstrations, in the centre of 
Athens may explain comments such as those by Mahmud (24, student). He feels 
that the urban geography of Athens as a large, spatially dispersed city, does not 
lend itself to close-knit political, social and cultural networks despite the 
attempts to create them by certain members and organisations within the 
Palestinian diaspora in Athens. Those Palestinians who work for a large 
Palestinian-owned company also seem to form their own circles and who 
although may feel politically infused, may have very little contact with lower 
income Palestinians. 
Palestinians who are not so well off are more likely to live in more 
central locations in suburbs such as Petralona, Platia Attikis, Sepolia, Daffil and 
flats that are smaller and less comfortable. There are exceptions of course, but 
this generally seems to be the case. Palestinians who live in lower income areas 
appear to be more likely to meet up in cafes and public areas. In this way, their 
homes may have less symbolic importance and constitute spaces of material 
necessity; they may be seen more as spaces to simply eat, sleep and so on. 
It is 
important, therefore, to note the effects of the spatial geographies of homes in 
Athens that are linked to economic statuses as they can influence 
levels and 
networks of political agency and activism. The tendency of 
Palestinians living in 
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Athens to rent rather than own property may be symptomatic of high property 
prices, but it may also illustrate their feelings of transience and hybridity in 
Greece, and their continuous connections to Palestine. At the same time,, it may 
serve to increase feelings of rootlessness and insecurity. 
Blunt's work (1999) on embodied geographies of home illustrates the 
intimate relationships between the public and the private and between the spaces 
of domesticity and imperialism. Home is also seen as the space where colonial 
relations of power are exercised and maintained. In a similar vein, the Palestinian 
house can be seen as intimately connected to other informal diasporic spaces in 
Athens as well as to what are felt to be the colonised Occupied Territories of the 
West Bank and Gaza and the coloniser itself, Israel. Palestinian perceptions of 
the power Israel has over Palestinians could be seen as finding its way into 
Palestinian domestic spaces in Athens through the cross-border connections 
Palestinians have. The house may be a space where colonial and postcolonial 
relations and connections may co-exist in disjointed and ambivalent ways, a 
space where Palestinian perceptions of Israel as the coloniser are often pervasive 
and a source of bitterness and anger. Palestinians may feel that they cannot 
escape the occupation and colonialism they perceive is occurring as it follows 
them into own houses because of their cross-border connections to 
Palestine/Israel, despite their physical separation from it in Athens. At the same 
time, this can galvanise processes of resistance. Power relations present in 
Palestine/Israel may be seen as being actively struggled against within the house, 
as Palestinians in Athens use cultural artefacts and customs to create 
'Palestinian' spaces they feel comfortable and secure in and are able, as a result, 
to help them engage in potentially empowering political activities such as the 
advocacy of the Palestinian cause. Such diasporic spaces can, therefore, also be 
seen as spaces where colonial and postcolonial worlds may merge or clash. Their 
homes are both a material and symbolic reaction to what they perceive as Israeli 
imperialism and domination as well as attempted obliteration of their cultures 
and traditions (as well as lands). 
It is within the house as a physical space where those who have 
been 
subject to discrimination or marginalisation are seen as potentially 
deriving a 
source of active and latent power and agency. The notion of 
'homeplace' put 
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forward by hooks (1990) denotes the home as 'a site of resistance'. The home is 
seen as a haven, a reaffirmation and reconstruction of self and 'Identity' away 
from the public world. One also needs to accept that while domestic space is 
being constructed as a 'Palestinian' environment to help encourage a 'stable' 
Palestinian 'Identity', it is being negotiated as fractured, ambivalent and 'in- 
between'. As a hybrid, political space for Palestinians in Athens, the house is 'in- 
between' colonialism and postcolonialism, where Palestinians are resisting, 
subverting and attached to those whom they perceive as illegal occupiers (and, 
therefore, colonisers) of their land. The idea of the house as a political space and 
4site of resistance', therefore, highlights the importance of decoupling 'Identity' 
from political action and advocacy or, in other words, the idea that a stable or 
more essentialised 'identity' is needed in order to create and advocate change. 
Although houses are private and domestic spaces, the fact that 
Palestinians are articulating and contesting issues such as politics, 'Identity' and 
belonging as well as ways to be politically active in public spheres within them 
illustrates how arbitrary the division between public and private is. It is perhaps 
within houses that the connections between the personal and the political can be 
seen most clearly. The public and the private need to be thought of and 
conceptualised in tandem as each influences the other. The help or advocacy that 
finally materialises may often be the result of continuous negotiations in merging 
informal public and private spaces. Far from constituting isolated 'havens' of 
'identity', diasporic houses need to be seen as spatially and temporally connected 
to host and homeland societies and politics. Palestinian houses in Athens are 
connected to schools, offices, demonstrations, social gatherings, the Parikia, the 
Unions and so forth; they cannot be thought of as arbitrarily disconnected. 
Feminist writers have stressed that the home can become a political space 
where the domestic role of women as mothers and the everyday decisions they 
make there are as much political acts as practices and processes that take place in 
official, public spaces, which may be associated with men and the exclusion (and 
subordination and domination) of women (Pateman 1988). At the same time, the 
home itself can also constitute a site of exclusion and disempowerrnent 
for 
women if they feel isolated and marginalised. The temptation to engage in and 
reproduce essentialist notions of the private spaces such as the home as 
feminine 
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and public spaces as masculine has to be avoided (Staeheli 1996, cited in 
Freeman 2005). For Palestinians in Athens without access to formal political 
spaces, the house as a material space can become important political spaces for 
both men and women. The house is, however, a gendered space, as it is still 
women as wives and mothers who non-nally take on the role of 'making home' 
(Dwyer 2002) and, therefore, play an important part in helping to shape their 
family's constructions of 'Palestinian-ness'. 
In the Middle Eastern context, Steinmann (2005: 94) cites the work of 
Ahmed (1992), amongst others, to illustrate the "cultural relativity of a feminine 
power within the domestic space". However, it is difficult to determine and 
generalise whether Palestinian women in Athens are 'objects' or 'subjects'. 
Although their houses could be perceived as politicised sites of resistance where 
their reaffirmations of ways to be Palestinian and their teaching of their children 
to be Palestinian may feel potentially empowering for them, at the same time, 
more Palestinian men than women appear to have Greek citizenship status and 
access to political spaces outside the home. At the same time, Palestinian women 
may be conforining to the domestic role that they feel their husbands and other 
Palestinians (both men and women) in Greece expect of them. Although this 
domestic role may be politicised, it is narrowly defined in terms of what it 
constitutes and women may not feel free to be political in other ways. Women, 
who have the job of looking after the family, may wish to attend political events, 
for example, but family commitments, such as looking after children and 
relatives may prevent them from going. In addition, those Palestinian women 
whose residency is linked to their husband's job, or who came to Greece because 
of their husbands (which includes the majority of Palestinian women) are 
potentially more vulnerable if they wish to leave their husbands. Silvey's (2005: 
128) work on transnational Islam highlights the need to deconstruct stereotypes 
of Muslim women as either resistant or oppressed, but suggests that "lost in this 
dichotomization... is the much richer reality of women's shifting senses of power 
and religious subjectivities". Despite the fact that some Palestinian women are 
Christian, this statement appears applicable to all female participants and their 
relationships with men, politicisation and political advocacy. 
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The house as a cultural, social and i)olitical si)ace 
It is important to understand that the house is also a space where political, 
cultural and social perceptions and manifestations of 'Palestinian-ness' may 
dynamically but also uneasily come together. To theonse the house as a hybrid 
political, social and cultural space for Palestinians in Athens, one has to take into 
account the intricate and diverse nature of Palestinian existence and the material 
and symbolic cross-border, public/private, colonial/postcolonial connections in 
Athens, which appears to influence their dynamic feelings and actions of 
political activism and advocacy. Exploring diasporic and hybrid spaces in which 
Palestinians are negotiating 'Palestinian-ness' dynamically and strategically may 
illustrate that politicisation and advocacy can potentially occur within such 
hybrid and diasporic, spaces, despite feelings of insecurity, ambivalence and 'in- 
between-ness'. For many respondents, politicisation cannot be perceived as 
separate to the socio-cultural aspects of their lives, particularly if one sees public 
and private spaces as interconnected and merging. Therefore, dynamic 
constructions of being Palestinian and representations of difference and 
ing similarity are intimately related to politicisation and potential advocacy. Lacki 
fori-nal Greek citizenship, many Palestinians are becoming adept at using the 
informal spaces they have available to them to initiate and carry out political 
activities that are grounded in Greece but that are also related to Palestine and 
Israel. The house, as a private, domestic space is, therefore, increasingly 
becoming a significant political space where the enactment and negotiation of 
cultural, social and political 'Palestinian-ness' and the framing and advocacy of 
political messages are occurring together. The extract below taken 
from a 
discussion with Layla (38, FCE) illustrates the connections between the 
house, 
being Palestinian, politicisation and political action very well: 
I have some Greekfriends, colleagues in the company and now they 
don't buy 
any Israeli or American products. The Greek market is 
full of Israeli products. I 
go to Sklavenitis 6 and the potatoes are from Israel, the 
fruit from Israel, the 
dates, from Israel because I'm with the boycott and I don't buy at American or 
6A Greek supermarket chain. 
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Israeli products. Even my son, with Coca Cola and with everything. First of all, I 
lookfor the Greek products to tell you the truth. One of myfriends, she told me 
that she was in Sklavenitis with her mother and she wanted to buy a melon but it 
wasn Pt the season and she said to myfriend, hey Vivi here is melon and she told 
me that she looked at where it was from and it was from Israel, so she put it 
back, so you have to try and influence people, because it's terrible, our situation 
is really bad. This is what we can do - we start with we can do ourselves. After 
that, you spread out - maybe this will work, but to tell you the truth, for 4 years, 
not a single American product has entered this house, my mouth and my son's 
mouth. 
Layla feels she is Palestinian and politicised with a cause to advocate. As she 
does not have Greek citizenship to allow her to participate in formal politics, she 
is trying to be politically active in whatever ways she can. This illustrates the 
political importance of everyday spaces such as the house. The political has 
permeated into many or all aspects of her life; she, like many Palestinians, 
cannot separate them out into neat compartments of political and non-political, 
or private and public. Lina (38, businesswoman) also illustrates the complex 
relationships between cultural, social and political identities within the public 
and private diasporic spaces: 
When I see any Arab celebrating in his country, so lets say thefolklore ofJordan 
- we don't even have the right to have our folklore or if we have it, where to 
show it, so we suffer like that or sometimes when I'M explaining to my kids that 
they are ha4f Greek, half Palestinian, they say okay, let's go to Palestine, their 
country. How can I explain to them that I can't go? Legally I can go, because I 
have the Greek passport, but as Lina I cannot go because I cannot go there and 
see all the humiliation, the way they treat us when we enter the country, the way 
they take off our clothes, the way they treat the Arabs, like I never went because I 
see on TV and I am already touched when I see how they push a man who's 80 
years old or take off his shoes, I mean so many things that are so humiliating, 
that I really cannot take it to go there. Only from watching the TV 
Elizabeth, 
sometimes I feel palpitations. We are so bitter, very I mean just now talking 
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about it, I feel very ... emotional, so should I teach my kids, should I let them 
know exactly about my history, how much we suffered from Israel, or should I 
not let them see that andjeel bitter like we are, so sometimes I'm in-between, Fni 
trying not to let them have this hate, but I have it and sometimes I give it to them 
indirectly. You know what I mean? 
Liz: Yes. Do they go to an intemational school? 
Lina: They go to a Greek international school. Like we even have kids from 
Israel in the class. They play together, I never told them anything. I even invite 
these two kids when we have parties because I didn't want to exclude them as 
children, and unfortunately they came to the parties with their parents and I was 
trying to be very nice and civilised because it's not the child'sfault and of course 
it was hardfor me because the parents, one of thefathers is in the embassy and 
the other is in the Mossad; he works here for the security, so for me it was very 
hard, like I was trying to smile but because of the children I was trying to be 
civilised or hide my anger, like you know shouting or something but I was trying 
to be nice. 
Although Lina's house is a space in which she is trying to bring up her children 
as 'Palestinian' (despite the fact they are half Greek), it is also contested and 
problematic for her. Her experiences with Israelis in Greece is deeply upsetting 
for her as she feels she has to invite them into her home, destroying it potentially 
as a symbolic sanctuary of 'identity' and security away from what she feels is the 
injustice of the situation in Palestine. She may be seen as materially living out 
the clashes between the colonial and postcolonial as she confronts what she sees 
as the people who made her people 'suffer'. Although she finds these situations 
she is put in fiustrating and they do not appear to be immediately empowering, 
her own need to advocate the Palestinian cause may be strengthened by such 
encounters. Her desire to teach her children as much as possible about 
Palestinian history (which is true of the majority of Palestinians in Athens) can 
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be seen as part of such advocacy and a form of concrete political activism and 
resistance, which takes place within the house .7 
Ghada's (32, housewife) testimony below also depicts the close 
relationships between her perceived role as a mother of Palestinian children in a 
Palestinian house with a cause to advocate and how cross-border connections in 
the form of the mass media are involved: 
I was raised to love Palestine; it's in our hearts ... I was raised always talking 
about it, so I am trying to do the same with my children. Like my daughter, who 
is fussy with her food. I make her watch the television, so she can see how the 
children in Palestine don't have enough food or water and how they are 
suffering ... my children love Palestine, we have to love Palestine, so that we get it 
back 
The important role the house as a physical space in which political activities may 
take place is also illustrated by the experiences of Sa'id and Bilal. Sa'id, a young 
student, who is active within the GUPS and is very politicised (but has never 
been to Palestine) stresses the importance of his room as a Palestinian space, 
where he has "a huge Palestinian flag hanging on the wall". In his room at home 
is also where he listens to rap music, which he feels he can relate to because its 
themes include resistance, oppression and empowerment. His current perceptions 
of 'Palestinian-ness' as resistance have played a large role in his decision to 
become active within the Union, study political science and desire to become a 
diplomat in order to do what he can to help the Palestinian cause. Although it 
may appear that such perceptions are stable, they are not. Many factors have 
influenced Sa'id's politicised constructions of 'Palestinian-ness' and his 
potential to be politically active. These are, for example, the death of his father 
when he was young and his family's subsequent economic struggles as well as 
the area in which he lives, in the centre of Athens, where he has many networks 
with immigrants from other countries. He is openly frustrated with American 
foreign policy directed at the Middle East, condemns Israeli actions, listens to 
American music, wears Nike trainers (because "they are the best"), speaks Greek 
7 The teaching of children to be 'Palestinian' and politicised has been discussed in Chapter Five. 
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well and interacts with people from different places regularly and has never been 
to Palestine. It also becomes clear that his perceptions of 'Palestinian-ness' have 
also changed with his involvement in the Union as he has been forced to debate 
what it means to be Palestinian publicly. He has become used to consolidating 
his notions of what it means to be Palestinian into manageable and politicised 
(chunks' for easy digestion by others such as the Greek media. These aspects of 
his life appear to illustrate the peculiar, and often contradictory nature and effects 
of hybridity for those in diaspora, even when they do not openly describe 
themselves as 'hybrid' or actively express the varying, diverse and interrelated 
times and spaces that affect them and their constructions of 'Palestinian-ness'. 
Like Sa'id, Bilal (33, FCE) feels he is Palestinian and connected to 
Palestine, even though he has never been there. As a politicised non-citizen in 
Greece, he uses his cross-border connections and his office at home as an 
informal political space to be politically active, by creating slideshows and 
presentations on Palestinian issues, problems and the cause. He does this by 
taking images (of Palestinian children being beaten by Israeli soldiers, for 
example) and information (such as maps and statistics on the number of 
Palestinians killed during specific Israeli incursions into Gaza, for instance) from 
the internet and editing them into his own particular view of the cause that he 
wants to see disseminated. He then travels round Greece together with other 
Palestinians with similar views in his own time using the slideshows to advocate 
the Palestinian cause to Greeks in public meetings, illustrating the interconnected 
nature of diasporic spaces and networks and the public and the private. He feels 
compelled by events in Palestine/Israel in order to try and bring "Palestinian 
experiences and injustices to a wider audience, in my case, the Greeks". As he 
shows me one of his slideshows, he becomes very emotional and upset. His 
dynamic and politicised negotiations of Talestinian-ness' are visible as he 
directly translates his feelings of injustice, suffering and perceptions of the 
Palestinian cause, visions for the future and potential change into material 
political action through his technical abilities that he finds optimistic and 
potentially empowering. 
Abir (38, teacher) uses her home as a space in which to conduct informal 
'coffee mornings' or gatherings, in which domestic but also political issues are 
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discussed and debated with other Palestinian (and sometimes Arabic and Greek) 
women. Abir has been involved in a great deal of charity work and activism (see 
Appendix Ten) and it is through such meetings at her house and the houses of 
other Palestinians (and Greeks) that they are organised. For example, she has 
helped to set up a chanty called 'One Euro for a Tree Campaign', whose aim is 
to help replant trees that Palestinians in Gaza claim have been uprooted by 
Israelis. This charity encourages people to give one euro, which then goes 
towards the replanting effort. The symbolic resonance of this chanty's actions 
has to be noted. Many Palestinians in Athens view the uprooting of Palestinian 
trees as an assault on their livelihoods. The creation of and involvement in such 
charities can, therefore, be seen as constituting active forins of resistance in 
Greece to such perceived processes of loss and victimisation, occurring 'there'. 
Abir feels able to be politically active and resist and she does so in a 
variety of ways, whenever she can. She illustrates (the testimony below forms 
part of Appendix Ten) that with the right social, cultural and political conditions 
in place, it is possible for Palestinians to feel empowered by what they are doing: 
This was the idea behind these booklets that we published about Palestine, 
because Ifeel here how supportive they [the Greeks] are and how the reallyfeel Y 
the Palestinians suffering and so on, but they don't know the details. They think 
that there is a Palestinian state and they ask why don't the Palestinians have 
weapons, how come they cannot fight with tanks and things. I mean we have 
been under occupation for so many years, so I wanted so badly to explain to 
them because I know that in these times, people don't want to read a lot, they 
don't like to read, they don't have time, so I wanted to make it as simple as 
possible ... Ifeel optimistic about 
these efforts we are making. I hope they will 
help. 
Abir has teamed up with other Palestinians she thinks have similar thoughts and 
opinions as her, such as Jamal, (34, FCE) in order to write and produce 
these 
booklets, to advocate, outline and clarify the Palestinian cause and the 
history of 
Palestinians in the Middle East. They were initially published in Greek, but are 
now also being published in English. This was something they 
felt they could do 
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to help the situation and which they did within their own homes, using personal, 
informal networks but also in association with several Greek friends. In terms of 
advocating the Palestinian cause, Jamal. (34, FCE) feels that the booklets: 
will help, we have hadjeedbackfrom the Greeks, for example, all the Greeks at 
work have it and they understand more but maybe they support us because they 
work with us and they are influenced by us but I think this book helped them 
understand what thefacts are and the history. And the media is so much on the 
Israeli side; they have the power, the money, everything and their stories become 
fact and people, they cannot differentiate between who is the victim and who is 
the murderer and this is quite obvious. I'm talking about the younger generation. 
They don't even understand what's going on now, forget about the past. People 
only see, for example, with the suicide bombings they only see the action, they 
don't know or understand why it is happening, how a young girl or boy can have 
all this in their heart that makes them do something like that and kill themselves. 
For what? They must be suffering so much. I know, my aunt is living there. She 
has 9 children, with no education, no present, no future, no work. What is there 
to livefor? How long can you live in this way? Seeing houses being demolished, 
so many complications, because if you see people constantly being murdered, 
you are ready to blow yourse4f up to get rid ofyour life. There is no hope. 
Liz: Do you feel you are doing more to help now than in the past when you were 
living in Kuwait or Egypt? 
Jamal: I am doing much more now. 
Liz: Why is that, do you think? 
Jamal: So many things - because of the position I am in, 
because here I have the 
flexibility, really we have the support of the Greeks and the 
freedom to do 
whatever we want and we need to do to help, within certain 
boundaries which we 
know and respect and so I think I'M doing much more 
here, even financial 
support and with this book we published. I would never 
have been able to do that 
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I. n the Arab world because there are so many restrictions, for us there are more 
restrictions because of our situation. 
Both Abir and Jamal appear to be actively trying to resist what they see as 
powerful Israeli influenced media and historical discourses; by publishing these 
booklets they are determined to present the silenced and marginalized 
'Palestinian side' or versions of history and the situation in Palestine/Israel. 
These can be seen as tangible forins of resistance, which resonate with PLO 
tactics (outlined in Chapter Five) of using the narratives of suffering and 
injustice as a means to encourage 'struggle' and resistance. Palestinians often 
(actively or inadvertently) describe themselves as both victims and fighters, 
discriminated against and defiant. 
Jamal's testimony also illustrates that negotiating feelings of injustice and 
despair, hope and perseverance can lead to informal political activism and 
processes of resistance, which have made him feel both disillusioned and 
empowered. He also highlights the role of the situation 'there' and how it can 
impact on action 'here' in Greece; the two are intimately connected. Helping also 
seems to depend on the connections and networks individuals have with one 
another and within different Palestinian social circles. It should be noted that 
Jamal has had great difficulties with his citizenship status, but these do not 
appear to have hindered him from trying to help, hence the importance of 
recognising the importance of unofficial spaces and activities as valid ways in 
which Palestinians may be politically active. Hardship and problems can also 
spur feelings of actions and activities that are perceived as potentially useful as 
well as useless. The house, as a personal, easily accessible and informal space 
may be perceived as one of the most inclusive sites for resistance and advocacy. 
Conclusions 
ormal Palestinians may associate politics (and therefore, political activism) with f 
political spaces that they, on the whole, do not have access to. However, this 
research demonstrates that the problems Palestinians in Athens may encounter in 
terms of formal citizenship does not prevent then from feeling politicised, 
being 
politically active and advocating the Palestinian cause through informal 
diasporic 
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spaces. Helping in terms of supporting and advocating the Palestinian cause are 
seen as the major ways in which Palestinians in Athens feel they can help; yet 
most do not perceive such acts as political, despite the fact that they may admit 
to feeling and being politicised. Although for academic purposes, 'helping' and 
political activism or advocacy can be seen as the same, this section has 
illustrated that Palestinians in Athens tend to perceive them as distinct. For them, 
advocacy is seen more as a charitable and social rather than political act. Yet, 
such processes are also political, whether they are recognised as such or not, as 
such decisions cannot be divorced from negotiations of Talestinian-ness' as 
politicised and their need to advocate the Palestinian cause (or 'help') however 
they can. During the process of helping, they are demonstrating their affinity and 
solidarity with Palestinians (mainly in Palestine and also in refugee camps 
outside Palestine) they are attempting to help. 
Evidence from this research suggests that Palestinians in Athens appear 
to feel resistant and hopeful, as well as despairing and pessimistic. Within single 
interviews and discussions, all these (often contradictory) feelings are often 
displayed at various times. It is very difficult to generalise about Palestinian 
feelings and perceptions of hope (and empowerment) and apathy (and 
disempowen-nent) within diasporic spaces in Athens. As illustrated in Chapter 
Five, there are tensions amongst Palestinians in Athens as they attempt to 
represent themselves as 'united' despite the realities of their inherent disunities 
and diversity. Many respondents appear to oscillate between feelings of hope, 
resistance, apathy and despair. Therefore, they may for example, talk of the 
importance of remaining united, of loving Palestine, of hope for the future and 
belief in the 'resistance' movement. At the same time, they also talk of feelings 
of helplessness, disillusionment, suffering and apathy due to their citizenship 
status, economic positions, their physical separation from and the ongoing issues 
'there'. 
As lived experiences, it could be argued that diasporic spaces become 
overtly political because for many Palestinians In Athens, the political and the 
personal are inextricably tied (for examples outside Greece see the 
autobiography of Ghada Karmi 2002 and Barghouti 2004). It makes sense, 
therefore, to assume that informal cultural and social spaces such as the 
home 
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and the Parikia are also political and politicised spaces, where 'Palestinian-ness',, 
political ideas and thoughts are constantly and dynamically nourished, negotiated 
and contested as a result of cross-border connections and dealing with 
differences and similarities. For those in diaspora such as Palestinians5 who are 
mainly powerless in the public political arena, diasporic spaces can become sites 
of symbolic and material political empowerrnent and resistance where they are 
actively able feel and act as Palestinian. Diasporic spaces that Palestinians, 
irrespective of their citizenship statuses, are involved in illustrate how those in 
diaspora and migrants can practise their politicisation in the forrn of the 
advocacy of messages and cause in order to have their political voices heard. 
Forrns and processes of resistance do not mean that Palestinians are creating or 
becoming homogenised subjects of change within such hybrid spaces. Although 
political diasporic spaces may be potentially empowering for Palestinians in 
Athens, they are also problematic and not free from tensions and conflicts. 
Above all, they are very complex because they encompass dynamic, strategic 
and fluid negotiations of cultural, social and political identities, power relations, 
I in-between-ness' and colonial/postcolonial worlds that are symbolically and 
materially bounded and unbounded. 
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Chapter 8 
Conclusions: diasporic Palestinian identities, spaces and political 
advocacy 
This thesis has highlighted the importance of the critical understanding of 
diasporas not as closed, 'stable' 'ethnic' cultural groups or 'communities' but as 
situated, contingent and flexible, as both mobile and immobile, bounded and 
unbounded. It has demonstrated the beneficial use of combining geographical, 
postcolonial and diasporic perspectives in research that is committed to partially 
unravelling historicized and dynamic power relations, tensions, resistances and 
subjectivities through time and space. To this end, this thesis has examined the 
complex spatial cultural, social and political identities of Palestinians in Athens 
and has illustrated how they are fluid, strategic and hybrid as well as problematic 
and contested. Palestinians may negotiate their 'Palestinian-ness' as ambivalent 
and 'in-between' as they articulate notions of home and belonging that are 
unstable, liminal and de-territonalized but these are also infused with the need to 
be rooted, re-territorialized and connected to a distinct territorial homeland. The 
role of material and symbolic cross-border connections in such attachments has 
been shown to be important. Palestinians in Athens may use such connections to 
encourage notions of 'shared consciousness' and 'collective memory' that are 
seen as integral to constructions of 'unity', 'solidarity', 'identity' and resistance 
that underlie their cause. This thesis has highlighted not only how significant 
Palestinians in Athens feel these are but also, in the process, the internal tensions 
and conflicts over representations of differences and similarities. 
Throughout this thesis, notions and realities of boundedness and 
unboundedness have been illustrated as relevant to understanding diasporic 
Palestinians in Athens. On the one hand, their multiple subjectivities and hybrid 
positionings within diasporic spaces may allow us to construct them as I in- 
between% 'on the move' and able to transgress the geographical borders of 
Greece as their lives, spaces and identities 'here' are intimately connected to 
Palestine 'there'. In the process, there may be a decoupling of citizenship and 
(national identity' as they acquire Greek citizenship status. Their physical 
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separation from the Middle East and Palestine , in particular, may be both 
empowering and resistant for them politically, as they feel able to engage in 
political advocacy within informal diasporic spaces in Greece. 
On the other hand, their lives and identities are grounded and situated in 
Greece, where they feel both supported and 'foreign' or different. In reality, their 
negotiations of hybridity in diaspora are often problematic, confusing and 
ambivalent. Their lack of citizenship status (as well as ambiguous and difficult 
legal or residency status) and their material and symbolic connections to 
Palestine has also stimulated feelings of exile, displacement, statelessness, 
suffering and injustice resulting in perceptions of apathy and despair, as they 
may feel isolated and unable to participate politically because they lack access to 
the forinal political spaces they see as necessary for political engagement. 
However, such feelings can also trigger the need to feel and be resistant and to 
get involved in the struggle to advocate the political cause. At the same time9 
they also have the propensity to encourage associations between citizenship, 
statehood and 'national identity" as a future Palestinian state specifically for 
Palestinians is usually seen as the only solution to current problems. 
This thesis has shown that as a result of different (and uneven) cross- 
border connections, those in diaspora may be constructing notions of collectivity 
and 'shared consciousness' strategically but they may also negotiate their lives 
and identities as 'in-between' and hybrid, which can result in tensions and 
ambivalence. This can also have both positive and negative repercussions in 
terins of feelings of 'unity', disunity, hope, empowerment, despair and apathy 
about which it is difficult to generalise. On the one hand, Palestinians in Athens 
may be constructing themselves as active, resistant, hopeful, 'unified' and 
politicised Palestinian subjects as a result of their relations to Palestine. On the 
other hand, they also appear to be plagued by material problems associated with 
their citizenship and residency status and their separation and exile from their 
homeland, despite their networks. Diasporic spaces and cross-border connections 
can, therefore, be seen as enabling and empowering as well as limiting and 
hindering in terms of political advocacy. Such lobbying of the Palestinian cause 
appears to encourage positive perceptions of 'unity', but also negative images of 
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injustice and suffering, hence perhaps, increasing the potential for conflicting 
feelings of hope and despair. 
The salience of thinking about diasponc political spaces is that the 
processes of resistance and advocacy that may take place within them can be 
conceptualised as connected to other times and spaces. Processes of de- 
territorialisation, re-territorialisation, connection and separation to Palestine as a 
territorial homeland are simultaneously occurring within diasporic spaces. 
Feelings of rootedness and attachment, as highlighted in Chapters Four and Fivel 
appear to be crucial aspects within the advocacy of the Palestinian cause5 that are 
imagined as encouraging 'unity', belief in a 'shared consciousness' and the need 
for a defined state in which to be politically active citizens. The notion of 
territory, as Elden (2005) reminds us, is still important. Such appropriations and 
uses of space (as de-territorialised and territorialised) for political means 
illustrates that realities of postcolonial resistance and cultural and political 
belonging are awkwardly and problematically played out through time and 
space, unsettling "political geographies' tendency to see resistance politics as 
localized" (Featherstone 2003: 405). Postcolonial struggles of resistance may be 
seen as attempts to continuously carve out independent times and spaces. 
However free they may appear, they are, at the same time, necessarily connected 
to the coloniser, whether realised or not. Such struggles are charactensed by 
processes and feelings of attachment and fluidity because the spaces in which 
these struggles take place are both bounded and unbounded as they force the 
'here' and the 'there' (and the colonial and postcolonial) to come together in 
disjointed ways. Diasporic politics then becomes a "mixture of spatial fixity and 
unfixity' (Castree 2003, quoted in Elden 2005: 9), during which the 'here' and 
'there' may have very different repercussions in terms of feelings of 
empowerment and resistance. 
This research has illustrated the political and cultural dilemmas and 
opportunities the notion of hybridity has created to those in diaspora. Laclau 
(1996, cited in Moreiras 1999: 397) stresses that "hybridisation is not a marginal 
phenomenon but the very terrain in which contemporary political identities are 
constructed". However, the Palestinian 'subject' of hybrid and multiple 
identification that is potentially created in diasporic spaces, as a potential agent 
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for change, may be conflicted and problematic as a result of having to negotiate 
'here' and 'there' continuously within the processes and attempts at resistance 
and advocacy. This 'subject' also has to somehow articulate an ambivalent 
positioning between the political need for 'unity' and a distinct Palestinian 
'Identity' as part of the advocacy of the Palestinian cause; as a result, such 
subjects may be fractured and dislocated through time and space. Although it is 
tempting to claim that Bhabha's (1994) liminal and hybrid 'Third Spaces' and 
'Identities' make those involved in resistance struggles feel empowered, this 
thesis demonstrates that this is not always the case. Many Palestinians in Athens 
view their instability, fluidity and insecurity as a result of their non-citizenship 
status and complex residency issues as problematic and counterproductive to the 
advocacy of their cause. Therefore, this thesis has shown that in reality, 'identity' 
positionings are difficult to generalise about and can be very hard for 
Palestinians to deal with. For those in diaspora, often without the physical ability 
to be politically involved in Palestine, advocacy or the 'struggle' as it is often 
put, takes on very powerful political meanings and significance, as it is often 
perceived as one of the main things they can do to 'help' and be involved in the 
resistance and 'liberation' of Palestine. Yet, as I argue, the realities of such 
advocacy in terms of feelings and actions of resistance and empowerment are 
complex, contested, and intimately dependent on the fluid and strategic 
involvement in,, negotiation and use of diasporic spaces as well as numerous 
other local and cross-border cultural, social and political factors. This case study 
of the Palestinian diaspora in Athens illustrates that it is hard to come to concrete 
conclusions about the relationships between 'Palestinian-ness', feelings of 
empowerment and resistance, as well as of political activism and informal 
diasporic spaces. 
This thesis has depicted the difficult merging and clashing of colonial and 
postcolonial worlds and of different but Jarring, crosscutting times and spaces 
within Palestinians' everyday lives in Greece. It is important to be able to 
theorise and understand the awkward and uneven merging between local, global 
cultural, social, political and economic aspects of people's lives. Flexible 
theoretical and practical frameworks are needed to map and unravel the complex 
and messy 'Third Spaces' and struggles of postcolonial/colonial lives and 
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positionings, as well as their constructions of resistances, hopes and apathies. As 
Pile (1997: 30) points out: 
resistance may reterritorialise space in various ways, in ordej- to 
transform its meanings, undermine territory as a natural source of 
power, and enable territory to become a space of citiZenship, 
democracy andfreedom - within limits. Territories involve location, 
boundary and movement - and they will therefore overlap, be 
discontinuous and shifting as people seek alternative ways of living, 
alternative connections to the world. 
There is, therefore, a need for research into the new and emerging spaces in 
which resistance, politicisation, political activism, citizenship and belonging are 
negotiated, so that "a redefinition and re-symbolisation of political belonging and 
citizenship" can occur (Labelle and Midy 1999: 219). This may enable those 
with difficult and ambiguous relations to the state to feel less marginalized and 
excluded. At the same time, informal political spaces are also important. 
"Invisible citizen activity" (Mackian 1995: 212) may occur in such spaces as 
people make informal political decisions that affect their lives that are outside 
(but may also potentially influence) formal and official spaces of 'Identity', 
citizenship and politics. In the process, however, as Marston (1995: 196) 
stresses: 
we must not pin our hopes on citizenship as a way of homogenising a 
complex civil society composed of groups within vastly different 
social, political and cultural identities. Thus it is not simply a 
question of including theformerly excluded in the larger community. 
The very concept of citizenship itse4f must be re-evaluated and 
transformed to reflect new relationships that are emerging in Europe 
(and elsewhere). 
It has been difficult to separate out the cultural, social and political aspects 
of Palestinian lives and identities that are intricately connected. 
There is clearly a 
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need for more nuanced understandings of the interrelations between different 
times and spaces; there is also a need for more subtle understandings of the 
cultural, social and political aspects of life for those in diaspora who feel the 
need to advocate causes and engage in homeland politics. Their strategic and 
fluid uses and negotiations of 'Identity', citizenship, home and belonging, that 
may be difficult and have empowering and/or despairing repercussions, suggest 
the need to examine their processes of advocacy, resistance and politicisation as 
connected not only to their homelands, but also within the institutional and 
legally bounded constraints of the countries in which they live. Identities, like 
spaces, are relational, open-ended and inclusive but are also situated, powerful 
and exclusive. Careful and critical geographical analyses of the complex ways in 
which bounded and unbounded identities, times and spaces coalesce are crucial, 
as are the particular reasons and specific results of these coalescences, such as 
the realities of power relations, resistance, empowennent, apathy and 
marginalisation. 
My analysis of diasporic spaces and identities may appear idealistic, yet 
it is based on the material lives, perceptions, experiences and emotions of 
diasporic peoples and a desire and commitment to explore and better understand 
their material and psychological realities, constructions and negotiations. 
Thinking and acting 'beyond the state' requires us to critically interrogate the 
language and tenns that we use, albeit with unease, so that we may begin to 
potentially imagine what a more hybrid world characterised by increasing cross- 
border connections and (im)mobilities may actually look and feel like. Rather 
than imagining people in 'categories', we should perhaps try to explore in much 
more depth the networks, connections and relations people form with each other 
as they negotiate differences, similarities, power inequalities through time and 
space. The study of spaces can act as the study of dynamic nodes, In which 
people individually and in groups are able to physically and mentally Position 
themselves as 'in-between' and as politically, socially and culturally (im)mobile. 
It is through such spatially and temporally (dis)located spaces and connections 
that they may potentially be able to come together, deal with 
differences 
peacefully and share visions of change that undermine local/global 
dichotomies 
and nation-state boundaries. 
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I have raised a number of extremely complicated issues within this thesis, 
as a result of the research carried out, to which there are no clear answers or easy 
solutions and it is not my intention to provide them. However , in a world that is 
constantly changing or moving, perhaps we, as academics, are sometimes slow 
to catch up. Such issues are thus worthy of ftirther attention. Robins and Aksoy 
(2001: 709) stress the importance of "movement in the world, movement in the 
mind", suggesting the need to radically interrogate the ways in which we, as 
social scientists, think about, analyse, represent and research the relationships 
between 'movement' and contemporary society. This thesis has made a small 
but significant contribution in these areas. These issues ought to be at the 
forefront of further geographical inquiry into the lives and identities of migrants 
and those in diaspora and their spatial and temporal interactions with processes 
of citizenship, politicisation and resistance. 
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Appendices 
1. List of Respondents' 
Abbas: male, 26, student, interview carried out at fast food restaurant on gth 
February 2004,8pm, in Greek (interview not taped). He is from Tulkarem, in the 
West Bank, where he was bom and raised. He has lived in Athens for 3 years. He 
has a Palestinian identity card as well as Jordanian citizenship. He speaks Greek 
fairly well. 
Abdul: male, 28, casual office worker, unmarried, interview carried out on 23 rd 
January, 2004,7pm at Goody's fast food restaurant, in Greek (interview not 
taped). He has lived in Athens for 9 years. He is from Bethlehem in the West 
Bank. He originally came as a student, went back to Bethlehem, where he 
worked but then returned to Athens in 2000. The last time he visited his family 
in Bethlehem was in 2001. He is having problems with his residence permit in 
Athens that he has to renew every year and which he is finding is becoming 
increasingly more difficult. He speaks Greek fluently. 
Abdullah: male, 33, painter (self employed), interview carried out at his work, 
21" October 2003,4pm, in Greek (interview taped). He has lived in Athens for 
II years. He came originally as a student from the West Bank, where he was 
born and grew up. After finishing his studies, he decided to stay. He has a 
Jordanian passport and has a work permit, which he found hard to get and has to 
renew every year. He has been back to the West Bank twice, in 1997 and 2000. 
He speaks Greek fluently. He intends to apply for Greek citizenship soon, but is 
expecting it to be very difficult. 
Abir: female, 38, teacher, married to Lebanese foreign company employee 
(FCE), mother of three children, interviews carried out on 14'h and 20th January 
20041,1 Oam at her home , in English 
(first interview taped, second not taped). She 
has lived in Athens for 7 years. She was born in Nablus, but moved with her 
parents to Lebanon. She got married in Lebanon and in 1996 left with her 
1 All names are pseudonyms. 
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husband and children for Greece. She has what she calls a Lebanese passport as 
well as Jordanian citizenship. Her residency in Greece is linked to her husband IS 
work and residence permit, which he has as a result of his job. 
Ahmed: male, 34, FCE, married to a Palestinian, father of two children who go 
to an international school in Athens, interview carried out at his home,, 15 th 
December 2003,8pm, in English. His wife, Maha, was also present (interview 
taped). He has lived in Athens for 8 years. His family fled from the north of what 
is now Israel in 1948 to Syria, where he grew up. He has a Syrian passport and 
residency in Greece due to his job. His complex citizenship status prevents him 
from travelling to Palestine/Israel. He does, however, see his family in Syria 
every couple of years. He does not speak Greek, but understands some words. 
Aiman: male, 14, not at school, but looking for work, his family are seeking 
asylum (but not in Greece), interview carried out at room in 'hotel' he has been 
sharing with his family for 6 months, 18'b December 2003,8 pm, in English. 
This is a small, filthy room with shared bathroom facilities, which they have to 
pay 15 euros a night for (interview not taped). He speaks some Greek. 
Bahira: fernale, 36, doctor, married to a Palestinian, mother of four children,, 
interview carried out at her home, 12 th December 2003, Ham, in English 
(interview taped). She has been living in Athens for 13 years and has a Jordanian 
passport. She applied for Greek citizenship 10 years ago and is still waiting. 
Bilal: male, 33, FCE, interview carried out at his home, 17 
th October 2003,7pm 
in English (interview taped). His wife, Nadia (also Palestinian), was present. He 
has lived in Athens for six and a half years. His family were originally from 
Haifa, but fled to Lebanon in 1948, where he grew up and studied. He has 
special Lebanese travel documents that are given to Palestinians in Lebanon and 
has never been to Palestine. His residency in Greece is due to 
his job. He does 
not speak Greek well. 
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Costas: male, 32, official at Aliens Department, interview carried out at his 
home, 15 th October, 2003,6pm, in English (interview not taped). 
Dina: female, 17, goes to an international school, has Palestinian father, 
Lebanese mother who are divorced, interview carried out at her father's home, 
8 th November 2003,1 lam, in English (interview taped). She has lived in Athens 
all her life (except for a brief period when she was three, when she lived in 
Lebanon) and has visited relatives in the West Bank three times. She used to visit 
her relatives in Lebanon almost every summer. She speaks Greek fluently. She 
learns Arabic at school but English is her first language. She speaks Greek more 
to her father and Arabic more to her mother. She has Greek citizenship. 
Faeq: male, 45, FCE, married to a Palestinian, father of two children who go to 
international schools , interview carried out at his home, 16 
th November 2003, 
10am , in English (interview not taped). He has lived in Athens for 15 years. His 
family have lived in Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, the United States and Lebanon since 
1948. He was born in Lebanon and has special Lebanese travel documents. He 
tries to visit his family in Lebanon every year or so. He has a permanent 
residence penult, but not Greek citizenship. He has never been to 
Palestine/Israel. He speaks Greek. 
Fadila: female, 30, housewife, mother of two young children, interview carried 
out at her home, 11 th November 2003,8pm. Her husband, Majid (a Palestinian 
FCE) was also present (interview not taped). She has lived in Athens for 6 years. 
Her family was originally from Ramla, in what is now Israel. Her family fled to 
Jordan in 1948, where she was born. As a consequence, she has Jordanian 
citizenship, as well as Canadian citizenship, as she has also lived in Canada. Her 
residency in Greece is linked to her husband's residency and work permit, which 
he receives as a result of his job. She has never been to Palestine/Israel. 
She does 
not speak Greek, but understands some words. 
Fawaz: male, 40, painter (self-employed), married to a Greek, interview carned 
out at his work, 21" October 2003,4pm, in Greek (Interview not taped). 
His two 
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children go to Greek schools. His brother, Abdullah was also present. He has 
lived in Athens for 15 years and came as a student originally from the West 
Bank, where he was born and raised. He speaks Greek fluently. 
Ghada: female, 32, housewife, mother of three, married to Palestinian FCEI 
interview carried out at her home, 7'h November 2003,1 lam, in English 
(interview taped). She has lived in Athens for 7 years. She was born and raised in 
Jordan, which she visits every summer. She has never been to Palestine/Israel. 
Her family were originally from villages around Haifa and moved to Jordan in 
1967, after having lived in Jenin. Her residency is linked to her husband's, which 
he receives through his job. She does not speak Greek. 
Hala: fernale, 24, living in Greece illegally, mother of four, married to 
Palestinian, interview carried out at basement 'home', room shared with 20 other 
Palestinians, 9 th December 2003,5pm, in English (interview not taped). She and 
her family have been in Greece for six months. They are originally from Gaza 
and came illegally via a boat. She does not speak Greek, but understands some 
words. 
Haleef. male, 55, embassy official, father of two, interviews carried out 16 th 
June, 14 th October 2003,12 midday, in Greek (first interview taped, second not 
taped). He has lived in Athens for over thirty years. He is originally from 
Qualquilya, which he cannot visit due to former political activities in the West 
Bank before moving to Greece. He speaks Greek fluently. 
Heela, female, 40, office worker, married to a Palestinian, mother of two, 
interview carried out at her home, 13 th January 2004,8pm, in English (interview 
taped). She has been in Greece for 15 years. She was born and raised in Jordan, 
to which her parents moved to in 1948. She has never been to Palestine. 
She has 
Greek citizenship, which she has just been granted after what she 
felt was a long 




Jamal: male,, 34, FCE, interview carried out at caf6,13'h November 2003,8prn. 
in English (interview taped). He has lived in Athens for 8 years. His mother is 
Egyptian, his father Palestinian and he considers himself Palestinian. His father's 
family were originally from Gaza. His father studied in Egypt, where he met his 
Egyptian wife. His parents then moved to Kuwait in 1966, where Jamal was 
raised. He has Egyptian travel documents because these are what his father has. 
After the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, he and his family were forced to leave and 
they went to Egypt. Jamal lived and worked there for five years before coming to 
Greece. He is having gave problems with his residency in Greece and is in 
imminent danger of being deported, despite help from lawyers working for the 
foreign company he is employed by (see Appendix Two). He speaks a little 
Greek. 
Jamila: female, 20, student, member of GUPS, also works part-time, interview 
carried out at caf6, I Oth November 2003,4pm, in Greek (interview taped, but not 
very clear due to background music). She has been in Greece since she was one 
and half Her mother's family were originally from Safad, in what is now called 
Israel. Her father is Egyptian. They fled in 1948 to Lebanon and lived in a 
refugee camp, where she was born and lived before she came to Athens. When 
she left Lebanon, her parents were separated and her mother managed to find 
work in Cyprus through family friends, so they lived there for a year before 
moving to Athens, essentially to work. She has been back to Lebanon once, 
when she was twelve. She has never been to Palestine/Israel. She went to a 
Greek school and speaks Greek and Arabic fluently. She has an Egyptian 
passport, which she got because of her father. She has a student residence permit 
which allows her to live in Greece. 
Ibrahim: male, 32, construction worker, married to a Palestinian, 
has a young 
child , interview carried out at 
his home, 24th October, 2003,8 pm, in Greek 
(interview taped). He has lived in Athens for 12 years. He originally came to 
study, but decided to stay and work. His grandparents 
fled to Syria in 1948 from 
Safad, which is now in Israel. He was born and raised in 
Syria. He has a work 
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and residence permit and is trying to get Greek citizenship , in order to be able go 
to Palestine, where he has never been. He speaks Greek fluently. 
Issam: male, 53, engineer, leader of old GUPW, married to Greek, interview 
carried out at caf6,12th June 2003,7pm, in Greek/English (interview taped). He 
has lived in Athens for 30 years. His family were originally from Jaffa in what is 
now Israel. In 1948, they became refugees and lived in Kalandia camp, near 
Jerusalem. In 1967, his family moved to Jordan. In 1973, he went to Lebanon 
and then to Greece. He has a residence permit, as well as Jordanian citizenship. 
He speaks Greek fluently. 
Karim: male, 24, student, interview carried out at restaurant, 21s' January 2004, 
2pm, in Greek (interview not taped). He has lived in Greece one year and three 
months. He is originally from Beit Zara, a suburb of Bethlehem, but moved to 
Greece from Jordan, where he grew up. He has a Palestinian identity card as well 
as Jordanian citizenship. He is supposed to have a student residence permit., 
which he has been trying to get, but is finding the bureaucracy involved difficult. 
He speaks Greek, but is not fluent. 
Khalid: male, 43, self employed garage owner, father of two who go to Greek 
h 
school , interview carried out at 
his home, 20' October 2003,8pm in Greek. His 
wife, Sunya (also Palestinian), was present (interview taped). He has been in 
Athens for 15 years. His family were originally from Safad, in what is now Israel 
and they fled to Syria in 1948, where Khalid was bom and raised. He came 
originally for one year and then decided to stay. He originally came with a 
tourist visa, and then managed to get a student permit to allow him to come and 
go, but never studied. He worked instead and now has a residence permit 
although he applied for Greek citizenship three years ago, which he expects to 
get soon as he has contacts that are helping him out. He has visited his family in 
Syria 6 times since living in Athens. He speaks Greek fluently. 
Layl : female, 38, FCE, divorced from Palestinian husband, mother of one child 
ffi 
who goes to an international school, interview carried out at 
her home, 14 
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December 2003,4 pm, in English (interview taped). She has been in Greece for 
18 years. She came as a student and then stayed. Her family was originally from 
Accre, in what is now Israel. They fled to Lebanon in 1948, which is where she 
was born and lived until 1975 when the family moved to Abu Dhabi, where they 
still live. Her Lebanese travel documents make travelling to anywhere apart from 
Lebanon problematic. She still has relatives in Lebanon, whom she visits 
occasionally. The last time was in 2003. She has never been to Palestine/Israell 
but is trying to get Greek citizenship. She speaks Greek, but is not fluent. 
Lina: female, 38, businesswoman, married to a Greek, mother of two, interview 
carried out at her home, 15 1h December 2003,5pm, in English (interview taped). 
She has lived in Athens for 18 years. Her father was Palestinian; her mother was 
Lebanese. Her father's family were originally from Jaffa in what is now Israel. 
She grew up in Lebanon, but moved to Jordan, where she finished high school 
and from where she moved to Greece in order to study. She has Greek 
citizenship and admits that before she had it, things were much more difficult for 
her in Greece. She speaks Greek fluently. She has never been to Palestine. 
Maha: fernale, 29, housewife, mother of two children, who go to international 
schools, interview carried out at her home, 15 1h December 2003,8pm, in English. 
Her husband, Ahmed (a Palestinian FCE), was also present (interview taped). 
She has been in Greece for 8 years. She is from Nablus, in the West Bank but 
because of the current situation, she has not visited her family since 1997. She 
has what she calls a Palestinian identity card, but she also has a Jordanian 
passport as she worked there after she finished university at Bir Zeit, in the West 
Bank. In Greece, her residency is linked to her husband's residency and work 
permit, which he receives because of his job. She does not speak Greek, but 
understands a little. 
Mahmud: male, 24, student, member of GUPS, interview carried out at the 
Parikia, 9th November 2003,7pm, in Greek (interview taped). He has lived in 
Athens for 5 and half years. He comes from Beit Zahour, which is a village near 
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Bethlehem, where he grew up. He has a Palestinian identity card and a student 
residence permit (although he also works part-time). He speaks Greek fluently. 
Majid: male, 36, FCE, father of two young children, interview carried out at his 
home II thNovember 2003,8pm, in English (Intervi I lew not taped). His wife, 
Fadila (also Palestinian), was present. He has lived in Athens for six years. His 
family was originally from a small village, Safad, near the Golan Heights but 
fled to Lebanon in 1948, where he was bom and grew up. He has Lebanese 
travel documents that are especially for Palestinians, but also Canadian 
citizenship as he has lived there with hi if is wi e. He has temporary residency and a 
work pen-nit in Greece due to his job. He does not speak Greek, but understands 
a little. 
Maria: female, 3 1, housewife, Greek married to Palestinian businessman, mother 
th of two , interview carried out at Parikia, 7 June 2003,5pm, in Greek (interview 
not taped). She attends Arabic lessons at the Pankia every week and has visited 
Palestine (the West Bank) 4 times with her husband and children, who also have 
Arabic lessons there. 
Marwan: male, 23, student, member of GUPS, interview carried out at Pankia, 
9th November 2003,9pm, in Greek (interview taped). He has lived in Greece for 
3 years. He was born in Athens, because his Palestinian father had come to 
Greece to study, got married to a Palestinian and had Marwan. After 7 years, his 
mother died, and he went to Jordan to be looked after by relatives until he 
decided to come to Greece to study. He has Greek and Jordanian citizenship. He 
speaks Greek well 
Masud: male, 26, construction worker, interviews carried out 9'h June 2003,8pm 
at his home, 19'h January 2004,9pm, at fast food restaurant, in English 
(interviews not taped). He has lived in Greece for 4 years. He is from Gaza and 
came to Athens because he was wounded and was subsequently treated at an 
Athenian hospital. He has a residence and work pen-nit as well as a Palestinian 
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identity card. It is difficult for him to return to Gaza because of political 
activities he was involved in before he left. 
Mohammed: male, 43, teacher, father of two, interviews carried out at cultural 
event, 8 th November 2003,9pm, at his home, 91h December 2003, fast food 
restaurant, 12 th December 2003,8 pm, 17th January 2004, at fast food restaurant. ) 
8pm, in English (only interview carried out at restaurant taped, but not very clear 
due to background noise). He has been living in Athens for 15 years. His family 
were originally from Gaza. He came to Greece on a tourist visa intending to stay 
a month, but is now a legal resident. This is despite the many problems he had 
obtaining residency in Greece as a political refugee, which took over 6 years. He 
has a Jordanian passport. 
Mounif. male, 35, unemployed although works sporadically as a labourer and is 
a telecommunications engineer by profession interview carried out at fast food 
restaurant, I 9th January 2004, lOpm, in English (interview not taped). He is in 
Athens illegally, having arrived by boat 6 months ago, from Lebanon, where his 
family fled to in 1948. He is trying to get to Germany where he studied - he 
speaks German fluently (even though he has a brother living in Athens). He 
speaks a little Greek. 
th 
Mourid: male, 38, FCE, father of two young children, Interview carried out 9 
January 2004 at his home, 9pm, in English. His wife, Samira (also Palestinian), 
was present (interview taped). He has lived in Athens for 10 years. He is from 
the West Bank. His father left the West Bank to study in Lebanon in 1948, and 
then went to Jordan and then Kuwait, where Mound was born and raised. 
Mourid lived in Kuwait until he was 25, after which he went to Jordan for a 
couple of years before moving to Greece. The last time he went to the West 
Bank 
was 20 years ago, but after his grandfather who lived there died, 
he was not 
allowed to go because he no longer had immediate relatives living there. 
He has 
a Jordanian passport. His residency in Greece is linked to 
his job. He speaks a 
little Greek. 
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Mustafa: male, 42, unemployed , interview carried out at caf6,28 th January 2004. 
9pm, in Greek (interview taped). He has lived in Greece for 17 years. His family 
are from Hebron , in the West Bank, where he was born and grew up. He came as 
a student and decided to stay. He actually started studying In Jordan, but went for 
a visit to the West bank in 1982 and was not allowed to leave for 3 years and 
when he was, he was not able to get permission to go to Jordan. It was then that 
he decided to come to Greece because he had heard of the support they gave 
Palestinian students. He has been back 3 times since he left. The last time was in 
2000; he has not been able to go since because of the current situation. He is not 
in Greece legally; he is still apparently waiting to get his residence permit. He 
has a Palestinian identity card. He speaks Greek fluently. 
Nabil: male, 37, engineer/deputy mayor, divorced from Greek wife, interview 
carried out at Parikia, 7 th June 2003,6pm, in English/Greek (interview not 
taped). He has lived in Athens for 21 years. He is originally from the West Bank 
but his family moved to Jordan in 1967, where he grew up. He originally came to 
Greece to study and decided to stay. He is a Greek citizen and speaks Greek 
fluently. 
Nadia: female, 24, housewife, interview carried out at her home, 17 th October 
2003,7 pm. Her husband, Bilal, (a Palestinian FCE) was present (interview 
taped). She has lived in Athens for six and a half years. Her family was 
originally from what is now Israel and fled to Lebanon, where she was born and 
grew up. Her residency in Greece is linked to her husband's job. She is doing a 
Greek language course as she is keen to learn Greek. 
Nafeesa: female, 25, asylum seeker, mother of three, interviews camed out at 
basement 'home', a room she shared with 20 other Palestinians (mostly asylum 
seekers too), 9th December 2003,8pm, and on 12 
th December, II am, going to 
medical charities in centre of Athens, in broken English and with the 
help of a 
translator (interview not taped). She has been in Greece for 6 months 
(3 in an 
asylum seeker holding centre on an Aegean island and 3 in 
Athens). She is from 
Gaza. She does not speak Greek, but understands some words. 
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Nisreen: fernale, 23, student, member of GUPS (president), interview carried out 
at a caf&, 14'h July 2003, in English (interview taped). Her family is from Nablus 
(West Bank) and Accre, in what is now called Israel. She was born and raised in 
Lebanon, but her family moved to Cyprus when she was at high school. Soon 
after, they moved to Greece because of her father's job, where she finished 
school (she attended the Libyan school in Athens). She is a registered refugee 
and has to renew her residence permit every five years. She also appears to have 
what she calls a refugee passport, which she has to renew every 2 years and with 
which she can travel wherever she wants. She does not want to become a Greek 
citizen. She has never been to Palestine/Israel. She speaks Greek fluently. 
Omar: male, 20, student, interview carried out at caf6,12 th November 2003. ) 
6pm, in English (inter-view taped). He was bom in Athens has lived there all his 
life. His father's family are originally from Qualquilya, West Bank. He has been 
there to visit relatives three times. The last time was six years ago. His mother is 
Lebanese. He went to an international school in Athens, before entering 
university. He speaks English and Greek fluently. He also speaks some Arabic. 
He has Greek citizenship. 
Rafat: male, 48, FCE, representative of PLO in Athens, interview carried out at 
his office, 15 th January 2004,10am, in Greek (interview taped although we were 
interrupted often by the phone). He is married to Greek and they have 2 children 
who go to an international school. He is from the West Bank. He has been living 
in Greece for 28 years and came originally to study. For 14 years after he left, he 
was not allowed to return due to the political activities he was involved in before 
he left. Since then, he has been allowed to go twice. He is not a Greek citizen; he 
has a residence permit, which he has to renew every 5 years. He has a 
Jordanian 
passport and Palestinian identity card. He speaks Greek fluently. 
Rafiq: male, 40, restaurant worker (has had several unskilled jobs since 
he has 
been in Greece), interviews camed out at the Pankia, 6" June 2003,8.30 pm, 
28th June 2003,8pm, gth July 2003,8pm, in English (IntervIews not taped). He 
has lived in Greece for twenty years and came as a student, 
but never finished his 
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degree. He has had trouble with his residency. He is now applying for political 
asylum. He is originally from Gaza, but has never been back, as he is not 
allowed due to his political connections and fact that he used to work for the 
PLO. He speaks Greek fluently. 
Rania: female, 38, FCE, married to a Palestinian, mother of two children who go 
to international schools, interview carried out at her home, 15 th January 2004, 
8pm, in English (interview taped). All her immediate family were present 
(including her mother, who was on a visit from Ramallah). She has been in 
Athens for 14 years as a result of her husband, who has been living in Athens for 
over 30 years. She was born and grew up in Ramallah. Her family were 
originally displaced from Jaffa, in what is now Israel. She went to Jordan after 
she finished high school, where she started working. She has not been back to 
Ramallah for 8 years. She has Jordanian citizenship. Her Palestinian identity card 
is kept at the border when she leaves the West Bank and she has to go back every 
3 years to renew it. The last time she renewed it, she was not allowed to enter the 
West Bank and she is also scared of going in case she is not able to leave as a 
result of all the regulations and procedures she perceives there are there. She 
goes to Jordan every year to visit family she has there. Her husband, as well as 
her children, (who were born in Athens) has Greek citizenship; she has a 
residence and work penult to live in Greece. She may herself apply for Greek 
citizenship in the future. She speaks Greek fairly well. 
Rashid: male, 41, self-employed (member of old GUPW), married to Greek, 
interview carried out at caf6,20th January, 8pm, in English (interview not taped). 
He has been in Athens 22 years. He came originally as a student and stayed to 
work, out of necessity. His family were originally from the north of what 
is now 
called Israel but fled in 1948 to Lebanon, where he grew up. 
He has Lebanese 
travel documents, but cannot travel with them, even to Lebanon. He tried to go 
back when his father was dying but was not allowed - 
he does not know why. He 
applied for Greek citizenship in 1986 and is still waiting; at present, 
there is no 
other country he is allowed to go to so is stuck in 
Athens. 
314 
Sa'id: male, 25, student, member of GUPS, interview carried out at fast food 
restaurant, 24th October 2004,4pm, in English (interview taped). His family 
were originally from Jenin, West Bank. They then moved to Kuwait. He was 
born in Jordan (his mother went there especially to have him), lived in Kuwait 
for a couple of years and then in Jordan for a couple of months before moving to 
Greece at the age of three. He has a Jordanian passport and a student residence 
permit, which allows him to study, but not work (although he does so part-time). 
He speaks Greek fluently. 
Sami: male, 57, doctor turned politician, divorced from Greek wife, has two 
children, interview carried out at his home, 14 th January 2004, lOpm, in Greek 
(interview taped). He has been in Greece for 35 years. He came originally as a 
student and decided to stay. His family are from what is now Israel but moved to 
Jordan in 1948, where he grew up and lived before coming to Greece. He has 
Greek citizenship. He speaks Greek fluently. He visits his family in Jordan every 
couple of years. 
Samira: female, 38, housewife/artist, mother of two young children, interview 
carried out at her home, 9th January 2004,9pm, in English. Her husband, Mourid 
(a Palestinian FCE), was also present (interview taped). She has been in Athens 
for 15 years. She came with her parents, and went to an American college in 
Athens, after having studied in England and working for a few years in Jordan, 
where her parents lived before moving to Greece. Her father is from what used to 
be called Lid and is now called Tel Aviv. Her mother is from Jerusalem. They 
both left in 1948. Her father's family moved to Jordan and her mother's family 
moved to Syria. Once married, her parents lived in Jordan. After a few years, her 
father got aj ob in S audi Arabi a, where S amira was born. She speaks Greek wel I- 
Sana: female, 34, housewife, mother of two who go to international schools, 
I 11h December married to Palestinian FCE , interview carried out at 
her home, 
2003, 10.30 am, in English (interview taped). Her parents left Qualqllya, in the 
West Bank in 1967 and moved to Kuwait, where she was born. She has a 
Jordanian passport. She was 8 years old the last time she visited 
Qualquilya, 
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where relatives on her father's side live. Her family on her mother's side live in 
Jordan and it them she visits as often as she can. 
Sunya: female, 32, housewife, married to self-employed Palestinian, mother of 
two children who go to Greek school, interview carried out at her homeý 20 th 
October 2003,8pm, in Greek (interview taped). Her husband Khalid was present 
some of the time. Her family is originally from what is now Israel and fled to 
Syria, where she was born and raised. She came to Greece because of her 
husband, whom she met when he was on holiday in Syria. She speaks Greek, but 
is also having Greek lessons. She has applied for Greek citizenship, which she 
expects to get after 5 years. 
Suzanna: female, 37, housewife, married to Lebanese FCE, mother of three 
children who go to international schools, interview carried out at caf&, 17 th 
December 2003,1 Oam , in English (interview not taped). She 
has lived in Athens 
for 18 years. She grew up in Lebanon and has Lebanese citizenship. Her 
residency in Greece is linked to her husband's residency and work pen-nit he has 
through his job. She speaks some Greek. 
Tamara: female, 32, researcher, married to Greek, interview carried out at caf&, 
27 th January 2004, Ipm, in English (interview taped). She is originally from 
Gaza, which she visits often. She has lived in Athens for six years and has a 
residence pen-nit because she is married to Greek. She came as a result of her 
husband, whom she met in the United States, where she studied. 
Taisir: male, 15, asylum seeker, interviews carried out at his basement 'home', a 
large room shared with another 20 Palestinians in a similar position, sharing one 
small bathroom, 9th December 2003 6pm, 12 
th December, 2003,10am, on a visit 
to Greek NGOs dealing with refugees, in English (interview not taped). He 
has 
been in Athens for a year and is looking for temporary jobs. 
He speaks a little 
Greek. 
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TaKj'q: male, 60, doctor, married to Greek, father of two, interview carried out at 
hospital where he works, 18 th October 2003,9 am, in Greek (interview taped). 
He has been in Greece for 38 years. He came as a student and decided to stay. 
His family were refugees from what is now Israel and fled to Jordan In 1948, 
where he was born and raised. He has Greek citizenship, which he has had since 
1986 and which he found very hard to obtain (the decisions in the past were 
down to individual Ministers, unlike now, where there are certain criteria that 
have to be met, such as length of residence, number of children and so forth). He 
has never been to what is now Israel, but went to Jerusalem in 2001. He goes to 
Jordan every year. He speaks Greek fluently. 
Tarub: female, 39, asylum seeker, widow, mother of three , interviews carried out 
at her room in a 'hotel' she has been living in for the last 6 months, 18 th and 22 nd 
December 2003,8pm, in English, using a translator (interview not taped). This is 
a hotel in which inhabitants (mostly recent immigrants) pay 15 euros a night for 
unsanitary conditions -a small, dirty room, shared bathrooms, in which whole 
families live. In her case, she was sharing it with her three sons. She does not 
speak Greek. 
Walid, male, 35, FCE, married to Palestinian, father of one, interview carried out 
18 th December 2003,10 am, at work, in English. His family are from Qualquilya, 
in the West Bank, where he was born and grew up. He has lived in Athens for 10 
years. He has a Palestinian identity card and his residency in Greece is linked to 
his job. He speaks a little Greek. 
Wihad, female, 28, housewife, mother of two who go to international schools, 
married to Palestinian FCE, interview carried out at Parikia, 7 
th June 2003,7pm, 
in English (interview not taped). She has lived in Athens for five years. Her 
family were originally from what is now Israel. They left in 1947 and moved to 
Kuwait and then to Saud, Arabia, where she was raised. They finally moved to 
Jordan, where she met her husband. She is in Greece because of her 
husband and 




2. Jamal's testimony on his mobility restrictions 
Jamal: I have Egyptian travel documents - they are the worst travel documents 
used by the Palestinians because actually we don't have the right to go back to 
Egypt and it causes us a lot ofproblems until now. 
Liz: How come you have these travel documents? 
Jamal: First because we are from Gaza and Gaza after the wars in 1948 was 
given to Egypt and West Bank was given to Jordan and those living there were 
given Jordanian passports and those of us in Gaza were given Egyptian travel 
documents. 
Liz: Okay, so you have these documents and they have given you a lot of 
trouble? 
Jamal: Yes, I have so many stories to tell. 
Liz: Tell me one or two of them. 
Jamal: I can tell you the latest one. I have been in Greecefor almost 9 years and 
I have been given residence by my job for the last 8. Suddenly, they started 
saying that I am not Palestinian. 
Liz: Who said this? 
Jarnal: The people at IKA (Social Insurance), the authorities. They started saying 
that I was not Palestinian, but Egyptian, but I'm not Egyptian and they said that 
I have to pay IKA because there is an agreement between the government and 
Egypt that citizens of both countries pay IKA in both countries so after 
8 years 
they realised that I was not Palestinian although on my permit it wrote 
Palestinian, suddenly they said, no you are Egyptian and I have to pqv the 
IKA 
for the last 8 years and double the amount as a penalty, it, hich is something 
like 
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$150,000, which of course I couldn't pay sofor the last 9 months I am staying in 
Greece without legal status, I cannot move or travelp I cannot go to ml! Jami1v 
who live in Egypt and I'm stuck and I don't know if it will be solved or not. Ok 
my company is trying, but until now I don't know whether they will manage to 
solve it or not. The lawyers are trying and I have some helpfrom the Palestinian 
embassy who have volunteered to help but with no success. If I am caught, I 
could be deported to where I don't know, because there is no country I can go to. 
I don't really belong anywhere; there is nowhere I can go to legally. I am 
trapped here; it's a prison for me. 
Liz: It sounds like a terrible situation. 
Jamal: Actually this is my situation for the last 34 years - this is how old I am. 
Because people see you as someone without a state, without citizenship and they 
don't want to take you and the ones that take you see you as a burden. 
Liz: Have you ever been back to where your parents are originally from? 
Jamal: My mother is Egyptian and myfather is Palestinian; I got my nationality 
from myfather, but in Egypt they don't give you the nationality ifyour mother is 
Egyptian, no - it goes through thefather. All of us lived in Kuwait. 
Liz: But have you ever been to Gaza? 
Jamal: Yes, 2 times. Thefirst time I went I was 6 years old and I was very happy 
because it was thefirst time that Ifelt that I had a home, that I have a country, a 
land that I can walk on withoutfear. Then I went to Gaza again with myfather, 
my sister and my brother when I was 12 and the last time I was there I was 17 so 
a long time ago. Actually my grandparents lived there but not in their original 
home but Rafah, they had to move to close to the Egyptian border. My father 
helped to build them a house and they stayed there until they passed awaly. 
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Liz: So, how come your parents decided to move then? 
Jamal: My father went to Kuwait in 1966. Actually he finished his studies in 
Egypt and then he got married and they moved to Kuwait to Egypt. 
Liz: And he didn't have any problems moving around? 
Jamal: No. then it was easier, no complications - people were feeling more 
sympathetic towards us and there was no corruption in the politics 
Liz: When did things start to change then? 
Jamal: Okay, things stated changing severely for my status after the Guýf War 
regarding movement between countries, because after the war the countries 
began to realise that if they got stuck with the Palestinians you can send them 
nowhere, and you know even when I moved from Kuwait, during the war my 
parents were on vacation in Egypt and I was living in Kuwait because I was a 
teacher at Kuwait University -I was giving some summer classes and they 
attacked there. And I had to move - there was no communication, they didn't 
know if I was alive or dead and so I had to try and go to Egypt. I managed with 
somefriends with Jordanian passports although they were Palestinians, to go to 
Jordan and it was quite an adventure. We went with their car, I left everything in 
Kuwait. I went through Iraq with the car and on the Jordanian border they 
didn't allow me in although I had a visa - now I cannot go to Jordan at all even 
if my residence was okay. 
Liz: Really? 
Jamal: No, after the Gulf war, many of the countries, Egypt, Jordan 
forbid the 
Palestinians from going there. 
Liz: So where are you allowed to go with your residence permit 
here? 
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Jamal: I can go to most countries in Europe -I have been to Mexico, America, 
but to the Arabic countries, no - they started to give us a hard time, for what 
reason I don't know. I wish I had an explanation. My mother is Egyptian, I as 
born there, my family is there but I cannot go there. Recently I could go but 
straight after the war I couldn't. Let me continue with my story. So at the 
Jordanian border, they stopped me for 4 or 5 hours; they would not let me in 
and I could not go back so I was stuck. Luckily there was a Greek officer there 
with us and he got permission to go to Amman and he would get a paper that I 
would not stay longer than one day, so I went to myjamily there and her eldest 
boy took me to the police station and we wrote that I would not stay for more 
than I week. I stayedfor I week illegally but I had to. After this, I managed to 
get a visa to Egypt but actually this visa was no good because once I travelled, 
they stopped me at the borders for 2 days because they did not accept the visa 
and they said it was illegal, so after 2 days myjamily in Egypt managed to get 
the approvalfrom someone high in the Ministries and I managed to get in but I 
stayed for 5 years with no legal status, no residence, nothing, no documents, 
until I got the opportunity to work in Athens and I came here. 
Liz: So , it must 
have been a really big thing for you getting this job here? 
Jamal: Yes. So I worked in Egypt illegally and so many things happened; it was 
a tough time. 
Liz: So the last 3 years you were able to travel to Egypt? 
Jarnal: It was easier, but it was not easy because after the Guýf war, 
Palestinians were not allowed to go to Egypt, even those who held Egyptian 
travel documents. 
Liz: It's very confusing. 
Jamal: Yes, only those who were Jordanian Palestinian were allowed, 
for those 
holding Lebanese travel documents it was verý, difficult and for us it was 
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I. mpossible. At that time, it was strange, I cane to Greece; I stayedfol- 2- vears 
and then I couldn't go back but after that I managed tofind someone to help me 
to go back. 
Liz: So when was the last time that you saw your family? 
Jamal: April. 
Liz: Do they come here as well? 
Jamal: Once, they managed to come, but it's difficult for them too because 
there's something strange in Europe. For some period they said that we don't 
accept travel documents to enter Europe. 
Liz: So that doesn't still happen? 
Jamal: No, it was only for 4,5 months and the Palestinian embassy made a 
great effort to get me this because no Palestinian with a travel document could 
travel there - nobody knows why, so what I am trying to say is that all the time 
you have to deal with laws that affect you but you don't know why things change 
or what is going to happenfrom one day to the next. 
Liz: You must feel very insecure. 
Jamal: More than that - it's part of our lives tofeel insecure; you get used to it, 
but sometimes it gets too much; the pressure is too much. 
3. Lina's testimony on feelings of injustice and suffering 
I have many friends, with no reason with no interfering in any political group, 
they have been in jailfor 3 years, 9 years, they were tortured, they took out their 
nads, anyway I will not tell you what they did to them maybe you will not sleep 
at night, really, some of them because I knew them many years, they 
had nothing 
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to do with any political group but when they pick up, lets say they are lookingfor 
an active person, they think he I's hiding in thi's village, they go there and thel. 
pick up all the kids who are in his age and they are kids, because they arefrom 
12 to 20, teenagers, they pick them up and they start torturing them and that boy 
is not a criminal, he isjust trying tofightfor his country, so of course there they 
don't have the right to talk, because even when they don't talk, they are tortured, 
so it's a big risk ... 
All my life, Elizabeth, until now, we are occupied and even, 
day, we hear that 10 Palestinians were killed, 100 Palestinians are killed, even, 
2 or 3 years one of myfriends is in jail, we don't know why, we don't know when 
he is coming out and I knew this girl. She was Palestinian living in Lebanon. She 
was living in a Palestinian camp in Beirut, in Lebanon and when the war 
happened, the Israelis took her because she was Palestinian and she was 
tortured for 4 years at the Israeli jail without doing anything; she was just a 
student. When she came out, she told us what happened to her and thefault she 
did, she was just Palestinian. They used to let them sit in a room full of water 
and keep the electricity on for more than one hour; I mean they did really 
terrible things. I wonder how they think about these diabolic things you know 
what I mean? Of course not to mention killing pregnant women, killing babies, in 
this case there is no rule for war. We know from the movies, from history that 
war is between man and man, between 2 camps with weapons. In our case, it's 
them, with all the equipment, you know, I mean the Arabs, sometimes don't even 
have shoes to wear; they are with one pair of trousers and stones. They have all 
the equipment, kalashnikovs, anything you want and they are killing men, 
women, children, pregnant women; they are raping women there most of the 
time, I mean it happens, so socially, it's very bad and look I knew this girl, she 
was a friend of mine. She lived in Ramallah; she was 38 and suddenly they 
discovered that she had cancer and her father wanted to send her for 
chemotherapy and it was the time last year in march, they had troubles in 
Ramallah, so she couldn't reach the hospital and she was suffering because she 
needed surgery. Anyway, she died 2 months after, so you see, the human being in 
Palestine has no human rights, nothing, nothing. 
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I start my next question but I notice that she has started crying, so I apologize 
and stop, telling her not to worry. She gets up and goes to get a tissue, and to 
recompose herself 
Lina: I'm sorry. 
Liz: Don't worry; it's a very difficult issue. 
Lina: Look, Elizabeth, like many times, we think, okay, we have the occupation 
down there, like you could think, I am a Palestinian girl, let's say I live there and 
I don't interfere in politics, I'll continue studying, but it's not like that. Everyone 
is affected, everyone, I mean you understand what I'M saying? (raises her voice 
slightly, getting a little indignant). Just because we exist, they kill us. And what 
really one of the million things that hurt is that they kill continuously the 
Palestinians and when I Israeli soldier, not woman, but a soldier is killed, they 
put it on the CNN and they make a story about it and they make it like, a huge 
thing, but what about our children? By the way, do you want to see some 
pictures? 
Liz: Yes, yes 
She shows me a book on the Palestinians (It is titled 'The Palestinians', by 
Jonathan Dimbleby) and some large photos of conflicts between the Israelis and 
Palestinians, wounded Palestinians and Palestinian children in the streets. 
Lina: Here, this means the boy who'Sfightingfor Palestine. You know Elizabeth, 
if you look through any, look at this, if you look at any Arab who lives there, 
even ourfeatures are different because of the pressure that we have. You 
know 
what I mean? Our children, they don't have a childhood like any other child 
in 
the world, but even a child who's 3 years old, without exaggeration, you see pain 
in theirface. 
Liz: Because of what they have had to expenence? 
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Lina: Like last year in Jenin, they killed left and right. They didn't even let - I'll 
tell you this specific case. This man, he killed all his family in his house. Hi's 
house was very small, 2 rooms. They killed his wife and 2 sons and the brother, 
so after 2,3 days, the bodies stated to stink in the house and he was tlý'Ing to 
open the door just to put the bodies outside, so when he opened the door, thel. 
were shooting on him, not even letting him put the bodies outside. The other case 
that I have been told about personally, not from the news. They got this mother 
who was maybe 60 years old and she had 2 sons and they put her in the yard and 
the tortured her son in front of her; they killed him after and she was begging Y 
them to kill her because she couldn't take the suffering and they didn't kill her. I 
mean, it's so much, it's so much against humanity what they do and then Bush 
comes on the television and he is talking about the peace. What peace? Really, 
whatpeace? (getting very agitated) Just because we exist, they kill us. 
4. Discussion with Maha and Ahmed on 'unity', political representation and 
participation 
Liz: For Palestinians such as yourself, living outside this area, how does your 
voice get heard? 
Ahmed: I mean, okay, we are in the diaspora, before the Oslo Accord in 1994, 
the PLO was representing us, I mean they still are but they used to represent all 
the Palestinians, both inside and out and we who live outside would like these 
people to stay because this is the body that represents all the Palestinians inside 
and outside, all of thefactions. So it's very importantfor usfor the PLO to stay 
and because now after the Oslo Accord, it started to lose its role, the PLO and so 
I believe that it's very important to put back the whole of the PLO, how it used to 
be. Everything has to be approved by all Palestinians so those Palestinians who 
live in the diaspora have to be able to say their opinions, to have a say in what is 
going on. 
Liz: But how practically could this happen now? 
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Ahmed: We have a constitution with the PLO, the National Council, but it's been 
now, because of the current situation they cannot do - 
(His wife interrupts him and they talk in Arabic for a few minutes) 
Ahmed: The National Council, so we have institutions but the problem is that 
there is no free movement between people inside and outside, but we have 
institutions, we have all of these, where we can say there. 
Liz: Okay, but about people such as you living in the diaspora? 
Maha: Okay, those people they are free to express themselves in demonstrations, 
through the foundations that are outside, like the NG0s, for so many people, 
there are a lot of foundations in Europe working for the helping the families 
inside; this way -for us this is the only way. 
Liz: This is what I'm trying to get at - are you restricted living here, and you 
don't have so much say? 
Maha: Yes, yes 
Ahmed: The only wayfor us to say our opinion and be influential, isfor us to put 
an appeal with the NGOs and the institutions before Oslo was formed, you 
remember in 1988, the last Palestinian Council, where we recognised the right 
of the Israeli people to exist and that there should be two states; this was the last 
time the Palestinian Council could meet. After that people could not 
communicate, but this is the only way they can. 
Liz: So are you talking about the situation there, you're not talking about the 
PLO worldwide? 
Ahmed: Worldwide, they used to represent all of us. 
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Liz: What about the embassy here, is it PLO? 
Maha: Yes 
Ahmed: Yes 
Liz: It's unclear though, because I'm not sure if it's supposed to be 
Ahmed: Yes, itS unclear, exactly. 
Maha: Excuse me Elizabeth (she starts speaking to her husband in Arabic again) 
Maha: Ah, but I tell what, not in a complete picture. All the Palestinian 
embassies outside, even in Europe and wherever in the world, they can express 
whatever we want them to express to the world, definitely but because o certain ýf 
political reasons they won't go out of line in the country that they are in, but 
inside it's different, but I think in Greece, I think the are free to do whatever, y 
because the Greekpeople, the Greek government is very supportive. 
Ahmed: Until we have our own official civil institutions in a democrac it will Y, 
be different; now the embassy cannot play this role, we need to have institutions 
like the Palestinian Council where we can have our own representatives elected. 
Liz: Which can branch out to communities living outside too? 
Ahmed: Yes, yes, because this council, I mean Edward Said was a member, the 
owner of the Palestinian company I workfor also was a member, so all over the 
world there were members; now it has more than 500 members, I think who used 
to represent Palestinians all over the world, but I think it was a condition set by 
the Israelis and the Americans, to make all the Palestinian Authority start to 
dissolve, to dissolve the PLO. 
327 
Liz: Were they trying to weaken Palestinian unity? 
Ahmed: Yes, and like to reach to a point where the Right of Return ivas wail, ed, 
to try to cut the links between those outside and inside, so that to make sure that 
those people who were living outside stayed outside and would never dream of 
going back. They can go back to the 1967 areas but not the pre-1948 part: this 
was the plan from the Israelis and the Americans, I think. 
Liz: So, in light of all this, do you feel that Palestinians are united? 
(Pause) 
Liz: Starting from here in Greece, at the more local level 
Ahmed: Yes, yes. There are certain issues where no Palestinian can disagree 
with the other, especially those things like the Right of Return, the issue of 
settlements, the core issues ifyou like. I don't think those people who are trying 
tofind a compromise, what I think their role should be is to advance these ideas 
as a plaýform for peace, for a treaty between us and the Israelis, to try to, but 
again its for the Palestinians to decide, not anyone else, but I mean it's a 
democracy, so everyone can say what they think, like those people who made this 
Geneva Condition, they arejust speakingfor themselves; they don't represent all 
the Palestinians, so okay, I mean we don't mind as long as they are just 
representing themselves. 
Liz: But do they claim to speak for Palestinian people as a whole? 
Ahmed: I don't think so; the only things that I personally have objection to 
because the guy who signed, he used to be a Minister in the Palestinian 
Authority and that's where I think the mistakeform the Palestinian side, was 
made, because I mean when he is Palestinian official, this means that 
he i's 
backed by the Palestinian authority, so he's not independent but involved; 
he 
would talk in a different way if he was not part of them; 
he doesn't have a 
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forward role or stance, that's where I think the problem is, but it's a democrac 1'. 
Anyone can say, okay Ipropose this. Personally I don't mind if he did not come 
from the Palestinian authority; I would prefer if he didn't but it's a sensitive 
point. If it came from a university professor or anybody else okay why not, I 
would accept it. 
Liz: But let's say you strongly disagreed with the proposals being put forward - 
how would people let their opinion be heard and what channels could you 
follow? 
Ahmed: Now? 
Liz: Yes, at this moment in time. 
Ahmed: It's different for the Palestinians. Now, with the current situation, I 
don't think that our opinions would be heard - it's very difficultfor us. 
Maha: Like now, with this Geneva thing, let's say that we don't like it, how do we 
let our voice reach out, or be heard? 
Liz: If there was something you really disagreed with. 
Ahmed: Now, we cannot 
Liz: So this is why the current situation is also so difficult for you, and so 
complex. 
Maha: But we depend on the people inside. For me, I depend on them and 
I am 
with the old generation like myfather. I'M from the people who say that the onlv 
people who can decide are the people there. They are the ones who should 




Ahmed: But the population outside is more. 
Maha: Yes, I know but I mean that the way that they want it to be, the way that - 
the suffered more than the people outside. y 
Ahmed: But what about those Palestinians in the camps outside? 
Maha: A yes, I know, yes, but I mean how will their voice be heard those who 
are in the camps, how can their voice be heard, it cannot - 
Ahmed: Yes, but - 
Maha: They are depending on the people who are fighting inside, who are 
resisting, exactly, they know that those people will not let them down, because 
these people are activelyfightingfor those refugees to be able to come back. 
Ahmed: Like you know because we have those factions, the PLO, Hamas or 
Jihad also the Popular Front, the Democratic Front, Fatah. 
Liz: Yes, I find it a little confusing, all these different groups and their ideas! 
Maha: Yes, it is 
Ahmed: Yes but they all agree on the goals, but the way to reach the goals is 
different. Fatah, for example, the mainstream one, they believe that we can make 
peace with the Israelis. Hamas and Mad, on the other hand believe in an armed 
struggle, others believe in negotiations, of course on the turning point through 
the history of Palestine, at some point, they have to reach an agreement, a 
compromise. 
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5. Haleef's views on a future Palestinian state 
Arafat went in military uniform and his gun and a branch of an olive tree and he 
would say I have a branch of an olive tree but I also have my gun. I have tiot 
come to fight you and I don't want to fight. These are our rights. You as 
members of the UN know the resolution in 1967,1968 which said that the 
Israelis must leave from our land and they're not leaving. This is what I'm 
doing. Put pressure on them and recognise my right to have a country too and I 
won't have any problems. Of course, in order to get there, a lot of work was 
needed. Before we managed to get to the UN, it wasn't that easy, but you saw 
what Golda Meir said, that I don't exist. He said I don't know of any Palestinian 
people - they don't exist in 1966, when the Mayor of Nazareth went to talk to the 
Knesset. What did you say, they said to him when he asked them for money to 
create the centrefor culture and civilisation in Nazareth so that the culture and 
traditions of the Palestinians were notforgotten. What, he said -I am not aware 
of the existence of this group of people called the Palestinians. So, I have to 
prove that I exist and not just that I exist, but that I am entitled to my own 
country. This is not an easy thing, Elizabeth. This, to reach this point, it's a race, 
1. t's done through sacrifices, with people who have been killed, with women who 
have become widows, with children who have become orphans, people who were 
in Jailfor 20 years, with pressures but at the same time, you always know your 
goals and your limits. Ifyou say no, I want to achieve more, you know that your 
own capabilities don't allow this, don't make this possible. It's as if you're 
committing suicide. In other words, on the one handyou have to be objective and 
realistic, but on the other hand, at the same time, you have to know that this 
realism should become detached from your own principles and the starting 
points from where you began your struggle in order to succeed and to leave 
opportunities for future generations, for our children-I can't make my child 
commit or tie him down or somebody else's child from Nazareth, 
from Haifa, 
Jaffa, Tel Aviv to a solution now, that we've sorted it out and that you can 
forget 
that you had a house in Tel Aviv. I can't tell them this Elizabeth. 
I don't have the 
right. I have to make sure that future generations of children 
have the 
opportunity and have the right in thefuture when conditions may 
be different or 
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the situation will change to say to the Israelis, gentlemen you were strong then, 
you took our houses, you made us sign a paper that said that this is the 
Palestinian land that we are entitled to, to say no this i's not acceptable. Just like 
you and in the same ways, using violence and dominance, that you took it from 
me, I will take itfrom you. I don't have the right to sign on behaýf of the refugees 
who live today in the refugee camps of Lebanon inside a house theS 1'7e of this 
room, to people who have been waiting 50 years for this issue to be resolved. I 
can't say to them forget about it, forget about going back. We have to bepatient. 
I'm going to sign to create the sort of state they are suggesting now, to put mY 
mind at rest, so that this situation can end? No, because it's notfairfor them. 
The Jews are still asking for money from the Germans, to this day and the 
Germans will continue to payfor the slaughter that Hitler was responsiblefor. I 
want to say that the issue is not Hamas or Jihad believe me. If the people, 
everyday people are to be convinced that this suggestion of the road map I's 
really a solution, there will be no-one who can say no. You can be sure of that. 
And if Hamas were to say anything, they would lose support. People are 
interested in living better lives. People want to go and work in Israel; they want 
to re-build their factories that have been destroyed. I don't know if you saw 
yesterday the destruction the Israelis left behind. They left nothing standing. A 
factory that makes paper, plastic cups, plastic plates got destroyed. Now this, 
what does it have to do with the situation? When you go into an area and you 
destroy everything, what do you expect from the people who are affected? Do 
you expect them to say well done, thank you? You can't behave in such a way in 
this day and age and at the same time, ask for peace. You have to then really 
work hard at convincing these people that you seriously want peace after you do 
thongs like that. It's actions, not words, that count. Ifpeople are not convinced - 
the only judges, the ones who are able to say ok are the people. It may not 
happen that they say it as a whole, through a vote, but the message, what thev 
feel, shows. When my brother can't go 1500m to his fields to collect his peaches 
in order to makejam to distribute to his neighbours, what can you say, to 
him? 
And this is not an isolated case. It is not even 2 people. We're talking about 
many people here. And the Israelis say, and you hit us too, with 
bombs. Yes, but I 
would say to them: you are living, you have a state system, companies, 
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infrastructure, police, a whole system in place. You have everything. You have 
planes that drop missiles; you have tanks that shoot bullets whenever thev want. 
You have an army, which goes and demolishes whole houses. I can't say no to 
any of this. To what shall I say no? To what? With what? And I am alway's the 
one who's called the terrorist. So Sharon, who kills 15 people somewhere when 
he's just looking to kill one person and at the same time, 15 get killed, is not a 
terrorist? No European, since they live in Europe, when it is announced that the 
Israelis have killed Palestinians, even Tony Blair condemned it, 3 weeks ago I 
don't know ifyou remember, they killed all those Hamas members and he said it 
doesn't help the peace process. Is this all you have to say? With this rocket that 
the Israelis used, another 7 innocent people were killed. Did you say anything 
about terrorism then? You said I condemn this action, but did you say why you 
did? "en, the next day, Hamas responded to these killings and killed 16 people, 
all of them said, these terrorist organisations, which has to be - now myfriend 
why? What do you think I am? Do I have to listen and obey everything you tell 
me? Sharon, who kills - why don't you call him a terrorist? 
6. Sa'id's discussion on the acquisition of citizenship 
Liz: I suppose some of them [Palestinians in Athens] have got citizenship issues 
and they can't go back. 
Sa'id: Yes, they can )t go back, the Israeli government wants to prosecute them; 
it's really hard. They come here and let's say they make 1000 euros a month; 
I'm going to send 200 to myJamily. In Palestine, 200 euros is a lot of money, so 
they stay. Eventually, he's going to go back and get married. 
Liz: I have the impression that recently most Palestinians who come do so as 
students, not economic migrants. 
Sa'id: Yes, because how are economic migrants going to get here? 
The only 
way to get here is though Turkey, and come illegally and 
Palestinians don't do 
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this. In the whole of Greece, you'll onlyfind about 20 or 30 who have come in 
this way. 
Liz: So they can't apply for work pennits? 
Sa'id: No, it's not allowed. If a company here sends you a paper saying that 
- 1! 011 have a job with them, then you can get a work visa to come and work here but 
this doesn't happen because they don't take people from Palestine any more. 
The education there, it's not good any more and they study there and theyfind a 
job and send money to theirfamilles because they say if I go back, I won't get 
anything. If I stay here and work, I can send money to myfamily but eventually 
they're going to go back. 
Liz: So most go back? 
Sa'id: Yes. People who applied as political refugees in Germany or wherever, 
they do this so that they can go back. They come here, they see that they're not 
going to make it, they find a way, they go to Sweden, and they apply to be a 
political refugee there. 
Liz: And how does that help them go back? 
Sa'id: The Israeli government cannot stop them if they have a European 
passport. They get political asylum so that they can go back. 
Liz: So they can get the citizenship of the country. 
Sa'id: Yes, in Germany it's 5 years, that's why they go there, here it's 5 years I 
think. Spain, nobody goes there because it's 10 years. In Canada, it's 3 years 
but 
nobody can get to Canada, it's really difficult. SO, they go to these countries, 
thqýv say they're going to stay 3 years. If they have problems with the 
Israeli 
government, prosecution or anything, they know that when they 
leave that they 
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cannot go back to see their family with the Palestinian passport they have. So 
then they askfor asylum and as soon as they get the citizenship they go back. 
Liz: So the same thing happens here I suppose - the get Greek citizenship and go 
back. 
Sa'Id: If they have Greek citizenship, not many do. It takes 10 years and it's 
really hard. By the time you apply and get it, Palestine will be returned. 
7. Mahmud's personal strategies of resistance 
The department I workfor is with artificial kidneys, which is something that I'll 
have to see what the situation is like there; here, everyone is after their own best 
interest aren't they? Even though I would really love to go back and give 
something to my country. I came here on a scholarship, my country sent me here 
on a scholarship so I came as a result of my government, so sometimes I think 
that even if I stay here, I want to do something to help. I have already talked to 
the representative of the company that I workfor about opening a department 
there and seeing what we can dofrom here to help. Such departments are rarely 
found on Palestinian soil - such departments simply don't exist and they are 
forced to go to Israel and with dialysis you have to go every day for treatment 
and stay four hours and before you get the permit to be allowed to go you may 
have died, so that's why - we'll see what happens. I spoke personally to the 
head 
of the company and there is definitely the possibility that we might 
do something. 
It's just that I don't know exactly what we will be able to do and how exactly we 
will contribute but we will see. There are moments when you see the situation 
getting worse there, you leave your work and things and university and you sit 
and concentrate on that. Last year, with the problems 
in Bethlehem, when they 
went into the Church of the Nativity and with 
Arafat, I don't know if you know 





Mahmud: This stage, or demonstration that we set up, as students and some of 
us had nothing to do with politics or with the Union, like me, until last Year, I 
had nothing to do with the Union. Before, when they used to call me to come to 
meetings to talk about things and the situation, I used to avoid going - if I had 
anything else to do I would rather go there. It didn't mean that I didn't feel 
anything for my country, it's just that from the moment that these scandals 
happened, we left everything and we sat outside the Israeli embassyfor 24 hours 
in the cold and the most important thing is that we didn't stop thinking that we 
were going through nothing compared to what the people there were going 
through and then I have to say then you feel tortured and you fight with yourseýf 
look I am here and I'm okay, I have a job and I'm lucky and I'm having a good 
time with my friends and there are others who are there getting killed for our 
sakes, so that we can create a country. And you think, what am I sitting here and 
doing? It's at such moments when you want to quit everything and go back, so 
you have to remind yourseýf and calm down and that you have to stay here and 
get your degree and then I'll be able to help in another way. 
Liz: Yes, so do you feel that you're helping at all being here? 
Mahmud: I try, I try to do whatever I can to help but despite all that I am only 
doing I% of what I could be doing - you can always do and contribute more. 
For example, ifyou give an interview, or go on television, whatever, these things 
are good and right and we have to do them because you give the right 
information about Palestine to people but a person who is there like my fellow 
students there, picks up rocks, weapons, whatever he can and he goes and 
he 
fights. I when I go on television or when I go to a demonstration or whatever, 
nothing happens to me, and there again you become very affected and you start 
thinking about things and about what you're doing here. Youjeel that You 
don't 
belong here. So there is always this battle going on inside you. It's just that 
everyday life and stuff, you have to focus on that and get on with 
it. You see the 
situation there and I don't want to askfor moneyfrom mY parents so 
I have to 
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work so I have to make it on my own, so I have to make sure I have enough 
money to pay for all my bills and then you have to get all your permits, fillish 
university, all these things force you to get on with things and for seconds 
sometimes youforget the situation there. 
8. Ibrahim's views on advocacy 
Liz: Is there is a big difference between the rich and poor in Palestinian society 
would you say -I mean do the poor resent those who are wealthy? 
Ibrahim: Yes and of course those who do have money look out only for 
themselves. 
Liz: They don't care about others who are poorer? 
Ibrahim: They care but only to the extent that it doesn't harm their ownfinances. 
Liz: So do you living here feel as if you are helping the situation there at all? 
Ibrahim: Look, everyone has a role to play. He may contribute with money and 
get involved in that way, or to bring up his son to be Palestinian. This is 
something a person can do; each does whatever he can or wants to do. Okay, 
we, my wife and I, my wife, she gives her time to the Arabs, the migrants here 
generally, notjust the Palestinians. She goes and teaches Arabic at a school, at 
a primary school, the second class of primary school as a volunteer. So she's 
doing somethingfor Palestine at least. 
Liz: So do you think that there are many opportunities for people to do 
something if they want to? 
Ibrahim: Socially, yes of course. With money, you can send money to specific 
families who need help there. 
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Liz: What about festivals, things like that? 
Ibrahim: Yes, okay, but they don't do that much to help except educating people 
about the problem that exists. Politically, the political power in ani, countn, 
these days is out of reach of the ordinary person; they are not listened to orfeel 
empowered in all countries, Greece and England too. Look what happened with 
Tony Blair. He did what he wanted with Iraq. The politicians are isolatedfrom 
the people. There is no such thing as a democracy these days because when You 
vote someone into Parliament and you trust him to voice your concerns and 
problems and he voices his own concerns and looks after his own interests not 
yours, then you don't have a democracy, do you? So there is a big difference 
between those in power and everyday people. So those in power don't offer 
anything really to people; they just give them bits of information but those in 
powerjust do whatever they want. 
Liz: But there are marches, demonstrations, things like that. 
Ibrahim: Yes, but what good do they do? Do you see them doing any good? 
Liz: Perhaps people feel that they are doing something or they feel empowered in 
some way. 
Ibrahim: Okay, perhaps they may have some influence in thefuture. So a leader 
who comes into power will know perhaps that he will not have the support of 
certain groups ofpeople who have demonstrated their opinions. But there's not 
that many and they don't do that much because things are so controlled, you 
know what I mean. It's like the Karayiozi 
2_ it's all a show, we are puppets of the 
state. So I don't really believe that much in demonstrations although 
I have 
taken part in a few that have led to the Israeli embassy 
but it doesn't do 
anything. The struggle, for me is when you give 50 euros to a struggling 
fam ily 
in Palestine so that they can livefor 10 days and resistfor 
longer - this is true 
2 Karayiozi is a puppet character in a popular Greek satirical puppet theatre of the same name. 
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support. This actually helps people - because there is a lack offood, medicine. 
Just saying I'm on your side, that doesn't do anything. Okay hi's heart is in the 
right place. But what good is saying that I am with you when the other persons 
starving? 
Liz: Therefore, the financial role of Palestinians living abroad is very important? 
Ibrahim: Yes, it's very important. I mean those who are outside cannot do more 
than that. We cannot do more here. If we did we would have problems in all 
senses of the word. Here, where we live, we have to obey the law; we can't do 
whatever we want. 
Liz: But surely it's also important for Greeks, people in Europe generally to 
understand what's really going on there? 
Ibrahim: But it's not many people who take part or who get involved here in 
Greece politically. Here it's mainly KKE3who listen to us and are involved with 
the Palestinian cause but outside of this political sphere you will not find many 
people getting involved or advocating our cause. In order for people to support 
us politically or to get involved they have to be ftom that political sphere. 
Ordinary people on their own would not; they would not do anything. So there is 
just political support. The people who come on the marches are only those from 
KKE and Synasprismos 4, and other left wing parties so there is no mainstream 
support or involvement. This means that the others don't want to or not that they 
don't want to but it needs political will and someone on top of you organising 
things, telling you to go and you need to be part of a political organisation that 
tells you to take part and support or not. Other people are all talk; they don't do 
anything. 
3 KKE is the communist party of Greece. 
4 Synasprismos is a small left wing political party. 
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9. Haleef's memories of the role the GUPS played in abolishing tuition fees 
for Palestinian students 
Liz: How easy is it for Palestinians to get involved in political activities such as 
demonstrations or Unions? 
Haleef. Now to give you an image I've been here since 1973.1 came here and I 
didn't know Greek, I came to study. When we created the Union of Students, a 
law was passed in 19 76 that foreign students in Greece have to pay tuition fees. 
Then, Rallis was the Ministerfor Childhood. Yiorgos Rallis was prime Minister 
in 1981 when elections were held and Yiorgos Papandreou got elected. He was 
the last Prime Minister before PASOK got into power. Then he created his olvil 
party and so on and so on. He's an old man now; he's eighty something. He was 
in Nea Dimokratia 5 of course; he was conservative and so on. We, as a Union of 
Students - there was no Embassy then, no diplomatic representation, no 
in rmation office. There was absolutely nothing. We were students and we made Ifo 
a committee. It was me, a person who is now a dentist and a doctor at Aghio 
Savva (a hospital) and another student who has left Greece. There were four of 
us and we asked to meet the Prime Minister. We waited a month and then we 
went into his office ofMr Ralli in 1976, in March, after the carnival, I remember. 
And we went in and he said, my child, what is your name and what are you 
studying and we started chatting about Palestine. When we spoke Greek to him 
and we each told him what we were studying and we told him that we had 
problems and that we couldn't afford to pay the tuition fees. We explained that 
we didn't have universities in our country and that was why we were here trying 
to study and the money that we are sent is for us to live on, you have to 
appreciate that, we told him, its a very situation for us. And we explained to him 
that we would be Ambassadors of Greece wherever we went and back in our 
homeland and we asked him - he listened to us speak one 
by one and he told 11s: 
I, when I see Arabs, Palestinians speaking the Greek language, as you 
do, when 
they are studying and under the difficulties they are experiencing and the stress 
5 The main right-wing political party in Greece. 
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they have to go through and they the fact that they have learnt Greek - it Is nil, 
debt to help you. I am obligated to; I'm not doing you a favour. And I will not 
change things with a Prime Ministers decision. I will pass it, as a law In 
Parliament and this was Nea Dimokratia in 1976. It is the law in Greece since 
1976 that Palestinians don't have to payfees. We weren't officials; we werejust 
a Students' Union and the man was conservative. He wasn't PASOK. 
10. Abir's description of advocacy she is involved in 
Abir: I went to the big demonstration against the war in Iraq and to some 
smaller ones too. Once we went all the women, all dressed in black to the UN 
representative here near Syntagma, on Mothers Day. There were women from 
Greece, Egypt, Syria, Jordan, other places too and we were all campaigningfor 
human rights. Anyway, we submitted a letter to Kofi Annan and the European 
Parliament and we held u pictures andposters. 
Liz: When was this? 
Abir: Two years ago. At the beginning of the second Intifada in 2001, everyone 
was furious and everyone wanted to do something, to tell everyone, but some 
people prefer not to get involved. Some people still have connections with the 
WestBankandthe are scared in case it stops them from going, but I don't care y 
and I don't need to go there, so I'm much more free to do and say what I like, 
which I do. Two and a haýf years ago, we had a big bazaar. We hadfood; we 
collected money for hospitals in Jerusalem and recited Palestinian poetry. It 
was organised then. Now, efforts are more on an individual and informal basis. 
Two years ago, I was also involved in making a book on Palestinian issues and 
history and I arranged a coursefor Palestinian children who didn't know about 
the cause. There is a lot of ignorance about the issues even amongst 
Palestinians and especially children who go to international schools. They felt 
ashamed that they didn't know very much, so I decided to do this because I am 
an Arabic teacher and I have experience teaching children. I had to 
find 
references for this course and Ifound that a lot of books stop at 1948 or 
1967. 
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They are more historical than contemporary, so this was when I met with 
Ahmed. We found this old book that was very brief and that was written 30 
years ago and we updated it and continued with the history, because wejelt that 
a book was needed to show what has happened more recently too in a concise 
and clear way. This course - 18 children came to it. I was very pleased with it 
and so were they. We made a lot of discussions, I made them investi . gate things, 
find things out o their own and I think it was very effective. The thing is you 
can't depend on the Greek media to give you information. You won't get the 
whole story. They are obsessed with celebrities. 
Liz: Do you think enough is being done here to help the Palestinian cause? 
Abir: No more should be done. We should try to get in contact with the Greek 
women's organisations. I know the Athens Centre for Women. It is a feminist 
centre. They called me to give a lecture on the women in Palestine and 
Apartheid wall before Christmas, in December, which I was very happy to do. 
Liz: Do you feel helpless at all? 
Abir: No, I don't. I do things to help. I am active, but others do not do so much. 
They are not used to travelling great distances and they stick to the areas they 
know and the circles they have so it's difficult to get them to do things and go 
places. My children are grown up now, so I have more time to get involved and 
do things ... 
I have also taught a course, which was an Arabic language course, I 
didn't target these children, only the one who don't speak Arabic and who go to 
International schools here and who will go to the UK or America to study. 
The 
problem with the Parikia and with Palestinians 
here is that we don't have 
contacts wi . th Greeks. We need to increase them 
because it's a shame as there is 
a lot more we could do. I went to a school in 
Holargos (a suburb of Athens) 
once and I talked about being Palestinian, which was really good 
and it was 




www. al-awda. org: website of the Palestine Right to Return Coalition, a "broad 
based, non-partisan,, democratic and charitable organisation of grassroots 
activists and students", campaigning for the right of return of all Palestinian 
refugees to their "homes and lands of origin". 
www. badil. org: website of the Resource centre for Palestinian residency and 
refugees rights, which is registered with the Palestinian Authority. It was 
established to "support the development of a popular refugee lobby for the right 
of return through professional research and partnership-based community 
initiatives". It provides information, such as documents, statistics and 
publications, on Palestinian refugees and their right of return. 
www. 4data. cgZpalestine/palestine. html: small Canadian-based website describing 
and advocating Palestinian history and 'Identity' mainly through the use of 
images. 
www. hejleh. com/countries/Talestine. html: comprehensive website, providing 
links to the homepages of Palestinian families, companies, cultural resources, 
media, government, educational and non-goverrimental organisations as well as 
an outline of Palestinian history and geography. It advocates peace but not using 
"this peace process" which it argues is in favour of Israelis, not Palestinians. 
www. palestinecenLeL. qr&-: website of The Palestine Centre, an 
"educational 
program of The Jerusalem Fund. It is dedicated to analysis of the relationships 
between the United States and Middle East with particular emphasis on 
Palestinian and Arab-Israeli conflicts. The Palestine Center... provides a much- 
needed Palestinian/Arab perspective to the political, academic and 
media 
establishments in Washington, DC and throughout 
the United States". 
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www. palestine-net. com: comprehensive website advocating the Palestinian 
cause, which provides inforination on Palestinian history, geography, culture. 
economy, life and politics and includes links with other Palestinian websites and 
resources. 
www. palestineremembered. com: website dedicated to the remembering of the 
Nakba, emphasising, as it does in its mission statement that "core issues of the 
Palestinian-Israeli conflict are dispossession and ethnic cleansing ... of the 
Palestinian people for the past five decades. It forms a medium where Palestinian 
refugees can communicate, organise and share experiences" and it preserves 
memories and provides information on Palestinian areas that were "destroyed by 
the Israeli army" in order to "raise refugees' awareness of the right of return". 
www. passia. org: the website of the Palestinian Academic Society for the Study 
of International Affairs, an Arab, non-profit institution which "seeks to present 
the Palestinian Question in its national, Arab and international contexts through 
academic research, dialogue and publications". 
www. palestinercs. org- the website of the Palestinian Red Crescent Society 
(PRCS). The Palestinian National Council mandated the PRCS, which is a 
humanitarian society responsible for the provision of "a wide range of health, 
social and other humanitarian services for the Palestinian people throughout the 
Middle East". Its website provides statistics and information on Palestinian- 
related health and social issues in particular. 
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